JUDGMENT : S.N. Phukan, C.J. - This is an application u/s 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short, "Code of Criminal Procedure"). 2. On the F.I.R. filed by the informant Chandra Sekhar Das, the father of the deceased, Laxmisagar P.S. Case No. 194/98 under Sees. 498-A/306/34, Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act was registered against the Petitioners and others. It has been alleged in the F.I.R. that Monalisa, the daughter of the informant, had married Rajesh Kanungo, who is the son of the Petitioners, in the year 1994. At that time, the Petitioners had demanded a Maruti car as dowry. As the demand was not fulfilled, Monalisa was being mentally tortured by her husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law. However, Rajesh purchased a Maruti car by taking loan from his employer, the National Aluminum Company. Thereafter, a demand was raised that the car loan should be repaid by the informant. As the informant was 'under financial troubles, he could not be able to meet the demand, for which Monalisa was tortured. 3. Earlier, Criminal Misc. Case No. 4721 of 1998 was filed which was disposed of as withdrawn by a learned single Judge of this Court with liberty to the Petitioners to file fresh petition. Normally, this petition should have been listed before the learned Judge who had disposed of the earlier application. This fact was not brought to my notice. Be that as it may, as the petition came up before me, I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and also perused the case diary. I propose to dispose of the petition. 4. Section 438 was introduced in the new Code of Criminal Procedure on the basis of recommendation of the Law Commission. The object of this section is to relieve a person from unnecessary apprehension or disgrace. The Law Commission observe that a provision be made for anticipatory bail on the following grounds, viz.: (i) Sometimes, influential persons try to implicate the arrivals in false cases for disgracing them or for other.... The object of this section is to relieve a person from unnecessary apprehension or disgrace. The Law Commission observe that a provision be made for anticipatory bail on the following grounds, viz.: (i) Sometimes, influential persons try to implicate the arrivals in false cases for disgracing them or for other.... (ii) In recent times, this tendency is, showing signs of steady increase because of the accentuation of political rivalry; and (iii) There seems no justification to require an accused person first to submit to custody, remain in prison for some days and then apply for bail, where he is not likely to abscond or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail. 5. In Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others Vs. State of Punjab the Supreme Court has clearly distinguished the difference between ordinary bail and anticipatory bail. It has also been held that Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be invoked on the basis of vague.and general allegation as if to arm oneself in perpetuity against a possible arrest. This power should be exercised sparingly. At the stage of hearing of an application for anticipatory bail, the evidentiary value of information cannot be probed and anticipatory bail should not be granted if the police can make out a case that there are incriminating materials regarding the involvement of the accused person. 6. I have taken note of some judgments of various High Courts and the Supreme Court. I am of the opinion that while granting anticipatory bail, the Court has to be cautious as it may interfere with the investigation. However, if the accusation against the accused persons is made with an ulterior motive, the object being to injure and humiliate them, anticipatory bail should be granted. Further, anticipatory bail should not be granted as a matter of course. If the Court is satisfied that grant of such bail would hamper the investigation, the prayer should be refused. Moreover, after filing of charge-sheet and issuance of non-boilable warrant of arrest, the question of granting anticipatory bail does not arise. 7. Learned Government Advocate has brought to my notice the order of the apex Court in. Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1987 SC 717. The order being short, I quote below the entire of it: The widespread belief that dowry deaths are even now treated with some casualness at all levels seems to be well grounded. 7. Learned Government Advocate has brought to my notice the order of the apex Court in. Samunder Singh v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1987 SC 717. The order being short, I quote below the entire of it: The widespread belief that dowry deaths are even now treated with some casualness at all levels seems to be well grounded. The High Court has granted anticipatory bail in such a matter. We are of the opinion that the High Court should not have exercised its jurisdiction to release the accused on anticipatory bail in disregard of the magnitude and seriousness of the matter. The matter regarding the unnatural death of the daughter-in-law at the house of her father-in-law was still under investigation and the appropriate course to adopt was to allow the concerned Magistrate to deal with the same on the basis of the material before the Court at the point of time of their arrest in case they were arrested. It was neither prudent nor proper for the High Court to have granted anticipatory bail which order was very likely to occasion prejudice by its very nature and timing. We therefore consider it essential to sound a serious note of caution for future. The High Court is under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction to grant anticipatory bail in such a matter of this nature. So far as the present matter is concerned, since it has become infractions, we do not propose to pass any order. Subject to these observations, the appeal is dismissed. 8. Coming to the case in hand, from the case diary produced before me, more particularly from the statement of the cousin brother and the parents of the deceased recorded u/s 161, Code of Criminal Procedure, I find that demand of dowry by the Petitioners cannot be ruled out. In view of the above, I have not considered in depth the other materials on record and I leave it to the Courts below. 9. Mr. G. Rath has urged that it is a pure case of suicide as is evident from the second post-mortem report and the contents of some letters between the deceased and her husband, and between her in-laws and parents. As stated above, I am not supposed to scan the evidence for the purpose of granting anticipatory bail. 9. Mr. G. Rath has urged that it is a pure case of suicide as is evident from the second post-mortem report and the contents of some letters between the deceased and her husband, and between her in-laws and parents. As stated above, I am not supposed to scan the evidence for the purpose of granting anticipatory bail. There is also nothing on record to show that the informant has tried to implicate the Petitioners in a false case for disgracing them or for the purpose of getting them detained in jail for some days. 10. My attention has been drawn to the observations made by the Supreme Court in K.L. Verma v. State and Anr. 1996(7) SCALE (SP) 20, which are quoted below: Anticipatory bail is granted in anticipation of arrest in non-boilable cases, but that does not mean that the Court, which is to try the offender, is sought to be bypassed. It was, therefore, pointed out that it was necessary that such anticipatory bail orders should be of a limited duration only and ordinarily on the expiry of that duration or extended duration, the Court granting anticipatory bail should leave it to the regular Court to deal with the matter on an appreciation of evidence placed before it after the investigation has made progress or the charge-sheet is submitted. By this, what the Court desired to convey was that an order of anticipatory bail does not ensure till the end of trial but it must be of limited duration as the regular Court cannot be bypassed. The limited duration must be determined having regard to the facts of the case and the need to give the accused sufficient time to move the regular Court for bail and to give the regular Court sufficient time to determine the bail application. In other words, till the bail applicant is disposed of one way or the other, the Court may allow the accused to remain on anticipatory bail. To put it differently, anticipatory bail may be granted for a duration which may extend to the date on which the bail application is disposed of or even a few days thereafter to enable the accused persons to move the higher Court, if they so desire. 11. For the foregoing reasons, I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioners till the end of the trial. 11. For the foregoing reasons, I am not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the Petitioners till the end of the trial. However, to enable them to approach the appropriate Court, I direct that the protection granted to them by order dated 27.11.1998 shall continue to operate for a period of two weeks from today. Since a time limit has been fixed, they may approach the appropriate Court as early as possible so that the Court would get sufficient time to hear the parties and pass orders in accordance with law within that period. In case bail is rejected, the Petitioners may move the higher Court, which shall dispose of their petition during the aforesaid time. It is made clear that while considering the bail petition of the Petitioners, the Court (s) below shall not be in any way influenced by the observations made by this Court or by the fact that this Court has granted interim protection. 12. The Criminal Misc. Case is disposed of accordingly.