Judgment :- M. KARPAGA VINAYAGAM, J. M. Vijayakumari, the appellant herein, claiming herself to be the wife of one Ezhumalai, is challenging in this appeal, the order dated August 18, 1997 passed by the learned single Judge of this Court in W.P. No. 12551 of 1994 dismissing the writ petition requesting for issue of certiorari calling for the records of the first respondent, the Financial Controller, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, relating to the order of removal of the petitioner from her service in Memo No. 058504/563 Estt./A2/FOH/91-15, dated February 11,1994 as confirmed by the second respondent, the Chief Financial Controller, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in Memo No.058503/99-Estt./A2/FOH/91-96,dated March 21, 1994 and to quash the same. 2. The facts which are relevant and required for the disposal of this appeal are these : (a) The appellant is the daughter of one late Marimuthu. He was employed as a Helper at Basin Bridge power House, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board. He died on January 14, 1982 while in service due to cancer. He left behind his wife Chinnammal, his daughter the appellant and another daughter Kalavathi. (b) Tamil Nadu Electricity Board introduced a scheme during the year 1978 giving employment assistance to the dependent of the Board employee who dies in harness while in service, on compassionate ground. As per Annexure II to B.P.Ms. (Ch.) No. 411 (Adm. Br.), dated July 22, 1983, the dependents include windowed wife/son/unmarried daughter. (c) On June 19, 1990 the appellant Vijaykumari applied to the Board for job as one of the dependents to the deceased Marimuthu, who died while in service. Alone with the said application she gave a written declaration that she was not married and also produced a copy of the written declaration in the Board made by her younger sister Kalavathi, another dependent, recommending for the job to be given to the appellant.(d) On June 28, 1990 the Chief Financial Controller appointed her as Office Helper (Trainee) for three years by Memo No. 041749/Estt./A2/FOH/90-2. Accordingly, the appellant, on June 29, 1990 joined duty as Office Helper (Trainee) in the second respondent's office. (e) On October 8, 1990 the Board received an information through Kalavathi, the sister of the appellant, stating that the appellant obtained the job suppressing the fact that she already married one Veerabadran, son of Muthumari of Vippodu village. Accordingly, the appellant, on June 29, 1990 joined duty as Office Helper (Trainee) in the second respondent's office. (e) On October 8, 1990 the Board received an information through Kalavathi, the sister of the appellant, stating that the appellant obtained the job suppressing the fact that she already married one Veerabadran, son of Muthumari of Vippodu village. On this information, the Board directed the Vigilance to investigate the matter and file a report. (f) The Vigilance Officer conducted enquiry and interrogated the appellant and other witnesses and sent a report to the Board stating that the appellant had furnished false information that she was unmarried and thereby she gained entry into Board's service. (g) When the appellant was enquired into about this, she gave a statement that she did not get married. To this effect, she also gave a written statement. Thereafter,the appellant applied for leave to the Board from April 3, 1991 to April 9, 1991 stating that her marriage is fixed on April 3, 1991. (h) On June 29, 1991 the Vigilance Officer sent a report to the Board stating that her declaration made in the application that she was unmarried is a false one and that in order to avoid departmental proceedings, the appellant created some records, as if she got married only on April 3, 1991 to one Ezhumalai, after entering into the Board's service. (i) On receipt of this report, the Board issued a charge memo on September 9, 1991 to the appellant giving the details of the above charges and directing her to submit explanation for the same, within 7 days from the date of receipt of the charge memo.(j) On September 13, 1991, the appellant sent a letter to the Board requesting the copies of the statement given by the witness and other documents proposed to be relied on for the above charges to enable her to send her reply. Accordingly, on September 17, 1991 the Board sent the copies of the statements of Kalavathi and Gangadurai and the copy of the Birth Certificate of the daughter of the appellant, who was born on October 3, 1982. On September 19, 1991 the appellant sent a reply refuting the charges. Accordingly, on September 17, 1991 the Board sent the copies of the statements of Kalavathi and Gangadurai and the copy of the Birth Certificate of the daughter of the appellant, who was born on October 3, 1982. On September 19, 1991 the appellant sent a reply