JUDGMENT 1. - This Criminal Misc. Petition has been directed against the order dated 12.6.1997 passed by the learned Special judge for trial of cases under the Essential Commodities Act, Bhilwara. 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the petition are that Gulab Chand Jain, the then Enforcement Officer, Office of the District Supply Officer, Bhilwara, filed a complaint for alleged commission of offence under section 3/7. Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (for short 'the Act') alleging that the petitioner firm being a partnership firm constituted of three petitioners is trading in food-grains at Mandal, Bhilwara holding food-grains licence No. 5/80. The District Supply Officer Madho Lal Bhatt along with his subordinate officers as well as Tehsildar of Mandal, from 1.12.1990 to 7.12.1990 inspected the business premises of the firm as well as the account-books and also physically verified the stock of food-grains articles as listed in the complaint itself. Resultantly, it was found that the petitioner firm was having a stock of various food articles and food grains in excess of the limit prescribed under the terms of licences to the extent of 668 quintals and 25 kilograms in clear contravention of condition No. 5(4) of the licence issued under the Pulses, Edible oil Seeds and Edible Oil Storage Control Order, 1977 (as amended upto date) and pulses and oil seeds were found to be stored at the premises of one Shambu Lal Kabra which was not a declared godown under the licence issued to the accused petitioners which also contravened condition No. 2 of the licence so granted. Besides, it was also found that forged record was also being prepared and conditions N6s. 3 and 8 of the licence were also contravened and so the accused were liable under section 9 of the Act. Similarly, there were also allegations of contravention of conditions Nos. 7, 11 & 20 of the licence. 3. The complaint was registered on 13.12.1990 and, consequently, the accused-petitioners were summoned by bailable warrants and they appeared positively on 27.2.1991 when they were bailed out. The learned Special Judge went on adjourning the case for framing charges against the accused-petitioners and, lastly, it was on 30.9.1993 that the charges under sections 3/7, 8 & 9 of the Act were framed against the accused-petitioners, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried and so the trial commenced. The learned Special Judge went on adjourning the case for framing charges against the accused-petitioners and, lastly, it was on 30.9.1993 that the charges under sections 3/7, 8 & 9 of the Act were framed against the accused-petitioners, who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried and so the trial commenced. The Court repeatedly issued process for appearance of the prosecution witnesses but it appears that before 2.11.1995, neither witnesses were served nor did any witness appear before the trial Court but, however, on 2.11.1995 it was ordered that the case be retried and, consequently, first three witnesses out of the list filed and relied upon by the prosecution in support of its case, were ordered to be summoned and the summonses were further ordered to be delivered to the APP - I for service in time. However, no prosecution witness was present on 21.12.1995, 4.4.1994 or 22.8.1996. Again, it was on 21.11.1996 when none of the prosecution witness being in attendance, the learned trial Judge further observed that since these proceedings are required to be proceeded with summarily and hence again de novo trial was ordered on 21.11.1996 and the case was again listed for statement of accusations to be read over to the accused on 6.2.1997 and no substantial proceedings could be transacted on-6.2.1997 and, besides, the case stood adjourned to 13,3.1997 and, lastly, to 12.6.1997 when statements of allegations for the offences under sections 3/7, 8 & 9 of the Act were read over and the accused-petitioners were called upon to plead as to why they should not be punished for the same to which the accused-petitioners denied and, accordingly, it was further ordered that the prosecution witnesses as listed 1 to 3 be summoned and produced for their statements on 16.10.1997 and hence this petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned P.P. and have also gone through the aforesaid proceedings conducted in the case by the learned Special Judge. 5. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned P.P. and have also gone through the aforesaid proceedings conducted in the case by the learned Special Judge. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners, while reiterating aforesaid proceedings, submitted that the District Enforcement Officer filed the aforesaid complaint against the accused-petitioners as early as on 13.12.1990 and the prosecution with great indifference and callousness proceeded with the case and the procedure so ordered to be adopted by the learned Special Judge also did not conform to the one prescribed under the Act after amendment where under Sessions/Addl. Sessions Judges only could, on their appointment as Special Judges try such cases summarily and the trial Court did issue repeated process to the witnesses listed and relied upon by the prosecution itself but without any avail. Besides, no effective proceedings could be taken so far beginning from 13.12.1990 and the case is yet pending at the initial stage and the prosecution did not succeed in production and examination of even a single prosecution witness. 