D. B. DUTTA, J. ( 1 ) THE present revisional application under section 115 CPC in directed against the order of the trial Court allowing an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. ( 2 ) A suit was dismissed for default in appearance of the plaintiff on 30. 11. 94. The plaintiff filed an application under section 151 CPC praying for restoration of the suit on that very date. The said application was heard and the court rejected that application with the observation that in view of the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 CPC section 151 could not be invoked. The plaintiff thereafter filed the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC on 2. 2. 95 along with an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act praying for condonation of the delay in filing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 and by the impugned order the court allowed the said two applications. ( 3 ) MR. Priyabrata Mukherjee, the learned senior counsel appearing for the defendant challenged the impugned order on the following grounds. It was contended that the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC was filed after the expiry of the prescribed time limit and that the learned Judge committed a jurisdictional error in deciding and disposing of the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC together with the application that was filed under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC together with the application that was filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay. In this connexion Mr. Mukherjee wanted this court to draw an analogy from the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3a of CPC which makes it imperative for the appeal Court to decide the question of limitation first before it proceeds further with the appeal. It is submitted that the learned Judge should have disposed of the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act before he proceeded to dispose of the application under Order 9 Rule 9. It is further contended that in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the plaintiff respondent did not explain the delay that was occasioned for filing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 with effect form 30. 11. 94, the date on which the order of dismissal of the suit was passed. Limitation actually began to run from 30. 11. 11. 94, the date on which the order of dismissal of the suit was passed. Limitation actually began to run from 30. 11. 94, the date on which the order of dismissal of the suit was passed and not on from the date on which the subsequent application under section 151 CPC rejected. In the circumstances, it was contended that the learned Court below was not justified in allowing the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Moreover, it was contended that even on merits the learned Judge was not justified in allowing the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC because of the fact that the default on the part of one Subimal Dey who is said to be the advocate of the plaintiff in appearing before the court in time on 30. 11. 94 is alleged to be the ground of default in appearance on the part of the plaintiff respondent in the suit when the suit was called on for hearing and dismissed on 30. 11. 94 and there is nothing on record to show that the said Subimal Dey was the advocate appointed to act on behalf of the plaintiff respondent under Order 3 Rule 4 CPC. In the circumstances, it is contended by Mr. Mukherjee that the plaintiff respondent could not be allowed to bank upon the default on the part of the said Subimal Dey in appearing before the Court at the time when the suit was called on for hearing and dismissed. Finally, it was contended that the plaintiff respondent executed a Vakalatnama in favour of one Ramchandra Banerjee in connexion with the suit and as such, the question of non appearance of the said Subimal Dey at the appropriate time was not at all relevant particularly when the plaintiff respondent has nowhere assigned any reason as to why the said Ramchandra Banerjee was not present at the time of call. ( 4 ) MR. Ramchandra Banerjee, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the learned Court below did not commit any jurisdictional error in taking up and deciding the question of limitation along with the main application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. ( 4 ) MR. Ramchandra Banerjee, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the learned Court below did not commit any jurisdictional error in taking up and deciding the question of limitation along with the main application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. There in nothing in the Civil Procedure Code which makes it imperative upon the trial court to decide the question of limitation first before taking up the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC on merits. It is contended that the provisions of Order 41 Rule 3a are meant exclusively for appeals and cannot be pressed into service in case of an application under Order 9 Rule 9 of CPC. Moreover, it is contended that the impugned order clearly indicates that the court below did actually record its decision upon the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act before it proceeded to deal with the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. In fact, the court's decision on the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC was preceded by a decision whereby the delay in filing the application was condoned on being satisfied as to the sufficiency of the cause. Regarding the question of appointment of Subimal Dey by the plaintiff-respondent within the meaning of Order 3 Rule 4 CPC, it is contended by Mr. Banerjee that in the impugned order the learned Court below had after examination of the case record, recorded this finding that Subimal Dey signed several petitions filed on behalf of the plaintiff in connexion with the suit and even though the Vakalatnama was not readily available with the record, the court below upon consideration of the record and the sworn testimony of Sri Dey was inclined to accept the position that Sri Dey was in fact an authorised agent of the plaintiff. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that Sri Banerjee was actually appearing as the senior advocate on behalf of the respondent in the suit and that it was Subimal Dey who was authorised by the respondent to act on his behalf and if the Vakalatnama be really not available from the record, it would at best warrant a presumption that there was no Vakalatnama filed in this behalf. But then, want of a formal Vakalatnama in the name of Subimal Dey would at best amount to an irregularity which is curable by the filing of such Vakalatnama even at this stage and could not be fatal to the petitioner's case for sufficient cause for non-appearance of the plaintiff at the time when the suit was called on for hearing or for not filing the formal application under Order 9 Rule 9 within the prescribed period of 30 days from the date of dismissal of the suit. ( 5 ) THE point for my consideration would therefore be as to whether any interference with the impugned order would be legally justified in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction of this court under section 151 CPC. ( 6 ) UNDISPUTEDLY, the suit was heard in part and was fixed for further hearing on 30. 11. 94. There was no dispute that in terms of the trial Court's order, the plaintiff respondent was required to pay adjournment cost of Rs. 200 to the contesting defendant. The order No. 186 dated 30. 11. 94 passed in the suit, as per copy filed, would go to show that on 30. 11. 94 at 11 A. M. although no hazira was filed on behalf of the plaintiff, the plaintiff himself was personally present in the court. The court directed the plaintiff to get ready by 11. 15 A. M. The next Order No. 186 dated 30. 11. 94 is the order whereby the suit was dismissed for default. The said order will show that the suit was dismissed at 11. 20 A. M. when there was no appearance on behalf of the plaintiff on call. From the following order it will appear that the plaintiff respondent filed a peremptory cash receipt showing that the plaintiff deposited the adjournment cost of Rs. 200 in court. It further shows that on that very day at 11. 25 A. M. , the plaintiff filed a petition with a prayer for accepting the adjournment cost and the court simply directed the petition to be kept in record in view of the fact that the suit had already been dismissed for non-appearance of the plaintiff. Annexure 'b' to the revisional application is the copy of an application filed in the suit on behalf of the plaintiff under section 151 CPC. Annexure 'b' to the revisional application is the copy of an application filed in the suit on behalf of the plaintiff under section 151 CPC. The filing seal would at once go to show that the said application was filed on 30. 11. 94. It purports to have been filed by Mr. Subimal Dey describing himself as an advocate for the plaintiff. It also contains two endorsements dated 30. 11. 94 by Mr. Dey in the capacity of an advocate for the plaintiff. The contents of the petition supported by the affidavit affirmed by the plaintiff himself disclosed the circumstances under which the plaintiff himself could not remain present at the time when the suit was actually dismissed for default. In paragraph 4 of that petition it has been categorically asserted that the plaintiff's advocate could not attend the court in time due to disturbances of the train service and that the said fact was even mentioned by the senior advocate for the plaintiff before the Court with a request to pass over the matter on that ground at the first sitting of the court. No counter affidavit is forthcoming to controvert this part of the allegation made in the application under section 151 CPC. Order No. 181 dated 1. 12. 94 would show that the plaintiff on filing a petition prayed for moving the application under section 151 CPC and the court was pleased to fix 16. 12. 94 as the date for hearing of the said application. In the order No. 191 dated 21. 1. 95, whereby the Court rejected the application under section 151, the court did not record any specific finding to the effect that it disbelieved the plaintiff's case that its advocate could not attend the court in time due to disturbances in train service, even though the court made a comment regarding the non-affirmation of any supplementary affidavit by the learned advocate himself or his clerk in support of the case of the plaintiff. From the trend of this order dated 21. 1. 95, it is clear that the Court below was of the view that the application under section 151 was not maintainable in view of the fact that the contingency was fully covered by the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 CPC under which no formal application was by that time filed. From the trend of this order dated 21. 1. 95, it is clear that the Court below was of the view that the application under section 151 was not maintainable in view of the fact that the contingency was fully covered by the provisions of Order 9 Rule 9 CPC under which no formal application was by that time filed. The court also observed that the application that was filed under section 151 was not even sufficiently stamped. Now, it is not the section of the law that is quoted in the petition which should matter with a court. The application that though not styled as one under Order 9 Rule 9 was in substance an application for setting aside the order of dismissal of the suit that was passed on the very date on which that application was filed disclosing the grounds for non-appearance of the plaintiff. If the said grounds could be believed to be true, the plaintiff must be said to have made out a sufficient cause for his non-appearance at the time when the suit was called on for hearing and dismissed. The plaintiff himself and the said advocate Mr. Subimal Dey, due to whose late appearance in court there was non appearance on behalf of the plaintiff in court at the time of dismissal of the suit, have taken oath respectively as PWs. 1 and 2. The plaintiff has deposed to the effect that Sri Dey was his advocate on record who was conducting the suit and that Sri Dey came to court on that day at about 11. 