refuting the charges. Along with that she also sent marriage invitation, marriage certificate registered in the Registrar's Office and the certificate issued by the Panchayat Board President in which it is stated that the marriage was performed on April 3, 1991 at Gangadeeswarar Temple, Purasawalkam and thereafter the said marriage was registered at the Registrar's Office. (k) By the memo dated September 28, 1991 the appellant was intimated that the Assistant Accounts Officer (Banking Section) was appointed as Enquiry Officer to go into the charges levelled against her and she was informed that she should present herself before the Enquiry Officer on the day demanded and fixed by him. (l) Thereafter, the appellant made a written request to the Enquiry Officer to have the assistance of a Union representative to be present in he enquiry on her behalf. The Enquiry Officer allowed the same and one Sankaranarayanan, the Union representative of her choice was permitted to represent the case on her behalf. (m) On October 15, 1991 the enquiry commenced. The charges were read over to her and she was questioned in the presence of the said Union representative on November 2, 1991 on Gangadurai, the brother-in-law of the appellant was examined as a Board witness. He was cross-examined by the representative of the appellant. On December 20, 1991 another Board witness Dr. G. T. Thaiagarajan, Assistant Health Officer, Corporation,was examined. He was questioned about the Birth Certificate issued by the Corporation relating to the birth of the daughter of the appellant.(n) Though Kalavathi was said to be one of the witnesses for the Board, despite service of summons, she did not come and attend the enquiry. Therefore, she was dispensed with as "not required". (o) Between March 5, 1992 and March 13, 1992 the four witness produced by the appellant were examined. These witness gave statement to the Enquiry Office that they attended the marriage of the appellant with one Ezhumalai, who is one of the said four witnesses, on April 3, 1991 and then the said marriage was registered at the Registrar's Office. (o) Between March 5, 1992 and March 13, 1992 the four witness produced by the appellant were examined. These witness gave statement to the Enquiry Office that they attended the marriage of the appellant with one Ezhumalai, who is one of the said four witnesses, on April 3, 1991 and then the said marriage was registered at the Registrar's Office. (p) Since the appellant asked for time for filing written arguments, time was given to her and she gave written arguments on March 23, 1992. (q) After a detailed considered of the materials and the written arguments, the Enquiry Office sent a report dated February 20, 1993 to the Board giving a finding that the appellant got already marriage to one Veerabadran, son of Muthumari, well before she applied for Board's service and to circumvent the Board's Rules, she created a false record, as if she married one Ezhumalai, son of Muthumari on April 3, 1991 and as such, the charge enquired into was fully proved. (r) On receipt of the above report, the Board by the memo dated November 25, 1993, after agreeing with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, along with the enquiry report, directed the appellant to show cause as to why she should not be removed from the service of the Board in connection with the charge framed and proved against her. (s) By way of reply, the appellant sent a letter giving a detailed explanation to the Board on December 2, 1993. (t) On February 11, 1994, the Financial Controller, after having examined, analysed all the facts and material evidence and the explanation submitted by the appellant, came to the conclusion that the said explanation was not convincing and acceptable.(u) Hence, the provisional punishment of removal of service as already mentioned in the show cause notice dated November 25, 1993 was confirmed and the appellant, Office Helper (Trainee) was removed from the service of the Board with immediate effect. This order of removal was communicated to the appellant with the information that she may prefer an appeal to the Chief Financial Controller, if she desired so, within one month from the date of receipt of this order. (v) Thereafter, being aggrieved over the said order, the appellant filed an appeal on February 22, 1994 before the second respondent. This order of removal was communicated to the appellant with the information that she may prefer an appeal to the Chief Financial Controller, if she desired so, within one month from the date of receipt of this order. (v) Thereafter, being aggrieved over the said order, the appellant filed an appeal on February 22, 1994 before the second respondent. (w) By the order dated March 21, 1994 the second respondent dismissed the appeal holding that the appellate authority did not find any reason to modify the final orders passed by the punishing authority. (x) These orders were challenged in the writ petition before the single Judge, who, in turn, after hearing both parties, confirmed the orders of the respondents and dismissed the same on August 18, 1997. (y) Having failed before the authorities concerned and the single Judge, the present action has been resorted to by the appellant by filing this writ appeal. 