JUDGMENT : P.C. Naik, J. - The challenge in this appeal by the Defendant-wife is to the order dt. 21-7-1994 whereby the Judge, Family Court, Cuttack has dissolved the marriage of Respondent No. 1 (Plaintiff) with her by a decree of diverce by mutual consent subject to the husband paying her a sum of Rs. 30,000/-towards lump sum alimony and maintenance. 2. Admittedly, the marriage of the Appellant with Respondent No. 1 was solemnised at the Baptist Mission Church on 27-8-1991 according to the Christian rights and custom. The Appellant and Respondent No. 1 stayed together for a short time, where after they were separated. The record indicates that earlier the wife has filed a petition u/s 125, Cr. P.C. (Cr. Misc. Case No. 321 of 1985) which was allowed by the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Cuttack and the husband was ordered to pay maintenance of Rs. 200/- per month to her. Being dissatisfied with the quantum, the wife preferred Crl. Revision No. 212 of 1988 wherein this Court vide order dt. 24-10-1989 enhanced the maintenance from Rs. 200/- to Rs. 240/- per month. As the maintenance was not paid as directed, an execution was lodged whereupon a part of the maintenance due was paid. Execution proceeding was pending for subsequent period of maintenance. It is also on record that O.S. No. 141 of 1991 was filed u/s 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 by the husband before the Subordinate Judge, Balasore for a decree or divorce, We need not go into the details of the said suit as the same was withdrawn, 3. On 26-4-1991. C.P. No. 208 of 1991 which gave rise to this appeal was filed by the husband before the family Court, Cuttack for a decree of divorce in his favour u/s 14 of the Indian Divorce Act on the ground of desertion. It was specifically pleaded therein that as wife had intentionally withdrawn from the matrimonial house, it amounted to cruel as he was forced to lead an unholy life on account of desertion by the wife for no fault of the husband, who was left with no option, but to pay for pray for dissolution of marriage. 4. The wife entered appearance and filed her written statement refuting the allegations made by the husband that she had deserted him. 4. The wife entered appearance and filed her written statement refuting the allegations made by the husband that she had deserted him. It is her specific case that she was forced to leave the matrimonial home because of the cruel behaviour of her husband who was dissatisfied with her as she could not bring sufficient dowry and also because he was forced to marry her on the insistense of his father though he was in love with another lady. 5. Curiously, neither any issue was framed nor was any statement of the party recorded by the Judge, Family Court. Order No. 44 dt. 9-3-1994 recorded by the Judge, Family Court indicates that the petition filed by the husband along with the connected misc. cases was posted to 21-7-1994 for final disposal. Order No. 45 that was recorded on 21-7-1994 reads thus: Ptr. and Respondent are present. Ptr, prays for 15 days time. Heard. The parties in the proceeding along with other misc. cases i.e. Cr. P. 1020/91. Cr. P. 234/93, Cr. P. 205/94 and Cr. P. 223/91 order is passed as follows: Sd/-. Judge, F.C. And thereafter, order No. 46 of even date i. e. the impugned order was recorded wherein the marriage was dissolved. The opreative part of the order reads thus: x x x the husband is directed to deposit Rs. 30,000/-in favour of the lady towards lump sum alimony and maintenance as a condition for effecting divorce in between themselves by mutual consent. The husband is given time to pay the amount of Rs, 30,000/- by way of bank draft in the name of the lady by 16-1-1995. Put up this proceeding along with Cr. P. 1020/91. Cr. P. 234/93 and Cr. P. 205/94 on 16-1-1995 for further orders. Sd/ Judge, Family Court, Cuttack. 6. The impugned order is assailed by the wife, inter alia, on the ground that the petition filed by the husband being wholly misconceived ought to have been rejected. It is contended that the Family Court has wrongly recorded the finding that the wife consented to the dissolution of the marriage by a decree of divorce by mutual consent. On the other hand, according to the learned Counsel for the husband, the judgment in question, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is proper and calls for no interference. 7. On the other hand, according to the learned Counsel for the husband, the judgment in question, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is proper and calls for no interference. 7. Before proceeding further we may observe that the manner in which the case proceeded before the Family Court was not proper. The parties being Christians would be governed by the provisions contained in the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, which fact was last sight of and the proceedings were dealt with as if the same were under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1956. This we say because an application u/s 24 of the Hind Marriage Act, which is admittedly not applicable to the parties was entertained and posted for hearing. The marriage in question was dissolved by a decree of divorce by mutual consent under which not a Christian marriage but a Hindu marriage can be dissolved u/s 13(8) of the Act. 8. An application for dissolution of Christian marriage under the Indian Divorce Act, 1869, can be filed by the husband of the wife on the ground mentioned in Section 10 of the Act. A mere perusal of the said revision whould show that the dissolution of Chritian marriage on an application of the husband is confined to the ground of adultery only. Section 14 of the Act under which the application was filed by the husband does not contain a ground for divorce but relates to the powers of the Court to pronounce a decree of dissolution of marriage on being satisfied with the evidence before it that the case of the Petitioner has been proved in the manner provided therein. A reference can also be made to Sections 17 & 20 of the Act, which lay down that every decree of dissolution of marriage by a decree of divorce or nullity of marriage made by a District Judge shall be subject to confirmation by the High Court. So, a decree passed by a District Court dissolving the Christian marriage u/s 10 of the Divorce Act does not take effect unless it is confirmed by the High Court in terms of Section 17 of the Act for which purpose a reference has to be made by a District Judge to the High Court. So, a decree passed by a District Court dissolving the Christian marriage u/s 10 of the Divorce Act does not take effect unless it is confirmed by the High Court in terms of Section 17 of the Act for which purpose a reference has to be made by a District Judge to the High Court. The impugned order obviously, therefore, even assuming that the jurisdiction was properly exercised