JUDGMENT 1. THE question as to whether the petitioner is entitled to interest on the amount directed to be paid by the defendant (Purchaser) So the plaintiff (Vendor) by way of consideration for execution of a deed of sale or not is the question involved in this application. 2. THE plaintiff-respondent filed a suit against the defendant-appellant claiming, inter alia, the following reliefs : (a) A decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises and delivery of khas possession of the suit premises and delivery of khas possession thereof to the plaintiff after exacting the defendants therefrom : (b) Alternatively, a decree for specific performance of the contract directing the defendant No. 1 to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 2. 34. 000/- to the plaintiff and get a deed of conveyance executed and registered by the plaintiff at her own costs: (c) A decree for damages tentatively @ Rs. 50.000/- for wrongful use and occupation from 19. 2. 88 till the filing of the suit and further damages till recovery of possession, by adjustment of the amount with advances, alternatively for damages for breach of contract for Rs. 50. 000/-". The admitted fact of the mayer as follows: the plaintiff-respondent entered into an agreement for sale of June, 1996 for purchase of the flat on the first floor of the eastern side of the premises No. 1/1z/1, Garihat Road, Calcutta-68 for a consideration of Rs. 3. 25.000/ -. The appellant initially paid a sum of Rs. 10.000/- and later on paid several amounts totalling Rs. 91.000/- for which a receipt was granted to him by the plaintiff. The said agreement for sale was on oral one. Admittedly there existed a dispute by and between the plaintiff and the defendant as to whether a garage was also the subject-matter of the aforesaid transaction or not. The respondent had put the appellant in possession of the aforementioned premises in par performance of the contract. As despite same the balance consideration amount was not paid by the appellant, the plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit. 3. IN he suit the plaintiff, inter alia, pleaded as follows: "in case, however the Court be pleaded to grant unto the defendants the relief of specific performance. provided they prove their readiness and willingness to buy the flat, there should he decree for specific performance of the contract directing the defendant. 3. IN he suit the plaintiff, inter alia, pleaded as follows: "in case, however the Court be pleaded to grant unto the defendants the relief of specific performance. provided they prove their readiness and willingness to buy the flat, there should he decree for specific performance of the contract directing the defendant. No. 1 to pay the balance consideration of Rs. 2. 34. 000/- Rupees two lacs thirty four thousand) only to the plaintiff and gel a deed of conveyance executed and registered by the plaintiff at the cost of the defendant No. 1. The defendant No. 1 was and is not ready and willing to perform her part of the contract and in fact she has not the means of money to purchase the flat. The defendants literally practised fraud upon the plaintiff to enter upon the suit fiat by misrepresentation. The defendants, therefore, are obliged to vacate the suit flat and the plaintiff is entitled to recover khas possession of the same. The defendants are liable to pay compensation for wrongful use and occupation of the suit flat from 19. 2. 1988. The claim in this regard is valued tentatively at Rs. 50. 000/- subject to the final determination by the Court. The defendants are also liable to pay damages of Rs. 50. 000/- for failure to act in terms of the agreement for sale. The plaintiff craves leave for the same in the alternative. " 4. THE learned trial Judge in its judgment dated 4. 8. 94 ordered : "that T. S, 208/88 be and the same is decreed in part on contest with cost as against both the defts. Plaintiff do get a decree for specific performance of the oral contract that took place between plaintiff and defendant No. 1 in June, 1998 with regard to the suit flat on defendants paying the balance consideration of Rs. 2,34,000/- together with interest thereon at the simple rate of 10% per annum with effect from April 1988 till end of July. 1994 within two months hereof or such further time, as may be extended by the Court in this regard. If defendant No. 1 pays the aforesaid amount within the time specified by the Court, plaintiff shall execute and register a proper sale deed in respect of the suit flat in favour of defendant No. 1 within two months thereof. 1994 within two months hereof or such further time, as may be extended by the Court in this regard. If defendant No. 1 pays the aforesaid amount within the time specified by the Court, plaintiff shall execute and register a proper sale deed in respect of the suit flat in favour of defendant No. 1 within two months thereof. Failing this, defendant No. 1 will be at liberty to get the sale deed executed through Court. If, however, defendant No, 1 fails to make the aforesaid payment within the time specified by the Court, the plaint shall get a decree for eviction of the defendants from the suit flat in the alternative and shall also get damages against the defendants for wrongful use and occupation of the suit flat By the defendants at the rate of Rs. 1000/- per month with effect from their occupation of the suit flat, viz. from June, 1986 till this day and subject to payment of additional Court-fees, if any future damage can be awarded in a separate proceeding. In that case the plaintiff shall also return Rs. 91. 