3. Mr. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the appellant,would at length, while attacking the impugned orders, strenuously contended that the Enquiry Officer conducted the enquiry by acting as Presenting-cum-Prosecuting Officer, in violation of the principles of natural justice, causing great prejudice to the interest of the appellant and that the biased attitude shown by the Enquiry Officer indulging himself in the lengthy cross-examination of the witnesses and the non-consideration of the relevant materials produced by the delinquent, would make the order of removal invalid, since the same was based on the perverse finding given by the Enquiry Officer :4. In support of the said submissions, the learned counsel cited the following authorities : (1) Central Bank of India v. Prakash Chand Jain, (1969-II-LLJ-377) (SC) (2) C. Nagaraja Bhat v. Canara Bank, 1988 I L.L.N. 221(3) Anil Kumar v. Presiding Officer and others, (1986-I-LLJ-101) (SC) (4) Bharat Electronics Ltd. v. K. Kasi, 1986 (1) LLN 812. (5) State of Madras v. Kandaswami, 1972 (1) MLJ 374 . (6) R. K. Kindra v. Delhi Administration and others, (1984-II-LLJ-517) (SC) (7) Murlidhar Sitaram Rane v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 (1) LLN 558 and (8) Meenglas Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, (1963-II-LLJ-392) (SC). 5. (5) State of Madras v. Kandaswami, 1972 (1) MLJ 374 . (6) R. K. Kindra v. Delhi Administration and others, (1984-II-LLJ-517) (SC) (7) Murlidhar Sitaram Rane v. State of Maharashtra, 1990 (1) LLN 558 and (8) Meenglas Tea Estate v. Its Workmen, (1963-II-LLJ-392) (SC). 5. In line with the guidelines for departmental enquiry given by the Apex Court as well as this Court in the citations referred above, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would make the following submissions which are in brief : "Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is the duty of this Court, when a complaint is made without any evidence at all to support the impugned conclusion of the Tribunal, to find out whether the complaint so made is justified or not. In this case, the Enquiry Officer himself examined each of the witnesses by asking them questions, sometimes leading questions. Therefore, the sometimes leading questions. Therefore, the enquiry authority must be deemed to be biased in as much as all the witness for the Board were examined by him as if he was the Presentation Officer. Various questions put by the Enquiry Officer in this case to the witness and the delinquent could be regarded as objectionable and exposing state of biased mind on the part of the enquiring officer. In the instant case, the appellant had been questioned by the Enquiry Officer at great length and in considerable detail, and this would tantamount to cross-examining the appellant.It is now well-settled that the principles of natural justice have to be followed and the Presiding or Enquiry Officer can in no case enter the arena and assume the role of a prosecutor and judge as the Enquiry Officer has done in the instant case. An enquiry report in a quasi-judicial enquiry must show the reasons for the conclusion. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. The previous statement made by Kalavathi could not be taken as substantive evidence against the appellant, because the said Kalavathi did not appear as a witness before the Enquiry Officer. It cannot be an ipse dixit of the order in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. The previous statement made by Kalavathi could not be taken as substantive evidence against the appellant, because the said Kalavathi did not appear as a witness before the Enquiry Officer. The principal that a fact sought to be proved must be supported by statement made in the presence of the person against whom the enquiry is held and that statements made behind the back of the person charged are not to be treated as substantive evidence, is one of the basic principles which cannot be ignored. It is also well-settled that where a quasi-judicial Tribunal records a finding based on no legal evidence and merely on conjectures and surmises, the enquiry suffers from the infirmity of non-application of mind and stands vitiated. In the instant case, fair enquiry had not been conducted. The Enquiry Officer did put several questions on his personal Knowledge. He relied upon voters list which was not marked during the enquiry. The principles of natural