Judgment :- K.A. Abdul Gafoor, J. Petitioner is working as Field Worker in the service of the 1st respondent. He entered service on 25.4.1961. He was served with Ext. P2 retirement notice. He attained the age of superannuation, 58 years, on 5.10.1997 according to the service records kept by the 1st respondent. He was informed by Ext. P2 whether he wants to retire from service on 5.10.1997 or wants to continue until the end of the said month. Option is available to the workman. It is at that time, the petitioner in Ext. R1(b) expressed his willingness to continue until 31.10.1997. That did not contain any reference to an application for correction of date of birth, as he contends in this Original Petition. Later he made Ext.P4 application also stating that his date of birth is 10.6.1944 and therefore, he can continue until 10.6.2002. Ext. P4 also did not refer to any application for such correction earlier made by the petitioner. The basis for the request made in Ext. P4 is Ext. P3, school certificate and also Ext. P3(a), identity card issued by the Electoral Officer. Petitioner submits that he had already applied for as contained in Ext. P1 as early as on 24.8.1995 and that has not been disposed of. Such application was well within the time provided for as per the procedure. Therefore, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking a direction for his continuance in service until 30.6.2002 when, according to him, he attains the age of 58 years. 2. It is contended by the respondents that Ext. P1 application has never been received in the office of the 1st respondent or any of its officers. The respondents submit that as Ext. R1 had been stated to be made on 24.8.1995, the petitioner would have mentioned it in Ext. P1(b) made pursuant to Ext. P2 retirement notice or in Ext. P4. Absence of reference to Ext. P1 in these two documents shows that Ext. P1 has not been filed really by the petitioner. It is also submitted by the respondent that if the date of birth, 10.6.1944, as claimed by the petitioner, is taken note of, it was impossible for him to have entered service on 25.4.1961, as he did admittedly not have the age of 18 years at least. P1 has not been filed really by the petitioner. It is also submitted by the respondent that if the date of birth, 10.6.1944, as claimed by the petitioner, is taken note of, it was impossible for him to have entered service on 25.4.1961, as he did admittedly not have the age of 18 years at least. The respondents relied on the decision reported in Union of India v. C. Ramaswamy (1997) 4 SCC 647) which reads as follows: "In matters relating to appointment to service, various factors are taken into consideration before making a selection or an appointment. One of the relevant circumstances is the age of the person who is sought to be appointed. It may not be possible to conclusively prove that an advantage had been gained by representing a date of birth which is different than that which is later sought to be incorporated. But it will not be unreasonable to presume that when a candidate, at the first instance, communicates a particular date of birth, there is obviously his intention that his age calculated on the basis of that date of birth should be taken into consideration by the appointing authority for adjudging his suitability for a responsible office. In fact, where maturity is a relevant factor to assess suitability, an older person is ordinarily considered to be more mature and, therefore, more suitable. In such a case, it cannot be said that advantage is not obtained by a person because of an earlier date of birth, if he subsequently claims to be younger in age, after taking that advantage. In such a situation it would be against public policy to permit such a change to enable longer benefit to the person concerned. This being so, it is difficult to accept the broad proposition that the principle of estoppel would not apply in such a case where the age of a person who is sought to be appointed may be a relevant consideration to assess his suitability". This Court also, in the decision reported in Joseph v. State of Kerala (1998 (2) KLT 217), took the same view, which reads as follows: "Once having secured entry into service, possibility in preference to other candidates, then the principle of estoppel would clearly be applicable and relief of change of date of birth can be legitimately denied". Thus, even if Ext. Thus, even if Ext. P1 is said to be received by the respondent, the petitioner cannot claim change of date of birth, as he had already obtained advantage of early entry in service. The correction of date of birth is not governed by any statutory rules in the service of the 1st respondent. In such circumstances, the petitioner is also estopped from seeking such a correction. He had, by 31.10.1997, more than 36 years of service to his credit, that is sufficient for a man life. Therefore, the Original Petition fails and the same is dismissed. 3. The petitioner shall be allowed last pay drawn by him during the period that he had been in service beyond 31.10.1997 on the strength of the stay order, treating it as re-employment. He shall be entitled to the retirement benefits calculated based on the emoluments that he received as on 31.10.1997.