by the Family Court, which in fact was not, did not have the effect of dissolution of marriage in the instant case. 9. Passing of a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion is wholly illegal being contrary to law. The relief which a deserted spouse can claim under the Indian Divorce Act is the relief of judicial separation u/s 22 of the said Act, which lays down that no decree shall after the passing of the Act be made for a divorce a mensa et toro, but a husband or the wife may obtain a decree of judicial separation on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without reasonable excuse of 2 years or unwards and such decree shall have the effect of a divorce a mensa et toro under the existing law and such other legal effect as provided in the Act. Thus Section 22 does not provide for a dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce on the ground of desertion, but only provides for a decree of judicial separation on any of the grounds contained therein. Such a decree, however, does nst have the effect of dissolving the marriage, but merely results in separation of the couple in bed and board as the term "a mensa et toro" signifies. In this view of the matter, assuming that the grounds of being deserted by the wife had been made out by the husband, decree of divorce could not have been passed in favour of the husband. 10. It has been observed in the earlier part of the judgment that this appeal under section19 of the Family Courts Act, is by the wife, who calls in question the dissolution of marriage by mutual consent. The question is whether the appeal is maintainable. To consider this it would be worth while to make a reference to the provision contained in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act. The question is whether the appeal is maintainable. To consider this it would be worth while to make a reference to the provision contained in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act. The said Provisions reads thus: Section 19 of the Family Court Act: Appeal-(l) Save as provided in Sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908) or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or in any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgement or order, not being an interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the High Court both on facts and on law. (2) No appeal shall lie from a decree or order passed by the Family Court with the consent of the parties (or from an order passed under Chapter IX at the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974): Provided that nothing in this Sub-section shall apply to any appeal pending before a High Court or any order passed under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) before the commencement of the Family Courts (Amendment) Act, 1991, and (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of the judgment or order of a Family Court. (4) The High Court may, of its own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the record of any proceeding in which the Family Court situate within its jurisdiction passed an order under Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of the Order, not being an interlocutory order, and as to the regularity of such proceeding.) (5) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment order or decree of at Family Court. (6) An appeal referred under Sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges. (6) An appeal referred under Sub-section (1) shall be heard by a Bench consisting of two or more Judges. Section 55 of the Indian Divorce Act: Enforcement of and appeal from, orders and decrees: All decrees and orders made by the Court in any suit or proceeding under this Act shall be enforced and may be appealed from, in the like manner as the decrees and order of the Court made in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction are enforced and may be appealed from, under the laws, rules and orders for the time being in force: Provided that there shall be no appeal from a decree of District Judge for dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage: nor from the order of the High Court confirming or refusing to confirm such decree: No appeal as to costs-Provided also that there shall be no appeal on the subject of costs only. 11. Section 55 of the Divorce Act bars an appeal from the decree of a District Judge for dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage nor from the order of the High Court confirming or refusing to confirm such decree. This is so because the decree of a District Judge for dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage is not effective till it is confirmed by the High Court. In other words, finality is attached to the decree only on being confirmed for incase the High Court refused to confirm, the marital ties are not dissolved. So, it can be said that the proceeding for confirmation of the decree is in a manner of continuation of the Original suit filed before a District Judge. In this view of the matter obviously, the provisions of appeal contained in Section 19 of the Family Court Act under which an appeal lies to the High Court from every judgment or order of the Family Court will not be attracted. 12. By placing emphasis on the words "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law on appeal shall lie from every judgment and order of a Family Court to the High Court on facts and law", the argument is that the appeal is competent. We do not agree. 12. By placing emphasis on the words "notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or any other law on appeal shall lie from every judgment and order of a Family Court to the High Court on facts and law", the argument is that the appeal is competent. We do not agree. It is no doubt true that the appeal revision looks very wide but while interpreting this provision the relevant revision contained the Divorce Act cannot be completely lost sight of. Section 55 of the Divorce Act, a reference to which has been made earlier, clearly indicates that a decree passed by a District Judge for dissolution of a marriage or of nullity of a marriage, is not appeal able for the simple reason that both require confirmation by the High Court and unless confirmed do not have the effect of dissolving the marriage. In other words the order of the District Judge for dissolution of marriage or nullity of marriage may be confirmed or may not be confirmed by the High Court. But finality thereto is attached only on confirmation by the High Court u/s 17 of the Act. As the order of a District Judge is not final inasmuch as it does not have the effect of dissolving the marriage the question of an appeal being filed against it does not arise. This is so because an appear can only lie against a judgment or order finally adjudicating some rights of the parties thereto. If the contention of the learned Counsel that an appearl u/s 19 of the Family Courts Act lies against the order of a District Judge, is accepted, it will have the effect of setting at naught the provisions contained in Sections 17 and 20 of the Indian Divorce Act. It will also have the effect of treating the order of the Family Court as final though the relevant statute requires that there can be no dissolution of marriage or nullity of marriage without confirmation by the High Court under the said Act. 13. It is no doubt true that Section 19 of the Family Courts Act which relates to appeal and revisions provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment and order of the Family Court to the High Court. 