justice have been completely throw to the wind by not taking into consideration of evidence of the witnesses produced by the delinquent and on the contrary, the Enquiry Officer had taken into account the uncorroborated testimony of one Gangadurai, who supported the charge framed. Moreover, the fact that Kalavathi had sent a letter withdrawing the earlier complaint against the deliquent has not been taken into consideration at all." 6. Mr. A. N. Sivaprakasam, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, in justification of the impugned orders, would vehemently contend that sufficient opportunity had been given to the appellant, that the Enquiry Officer did not conduct himself as a Presenting Officer, and that the evidence adduced through Board witnesses was properly analysed by the Enquiry Officer and elaborate reasonings have been given to accept the statements of the Board witnesses and to reject the evidence of the witnesses produced by the delinquent. In brief, the enquiry conducted by the Officer is fair one, the finding arrived at by the Enquiry Officer has been accepted by the first respondent after analysing the explanation given by the delinquent and the second respondent also in the appeal preferred by the appellant had dealt with the various aspects raised by the appellant and arrived at the correct conclusion and as such, the order of removal on the basis of the findings in the fact finding enquiry could not be disturbed in the writ jurisdiction. 7. In the light of the guidelines given in various authorities as referred above cited by the counsel for the appellant with reference to the conduct of departments enquiry, we shall now go into the question whether any evidence was available in support of the conclusion arrived at by the the Enquiry Officer. 8. No doubt it is true that the adequacy or inadequacy of evidence to support a finding given by the Enquiry Officer is not within the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The finding of fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer is entitled to respect, when it is established that the finding had been reached after consideration of all the relevant evidence and the surrounding circumstances.9. But in the instant case, it is the main thrust of the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant that the enquiry has not been properly conducted, the same is biased one and the conclusion has been arrived at without any evidence. Therefore, in our view, it is permissible to go into the said aspect in order to find out whether the Enquiry Officer was biased against the appellant, the finding was perverse and the same was not supported by any evidence and whether fair supported by any evidence and whether fair enquiry by observing principles of natural justice has been conducted. 10. It is quite relevant, at this stage, to bear in mind the observations made by the Apex Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S. K. Sharma, (1996-II-LLJ-296). In the said decision, the Supreme Court evolved certain basic principles of natural justice keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee. In the said decision, the Supreme Court evolved certain basic principles of natural justice keeping in view the context of disciplinary enquiries and orders of punishment imposed by an employer upon the employee. One of the relevant principles is as follows : "Whether the enquiry is not governed by any rules/regulations/statutory provisions and the only obligation is to observe the principles of natural justice-or, for that matter, wherever such principles are held to be implied by the very nature and impact of the order/action - the Court or the Tribunal should make a distinction between a total violation of natural justice (rule of audi alteram partem) and violation of facet of the said rules, as explained in the body of the judgment. In other words, a distinction must be made between "no opportunity" i.e., between "no notice"/" no hearing"and" no fair hearing. "(a) In the case of former, the order passed would undoubtedly be invalid (one may call it "void" or nullity as one chooses to). In such case, normally, liberty will be reserved for the Authority to take proceedings fresh according to law, i.e., in accordance with the said rule (audi alteram partem). (b) But in the latter case, the effect of violation (of a facet of the rule of audi a alteram partem) has to be examined from the standpoint of prejudice; in other words, what the Court or Tribunal has to see is whether in the totality of the circumstances, the delinquent officer/employee did or did not have a fair hearing and the orders to be made shall depend upon the answer to the said query." 11. Keeping in view the above principles, let us go into the questions referred to above. 