000/- taken by him from defendant No. 1 together with interest thereon at the simple: rate of 10% per annum with effect from April, 1987 till this day. " Mr. S. P. Roy chowdhury, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has raised a short question in support of this appeal. The learned Counsel submitted that keeping in view the statements made by the plaintiff in paragraph 12 of the plaint read with the prayer made therein, the learned trial Court mot have granted interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the balance consideration of Rs. 2,34. 000/- which would now come to Rs. 1. 48. 200/- instead in place of the damages claimed by the plaintiff at Rs. 50,000/ -. The learned Counsel further submitted that even no equitale relief court granted in favour of the plaintiff-respondent inasmuch as out of a sum of Rs. 3,25. 000/- the appellant admittedly had paid a sum of Rs. 91. 000/ -. 5. MR. Bagchi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that possession of the premises in question having been handed over to the plaintiff-appellant as far back as on 17. 12. 96. 3,25. 000/- the appellant admittedly had paid a sum of Rs. 91. 000/ -. 5. MR. Bagchi, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, on the other hand, submitted that possession of the premises in question having been handed over to the plaintiff-appellant as far back as on 17. 12. 96. the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief by way of interest and in support of his aforementioned contention reliance has been placed on Firm Sriniwas Ram Kumar vs. Mahabir Prasad, reported in AIR 1951 SC 177 . 6. THE only question which therefore, arises in this application is whether the learned trial Judge erred in granting interest on the balance consideration amount of Rs. 2. 34. 000/- ? The Court has a power to grant interest in a suit in absence of arty contract or a provision of statute under Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 7. THE learned trial Judge has granted a decree for specific performance of Contract. The said decree is not being challenged either by the appellant or respondent. The parties, therefore accepted the fact that the appellant was at all material times and still is ready and trilling to perform his part of contract. The Court by necessary implication must have found that it is equitable to grant a decree for specific performance of contract. The sum of Rs. 2. 34. 000/- was, therefore, directed to be paid as the balance consideration amount in order to enable the respondent to execute a register deed of sale in favour of, the appellant. The aforementioned amount was, therefore, not granted by way of a money decree. If the aforementioned amount was not granted by way of money decree, evidently Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure will have no application. The learned Counsel for the respondent did not dispute this proposition of law. 8. THE question which, therefore, now arises for consideration is whether the Court could award the aforementioned amount by way of equity. There is nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff had at any time demanded any interest. It is also not a case where there exists a special equity in favour of the plaintiff. It is now well known that the parties are normally bound by the pleadings. There is nothing on the record to show that the plaintiff had at any time demanded any interest. It is also not a case where there exists a special equity in favour of the plaintiff. It is now well known that the parties are normally bound by the pleadings. Neither any statements had been made in the plaint claiming interest nor any prayer to that effect has been made. The plaintiff respondent's positive case appears to be that in the event a decree for specific performance is granted. he should be granted damages to the extent of Rs. 50. 000/ -. Such prayer for damages can be made in a suit for specific performance of contract in terms of Section 21 of the Specific relief Act. 9. SUB-SECTION (5) of Section 21 clearly states that no compensation shall be awarded under the said provision unless the plaintiff has claimed the same in his plaint. The proviso appended to the aforementioned provision mandates the Court to allow an application for amendment of the plaint in the event the plaintiff has not claimed any such compensation in the plaint at the first instance. The Specific Relief Act, 1963 is a special statute. In a suit for specific performance of contract, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the said Act. 10. THE Specific Relief Act contains an adjective law. The ratio that law of Specific Relief, is in its essence, a part of law of procedure for specific relief is a form of judicial redress, is no longer res integra in view of the decision of this Court in Moulvi Alli Hossain Mian vs. Rajkumar Header reported in AIR 1943 Cal 41 at 426 it has also held to be adjective law in Radheshyam Kanial vs. Sham Kiran Bala Das, reported in AIR 1971 cal 341 . However, the said decisions have been distinguished by a division bench of the Patna High Court in Giridhar Das Anandji us. Ziaram Madhabji patel reported In 1971 PLJR 66 wherein while considering the scope of section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 vis-a-vis Section 15 of the old Act, it was inter alia, held that the said Act deals with the rights of the parties also. Ziaram Madhabji patel reported In 1971 PLJR 66 wherein while considering the scope of section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 vis-a-vis Section 15 of the old Act, it was inter alia, held that the said Act deals with the rights of the parties also. It is, therefore, clear that in the matter of granting a decree of specific Performance of Contract, the: Court is bound by both the adjective and substantive provisions contained in Specific Relief Act. 1963 and to that extent the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shall have also no application. 