13. It is no doubt true that Section 19 of the Family Courts Act which relates to appeal and revisions provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the CPC or the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law, an appeal shall lie from every judgment and order of the Family Court to the High Court. But this provision provides for an appeal cannot have the effect of overriding the provisions contained in Sections 17 & 20 of the Indian Divorce Act by treating the order of the District Judge dissolving the marriage by divorce or declaring it to be nullity to be final when the Indian Divorce Act does not attach any finality thereto unless confirmed by the High Court. 14. It may also be stated and as clear from the preamble,the Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for establishment of a Family Court with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and matters connected therewith. Section 7 of the Act consists of two parts. The first relates to civil jurisdiction and the other to criminal jurisdiction, which is limited to the provision contained in Chapter IX of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A provision has also been made in the said section for conferment of other jurisdiction on the Family Court by any other enactment. The Family Courts Act therefore, basically is an Act which provides a new forum namely a Family Court which has to exercise all the jurisdiction that was exercised by any District Court or any Subordinate Civil Court under any law in respect of suits and proceedings which are refused to in the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 7 thereof. Though the Act provides that a Family Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to any suits or proceedings between the parties to a marriage for a decree for nullity of marriage or a restitution of conjugal rights or dissolution of marriage the law under which the marriage is to be dissolved or under which judicial separation or nullity is to be granted will be the law applicable to the parties to the proceedings. If the parties are Hindus they will be governed by Hindu Marriage Act and if they are Christians like the case at hand they would be governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. If the parties are Hindus they will be governed by Hindu Marriage Act and if they are Christians like the case at hand they would be governed by the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Also that is provided by the Family Courts Act, is a new forum namely the Family Court in place of the District Judges or Civil Courts which prior to the enactment of the Family Courts Act were empowered to try the suits relating to matrimonial matters. So, though in view of the provisions contained in the Family Court Act, the case at hand was triable by the Judge, Family Court, Cuttack, he was obliged to try the case and decided it in accordance with the provisions contained in the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. Relief if any, could only be granted in accordance with the provisions contained in that Act and not de hors the Act. As observed by the Apex Court in Reynold Rajamani and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Another when a legislative provision specifies the grounds on which divorce may be granted they constitute the only conditions on which the Court has jurisdiction to grant divorce. If grounds need to be added to those already specifically set forth in the legislation, that is the business of the legislature and not of the Courts. Therefore, before dissolving the marriage on the application of the husband what was required to be seen was whether or not a ground u/s 10 of the Indian Divorce Act had been made out. This, the learned Judge failed to do and on the contrary proceeded to dissolve the marriage on a ground which is foreign to the Indian Divorce Act, and thereby completely misdirected himself and the proceedings. 15. We have, in the earlier part of our judgment referred to the provisions contained in Section 55 of the Divorce Act, Proviso whereof bars an appeal from a decree of the District Judge for dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage. As regards other orders or decrees that may be passed other than an order of costs, the said section itself provides that the same shall be enforced and may be appealed from in the manner as the decrees and orders of the Courts made in the exercise of its original Civil jurisdiction are enforced or appealed from under the laws, rules and orders in force. Thus, an appeal is not precluded, say from a decree, of a District Judge dismissing the petition for dissolution of marriage or of nullity of marriage. In other words other orders/decrees passed by the District Judge falling outside the purview of the proviso will be appealable. In this view of the matter all such decrees or orders not covered by the proviso, being appealable u/s 55 of the Divorce Act will be appealable u/s 19 of the Family Courts Act. Thus, the provisions contained in Section 55 of the Divorce Act and those contained in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act will have to be reconciled and construed harmoniously keeping in mind the provisions contained in the Indian Divorce Act. So, Section 19 of the Family Courts Act will have to be read and interpreted by keeping in mind the objects specific provisions contained in Sections 10,17,18, 20 and 55 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869. In this view of the matter it follows that the appeal provisions contained in Section 19 of the Family Courts Act cannot be of any assistance to the Appellant and so it follows that the present appeal is incompetent. Hence, though the decree of the Judge, Family Court is contrary to law, as this appeal for reasons indicated is not maintainable, no orders can be passed in this appeal except to direct the Judge, Family court, Cuttack to make a reference to this Court u/s 17 of the Indian Divorce Act in which proceeding the palpable error committed by that Court in passing the decree, it did, can be corrected. 16. With the direction aforesaid, the appeal is disposed of. P.K. Mohanty, J. 17. I agree. 18. Appeal disposed of.