12. Admittedly, the appellant was appointed as Officer Helper (Tribunal) on June 28, 1990 on compassionate ground for three years as per the scheme introduced by the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board in 1978 as stated above. She was removed from service on February 11, 1994. From this it is clear that she was allowed to work as a Trainee for nearly 31/2 years. She was removed from service on February 11, 1994. From this it is clear that she was allowed to work as a Trainee for nearly 31/2 years. Though the complaint was set by Kalavathi on October 8, 1990 itself and the Vigilance conducted the enquiry and sent a report on June 29, 1991 stating that there are prima facie materials against the delinquent to initiate departmental enquiry, she was not suspended nor terminated, though the same cane be done during the training period itself, as mentioned in the appointment order dated June 28, 1990. 13. Furthermore, it is to be noticed, as stated in the counter filed by the respondent, that the delinquent could be removed from service at any time she was appointed as Office Helper (Trainee) purely under emergency provision of the rules, and however, the first respondent,the Finance Controller, in order to follow the principles of natural justice, ordered departmental enquiry. 14. In pursuance of the said order, on September 9, 1991 charge memo was sent to the delinquent calling for explanation. When she demanded by the letter dated September 13, 1991 for the supply of copies of the documents, on September 17, 1991 the Board sent those documents and gave further time to give explanation. After receipt of the reply, she was also communicated about the appointment of the Enquiry Officer. The appellant, then requested the Enquiry Officer to permit her to be represented by Union representative. That was also allowed. Ultimately, the enquiry commenced on October 15, 1991. The enquiry was conducted in eight sittings from October 15, 1991 to March 13, 1992. The cross-examination and the examination of the witness was done by the Union representative on behalf of the delinquent. Even after enquiry, as requested by the delinquent, the time was given to file written arguments. Accordingly, the appellant filed her written submissions on March 23, 1992. Even thereafter, the Enquiry Officer took sufficient time for the verification of the documents and other records and ultimately, he gave his finding only on February 20, 1993. Only thereafter, the first respondent sent a show cause notice for the proposed punishment on November 25, 1993. On receipt of the reply dated December 2, 1993, the order of removal was passed terminating the appointment of the appellant only on February 11, 1994. Only thereafter, the first respondent sent a show cause notice for the proposed punishment on November 25, 1993. On receipt of the reply dated December 2, 1993, the order of removal was passed terminating the appointment of the appellant only on February 11, 1994. These things would reveal that neither the Enquiry Officer nor the first respondent showed undue haste before taking the said decision. In fact, a careful reading of the proceedings conducted by the Enquiry Officer and the removal order dated February 11, 1994 would make it obvious that the Board had given full opportunity to the appellant.15. Let us now go the charge. The charge is as follows : "Mrs. M. Vijayakumari, Office Helper (Trainee),joined the service on June 29, 1990, claiming that she is unmarried and under the compassionate ground. But she married Mr. Veerabadran in 1981. Her action is against Clause No. 19, XXV of the Tamil Nadu Electricity Board Standing Orders, applicable to the clerical staff and her action is a misconduct under the T.N.E.B. Standing Orders." The above charge was read over on October 15, 1991 to the delinquent in the presence of her Union representative. After recording the answer for the charge, the Enquiry Officer put further questions with reference to the statements in writing of Kalavathi and Gangadurai, who had stated that the delinquent got married to one Veerabadran even before her entering into the Board's service. The questions were also put with reference to the birth certificate of the alleged daughter of the appellant. Putting these questions, in our view, would not tantamount to cross-examination, because even along with the show-cause notice, as demanded by the delinquent, the copies of the statements of those persons and birth certificate were sent to her. The Enquiry Officer though it fit to get a clarification from the delinquent with reference to those documents and so, those questions have been correctly put to the delinquent. Therefore putting question by the Enquiry Officer giving opportunity to the delinquent for clarification cannot at all the termed to be the act of bias on the part of the Enquiry Officer. 