Judgment : 1. Defendant in O.S. No. 809 of 1979, on the file of District Munsif’ s Court at Vellore is the appellant. 2. The suit filed by the plaintiff was one for declaration declaring that the memo dated 29. 1978 and subsequent memos are null and void. It is his case that he has been appointed as Nominal Muster Roll worker in the year 1957, and promoted as Construction Foreman Grade VI during 1961, and later promoted as Wireman on 13. 1963, and again promoted as Lineman Grade I on 6. 1970. It is his further case that as per Board decision of the appellant dated 8. 1969, workmen who have put in six years of service would be absorbed in regular cadre and fixed the date as 4. 1969. There was delay in implementation of the said proceedings and in consequence thereof, the plaintiff was not absorbed in the corresponding category, but his juniors were absorbed. The defendant published the list of seniority under a memo dated 28. 1978, ranking the plaintiff as No. 68, and his date of regular appointment was stated as 6. 1970 in Lineman Grade I. It is his case that the defendant ought to have integrated the plaintiff as Lineman Grade I, and fixed his date of regular appointment as 4. 1969. But that was not done by the Board. It is also said that further proceedings were also passed by the appellant by memo dated 19. 1978, whereby the anomaly of a junior getting more pay than the senior was rectified, and even after the rectification, the plaintiff was not given promotion, which he was legally entitled to. Further proceedings were also passed by the appellant on 29. 1978, whereby 37 persons were recommended for promotion, in which the name of the plaintiff was not found. The defendant has failed to promote the plaintiff even in the second promotion list, and therefore, he wants a declaration that the memo issued by the defendant is illegal and void. 3. The main contention of the defendant was that the civil Court has no jurisdiction in this case and it is a matter which the Industrial Tribunal alone can entertain. It is also stated that even on merits the plaintiff is not eligible for integration and he also cannot claim promotion as of right. 3. The main contention of the defendant was that the civil Court has no jurisdiction in this case and it is a matter which the Industrial Tribunal alone can entertain. It is also stated that even on merits the plaintiff is not eligible for integration and he also cannot claim promotion as of right. It is also contended that even admitting the plaintiff’s case, that 37 persons are his juniors, when they have already been promoted, they are necessary parties to the suit. They prayed for the dismissal of the suit. 4. Both the trial Court as well as the lower Appellate Court have held that the suit is not bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and the Civil Court has jurisdiction to decide the issue. It further came to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to declaration as prayed for. The suit was decreed as prayed for. 5. The concurrent judgment is sought to be revised on the following substantial question of law in this Second Appeal:- “In the light of the decision of the, Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. K.S.Wakdhe , 1975 (2) LLJ 445 holding that if the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or on obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get adjudication under the Act; and in the instant case, when the right to categorisation is claimed, is not the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts taken away, and the respondent could have agitated his rights only by approaching the Industrial Courts?” 6. According to me, the appellant is entitled to succeed both on the ground that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and also on the ground that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction. Even according to the plaintiff, the defendant has already issued appointment memo on 29. 1978 for 37 persons and it is come out in evidence that they have already been promoted. The plaintiff claims seniority over those persons, on the ground that he should have been regularised with effect from 4. 1969. If the claim of the plaintiff that he ought to have been regularised with effect form 4. 1969 is accepted, naturally, the seniority of 37 persons who have already been promoted will be affected, in the sense, the plaintiff will have to be taken above them. 1969. If the claim of the plaintiff that he ought to have been regularised with effect form 4. 1969 is accepted, naturally, the seniority of 37 persons who have already been promoted will be affected, in the sense, the plaintiff will have to be taken above them. After promoting the 37 persons, a subsequent list was also published by the appellant, in which also, the name of the plaintiff was not included. In a case, where the plaintiff claims seniority over a number of persons, mere declaration that he should have been regularised on a particular date or that the memo issued by the defendant is invalid will not be sufficient. Without a consequential relief, mere declaration is not going to be of any use. By granting the declaration sought for, what the plaintiff has now achieved is that he must be deemed to have been regularised as on 4. 