JUDGMENT - VISHNU SAHAI, J.:---The question which we are called upon to decide in this application is whether respondent No. 1- R.S. Pande, is guilty of an offence punishable under section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 2.The circumstances in which we are seized of the matter, in brief, are as under :--- 2(a) 2-9-1993 was the date fixed in the Court of Mr. S.A. Dwivedi, Judge IInd Labour Court, Thane, in Reference (IDA) No. 137/1982, which arose from the dismissal of a workman S.C. Daga, an employee of J.K. Chemicals Ltd. after a ex-parte enquiry. In the said Reference, respondent No. 1 was appearing for S.C. Daga as representative of the Union and Mr. George Kurian, as Advocate, on behalf of J.K. Chemicals Ltd. During the course of hearing that day, a question which cropped up was whether the affidavit of company's witness S. V. Nayak be treated as examination-in-chief or the examination-in-chief of S.V. Nayak be recorded in Court. Whereas the stand of Advocate George Kurian was that the affidavit be treated as examination-in-chief, that of respondent No. 1 was that S.V. Nayak's examination-in-chief be recorded in Court. On this issue, a heated discussion took place between Advocate George Kurian and the respondent No. 1. During the course of the same, respondent No. 1 caught hold of the collar of shirt of Advocate George Kurian. Thereafter a scuffle took place between them. The Judge Mr. S.A. Dwivedi asked both the sides to observe restraint but, his request went unheeded by them. Consequently, he retired to his chambers. 2(b). The same day, Mr. George Kurian and Mr. S.V. Nayak made written complaints to the Court mentioning the facts contained in paragraph 2(a) and praying that the respondent No. 1 be debarred from appearing in courts and police protection be provided to them. 2(c). The same day i.e. 2-9-1993, the learned Judge made a written complaint to the President, Industrial Court, Maharashtra, Bombay enumerating therein the facts mentioned above and praying that directions be given to him to take suitable action. 2(d). The next day i.e. 3-9-1993, the learned Judge recorded statement of four persons namely Kumari Neeta Jadhav, Mr. Jayaram Pawar, Mrs. I.V. Nair and Mr. K.S. Benson, who happened to be present in the Court when the unsavoury incident, referred to above, took place. 2(d). The next day i.e. 3-9-1993, the learned Judge recorded statement of four persons namely Kumari Neeta Jadhav, Mr. Jayaram Pawar, Mrs. I.V. Nair and Mr. K.S. Benson, who happened to be present in the Court when the unsavoury incident, referred to above, took place. The first three were working as Sheristedar, Naik and Stenographer, respectively in the Court and last mentioned was an Advocate. 2(e). On 7-9-1993, the learned Judge made a second report to the President, Industrial Court, Bombay wherein he mentioned : (i) the unsavoury incident which took place on 2-9-1993; (ii) that he had recorded the statements of the four persons named above; and (iii) that he was enclosing the complaints filed by Advocate George Kurian and Mr. S.V. Nayak, and the statements of the said persons. He prayed therein that suitable action be taken in the matter. 2(f) On 14-9-1993, the learned Judge, IInd Labour Court, issued show cause notice to the respondent No. 1 indicating therein that he should show cause as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, be not initiated against him and also mentioning therein that he may file his written statement on or before 18-9-1993. 2(g) On 18-9-1993, the respondent No. 1 submitted his reply, which reads thus :- "With reference to your letter dated 14-9-1993, I have to submit as follows:- The alleged incident is out of provocation and unintentional. I had no intention to harm anybody and also no intention to undermine the dignity of Honourable Court. I express regrets for the same under the circumstances. I request you to drop the proceeding. Thanking you, Yours faithfully, S/d (R.S. Pande)" 2(h). On 5-10-1993, the President, Industrial Court, Bombay sent a written communication to the Registrar of this Court, mentioning therein in short, the facts mentioned in paragraphs 2(a) to 2(g) and praying therein that the matter be placed before the Hon'ble Chief Justice and The Judges of this Court for taking action under the Contempt of Courts Act, against respondent No. 1. 2(i). The written communication of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay was put up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice (M.K. Mukherjee, J. as then he was) on 12-10-1993, who was pleased to direct that it be registered as a criminal contempt petition. Consequently, office registered it as Criminal Application No. 2863 of 1993. 2(j). 2(i). The written communication of the President, Industrial Court, Bombay was put up before the Hon'ble Chief Justice (M.K. Mukherjee, J. as then he was) on 12-10-1993, who was pleased to direct that it be registered as a criminal contempt petition. Consequently, office registered it as Criminal Application No. 2863 of 1993. 