16. As a matter of fact, the Enquiry Officer had put questions both to the witness produced by the he Board and to the witness produced by the delinquent. Those questions, in our opinion, are in the nature of finding out the truth from the witness. 16. As a matter of fact, the Enquiry Officer had put questions both to the witness produced by the he Board and to the witness produced by the delinquent. Those questions, in our opinion, are in the nature of finding out the truth from the witness. There is nothing either in the conduct of the proceedings or in the findings given by the Enquiry Officer to indicate that the enquiry was not a fair one. At the same time, we could not but say as to why this much of time was taken by the Enquiry Officer to finish the enquiry between September 9, 1991 and February 20, 1993.17. The finding given by the Enquiry Officer is that the declaration given by the delinquent in the application dated June 19, 1990 that she was unmarried was false and that on the basis of the false representation, she obtained the job as Officer Helper (Trainee). In support of the finding, the Enquiry Officer has discussed the evidence of one Gangadurai, who is none else than the brother-in-law of the delinquent and who categorically stated that the delinquent got married to one Veerabadran in the year 1981 and that he only presided over the marriage function and that she gave birth to two children. The birth certificate of the first daughter of the delinquent also was produced through the Assistant Health Officer Dr. Thiagarajan. The records would reveal that he was not cross-examined. The reason for non-cross examination is that the delinquent was not informed that the said Doctor would be examined on the Doctor was not availed of by the delinquent, the Enquiry Officer himself put questions to Doctor with reference to the objection raised by the delinquent regarding the birth certificate in her reply dated September 19, 1991 to the charge memo dated September 9, 1991. Moreover, the copy of the Birth Certificate was given to the delinquent as stated earlier well in advance. Therefore, the statement made by the Doctor before the Enquiry Officer with reference to the birth certificate giving the details of the birth of the first daughter born to Vijayakumari and Veerabadran along with the details of the residential address could very well be considered. Therefore, the statement made by the Doctor before the Enquiry Officer with reference to the birth certificate giving the details of the birth of the first daughter born to Vijayakumari and Veerabadran along with the details of the residential address could very well be considered. In fact, the Enquiry Officer after oral enquiry verified the address found in the birth certificate along with the voters' list which is public document, and on verification, it was found that those details were tallied with.18. Under these circumstances, the evidence given by Gangadurai to prove the charge framed, in the absence of any infirmity, has been accepted by the Enquiry Officer. The only suggestion put to the said Gangadurai that he gave such false evidence before the Enquiry Officer because he demanded Rs. 5,000 from the delinquent for not giving such evidence, but the delinquent refused to pay the same. This mere suggestion which has been denied would not make the evidence of the said Gangadurai unreliable, in the absence of any material to establish the same. Moreover, in her reply sent on September 19, 1991 the delinquent after receipt of copies of statements did not make such an allegation against Gangadurai. 19. The Enquiry Officer, though referred the statement of Kalavathi who has been given the complaint earlier, could not be said to have come to the conclusion that the charge is proved merely on the basis of the said statement. It is true that in the absence of the examination of the said Kalavathi, the statement given by her cannot be construed to be substantive evidence. However, mere reference about her statement by the Enquiry Officer could not be contended that reliance was placed upon the said statement as substantive evidence. 20. In the instant case, the main evidence projected by the Board through Gangadurai who is supported to a certain extent by the birth certificate of the daughter of the appellant which was marked through Doctor. 21. It is contended by the learned counsel that the said Kalavathi, who originally gave complaint, has subsequently withdrawn and that the same had not been considered by the Enquiry Officer. This is factually wrong. On going through the records, it is clear that Kalavathi had not forwarded any such letter withdrawing the earlier complaint to the Enquiry Officer. 