M. B. VISHWANATH, J. ( 1 ) THIS second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff challenging the judgment and decree dated 6-9-1990 passed by the civil judge, mandya, in r. a. No. 99 of 1985 reversing the judgment and decree dated 9-8-1985 passed by the munsiff, nagamangala, in original suit No. 29 of 1982 decreeing the appellant-plaintiffs suit for permanent injunction restraining the respondent-defendant from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property. ( 2 ) THE suit property is a nine ankana house situated at paduvala patna village. The case of the appellant-plaintiff is that one master narasegowda bequeathed the suit property to the appellant-plaintiff under a deed of settlement dated 29-7-1949 and put the plaintiff in possession of the suit property. The plaintiff leased the suit property to one ramaiah and after the termination of tenancy in favour of this tenant ramaiah, the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit property. The respondents-defendants are trying to interfere with the plaintiffs peaceful possession. ( 3 ) ACCORDING to the written statement filed in 1982, the case of the respondents-defendants is that the suit house belonged to one bommamma and she was in possession as owner. This bommamma executed a gift deed on 20-4-1938 in favour of her only daughter kalamma and put kalamma in possession of the suit house. Said bommamma, mother of kalamma, died 36 years ago (this means somewhere in 1946 ). The respondents-defendants are the children of said kalamma. The respondents-defendants have been in possession and the appellant-plaintiff has no manner of right in the suit property. ( 4 ) AS has already been stated, the trial court granted permanent in junction prayed for by the appellant-plaintiff. The learned civil judge (first appellate judge) allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. ( 5 ) THE appellant-plaintiff has filed the present second appeal under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code as has already been stated. ( 6 ) AT the time of admission this court has framed the following substantial question of law: ( 7 ) ORDER 41, rule 31, Civil Procedure Code says that the judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state. ( 6 ) AT the time of admission this court has framed the following substantial question of law: ( 7 ) ORDER 41, rule 31, Civil Procedure Code says that the judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state. varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the judge or by the judges concurring therein. I find from the judgement of the first appellate court that it has fully and properly complied with the provisions of Order 41, rule 31, Civil Procedure Code. So the first portion of the substantial question of law, to my mind, does -not arise for consideration in this appeal. So far as the second portion of the substantial question of law framed by this court is concerned, it is argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff that the lower court has not considered the tax receipts exs. P-16 to p-27 produced by the appellant-plaintiff. It is also argued by the learned counsel for the appellant-plaintiff that some evidence has also not been touched by the first appellate court. The Supreme Court has Laid Down in Deity Pattabhiramaswamy v S. Hanymayya and others, that a judge of a High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact based upon appreciation of relevant evidence. . . . . . . . . however gross the error may seem to be. ( 8 ) THE learned first appellate judge has discussed in his judgment that the khatha stood in the name of bommamma to whom the respondents-defendants trace their title and that master narasegowda to whom the appellant-plaintiff traces the title has not produced any document to show that he was the owner. ( 9 ) THE case of the appellant-plaintiff is that in pursuance of settlement deed ex. P-l, also styled will, master narasegowda bequeathed the property in favour of the appellant-plaintiff on 29-7-1949 and put the plaintiff in possession of the suit house. ( 10 ) THE learned first appellate judge has discussed the evidence and referred to documents in paragraphs 34 to 42 of his judgment in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove lawful possession on the date of the suit. ( 10 ) THE learned first appellate judge has discussed the evidence and referred to documents in paragraphs 34 to 42 of his judgment in arriving at the conclusion that the appellant-plaintiff has failed to prove lawful possession on the date of the suit. ( 11 ) IT has been laid down by the Supreme Court in V. Ramachandra Ayyar and another v Ramalingam Chettiar and another, that the High Court will not be justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. ( 12 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the first appellate court, which is binding on this court on facts, does not suffer from any illegality or perversity. Accordingly this second appeal is dismissed. In the circumstances of the case no costs. --- *** --- .