11. SECTION 21 contains both substantive as well as procedural rights. The said provision is a complete Code in itself and overrides any provision contained in any other Act for the time being in force. 12. SECTION 21 of the said Act. therefore, having specifically provided for claim of damages and such damages having been claimed by the plaintiff-respondent, the learned trial Judge had no other option but to confine the plaintiffs claim to the relief prayed for therein and could not have passed an order inconsistent therewith or contrary thereto. In Firm Sriniwas Ramkumar vs. Mahabir Prasad. reported in AIR 1951 sc. 177 upon which reliance was placed by Mr. Bagchi, the Apex Court was considering a case where the defence raised by the defendant was that the money advanced to him by the plaintiff was by way of a loan and not for the purpose of executing any deed of sale. The Supreme Court relying upon Mohan manuch us. Manzoor Ahmad, reported in AIR 1843 pc 29 held that a money decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff in view of the admission of the defendant and in that context it was held that the plaintiff is entitled to some interest. In that case, therefore, a money decree was passed. Such is not the position here. 13. IT is interesting to note that in Tejram vs, Patirambhau. reported in JT 1997 (4) SC 677: ( AIR 1997 SC 2702 ) the Apex Court almost in similar situation declined to grant interest on such awarded sum. Further more the said sum becomes payable only at the time of execution of the sale deed or immediately prior thereto. 14. IT is interesting to note that in Tejram vs, Patirambhau. reported in JT 1997 (4) SC 677: ( AIR 1997 SC 2702 ) the Apex Court almost in similar situation declined to grant interest on such awarded sum. Further more the said sum becomes payable only at the time of execution of the sale deed or immediately prior thereto. 14. IT is further well known that Generalia Specialiabus Non Derogant' is a well known proposition which means that a special provision shall prevail over a general provision. This aspect of the matter has been considered by a Full Bench of the Patna High Court in Md. Yonus vs. B. V. Phenaki, reported in 1987 PLJR 65 and also in a decision, reported in (1978)37 FLR 280: ( AIR 1979 SC 65 ) and Rama Ravalu Gavade vs. Sataba Gavadue Gavade, reported in 1997 (1) SCC 261 . In the instant case, the plaintiff was aware of his rights under the specific Relief Act and claimed his eights thereunder. Having done so, he cannot rely upon any other statute. 15. SECTION 55 (4) of the Transfer of Property Act applies in a case where there is no contract to the contrary. It is accepted by the parties that in the instant case, the appellant was put in possession of the property in part performance of the contract for which he was not liable to pay any rent or profit. The question of grant of mesne profit would have arisen, had a decree for recovery of possession was passed. In fairness to Shri bagchi, the decisions relied on by him may be considered. 16. IN Keshanlal vs. Chandrababu Devi, reported in AIR 1990 AP 72 , the buyer was occupying the premises as a tenant at a monthly rent of Rs. 1000/ -. There is nothing to show that in that case damages in terms of Section 21 of the Specific Relief Act was claimed. In Union of India vs. Watkins Mayor, reported in AIR 1966 SC 275 the Apex Court was dealing with a case of bailment and in such situation held that under the Interest Act, the Court may allow interest to the plaintiff if the amount claimed is certain which is payable at a certain time by virtue of a written instrument, This case is also distinguishable on fact. In Bengal Nagpur railway Company vs. Rattanji Ramji. In Bengal Nagpur railway Company vs. Rattanji Ramji. reported in LRLXV IA 66: (AIR 1938 pc 67) the Court was concerned with a claim for work done. In Maline and New Brunswick Electrical Power\ Ltd. vs. Alice M. Hori reported in air 1929 PC 185, it has been held that interest cannot be allowed on equitable principle. It is now well known that a decision is an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It to also well known that even a slight distinction in fart or an additional fact may make a lot of difference in decision matting process. See Quinn vs. Lealhain (1900-1903) AER (Rep) 1, Krishna Kumar us. Union of India. 1990 (4) SCC 307- (AIR 1900 SC 1782), Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Sun Engineering co. Ltd. reported in AIR 1993 SC 43 : (1993 Tax LR 58), Regional Manager vs. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 , and Municipal corporation of Delhi vs. Gurnam Kaur. reported in 1988 (1) SCC 101 : ( AIR 1989 SC 38 ). 17. IT is also a settled law that an decision is not an authority on a point which was not argued. See Mittal Engineering Works (P) Ltd. vs. Collector of Central Excise, reported in 1997 (1) SCC 203 . 18. IN this view of the matter we are of the considered opinion that the plaintiff was entitled to the damages to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- and not interest at the rate of 10% per annum on the sum of Rs. 2,34,000/ -. For the reasons aforementioned this appeal is allowed in part viz. the decree of interest is set aside and in its place and stead the plaintiff shall be entitled to damages of Rs. 50,000/- plus interest at the rate of Rs. 6% per annum pendente lite and future. The cross objection filed by the respondent has not been pressed and is dismissed accordingly, but in the facts and circumstances of this case there will be no order as to costs. Appeal allowed in part.