6. Resultantly, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the accused- petitioners have got a constitutionally guaranteed right of expeditious trial and the same has been grossly violated since for last more than 7 years and the prosecution has not been able to examine a single witness in a summary trial procedure case and, therefore, looking to the callous and indifferent conduct and attitude of the prosecution as well as Enforcement Department which is the source of this prosecution, clearly gives an indication that the prosecution is not sincere, diligent and dutiful enough to get the trial expedited and, besides, in the aforesaid circumstances, the prosecution never produced a single witness nor did it help the learned trial Judge to secure attendance of the witnesses which are sought to be produced by the prosecution in support of charges levelled against the accused-petitioners. Therefore, his submission is that the accused-petitioners have already been made to suffer financially, physically and mentally besides socially, ought not to be prosecuted any longer since as the cumbersome procedure looking to the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of Section 326, Cr.P.C. is not likely to see its end in foreseeable future warranting quashing of the criminal trial pending against the accused-petitioners. 7. (3) of Section 326, Cr.P.C. is not likely to see its end in foreseeable future warranting quashing of the criminal trial pending against the accused-petitioners. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied on the decision rendered in Ugma v. The State of Rajasthan, S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No 351/97 decided on 4.3.1998 to supplement his submissions. 8. The learned P.P., however, looking to the circumstances, because of derelict and indifferent approach by the prosecution and so also the trial Court, submitted that looking to the gravity of the offences, this is hardly a case for quashing pending proceedings against the accused-petitioners. 9. After giving a considerate thought to the rival contentions and having regard to the totality of facts and circumstances, antecedents to the prosecution as well as the impugned order, there is no denial of the fact that the prosecution who is solely responsible for expeditious trial of the case and to produce and examine its witnesses at the earliest specially, in the instant case, almost important witnesses of the prosecution are responsible Government Servants and, therefore, in case the District Enforcement Authorities and the prosecution agency were sincere, diligent and dutiful enough to prosecute this case, the present developments could not have taken place and, resultantly, the grievance of the accused-petitioners that their premises were raided, searched and the essential commodities were seized between 1.12.1990 to 7.12.1990 and the essential commodities alleged to have been found in excess of the quantities that were permitted to be stocked/stored by the accused-petitioners under the terms and conditions of the licence so issued, stood seized and, consequently, the seized goods were placed at the disposal and for the order of District Collector, Bhilwara under the provisions of Section 6-A of the Act and, therefore, the learned Collector was and is competent to pass legal order as warranted without being affected by this order. However, so far as the present proceedings are concerned, as above, the same are pending since 13.12.1990. It shows that the Enforcement Authorities unnecessarily sat over the matter for more than 11 months and it did not require an inordinate delay in filing a criminal complaint against the accused-petitioners, in case they were offenders under any of the provisions of the Act warranting inordinate and unwarranted delay in launching of the prosecution. It shows that the Enforcement Authorities unnecessarily sat over the matter for more than 11 months and it did not require an inordinate delay in filing a criminal complaint against the accused-petitioners, in case they were offenders under any of the provisions of the Act warranting inordinate and unwarranted delay in launching of the prosecution. It shows that the prosecution was launched by the District Enforcement Authorities half heatedly and, consequently, when the accused-petitioners were called upon to face the trial by the learned Special Judge, the prosecution still did not evidence any interest in successful and speedy completion of the trial against the accused-petitioners, with the result, that there is no progress in the trial and the case is almost in the same condition and at the stage at which it had initially started. 10. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the accused-petitioners' premises having been so raided and searched and the procedure having been completed before 8.1.1990, since a period of more than 8 years has elapsed and without any substantial proceedings in the trial at all and, as a result, the accused-petitioners have, in all respect, suffered a lot and their life and liberty cannot be put to jeopardy for an indefinite period in violation of sacrosanct provisions of Art. 21 of the Constitution of India warranting quashment. There is nothing to disagree with the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and, in the aforesaid circumstances, there is no escape from arriving at the conclusion that in case these proceedings are further allowed to be proceeded against the present accused petitioners, it would amount to deprive the accused-petitioners, of a quick and a speedy trial as also implicitly guaranteed u/Art. 21 of the Constitution and hence, at present, on the basis of aforesaid discussion, the ends of justice warrant that the criminal proceedings so pending against the accused-petitioners be quashed and the petition be accepted. 11. Resultantly, this petition, being well merited, is hereby accepted and the criminal proceedings pending against the accused-petitioners in Criminal Case No. 36/90 against the accused-petitioners in the Court of the learned Special Judge (Essential Commodities Act), Bhilwara are hereby quashed and the accused-petitioners are ordered to be discharged from the bail bonds entered into for their appearance and facing trial pending before the trial Court. 12. 12. This petition along with its connected stay petition stands disposed of accordingly.Petition allowed. *******