21. It is contended by the learned counsel that the said Kalavathi, who originally gave complaint, has subsequently withdrawn and that the same had not been considered by the Enquiry Officer. This is factually wrong. On going through the records, it is clear that Kalavathi had not forwarded any such letter withdrawing the earlier complaint to the Enquiry Officer. Even the copy of the said letter dated October 4, 1991 said to have been sent by Kalavathi, which has been produced before this Court in the typed set would show that it was sent to the Chief Financial Controller, Electricity Board. There is nothing to indicate that the Enquiry Officer has received it during the course of enquiry Officer has received it during the course of enquiry. As pointed out earlier, despite the service of summons on various dates, the said Kalavathi did not choose to come before the Enquiry Officer either to support the complaint originally given or with the request of withdrawing the said complaint. Therefore, the statement given by Kalavathi either before the Vigilance Officer or the alleged letter dated October 4, 1991 sent by her for withdrawal of the complaint could be of no use to either of the parties.22. It is now well-settled law that the domestic Tribunals like an enquiring officer are not bound by the technical rules about the evidence under the Indian Evidence Act. At the same time, it cannot be debated that the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officers must be supported by the legal evidence, which consists of the statement made in the presence of the delinquent charged. Therefore, even without the evidence of Kalavathi, the Enquiry Officer could very well come to the conclusion on the other available evidence which has been given before the Enquiry Officer in the instant case by Gangadurai and the Doctor in the presence of the delinquent. 23. Much was said about the non-consideration of the relevant evidence adduced by the witnesses examined on behalf of the delinquent, by the Enquiry Officer. Factually, it is not correct. On perusal of the report of the Enquiry Officer, we find that the evidence of these witnesses on behalf of the appellant were in seriatim considered by the Enquiry Officer and valid reasons were given by him as to why their evidence is not to be accepted. 24. Factually, it is not correct. On perusal of the report of the Enquiry Officer, we find that the evidence of these witnesses on behalf of the appellant were in seriatim considered by the Enquiry Officer and valid reasons were given by him as to why their evidence is not to be accepted. 24. The first witness is one Jayalakshmi, the sister of the said Ezhumalai, who is the alleged husband of the delinquent. According to her, after the marriage between the delinquent and her brother on April 3, 1991 at the temple under Hindu custom, the same was registered at the Registrar's office also. Though she admits that the marriages of other members in her family were not registered, she was not able to say as to why her brother's marriage alone was registered. 25. The second witness is the President of Panchayat Board. He gave a certificate dated April 3, 1991 to the effect that as a Panchayat Board President he presided over the marriage at the temple and was present at the time of registration of the marriage at the Registrar's Office. But, he admitted in his evidence that he ceased to be Panchayat Board President in March, 1991 itself. When he was questioned as to why he gave the said certificate in that capacity, he stated that Ezhumalai requested for the said certificate, since there was some problem in his wife's job in the Electricity Board.26. The third witness is Ezhumalai, who is the husband of the appellant. He admitted that he did not know the reason as to why the marriage was registered. However, the fourth witness one Govindaraj, who is not related to either of the parties, would state that the marriage was registered, in order to see that the bridgeroom would not run away after cheating the bride. 27. The Enquiry Officer, thus discussed the evidence of each and every witness produced by the delinquent and rejected the same as unreliable by giving valid reasons. Furthermore, we must point out that the Enquiry Officer meticulously analysed all the relevant materials produced by both the parties and sent a detained report which runs about several pages. 28. As we indicated earlier, though the enquiry was over on March 23, 1992 on which date the appellant filed a written argument, the Enquiry Officer took nearly one year and sent the report on February 20, 1993. 29. 28. As we indicated earlier, though the enquiry was over on March 23, 1992 on which date the appellant filed a written argument, the Enquiry Officer took nearly one year and sent the report on February 20, 1993. 29. Apart from the inherent improbabilities in the evidence of the witnesses produced by the delinquent as pointed out by the Enquiry Officer, in the process of going through the statements of those witnesses in order to appreciate the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, we could also find some more infirmities in the evidence adduced by the delinquent. 