P. SRINIVASA RAMACHANDER VS. CENTRAL MACHINE TOOLS INSTITUTE, BANGALORE ( 1 ) AGGRIEVED by the order of the respondent 1 dated 17-10-1991 dispensing with his service, the appellant filed a writ petition in this Court praying for declaring some clauses in Annexure-A as void being opposed to the public policy. He also prayed to declare him to be continuously in service of the first respondent and that the impugned orders in Annexures-H to O did not affect his service career. The writ petition was dismissed by the learned Single Judge vide the order impugned in this appeal. The order of the learned Single Judge has been challenged on various grounds as detailed in the memorandum of appeal. It is contended that under the circumstances, peculiar in the case, the appellant stood permanently appointed and was not a probationer which could have authorised the respondent 1 to pass the impugned order. ( 2 ) THE record reveals that the appellant was intimated of his selection for appointment as 'senior administrative Officer in the Institute on the terms and conditions specified in Annexure-A. Some of the conditions relevant for the purpose of deciding this appeal were:- "probation: You will be on probation for a period of two years which may be extended or curtailed at the discretion of the Institute. You will continue to be on probation until such time you are absorbed (in writing) in the post. Notice: (i) During the probation period, your services are liable to termination without giving any notices. After absorption your services can (ii)be terminated at any time by giving three month's notice in writing or salary in lieu thereof on either side. Service You will have to furnish an agreement:undertaking that you will not apply for any post outside the Institute for a period of three years from the date of joining this post. You will have to reside in the quarters for which licence fee will be recovered from your salary as per rules of the Institute. General: (i) During your service in this institute, you will be governed by the Rules and Regulations of the institute in force from time to in the matter of Pay and (ii)Allowances and other service conditions, the Institute is following fundamental Rules and supplementary Rules". General: (i) During your service in this institute, you will be governed by the Rules and Regulations of the institute in force from time to in the matter of Pay and (ii)Allowances and other service conditions, the Institute is following fundamental Rules and supplementary Rules". ( 3 ) REFERRING to condition General (ii), the learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that as his client was given the benefit of Fundamental Rule 22-B, he was deemed to have been a permanent servant and not as a probationer. He has specifically referred to the orders passed on 1-10-1990 and 1-10-1991 giving the appellant first and second annual increments respectively. ( 4 ) A Division Bench of this Court in Y. N. Krishna Murthy v Karnataka Silk Industries corporation Limited, Bangalore , while considering a case on similar facts had concluded that in the absence of any specific rule to the effect that non-extension of the period of probation would automatically amount to confirmation, an employee was deemed to be on probation, and failure to extend the period of probation would not automatically amount to confirmation on the post of probation. To come to such a conclusion, this Court had relied upon the judgments of the hon'ble Supreme Court in: 1. State of Punjab v Dharam Singh. 2. S. Sukhbans Singh v State of Punjab. 3. G. S. Ramasivamy v Inspector-General of Police, Mysore State, Bangalore 4. Accountant General, Madliya Pradesh, Gwalior v Beni Prasad Bhatnagar 5. D. A. Lyall v Chief Conservator of Forests, Uttar Pradesh. 6. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Akbar Ali Khan. ( 5 ) IT is worth noticing that the condition regarding probation on appointment in that case was similar as has been noticed in the instant case. In the absence of a specific order to the contrary, the appellant was deemed to be on probation until such time he was absorbed in writing. Admittedly, such an occasion had not arisen in the case. Mere mention of the fact that fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules were followed by respondent 1 in the matter of pay and allowances supplemented by the release of the increments would not automatically confer the status of permanent employee upon the appellant. Admittedly, such an occasion had not arisen in the case. Mere mention of the fact that fundamental Rules and Supplementary Rules were followed by respondent 1 in the matter of pay and allowances supplemented by the release of the increments would not automatically confer the status of permanent employee upon the appellant. The appellant was, therefore not justified in seeking declaration from the Court that the conditions prescribed in his order of appointment did not affect his service career and were liable to be struck down or declared not affecting his rights. After having accepted the terms of appointment, the appellant could not retract at a time when his services were dispensed with. We also do not agree that the appellant had not accepted the terms and conditions in the order of appointment with respect to the period of probation. In his letter dated 25-9-1989, the