G. R. BHATTACHARJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. In this case charge-sheet however was submitted on 22-6-1998 against the present petitioner and another under Sections 120b / 121/121a/ 124a/ 307, IPC and Sections 10111 /13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 and the learned SDJM Ranaghat took cognizance thereon and committed the case to the Court of Sessions on 25-8-1998 for trial. The case is now pending for trial before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 2nd Court, Nadia. ( 2 ) IT is the case of the State that the petitioner who is a resident of Kashmir is involved in the unlawful activities of Kashmir militants and there are materials on record primafacie showing that he is actively associated with such unlawful activities. The learned Advocate for the petitioner, however, submits that in view of Section 196, Cr. P. C. no Court can take cognizance of the offences punishable under Sections 121/121a/ 124a, IPC except with the previous sanction of the Central Government or of the State Government and in this particular case no such sanction has been obtained and yet the learned SDJM, on the basis of the charge-sheet lied before him, took cognizance of the said offences which is megal and untenable in law. It is further submitted that in view of Section 17 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 also no Court can take cognizance of any offence punishable under the said Act except with previous sanction of the Central Government or any officer authorised by the Central Government in this behalf. It is submitted by him that since in this case no such sanction under Section 17 of the said Act has been obtained the cognizance taken by the learned SDJM on the charge-sheet in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 10, 11 and 13 of the said Act is bad in law and that being so the entire proceeding which is pending against the petitioner is illegal and void and therefore the petitioner should be released on bail. In support of his contention that any such proceeding is bad in law if prior sanction of the proper authority is not obtained, the learned Advocate for the petitioner relied upon the decisions in Abdul Mian v. The King Yusofalli Mulla v. The King Basdeo Agarwalla v. Emperor and Gokulchand v. The King. ' The proposition enunciated in these decisions is indeed well settled and there cannot be any doubt that where any prior sanction is necessary under the law the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence in the absence of such sanction, else the same will be illegal. ( 3 ) IN the present case if prior sanction in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 121/121a/124a, IPC and Sections 10/11/13 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 has not been obtained then the cognizance taken by the Court in respect of the offences under the said sections will be bad in law. It is, however, to be pointed out here that the present application of the petitioner is an application for bail only and it is not an application for quashing the cognizance or the pending proceeding/trial and there is, therefore, no scope of declaring or holding on the present application that the cognizance taken or the pending proceeding/trial is bad in law, not to speak of quashing the same. However, even if it is accepted that the cognizance in respect of the offences under the said statutory provisions is bad in law for want of prior sanction of the appropriate authority yet we will find that in this case the charge-sheet has been submitted under Section 307, IPC also for which no prior sanction is necessary. Therefore, even if cognizance in respect of all those sections stands vitiated for want of prior sanction, yet cognizance in respect of Section 307, IPC as mentioned in the charge-sheet will not be affected for that reason alone. Since the matter is now before the Court of Sessions for consideration of charge against the petitioner we leave it to the learned Court below to consider whether framing of a charge under Section 307, IPC is warranted by the materials on record and we refrain from embarking on any consideration of the aspect of the matter. Since the matter is now before the Court of Sessions for consideration of charge against the petitioner we leave it to the learned Court below to consider whether framing of a charge under Section 307, IPC is warranted by the materials on record and we refrain from embarking on any consideration of the aspect of the matter. ( 4 ) THE learned Advocate for the petitioner relies upon the Division Bench decision of this Court in Anwar v. State, where the accused/petitioner was directed to be released on bail in a case under Sections 21/29, NDPS Act on the ground that the charge-sheet which was filed in the case after investigation was not accompanied by statements of witnesses recorded under Section 161, Cr. P. C. thereby resulting into non-compliance of Section 173 (5), Cr. P. C. which kin turn amounted to non-submission of charge-sheet. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioner that since submission of charge-sheet without statements recorded under Section 161, Cr. P. C. amounted to non-submission of valid charge-sheet within the statutory period there was no option but to release the accused on bail under Section 167 (2) (a), Cr. P. C. With due respect, we are unable to agree with any such view. The word shall occurring in Section 173 (5), Cr. P. C. is not mandatory but only directory and it has been held by the Supreme Court in Narayan Rao v. State of A. P. (while dealing with corresponding provisions of the old Code) that an omission by a police officer to fully comply with the provisions of Section 173, should not be allowed to have such a far reaching effect as to render the proceedings including the trial before the Court of Sessions, wholly ineffective. Such irregularity is curable under Section 537, Cr. P. C. The decision of the Supreme Court in Niranjan v. State of U. P. also shows that every mistake or omission on the part of the Investigating Officer is not necessarily an illegality, which would vitiate the proceedings. It is now a firmly settled position of law that illegality of investigation does not vitiate the trial unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby (see, R. N. Rishbud v. State and State of U. P. v. Bhagwant Kishore, etc. ). It is now a firmly settled position of law that illegality of investigation does not vitiate the trial unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby (see, R. N. Rishbud v. State and State of U. P. v. Bhagwant Kishore, etc. ). A police report, by definition (Section 2/r), is a report forwarded by a police officer under Section 173 (2 ). Section 173 (2) enumerates the requirements of a police report. A report meeting the requirements of Sub-section (2) of Section 173 is a complete police report. The requirement of Subsection (5) of Section 173 is a totally different thing. The documents and statements referred to in Sub-section (5) of Section 173 are not the components of a police report. Such documents and statements in view of Sub section (5), are only required to be forwarded to the Magistrate alongwitht the police report, Therefore, it is difficult to comprehend how any omission on the part of the police officer to forward the documents and statements along witht the police report can convert the police report itself to a non-entity or divest it of its character and status as a police report. ( 5 ) A police report remains a police report even if the documents and statements referred to in Subsection (5) of Section 173 are not forwarded alongwith the report. And if it remains a police report, as it does, in spite of its not being accompanied by mind, alongwith the documents and statements, in that case there cannot be any question of enlarging the accused on statutory bail under Section 167 (2) (a), Cr. P. C. on the ground that chargesheet has not been submitted within the statutory period. The contrary view taken by the Division Bench in Anwar v. State (supra), is a decision per incurium inasmuch as it does not take into consideration not only the definition of police report in Section 2 (r) and its requirements delineated in Section 173 (2), but also the relevant decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above and the provisions of Section 537, Cr. P. C. as well as the implications and applications thereof. P. C. as well as the implications and applications thereof. The said Division Bench decision also did not take notice of the earlier Division bench decision of this Court in Suresh Mahata v. State of W. B. , where this Court repelled the contention that failure to forward the forensic report under Sub-section (5) of Section 173 alongwith the police report makes the charge-sheet non-existent, inoperative and invalid thereby entailing grant of statutory bail under Section 167 (2), Cr. P. C. ( 6 ) IT has also to be noted here that the Supreme Court in Durgesh Chandra Saha v. Bimal Chandra has held that the relief under Section 167 (5), Cr. P. C. that is, stopping of investigation and discharge of accused is available only so long the investigation is pending and not in a case where the investigation has been completed and the charge-sheet has been filed, because where investigation has been completed a different situation, not contemplated under Section 167 (5), Cr. P. C. emerges. Exactly for the same reason, where investigation is completed and the charge-sheet is filed, a different situation not contemplated under Section 167 (2) (a) emerges and thereafter there is no question of granting statutory bail we repeat, statutory bail to the accused under Section 167 (2) (a), which applies only during the pendency of the investigation and not beyond that, and this is so irrespective of the question whether there is any irregularity in the investigation or deficiency in the charge-sheet or lapses in the matter of immaculate compliance of Section 173 (5), Cr. P. C. In view of the discussions made above and in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court referred to above the irresistible conclusion is that the omission to forward the documents and statements under Section (173)5, Cr. P. C. alongwith the chargesheet is an irregularity curable under Section 537, Cr. P. C. in the absence of any prejudice to the accused. Such omission also does not render the charge-sheet non-existent nor open an avenue for granting statutory bail under Section 167 (2) (a), Cr. P. C. for that reason. The contrary view of this Court in Anwar v. State (supra), being a decision per incurium for reasons elaborately discussed above has no effect as a binding precedent. Such omission also does not render the charge-sheet non-existent nor open an avenue for granting statutory bail under Section 167 (2) (a), Cr. P. C. for that reason. The contrary view of this Court in Anwar v. State (supra), being a decision per incurium for reasons elaborately discussed above has no effect as a binding precedent. However, in our present case as we have seen, there is no question of the charge-sheet being nonexistent for want of necessary sanction because sanction or for that matter, prior sanction is necessary for taking of cognizance of certain offences and in the present case cognizance has been taken not only in respect of offences for which such prior sanction is necessary but also in respect of offence for which no prior sanction is at all necessary, such as Section 307, IPC. The prayer for bail is rejected. Petition dismissed.