2(j). On 7-3-1994, Criminal Application No. 2863 of 1993, came up for admission before a Bench of this Court, of which one of us (Vishnu Sahai, J.) was a member and the same day, the said Bench passed the following order :-- "Rule returnable within two weeks." 2(k). After service of rule on the respondents the said application became ready for final hearing and was put up on the final hearing Board. 3.Since the applicant is the Judge of the IInd Labour Court, in whose Court the alleged contempt is said to have been committed by the respondent No. 1, no one appeared for the applicant. On behalf of the respondent No. 1 Mr. C.U. Singh with Ms. Shobha Gopal and on that of respondent No. 2 Mr. R.L. Patil, Additional Public Prosecutor have put in appearance. We have heard them at considerable length and perused the entire material on record, including the affidavit dated 19-1-1998 filed by the respondent No. 1 in this Court. 4.The first question which crops up is whether respondent No. 1 is guilty of an offence punishable under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Our answer to it is in the affirmative. While giving the said answer, we have been mindful of the fact that before punishing a person under the Contempt of Courts, Act, the Court has to be very careful in striking a delicate balance between two extremes :--- (a) On one hand, it should bear in mind that it must be slow and thoughtful in exercising its contempt power. Being liberal in its use, is not a sound judicial approach because the power to punish for contempt is not meant to instill a sense of fear in the minds of people but to ensure the compliance of orders of Court and to maintain their dignity. The power should not be readily used for that would result in people shying from offering criticism, fair and free from malice, against judicial conduct and decisions. The power should not be readily used for that would result in people shying from offering criticism, fair and free from malice, against judicial conduct and decisions. It should always be remembered that criticism which is fair and free from malice results in Judges doing some soul searching and ensures that they do not go wrong. After all, "Justice" as Lord Atkin put it in the time-honoured way" is not a cloistered virtue; she must be allowed to suffer the scrutiny and respectful even though out-spoken comments of ordinary men See (Andre Paul v. Attorney-General of Trinidad)1, A.I.R. 1936 P.C. 141. (b) On the other hand, to permit willful contemnors or those whose acts constitute contempt per se, or those who maliciously scandalise Judges, to go scott-free, would be equally devastating and dangerous. There can be no manner of doubt that they deserve to be punished with a stern hand. For if they are not, the judicial process will get paralysed; there will be no compliance of orders of Court; and the losing party in a litigation will come out with a slanderous attack on the Judge who decides against him. And the logical result would be that courts would be rendered ineffective and Judges reduced to paper-tigers. That indeed would be distressing because all our institutions and the entire social fabric survives on a vibrant and powerful judiciary. In this connection, it would be useful to refer to two decisions of the Supreme Court. The first is that reported in A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 745 (Under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, in the matter of (Special Reference No. 1 of 1964)2), wherein in paragraph 142, at page 791, Their Lordships observed thus :-- "....... We ought never to forget that the power to punish for contempt large as it is, must always be exercised cautiously wisely and with circumspection. Frequent or indiscriminate use of this power in anger or irritation would not help to sustain the dignity or status of the Court, but may sometimes, affect it adversely. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness, and objectivity of their approach and by the restraint; dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. Wise Judges never forget that the best way to sustain the dignity and status of their office is to deserve respect from the public at large by the quality of their judgments, the fearlessness, fairness, and objectivity of their approach and by the restraint; dignity and decorum which they observe in their judicial conduct. We venture to think that what is true of the judicature is equally true of the legislature." The second is that reported in A.I.R. 1985 S.C. 1726 (Balram Singh, Petitioner v. Bhikam Chand Jain and others, respondents)2, wherein in paragraph 8, Their Lordships remarked :--- ".....It would be a travesty of justice if the Court were to allow such gross contempt of Court to go unpunished, without an adequate sentence and we find no mitigating circumstances whatever not to pass a sentence of imprisonment." 