1969, and his case for promotion must have been taken on that basis. Naturally, it affects the seniority and promotion of other persons who have already been promoted. 7. In a recent decision of our High Court reported in, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Vellore v. A.Krishnan , 1997 (1) CTC 116 , Justice D.Raju, has in paragraph 20 of the Judgment, held thus:- “20. That apart, yet another serious infirmity, which goes to the root of the matter and for which also, the suit is liable to be dismissed has been overlooked by the courts below. The appellant Board has taken an objection on the ground that the suit was bad for nonjoinder of necessary parties. In cases where seniority lists were challenged and the relief sought for involves, if granted to the claimant, prejudice to others whose interests and rights will be vitally affected the proceedings instituted without such parties before the court, would be bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The courts below, in my view, over-simplified the matter by observing that the plaintiff is seeking for a declaration of his rights. The courts below, in my view, over-simplified the matter by observing that the plaintiff is seeking for a declaration of his rights. As could be seen from the plaintiff’s averments, the specific case is that by virtue of the defective manner of implementation of the agreement entered into under Section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, juniors of the plaintiff have stolen a march over the plaintiff and derived undue benefits to the detriment of the plaintiff and that being the position, if the relief has to be granted and in this case actually has been granted by the court below, necessarily the other parties, who were said to be nearly 42 in number as per the claim of the defendant/appellant projected even before the trial Court, will be seriously and adversely affected. Such parties are therefore necessary and proper parties to the proceedings before the court. This is not a case where any validity of rule or a statutory provision is alone being challenged, in which case only an exception had been made that individual workers or employees or officers who may be affected need not necessarily be made parties, but in a case of the nature where no such claim was involved and the very claim is competing claim of seniority and rights, based on such claim of seniority, interse between various workers, the other workers, who, according to the plaintiff, have undeservedly stolen a march over the plaintiff in the matter of seniority and further promotions, ought to have been necessarily made parties to the suit and their absence renders the suit itself bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. On this ground also, the suit ought to have been dismissed.” I am in full agreement with the view taken by the learned Judge, and I hold that the present suit also is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. The suit ought to have been dismissed for that reason alone. 8. In this case, the appellant has taken the said ground even before the trial Court and the same was also reiterated before the lower Appellate Court. Both the courts have held that since the plaintiff has sought only the relief of declaration, persons who have already been promoted are not necessary parties. The plaintiff also did not make any attempt to implead the persons who have already been promoted. Both the courts have held that since the plaintiff has sought only the relief of declaration, persons who have already been promoted are not necessary parties. The plaintiff also did not make any attempt to implead the persons who have already been promoted. According to me, the view expressed by the Courts below is against the settled legal principle, and therefore, it has to be set aside. 9. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try such cases. The service conditions of Class-IV employees of the Board are provided in the Standing Order of the appellant/Board. According to the same, there cannot be a vested right of promotion. The only direction that could be given even in such cases is that the case of the petitioner should be considered for promotion. Again under the Industrial Disputes Act, conditions of service are matters which have to be taken before the Industrial Courts/Tribunal. It is an admitted case that the appellant is an Industry as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, and the plaintiff is a workman. The circumstances under which the workman is entitled to get promotion is a dispute which has to be resolved only under the Industrial Disputes Act. I need only take guidance from a recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in, Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and another v. Krishnakant and others , 1995 (2) CTC 208 : 1995 (5) SCC 75 , wherein their Lordships elaborately considered what is the meaning of industrial disputes and what is the effect of standing orders. In paragraph 20 of the Judgment, their Lordships considered the scope of industrial disputes, and in paragraph 35 of the judgment, their Lordships summarised the circumstances under which the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted and the circumstances under which the Civil Court can exercise its jurisdiction. It reads thus:- “35. We may now summarise the principles flowing from the above discussion. .