30. According to the marriage certificate, the marriage was solemnized by the Kasilingam. He was not examined. But the second witness calling himself as President of Panchayat Board claimed to have presided over the marriage. His name was neither mentioned in the marriage certificate nor he attested the same. It is recorded in the marriage certificate that the marriage was solemnized at 16, Doss Nagar, Kanyapuram, Madras under Sec. 7(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act. But, in the evidence all the above four witness would state that the marriage was solemnized at the temple under Hindu custom.31. These things also, in our view, would strengthen the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer and approved by the respondents to the effect that the episode of alleged marriage on April 3, 1991 at the temple at the Registrar's Office was a drama belatedly enacted in order to defend in the departmental enquiry. 32. As stated earlier, long prior to the alleged date of marriage on April 3, 1991, the Vigilance enquiry had started. During the enquiry, the delinquent sent a letter dated November 23, 1990 that she did not marry any one. It is under these circumstances, the appellant, in our view, has put forward a theory that she got married only on April 3, 1991, probably in order to avoid the departmental enquiry. 33. In view of the above fact situation, we do not find any infirmity either in the procedure in the conduct of the enquiry or in the conclusion arrived at by the authorities. 34. 33. In view of the above fact situation, we do not find any infirmity either in the procedure in the conduct of the enquiry or in the conclusion arrived at by the authorities. 34. To sum up : (1) The Enquiry Officer in this case has given full opportunity to the delinquent by following the principles of natural justice; the copies of the statement on demand by the delinquent were immediately furnished, the Union representative of her choice was allowed to be appointed to defend her case; the witnesses produced by the Board were allowed to be cross-examined by the said Union representative on behalf of the delinquent; though the delinquent did not avail of the opportunity of cross-examining the Doctor, the Enquiry Officer put questions to the Doctor relating to the objections raised by the delinquent in her reply statement to show cause notice about the birth certificate of her alleged child; she was allowed to file a written argument; after receipt of the enquiry receipt she was allowed to give explanation regarding the proposed punishment of removal and she was also intimated about her right of appeal within 30 days from the date of receipt of the removal order. Thus, in our view, full opportunity was given to the appellant.(2) The Enquiry Officer has not conducted the enquiry in a biased manner. The question put to the witnesses of both the parties were only for clarification and the same would not amount to cross-examination. Those questions put by the Enquiry Officer could not also be said to be the leading questions out of his personal knowledge. The enquiry authority is entitled to put questions to the witnesses for clarification wherever it becomes necessary. Furthermore, none of the questions put by the enquiring authority to the witnesses could be regarded as objectionable and exposing a state of biased mind on the part of the enquiry authority. (3) In the totality of the circumstances, we feel in this case that the delinquent did have a fair hearing, in accordance with the rule of audi alteram partem as there is no violation of principles of natural justice causing prejudice to the delinquent. (4) The report of the enquiry Officer is a well-reasoned one on consideration of the materials produced by both the Board and the delinquent without omitting any aspect. (4) The report of the enquiry Officer is a well-reasoned one on consideration of the materials produced by both the Board and the delinquent without omitting any aspect. As such, the finding of the fact recorded by the Enquiry Officer which has been rightly approved by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority, is entitled to respect, as it is established that the said finding has been reached after consideration of all the relevant evidence and the surrounding circumstances of entire case. (5) When the finding of the enquiring authority has been based on some materials, this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot sit in an appeal over the proceedings recorded by the competent authority. In other words, this Court sitting in writ jurisdiction is not to appraise the evidence afresh as a Court of Appeal. 35. In view of the above conclusions, we dismiss this writ appeal as deviod of merits.