JUDGMENT Shri Mehta, counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned trial Court erred in coming to conclusion that the present suit filed by the appellant was time barred though he recorded the finding in favour of the appellant that the house which was mortgaged in favour of the respondent/Bank by Kanahiyalal, happened to be an ancestral house in which the appellant and the respondent Kanahiyalal, his brother Surajmal and their mother Mulibai were having 1/4th share each. Shri Mehta further submitted while substantiating his arguments that the learned trial Court committed the error of coming to conclusion that period of limitation started running against the present appellant from the date when the preliminary decree was passed in Civil Suit No. 25-A/74 in which the decree was passed in favour of respondent No. 1 against Kanahiyalal. Shri Jain appearing for respondent No. 1 submitted that there is no error whatsoever committed by the trial Court on the point which has been argued by Shri Mehta. He submitted that when the preliminary decree was passed, the present appellant had the knowledge of passing of such decree because he had submitted an application for getting the certified copy of that. Shri Mehta submitted that after getting the certified copy of the preliminary decree passed in the abovesaid suit the present appellant had submitted an objection before the same Court making a prayer that his share in the ancestral property should not be subjected to the execution proceedings which may ensue in pursuance of the final decree. He further submitted that the said objection was over-ruled by the Court on 26.11.79 and final decree was passed on 19.2.1980. Shri Mehta further submitted that after passing of preliminary decree respondent Kanahaiyalal Judgment debtor) had the legal right to payoff the decreetal amount and to get exonerated from the pecuniary liability incurred on account of passing of that decree. I find force in the submission which has been advanced by Shri Mehta on this point for the reasons hereunder. Article 58 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as Limitation Act. for convenience) provides the period of limitation of 3 years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In the present matter the present suit has been filed on 16.9.1981. The preliminary decree was passed on 27.1.1977 and the final decree was passed on 19.2.80. for convenience) provides the period of limitation of 3 years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In the present matter the present suit has been filed on 16.9.1981. The preliminary decree was passed on 27.1.1977 and the final decree was passed on 19.2.80. It can not be doubted that the judgment debtor has the right to payoff the decreetal amount within a period of six months before the final decree is drawn. Therefore, the apprehension which could have been in the mind of the present appellant that the limitation would start from the date when final decree was drawn. Preliminary decree would not be put to execution. Therefore the date on which the final decree was drawn would be important factor and the starting point of the right to sue. Shri Mehta submitted that the present appellant raised an objection before the Court which passed the decree on 26.11.79. His objection was over-ruled by the same Court on 8.1.80. Therefore, needless to say that objection raised by the appellant in respect of involvement of his share in the ancestral property at the time of execution of the said decree by respondent No. 1 would start from 8.1.80. Besides that, the final decree was put to execution by respondent No. 1 after drawing of final decree i.e. on 19.2.80. The present suit has been filed on 16.9.81. Thus by any means the present suit has been filed within the period of limitation from the date when right to sue firstly accrued in favour of the appellant. Shri Mehta submitted that ancestral property could not have been put to auction for execution of the final decree because the mortgage of ancestral property was made by respondent Kanahiyalal in his personal capacity and for his personal use. Shri Jain submitted that surrounding circumstances indicate that the said loan was obtained by Kanahiyalal for family business and therefore, he was acting as Karta of Joint Hindu Family when he obtained the loan and executed the mortgage deed which is on record as Ex. D/1. When the document is by itself expressive of the intention of the parties executing it, there is no need of giving undue consideration to surrounding circumstances. Ex. D/1 unequivocally states that the said mortgage deed was executed by respondent Kanahiyalal for his own domestic needs and for his own business needs. D/1. When the document is by itself expressive of the intention of the parties executing it, there is no need of giving undue consideration to surrounding circumstances. Ex. D/1 unequivocally states that the said mortgage deed was executed by respondent Kanahiyalal for his own domestic needs and for his own business needs. It indicates that Kanahiyalal made a statement in the said mortgage deed that he was the sole owner of the property involved. Not only that, he clarified further by stating that he was responsible to solve the difficulty if any objection was raised regarding the said property by anyone. He also made a statement in the said mortgage deed that he had full power and capacity to dispose of said property as he was the only owner of the said property. He also clarified that it was free from all encumbrances. When that was the statement made by respondent Kanahiyalal. if at all, the respondent No. 1 suspected that the said property was a joint Hindu property and Kanahiyalal had obtained loan for the need of joint Hindu family and he was acting as Karta of the said family then it was for the officers of the respondent No. 1 to make an inquiry about the truthfulness of the statement of Kanahiyalal in the said mortgage deed. It has to thank itself for the non active-ness of its officers in this context. At the most respondent No. 1 was entitled to follow other legal remedies against Kanahiyalal in respect of said statement mentioned in Ex. D/1. For those statements and for such mortgage deed the share of other members of the joint Hindu family which owned the said house can not be made liable legally. Thus I uphold the submissions of Shri Mehta in this context by dismissing the submissions of respondent No. 1. Final decree may be drawn again by indicating the share of Kanahaiyalal which is liable to be sold. Thus the appeal is allowed with cost and suit of the plaintiff stands decreed. Counsel fee Rs. 1000/-.