5.A perusal of section 2 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 shows that contempt of Court may be of two types :--- Civil contempt as defined by section 2(b) and Criminal contempt as defined by section 2(c). 6.Section 2(b) defines civil contempt thus :--- "Civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a Court;" In the instant case, as there has been no wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking, given to a Court, the commission of civil contempt is ruled out. 7.But, we are implicitly satisfied that the respondent No. 1 Mr. R.S. Pande has committed criminal contempt as defined by section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 7.But, we are implicitly satisfied that the respondent No. 1 Mr. R.S. Pande has committed criminal contempt as defined by section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. The said provision reads thus :-- "(c) "Criminal Contempt" means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which-- (i) Scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner; 8.A perusal of section 2(c) would show that publication whether written or oral or by signs, or by visible representations or the doing of any act which falls in any of the three categories:-(i) to (iii), would constitute a criminal contempt. In our considered view, the act of the respondent No. 1 would squarely fall within the ambit of section 2(c) (ii). 9.The report dated 2-9-1993, sent by the learned Judge, IInd Labour Court, to the President of the Industrial Tribunal and statements dated 3-9-1993, of Kumari Neeta Jadhav, Mr. Jayram Pawar, and Mr. I.V. Nair, all of whom at the time when the incident took place, were working as Court functionaries in the IInd Labour Court and that of K.S. Benson, an Advocate, who was also present in the Court at the time when the incident took place, show :--- (a) an heated altercation took place between respondent No. 1 and Mr. George Kurian, an Advocate, on the issue whether the affidavit of Mr. S.V. Nayak be treated as his examination-in-chief or his examination-in-chief or his examination-in-chief be recorded in Court; (b) during the course of altercation respondent No. 1 caught hold of the collar of Mr. George Kurian and pulled him; (c) both respondent No. 1 and Mr. George Kurian did not pay any heed to the request of the Court to stop; and (d) the Court had no option but to rise and adjourn the case. George Kurian and pulled him; (c) both respondent No. 1 and Mr. George Kurian did not pay any heed to the request of the Court to stop; and (d) the Court had no option but to rise and adjourn the case. 10.It should be borne in mind that neither the Judge nor any of the aforesaid four persons, had any rancour or grudge against respondent No. 1 and had he not been guilty of the misdeamenour deposed to by them, they would not have falsely stated about it. It is also pertinent to point out that respondent No. 1 in his affidavit dated 19-1-1993, filed in this Court, and in his reply to the show cause notice issued by the Judge of the IInd Labour Court, admitted the incident, but, added that it was unitentional and took place on account of provocation offered by Mr. George Kurian and the circumstance that he got carried away in his over-zealousness, to protect the cause of the workman. 11.We are squarely satisfied that the facts mentioned in paragraphs 2(a), 9 and 10 show that the act of the respondent No. 1 actually interfered with the due course of judicial proceedings which were going on in the Court of Judge, IInd Labour Court and ultimately, resulted in the learned Judge adjourning the case and leaving the Court. 12.We are implicitly satisfied that the respondent No. 1 Mr. R.S. Pande, hereinafter referred to as the contemnor, is guilty of committing the offence of criminal contempt as defined by section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 13.The next question which crops up is the quantum of sentence to be awarded to the contemnor. Mr. C.U. Singh, learned Counsel for the contemnor urged that the ends of justice would be satisfied if the unqualified apology tendered by the contemnor is accepted by us. In the alternative, he urged, that in case we felt that apology simpliciter was not sufficient, then coupled with it some fine be imposed. On the other hand, Mr. Rajiv Patil, learned Additional Public Prosecutor urged that the sentence should be exemplary so that the types of the contemnor are disuaded from committing such reprehensible acts as those committed by the contemnor. He urged that a soft-view in the matter of sentence would provide impetus for persons like the contemnor to commit with impunity such offences. Rajiv Patil, learned Additional Public Prosecutor urged that the sentence should be exemplary so that the types of the contemnor are disuaded from committing such reprehensible acts as those committed by the contemnor. He urged that a soft-view in the matter of sentence would provide impetus for persons like the contemnor to commit with impunity such offences. We have given our anxious consideration to the rival contentions, 14.Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 reads thus :-- "12 Punishment for contempt of Court (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in anyother law, a contempt of Court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which my extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees or with both; provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court....." 15.A perusal of section 12 would show that the contemnor may either be punished with simple imprisonment extending to 6 months or fine extending to Rs. 2,000/- or both. The proviso to the section stipulates that the contemnor may be discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made by him to the satisfaction of the Court. 16.We may straight away mention that we are not inclined to accede to the contention of the contemnor's Counsel that the unqualified apology tendered by the contemnor would meet the ends of justice. In our view, the act of the contemnor was so reprehensible that it would tantamount to travesty of justice if we were to accept the said contention. 17.The question is whether a sentence of fine coupled with unqualified apology of the contemnor would be sufficient to satisfy the ends of justice. Our answer to it is in the affirmative. 18.We find, that the report of the learned Judge of the IInd Labour Court, and the statements of Kum. Neeta Jadhav, Mr. Jayaram Pawar, Mrs. I.V. Nair and Mr. K.S. Benson show that after the contemnor had objected to the proposal of Mr. George Kurian that the affidavit filed by Mr. S.V. Nayak be treated as examination in-chief, there was a heated exchange between him and Mr. Kurian and in a fit of anger, the contemnor caught hold of the collar of Mr. Kurian and pulled him. K.S. Benson show that after the contemnor had objected to the proposal of Mr. George Kurian that the affidavit filed by Mr. S.V. Nayak be treated as examination in-chief, there was a heated exchange between him and Mr. Kurian and in a fit of anger, the contemnor caught hold of the collar of Mr. Kurian and pulled him. We also find that in his reply to the notice issued by the learned Judge, IInd Labour Court, as to why proceedings under the Contempt of Courts Act, be not initiated against him, the contemnor stated that the incident took place out of provocation; was unintentional, he had no intention to undermine the dignity of the Court; and expressed his regret for the incident. We further find that in this Court, the contemnor filed an affidavit dated 19th January 1998, wherein in paragraphs 5 and 6, he stated that he got carried away when Mr. Kurian insisted that the affidavit of Mr. S.V. Nayak be treated as examination-in-chief and also stated that he had tendered a written apology to the Court and had no intention of causing any disrespect to the Court. 19.It should be borne in mind that although under section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 the Court has the power to impose a jail sentence, which may extend to six months of simple imprisonment, ordinarily, the Court does not impose a jail sentence. It is only where the contempt committed is so gross and outrageous that neither acceptance of unconditional apology of the contemnor nor a imposition of a sentence of fine on him, would satisfy the ends of justice, does this Court impose a jail sentence. We wish to emphasise that there should be some compelling reasons warranting imposition of a jail sentence. 20.In the instant case, we find no special reasons for imposing a sentence of imprisonment. In our view, a sentence of fine would suffice. We are of the view that the ends of justice would be squarely satisfied if in addition to accepting the unqualified apology tendered by the contemnor, he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default, to undergo two months simple imprisonment. 21.In the result, this petition is allowed. We are of the view that the ends of justice would be squarely satisfied if in addition to accepting the unqualified apology tendered by the contemnor, he is sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default, to undergo two months simple imprisonment. 21.In the result, this petition is allowed. Respondent No. 1 R.S. Pande is found guilty of committing criminal contempt as defined by section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and is sentenced to pay a fine Rs. 2,000/- in default to undergo 2 months simple imprisonment. The fine shall be deposited by him in IInd Labour Court, Thane within two months from today. Rule is made absolute in the said terms. The record and proceedings shall be transmitted by the office forthwith to the appropriate Court. Office is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the President, Industrial Court, Maharashtra and the IInd Labour Court, Thane within four weeks from today. Petition allowed.