20 A. M. when the suit was already dismissed. Sri Dey has also deposed that he was conducting the suit all along on behalf of the plaintiff. He also deposed that Mr. Ramchandra Banerjee and Mr. Ramjee Tiwari were engaged senior advocates by the plaintiff and that because of his non-appearance, the hazira could not be filed by the plaintiff. He also claimed that the application under section 151 CPC was filed by him for restoration of the suit. It was also he who filed the application under Order 9 Rule 9. In his cross examination it was elicited that he filed Vakalatnama for the plaintiff in the suit itself and he denied the suggestion to the effect that he was not engaged by the plaintiff to conduct the suit. It was also he who filed the application under Order 9 Rule 9. In his cross examination it was elicited that he filed Vakalatnama for the plaintiff in the suit itself and he denied the suggestion to the effect that he was not engaged by the plaintiff to conduct the suit. Now, under Rule 4 of Order 3 CPC a distinction is drawn between (i) a pleader appointed to act in a court, (ii) a pleader engaged for the purpose of pleading only and (ii) a pleader engaged to plead by a pleader duly appointed to act in court. As regards the pleader appointed to act in Court, it is provided by sub rule (1) that he cannot act for any person in any court unless he is appointed by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent. It is true that the Vakalatnama which is said to have been executed by the plaintiff in favour of Subimal Day is not available from the record, as observed by the lower court in the impugned order. But then, the materials on recored do contain instances to suggest that Mr. Dey did act on behalf of the plaintiff within the meaning of Order 3 Rule 4 CPC. Mere absence of the relevant Vakalatnama, in my view, must be held to be an irregularity which can be cured by production of a Vakalatnama in the name of the Mr. Dey even at this stage. It is true that from the copy of the vakalatnama filed on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit which has been annexed to this revisional application at the instance of the defendant petitioner, it would appear that Mr. Ramchandra Banerjee who pleaded before this Court in the present revision as the learned senior counsel on behalf of the plaintiff respondent received the Vakalatnama in connection with the suit from the plaintiff himself and not from Mr. Dey so as to warrant a conclusion that he was only a lawyer engaged to plead and not to act within the meaning of Order 3 Rule 4 CPC. It is true that why Mr. Ramchandra Banerjee did not act in connection with the suit at the time of dismissal of the suit for default on 30. 11. 94 has not been explained by the plaintiff respondent. I have already observed that Mr. It is true that why Mr. Ramchandra Banerjee did not act in connection with the suit at the time of dismissal of the suit for default on 30. 11. 94 has not been explained by the plaintiff respondent. I have already observed that Mr. Subimal Dey in his deposition categorically said that Ramchandra Banerjee was engaged as the senior advocate by the plaintiff. Even though Mr. Banerjee had the requisite authority to act on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit within the meaning of Order 3 Rule 4 CPC, the fact remains that it was Mr. Dey who was all along acting on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit within the meaning of Order 4 Rule 3 CPC. As such, inaction on the part of Mr. Ramchandra Banerjee in filing the hazira on behalf of the plaintiff in the suit or acting and pleading on behalf of the plaintiff at the appropriate time would not be fatal to the plaintiff's case of sufficient cause for non-appearance in the suit due to non-appearance of Mr. Dey. I find sufficient substance in the contention made on behalf of the plaintiff-respondent that Order 41 Rule 3a applies only to appeals and not to the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. I have already observed that the trial Court did first of all consider the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and condoned the delay before it proceeded to deal with and decide the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. There is nothing in the Civil Procedure Code so as to forbid any Court from taking up an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act together with the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC and deciding the question of limitation first before it goes on to decide the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC on merits. In my view, the lower court cannot be said to have committed any illegality or irregularity, acting in exercise of its jurisdiction, in deciding and disposing of both the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act and the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC together by a composite order. It is true that the application under order 9 Rule 9 CPC was formally presented before the Court on 2. 2. It is true that the application under order 9 Rule 9 CPC was formally presented before the Court on 2. 2. 95 in pursuance of the order of rejection of the application under section 151 CPC which was filed on the very date of dismissal. But then, it is the same ground that has been canvased in the application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC and the application under section 151 CPC as the ground of default in appearance on the part of the plaintiff respondent at the time when the suit was called on for hearing and in view of the materials on record, there in hardly any scope for holding that the learned Court below committed a jurisdictional error in accepting the sufficiency of the cause that was urged on behalf of the plaintiff respondent for his non appearance at the time when the suit was called on for hearing. Having regard to the facts and circumstances and the materials on record, I find that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality so as to call for any interference in excercise of this court's revisional jurisdiction. In the result, the revisional application fails and is hereby dismissed without, however, any order as to costs. Application dismissed