Judgment Mookherjee, J. This is an application for drawing up of proceeding for contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In course of arguments, however, on behalf of the applicants, Clause (iii) of Section 2(c) only of the Contempt of Courts Act, was relied upon and a prima facie case was attempted to be established with reference to the same. 2. Admittedly, a number of litigations are pending between the contesting parties, namely, the applicants and alleged contemnors, and the materials on the basis or which the alleged contumacious acts are claimed to have been made out, are broadly, documents and affidavits, forming parts of records of such proceedings. The said materials are:- (i) Annexure 'J' to the contempt application, which is an affidavit by alleged contemnor No. 1. In Paragraph 20, sub-paragraph (a) of the said affidavit an averment has been made to the effect that the appellant No.1 had never appointed Sri A.K. Chowdhury, to be the Advocate-on-Record for it that on a search of the record of the Department of this Hon'ble Court, no Vokalatnama of the appellant No. 1, appointing Sri Chowdhury, had been traced. (ii) The second document, which is also a part of Annexure 'J' to the present contempt application and had been marked as Annexure 'A' to the said Annexure 'J', embodies a resolution dated 25.7.1997, to the effect that Mr. A.K. Chowdhury, Advocate, should be barred to represent Company or any of its Directors in any way before any official, authority or any Court of Law along with an authorization in favour of one Mr. Gouri Shankar Jain to inform Mr. Chowdhury about the said resolution. The said resolution appears at page 286 of the Paper Book and has been described as 'extract of minutes' of the Board Meeting. 3. On the basis of the aforesaid, Mr. Sen argued that the requisites of Section 2, Clause C(iii), had been fulfilled although no favourable order can be said to have resulted on the basis of the alleged contumacious acts of misrepresentation and false statement. According to Mr. Sen, the requirement of a favourable order, resulting from the misrepresentation or false statement, would arise only in the case of Section 2, Clause (c), sub-clause (ii). 4. Appearing for the alleged contemnors, Mr. According to Mr. Sen, the requirement of a favourable order, resulting from the misrepresentation or false statement, would arise only in the case of Section 2, Clause (c), sub-clause (ii). 4. Appearing for the alleged contemnors, Mr. Chatterjee made a three fold submission in the first place, he submitted that since the documents, on the basis of which the petitioners have attempted to build up their case of commission of contumacious act by the alleged contemnors, either by false statements or misrepresentation, are all pending consideration by appropriate Courts in connection with different proceedings secondly, he has submitted that from the standpoint of merit, the resolution can not be said to be suffering from any misrepresentation as it was clearly indicated that it was extract of a resolution implying thereby that the whole resolution passed on 25th of July, 1997, was not being reproduced; Regarding the absence of authority of Sri A.K. Chowdhury learned Advocate, it was a bona fide statement made on the basis of searching of records, carried out on behalf of the alleged contemnors, and, even amounts that the statement was ultimately found to be not correct that, at best, could be said to be a failure in the part of the alleged contemnors to decipher the information from the search of records, undertaken but could not be said to have amounted to an attempted deliberate distortion of facts ; thirdly, Mr. Chatterjee, contended that it is too early a stage to conclude that the allegations of misrepresentation and false statements have been proved as to constitute contempt, particularly because, the statements/acts concerned were sub-judice in different proceedings-even it is not the proper stage for making finding regarding the existence of requisites for an action under Section 2(c)(iii) of the Contempt of Courts Act. 5. Mr. Sen, relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, (1) 199 (1) SCC 421 and (2) 1995(3) SCC 757 and Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decision reported in (3) AIR 1994 SC 1252. 6. We have carefully considered the respective submissions. 5. Mr. Sen, relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court, namely, (1) 199 (1) SCC 421 and (2) 1995(3) SCC 757 and Mr. Chatterjee relied upon the decision reported in (3) AIR 1994 SC 1252. 6. We have carefully considered the respective submissions. It is well settled that the application for drawing up a proceeding for contempt in the instant case is intended to extend an Invitation to this Court to take action on its own motion under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act and the alleged contemnor has a right under subsection (5) of Section 17 to file an affidavit in support of his defence. On filing of such affidavit, the Court is empowered if necessary, to take further evidence. So far as the criminal contempt in terms of Section 2(ii)(c) is concerned, it is now settled by the decision of the Apex Court that one of the requisites for holding Constitution of such contempt is procurement of a favourable order on the basis of the false statements or misrepresentations made. Reference in this connection may be made to the case cited by Mr. Chatterjee namely, (4) Naraindas .v Government of Madhya Pradesh and Others reported in AIR 1974 SC 1252 . So far as a contempt in terms of Sec. 2(c)(iii) is concerned, since the documents or statements which are alleged to have constituted the substratum of contempt in the instant case, are pending scrutiny and consideration by different Courts in different judicial proceedings, pending before such Courts, it would be inappropriate to ask the alleged contemnors to file an affidavit in terms of Section 17 in support of their defence, the disclosure of which before the conclusion of the pending proceedings, wherein the relevant documents and statements have been produced or made and before the concerned Courts have opportunity to deal with the same and express their views. There is great possibility also of embarrassment being created for such Courts, if any view is taken by this Court with regard to the correctness, propriety or impropriety of such documents and statements. The user of the terms “the administration of Justice” in Clause 3 of Section 2(c)(iii) has a special significance as its basis requisite cannot be said to have been satisfied in the facts of the present case till the proceedings pending before other Courts have culminated with judicial pronouncements. The citations of Mr. The user of the terms “the administration of Justice” in Clause 3 of Section 2(c)(iii) has a special significance as its basis requisite cannot be said to have been satisfied in the facts of the present case till the proceedings pending before other Courts have culminated with judicial pronouncements. The citations of Mr. Sen, as quoted above, are clearly distinguishable on facts. The documents and statements cannot be said to have attracted the liability of being condemned unless opportunity is given for their being considered and dealt with along with the whole gamut of other materials. Courts must be circumspect to see that one’s anxiety for maintaining the flow of Justice free and unobstructed may not result in a boomerang. For the reasons aforesaid, we hold that the application for contempt is premature and we dismiss the same as such. Such dismissal, however, will not, in any way, affect the consequences emanating from pronouncements of concerned Courts. Sen, J.: I agree.