ORDER R.P. Gupta, J. 1. This Miscellaneous Appeal purports to have been filed under Section 32 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 against order dated 21-1-1994 passed by Ist Additional District Judge, Khandwa, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 14/92 which confirmed the eviction order of the appellant in favour of the respondent from the residential accommodation as was directed by the Rent Controlling Authority, Khandwa, vide order dated 29-5-1992 in case No. 2-A/90(7) of 1990-91, which was passed under Section 31 of the aforesaid Act. 2. The admitted facts are that the concerned residential accommodation was allotted to the tenant/appellant by authorised officer under Section 39(2) of the aforesaid Act. The property belongs to the respondent/landlord. The appellant/tenant was Maleria Officer. The allotment was made to him in the year 1983. He was continuing in possession thereafter as tenant and the relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence through intervening allotment by the authorised officer as under Section 39(2) of the Act. The appellant is still in continuous employment of the State Government. 3. The landlord applied to Rent Controlling Authority under Section 39(2) of the Act read with Section 42 of the Act for vacant possession of this accommodation vide application filed on 11-12-1990, with allegation that the tenant had acquired his own residential house from Housing Board, Khandwa, under the scheme on 4th February, 1985 i.e. House No. B-77 M.I.G., Khandwa. The tenant can use that house for his own residence and for his family. It was alleged that the landlord requires the rented accommodation for his own use and occupation and for that of his son and his family, he has no other accommodation fit for occupation of himself for his family and his sons family, that the tenant has let out his own house, acquired from Housing Board, Khandwa, on a rent of Rs. 900/- per month to a tenant namely Kalyanee at a higher rent. 4. The Rent Controlling Authority accepted these grounds in spite of objection that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on both grounds or order eviction on those grounds even though the tenant was in possession under allotment by authorised officer under Section 39(2) of the Act. Rent Controlling Authority accepted both the grounds of eviction. 5. 4. The Rent Controlling Authority accepted these grounds in spite of objection that it had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on both grounds or order eviction on those grounds even though the tenant was in possession under allotment by authorised officer under Section 39(2) of the Act. Rent Controlling Authority accepted both the grounds of eviction. 5. In appeal, the Additional District Judge, was of the opinion that the Rent Controlling Authority had jurisdiction to pass order of eviction of such a tenant if the matter fell within the scope of Section 42 of the Act. He found that this matter falls within the scope of the Act, although it did not fall under Section 39(2) (proviso) of the Act. The eviction order was therefore upheld. 6 The tenant objection in this second appeal is that the only remedy available to the landlord was for a civil suit as is referred to under Section 12(1) of the Act and this tenant being still in service, the provisions of Section 42 of the Act are not attracted. It will be proper therefore to note these relevant provisions : "12. Restrictions on eviction of tenants. - (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely..." "42. Termination of tenancy. - The tenancy of any person who has been allotted an accommodation by virtue of his office shall terminate on the date on which he ceases to hold such office on account of transfer, retirement or otherwise and the said person shall vacate such accommodation within seven days of such date : Provided that the Collector or the authorised officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, extend the period for vacating the accommodation by a further period not exceeding four months." 7. It may be noticed that the landlord was not seeking eviction under Special provision of Section 23-A of the Act as he is not covered within the definition of landlord for the purpose of that Section 23-A as required under Section 23-J of the Act, so he is an ordinary landlord and not a landlord with privilege as laid down under Section 23-A of the Act. 8. 8. Section 12 of this Act lays down restriction on filing of civil suits for eviction of tenants i.e. except on the ground detailed in that section. Bona fide need for residence is also one of the permissible grounds. Similarly, acquisition of an alternate residential accommodation by the tenant under Section 12. So that section contemplates filing of civil suit by a landlord against the tenant for his eviction on the permissible ground, on no other ground civil suit can be filed. 9. Reverting to Section 42 of the Act, it mandates that tenancy of a person created by the order of the authorised officer under Section 39(2) of the Act, shall terminate "on the date on which he ceases to hold such office on account of transfer, retirement or 'otherwise'." 'Transfer' in this clause indicates transfer from the particular Municipal area where the tenanted premises is situated. In such a case i.e. when he ceases to hold office for these reasons, his tenancy gets terminated. His further liability arises to vacate the accommodation. Further right to a landlord, inherent in this, is read with Section 39(2) proviso (i), for requesting the Collector that he needs the accommodation for his own use and occupation and it may not be allotted to anybody else but he be put in possession. 10. The word 'otherwise' in Section 42 describes a mode of ceasing to hold office. A person can cease to hold office by transfer, retirement or in some other manner. That other manner would be called 'otherwise'. It could be by death, termination, dismissal etc. In those situations, his tenancy gets terminated, the consequent liability on this party is to vacate within 7 days and the consequential right that the landlord gets, would be to apply under the first proviso to Section 39(2) of the Act. This situation has not arisen in the present case nor is alleged to have arisen. 11. The learned Additional District Judge, in appeal, appears to have been mislead by the idea that for Section 42 to apply the tenancy could get terminated 'otherwise than by ceasing to be an employee'. The word 'otherwise' in Section 42 does not qualify the word 'termination of tenancy' but, it provides the employment at a place can cease 'otherwise' than by retirement or transfer. The word 'otherwise' in Section 42 does not qualify the word 'termination of tenancy' but, it provides the employment at a place can cease 'otherwise' than by retirement or transfer. The Additional District Judge thought that by acquisition of an alternate accommodation by a tenant, his tenancy got terminated and so the landlord could apply to the authorised officer or Rent Controlling Authority, to seek eviction or to seek possession of the accommodation. There is clear error of interpretation on the part of the Additional District Judge, Khandwa. The Rent Controlling Authority had no jurisdiction to proceed in this case on the allegations in the petition. The remedy was to file a suit in civil Court on the grounds alleged. 12. The learned Additional District Judge had put some reliance on 1987 MPLJ 243 title Jaya Bai v. Authorised Officer. This case arose in entirely different circumstances. The question arose of interpretation of the word 'need of the landlord' in the context of his petition under Section 39(2) proviso, at a point when the authorised officer wanted to allot a premises to some other officer under Section 39(2) of the Act, after allotment of previous officer ceased under Section 42 of the Act. There is no such situation in our case. Here the landlord is seeking eviction while the allotment under Section 39(2) of the Act is continuing. 12A. For the reasons above discussed, this appeal succeeds. The order of the Rent Controlling Authority, directing eviction of the appellant from the accommodation in question as also order of the Additional District Judge confirming the same, are set aside. However, this will not affect the rights of the landlord in any manner to seek other available remedies for eviction of the tenant before the Court of law. I leave the parties to bear their own cost.