appellant had specifically stated, "i accept the terms and-conditions mentioned therein", but requested, "to consider the starting pay with 5 advance increments. e. , from Rs. 3,500/- p. m. and also relax the probationary period of two years". Request cannot be equated with the acceptance of the conditions partially, particularly in view of the order of the respondents dated 27-9-1989, wherein the appellant was specifically intimated that the Management was, "glad to know that you have accepted the terms and conditions mentioned in our offer of appointment. . . . . . ". The appellant did not even whisper thereafter about his alleged conditional acceptance till the date his services were terminated. Even in the letter of appointment, the respondent had very clearly mentioned that his appointment was, "subject to the terms and conditions enumerated in the office of appointment letter No. 03 (3)/89-ADM, dated 18th September, 1989". Similarly, we do not find any substance in the submission of the appellant that the impugned order terminating his services amounted to-casting stigma on his service career and was thus liable to be quashed. While dealing with such a plea, this Court in Y. N. K. Murthy's case, supra, held thus:- "the ordinary Dictionary meanings of the word 'stigma' are: "mark branded on slave, criminal etc. ; imputation attaching to person's reputation; stain on one's good name". "a brand; a mark of infamy; a disgrace or reproach attached to anyone; any special mark; a spot; a bleeding spot; a scar; a spot sensitive to light". 2. ; imputation attaching to person's reputation; stain on one's good name". "a brand; a mark of infamy; a disgrace or reproach attached to anyone; any special mark; a spot; a bleeding spot; a scar; a spot sensitive to light". 2. In relation to employment, the word 'stigma' means aspersion or reflection on the conduct, efficiency and the like made in the order which is likely to adversely affect the future prospects of the individual relating to his employment or promotion. 3. In the absence of any statutory definition assigned, the Supreme Court considered its scope and ambit in Kamal Kishore Lakshman v Management of M/s. Pan American World Airways inc. and Others at paras 8 and 9 and relying upon its earlier judgments in Chandu Lal v management of M/s. Pan American World Airways Inc. and Others and Jagadish Mitter v Union of India, held: "according to Webster's New World Dictionary it is something that detracts from the character or reputation of a person, an ark, sign etc. , indicating that something is not considered norm; 1 or standard. The Legal Thesaurus by Burton gives the meaning of the word to be blemish, defect, disgrace, disrepute, imputation, mark of disgrace or shame. The Webster's IIIrd New international Dictionary gives the meaning as a mark or label indicating a deviation from a norm. According to yet another Dictionary, 'stigma' is a matter for moral reproach. Loss of confidence by the employer in the employee is a feature which certainly affects the character or reputation of the employee and, therefore, this Court correctly held in Ckandu Lal's case, supra, that allegation of loss of confidence amounted to a stigma. The ratio in the case of jagdish Mitter, supra, also supports this conclusion". ( 6 ) A perusal of the impugned order does not support the contention of the appellant that it amounted to casting stigma upon his service career. After referring to various judgments of the supreme Court and the relevant facts in this case, the learned Single Judge vide his order impugned in this appeal concluded thus:- "13. ( 6 ) A perusal of the impugned order does not support the contention of the appellant that it amounted to casting stigma upon his service career. After referring to various judgments of the supreme Court and the relevant facts in this case, the learned Single Judge vide his order impugned in this appeal concluded thus:- "13. Keeping in view, the principles enunciated by Apex Court, a cursory look at the letter of director-in-charge of the Institute to the petitioner dated 6th September, 1991 and the so called admissions made by respondent in its objections (para-8) does not suggest that the impugned order made would cast a stigma on the petitioner, which would entitle him an enquiry before passing an order of termination simpliciter. Prior to in the issuance of impugned order, there was correspondence between the Director-in-charge and the petitioner suggesting that the petitioner was not coming up to the expectations of the Institute in the performance of his duties. It is to be borne in mind that the petitioner was entrusted with the onerous responsibility as Senior administrative Officer in the Institute. The Administration Department is the nerve centre of the institute and any lapse, omission or commission on the part of the head of the department would have its telling effect on the entire working of the Institutc. Therefore, the Institute was forced to issue the letter dated 6th September, 1991 bringing to his notice the various omission and commission on his part while working as probationer. . . . . . . ". ( 7 ) WE agree with the reasoning and the conclusions of the learned Single Judge. ( 8 ) THERE is no merit in this appeal, which is accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case without any order as to costs.