JUDGMENT The petitioner in this application, has, inter alia prayed for issuance of a writ of or in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect or further effect to the order dated 1.1.85 passed by the Senior Commandant Railway Protection Force, the appellate order dated 29.10.86 as contained in Annexure 'D' as also the final order dated 31.10.89 passed by the Director General, Railway Protection Force, as contained in Annexure ‘J’ to the writ application. 2. The petitioner was recruited as a Rakshak-Trainee under the Railway Protection Force Act and the Rules framed thereunder, on 25.10.83. He, in terms of an agreement entered into by and between himself and his employers, was to undergo a training. On successful completion of training, a certificate of appointment, being No. 32802 was granted on 28.9.1984, as contained in Annexure 'A' to the writ application. He was thereafter deputed for service to Eastern Railway at the disposal of the Inspector-in-Charge of Ballygunge Unit, Railway, Protection Force. However, by an order dated 1.1.85 as contained in Annexure 'B' to the writ application, his service has been terminated purported to be in terms of Paragraph 2(a) of the agreement vide Appendix-A of Rule 23 of the R.P.F. Regulation on payment of one month's salary,. The petitioner preferred an appeal there against, which was also dismissed holding that there is no provision for appeal, by an order dated 29.10.86. 3. The petitioner filed a writ application earlier, inter alia, on the ground that the aforementioned order of termination as contained in Annexure 'B' to the writ application was not a termination simplicitor, inasmuch as, the said order had been passed at the instance of the respondent No. 4, as he was allegedly detained in connection with an offence allegedly committed by him. The said writ application was disposed of with a direction that the petitioner may file a representation before the Director General of R.P.F., who may call for the records and treat the representation as revisional petition and dispose of the same within 8 weeks from the date of receipt thereof, after giving an opportunity, of hearing. Pursuant to the said order dated 30.9.88 paned by this Court, the petitioner filed a representation on 5.10.88. The said representation of the petitioner, however, has been disposed of by the Director General, R.P.F. on 31.10.89. Pursuant to the said order dated 30.9.88 paned by this Court, the petitioner filed a representation on 5.10.88. The said representation of the petitioner, however, has been disposed of by the Director General, R.P.F. on 31.10.89. The said order is contained in Annexure ‘J’ to the writ application. A bare perusal of the said order would show that the same has been passed on the bash that the petitioner was bound by the terms of the agreement, pursuant whereto he had agreed that his services may be terminated by the Chief Security Officer at any time during the period of his initial training or the period of probation thereof on issue, of notice of one month or the tender of one month's pay in lieu of such notice. The Director General has arrived at a finding that the Senior Security Officer recommended that keeping in view his conduct during his training as well as during his early period of probation it was found that he is an individual or had traits which are undesirable and would come in the way of his becoming suitable member of the uniformed force. 4. Mr. Ghosh appearing on behalf of the petitioner has, inter alia, submitted that apart from the fact that there does not exist Rule 23 in the regulation, the impugned orders have been passed mala fide, Learned Counsel has contended that keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, and particularly the certificate as contained in Annexure 'C' to the writ application, it would appear that the petitioner’s services had been terminated malafide. According to the learned Counsel the respondent No. 4 had made an incorrect report regarding the petitioner’s detention of arrest pursuant whereto the impugned order had been passed. The certificate issued by the Officer-in-Charge, Budge Budge Police Station is to the following effect :- “As directed by the Additional Superintendent of Police (South Industrial) South 24- Parganas, you are hereby informed that your above petition was properly, enquiry into and during enquiry it was clear that allegation regarding your detention or arrest at this Police Station is baseless and fabricated. Moreover, there is no record on the question of your movality at this Police Station." 5. Moreover, there is no record on the question of your movality at this Police Station." 5. The petitioner, in Paragraph 14 of the writ application, has clearly stated that the recommendation for terminating his service had been passed on the basis of tile report of Sri P.K. Bhattacharya, Inspector of Railway Protection Force, Ballygunge, for which there was no factual foundation. According, to the learned Counsel, as, by reason of such a report, the petitioner’s reputation had suffered and a stigma had been cast, the observation of the respondent No. 2 to the effect that the order of termination is innocuous one, cannot be upheld. 6. No affidavit-in-opposition has been filed by the respondents. In the instant case, the petitioner had all along raised the plea of malafide. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that even if an order in passed which is not vitiated by reason of malice on fact, can be held to be invalid if the same has been passed for unauthorised purposes, as it would amount to malice in law. Reference in this connection may be made to (1) S.R. Venkataraman v. Union of India reported in AIR 1979 SC 49 . In the instant case, the petitioner has categorically stated before the respondent No. 2 that the recommendation of the Senior Commandant was made in view of the aforementioned report of the Inspector, which, in view of Annexure 'C' to the writ application, must be held to have been passed on a wrong foundational fact. Statements made in the writ application to the aforementioned effect having not been denied or disputed, the same must be hold to be correct. Furthermore, from a perusal of the impugned order dated 31.10.89 as contained in Annexure ‘J’ to the writ application, it would appear that the respondent No. 2 had not at all adverted to the aforementioned question raised by the petitioner before him. By reason of this Court's order dated 30.9.88, the representation of the petitioner was treated to be a revisional application. The respondent No. 2, therefore, was under a bounden duty to consider as to whether the termination of the services of the petitioner had been effected by way of punishment. Furthermore, in view of Annexure ‘A’ to the writ application, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the petitioner had successfully completed his training. The respondent No. 2, therefore, was under a bounden duty to consider as to whether the termination of the services of the petitioner had been effected by way of punishment. Furthermore, in view of Annexure ‘A’ to the writ application, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the petitioner had successfully completed his training. In that view of the matter, at least a part of the purported recommendation made by the Senior Security Officer to the effect that his conduct during his training was not satisfactory, could not have been upheld by the respondent No. 2. The question as to whether the conduct of the petitioner during the period of probation was satisfactory, or not, is essentially a question of fact. As indicated hereinbefore, the petitioner, in the writ application, as also before the respondent No. 2 had categorically raised a question that the aforementioned recommendation had been made on the basis of the report filed by the Inspector that the petitioner had been detained end arrested at Budge Budge Police Station. The tenor of the letter dated 16.4.86 as contained in Annexure 'C' to the writ application clearly goes to show that the said purported report of the Inspector was factually incorrect. It is, therefore, evident that the respondents No. 2 failed to pose unto himself the correct question so as to acquaint himself with the correct state of affairs in order to enable him to arrive at a correct finding of fact, and this misdirected himself in law. It is trite that if one asks himself a wring question he gets a wrong answer. It is further well settled that although an order of termination may be found to be innocuous on the face of it, the Court is not powerless to delve deep into the matter in order to arrive at a conclusion as to whether the same is mala fide either on fact or in law and/or thereby a stigma has been cast, or not. Once, the petitioner's contention to the effect that the report of the Senior Security Officer was based on the report of the Inspector to the effect that he had been detailed and/or arrested, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that thereby a stigma has been cast as against the petitioner. Once, the petitioner's contention to the effect that the report of the Senior Security Officer was based on the report of the Inspector to the effect that he had been detailed and/or arrested, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that thereby a stigma has been cast as against the petitioner. If by reason of an order, although innocuous on the fact of it, a citizen suffers civil or evil consequence, the same must be preceded by a fair enquiry and compliance of the principles of natural Justice. In the instant case, admittedly there had been no enquiry, nor the principles of natural justice had been complied with. Furthermore, as the aforementioned relevant facts had not been taken into consideration by the respondent No. 2, while passing the impugned order dated 31.10.89 as contained in Annexure 'J' to the writ application he must be held to have failed to take into consideration relevant facts. For the reasons aforementioned, this application is allowed and the impugned orders as contained in Annexure 'B', 'D' and ‘J’ to the writ application cannot be sustained they are quashed accordingly. However, keeping in view the fact that the petition is out of job since 1.1.85, in my opinion, interest of Justice will be sub-served if he is directed to be reinstated without any back wages, but he will be deemed to be continuing in service, and will be entitled to all consequential benefits including the benefits of increment etc. Urgent xerox certified copy if applied for, be supplied on priority basis.