(1) Where the dispute arises from general law of contract, i.e., where reliefs are claimed on the basis of the general law of contract, a suit filed in Civil Court cannot be said to be not maintainable, even though such a dispute may also constitute an “industrial dispute” within the meaning of Section 2 (k) or Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. .(2) Where, however, the dispute involves recognition, observance or enforcement of any of the rights or obligations created by the Industrial Disputes Act, the only remedy is to approach the forums created by the said Act. .(3) Similarly, where the dispute involves the recognition, observance or enforcement of right and obligations created by enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 - which can be called “sister enactments” to Industrial Disputes Act and which do not provide a forum for resolution of such disputes, the only remedy shall be to approach the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act provided they constitute industrial dis putes within the meaning of Section 2 (k) and Section 2-A of Industrial Disputes Act or where such enactment says that such dispute shall be either treated as an industrial dispute or says that it shall be adjudicated by any of the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act, Otherwise, recourse to civil court is open. .(4) It is not correct to say that the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act are not equally effective for the reason that access to the forum depends upon a reference being made by the appropriate Government. The power to make a reference conferred upon the Government is to be exercised to effectuate the object of the enactment and hence not unguided. The rule is to make a reference unless, of course, the dispute raised is a totally frivolous one ex facie. The power conferred is the power to refer and not the power to decide, though it may be that the Government is entitled to examine whether the dispute is ex facie frivolous, not meriting an adjudication. Consistent with the policy of law aforesaid, we commend to Parliament and the State Legislatures to make a provision enabling a workman to approach the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal directly - i.e., without the requirement of a reference by the Government — in case of industrial disputes covered by Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. This would go a long way in removing the misgivings with respect to the effectiveness of the remedies provided by the Industrial Disputes Act. .(5) The certified Standing Orders framed under and in accordance with the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, are statutorily imposed conditions of service and are binding both upon the employers and employees, though they do not amount to “statutory provisions”, Any violation of these Standing Orders entitles an employee to appropriate relief before the forums created by the Industrial Disputes Act or the civil court where recourse to civil court is open according to the principles indicated herein. .(6) The policy of law emerging from Industrial Disputes Act and its sister enactments is to provide an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to the workmen, a mechanism which is speedy, in- expensive, informal and unencumbered by the plethora of procedural laws and appeals upon appeals and revisions applicable to civil courts. Indeed, the powers of the courts and tribunals under the Industrial Disputes Act are far more extensive in the sense that they can grant such relief as they think appropriate in the circumstances for putting an end to an industrial dispute.” According to me the principles (2) and (7), fully apply to the facts of this case, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is completely ousted. The same view has been taken by the learned Judge of this Court in the decision reported in Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Vellore v. A. Krishnar , 1997 (1) CTC 116 . Learned counsel for the appellant also relied on the decisions reported in, Krishnan and another v. East India Distilleries and Sugar Factories Ltd., Nellikuppam and another , 1964 (1) LLJ 217, and The Premier Automobiles Ltd., v. Kamalakab Shantaram Wadke and others etc. , AIR 1975 SC 2238 . In fact the Premier Automobiles Ltd. case, 1975 (2) LLJ 445 : AIR 1975 SC 2238 was also considered in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation case, 1995 (II) CTC 208 : 1995 (5) SCC 75 . 10. In the result, the Judgments of both the Courts below are set aside for the reasons stated above. In fact the Premier Automobiles Ltd. case, 1975 (2) LLJ 445 : AIR 1975 SC 2238 was also considered in the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation case, 1995 (II) CTC 208 : 1995 (5) SCC 75 . 10. In the result, the Judgments of both the Courts below are set aside for the reasons stated above. Since I hold that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and also the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit, the question whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief on factual basis need not be considered. Therefore, the findings entered into by the Courts below (Civil Court) are without jurisdiction, and the same are set aside. The Second Appeal is allowed. No costs.