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1998 DIGILAW 465 (PAT)

Chandan Paswan v. State Of Bihar

1998-07-10

AFTAB ALAM

body1998
Judgment 1. JUDGMENT :- There is single appellant before this Court who stands convicted under Secs. 376 and 366 of the Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years and five years respectively under the two counts. The sentences are directed to run concurrently. 2 The prosecution case was instituted on the basis of the written complaint (Ext. 2) submitted by the prosecutrix Pawan Rekha Devi P.W. 6 to the Superintendent of Police, Codda on 27-1-1997. The Superintendent of Police sent her along with her written complaint to Meharma P.S. where on 28-1-1997, at 2.15 p.m., a formal first information report was drawn up incorporating the written complaint and giving rise to Meharma P.S. Case No. 6 of 1997. 3. In her written complaint the prosecutrix stated that on 16-1-1997 at about 4 p.m. while she had gone to the washermans shop, the appellant forcibly abducted her on the point of a pistol and carried her to a nearby sugar cane field. There he kept her detained for about two hours and at about 6 O Clock took her to the orchard adjacent to the petrol pump at Govindpur. He also beat her up several times when she tried to get away from there. At about 8 O Clock he tied up her hands with a muffler and committed rape on her. He then brought her to Firozpur, all the while threatening her with the pistol. The prosecutrixs infant child was sleeping in a temple at Firozpur. When she wanted to see her the informant took her there and then put the prosecutrix and her child in a car, covered her eyes and after about an hours journey took her out of the car at an unknown place. There were two more persons with him whom the prosecutrix was unable to identify as her eyes were covered. He kept her there for ten days and ten nights and committed rape on her once or twice every day. It was further stated in the written complaint that on 27-1-1997 (the date when the complaint was prepared and submitted) she somehow escaped from that place and came to Godda and was reporting the matter to the Superintendent of Police. 4. After the institution of the case she was sent for medical examination to the Sadar Hospital, Godda where she was examined by Dr. 4. After the institution of the case she was sent for medical examination to the Sadar Hospital, Godda where she was examined by Dr. L. Singh on 29-1-1997 at 10.30 A.M. The police after investigation submitted charge-sheet against the appellant on the basis of which he was put on trial for the offences punishable under Secs. 366 and 376 of the Penal Code. At the conclusion of the trial the Court convicted and sentenced him as stated above. 5. The prosecution examined seven witnesses before the trial Court in support of its case. Out of them P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 were declared hostile. P.W. 5 was simply tendered for cross-examination. P.W. 2 was the Doctor who had examined the prosecutrix. She was unable to give any definite opinion concerning the commission of rape on the prosecutrix. P.W. 6 was the prosecutrix herself and she remained firm and consistent in her accusation against the appellant. P.W. 7 was the Investigating Officer. 6. Before proceeding to examine the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses separately, it will be useful to take note of some broad features of the case as emerging from the materials on therecord. The place where the occurrence took place, that is, from where the prosecutrix was abducted is what is commonly called as red light area of the town and there are several houses of sex workers there. 7. The appellant shown to be 22 years old in the trial Courts judgment is the son of the local Mukhiya (some P.Ws. have described him as the Mukhias nephew but in his bail petition which I found on the record of the case he is described as the son of the Mukhia of the Panchayat). According to the prosecutrix he was a criminal and was feared by the people of the locality and further that after committing crimes he used to take refuge in the red light area. 8. The prosecutrix aged 28 years at the time of occurrence, was earlier married to some one in Rajasthan in the year 1988. She lived there till 1995 and gave birth to two children. Thereafter she came back to her place. Here she gave birth to a third child on 27-10-1996; according to her deposition her husband had come to see her in the months of February and March, 1996. She lived there till 1995 and gave birth to two children. Thereafter she came back to her place. Here she gave birth to a third child on 27-10-1996; according to her deposition her husband had come to see her in the months of February and March, 1996. Though she told the court that her husband was unable to keep her with him because of some disputes in his family and because he did not have a house of his own and further stated that he sent her money, it appears more probable that she was deserted by her husband. Back at home her brother did not give her any shelter in his house. According to the prosecutrix her brother wanted her to become a prostitute. He assaulted her and also took away some articles belonging to her. She had not gone to her brothers house during the past two years prior to the date of her deposition (August, 1997) and a proceeding under Sec. 107, Cr. P.C. was pending before them at that time. 9. On the other hand some of the prosecution witnesses, who were declared hostile by the prosecution, stated that her brother drove her out of his house because she had become wayward and unchaste. It further appears that at the material time the prosecutrix, having fallen out with her brother, did not have any fixed abode. She used to sleep for the night in the verandah of Jagdish Sah, P.W. 1 and used to spent the day hours in the premises of the Shiva Temple at Firozpur. According to her she managed her livelihood by giving tuition to children and by doing some tailoring work. 10. The defence tried to take full advantage of her unhappy and strained situation as described above. It was suggested aggressively that she was herself a wayward and wanton person who had targeted the son of the Mukhiya for levelling false accusation. 11. It is in the background of the aforesaid facts and circumstances that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is to be examined. It is noted above that excepting the prosecutrix herself all prosecution witnesses namely P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 turned hostile and simply denied having any knowledge about the occurrence. 11. It is in the background of the aforesaid facts and circumstances that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is to be examined. It is noted above that excepting the prosecutrix herself all prosecution witnesses namely P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 turned hostile and simply denied having any knowledge about the occurrence. On being cross-examined by the prosecution P.W. 1 Jagdish Prasad Sah denied having stated before the Investigating Officer that the Mukhiyas nephew forcibly carried away Pawan Rekha Devi (the prosecutrix), kept her confined for several days and forcibly subject her to sexual intercourse. He also denied having stated before the Investigating Officer that the prosecutrix had any relation with the appellant from before. 12. P.W. 3 Lata alias Latika Devi similarly stated that she did not say before the police that the appellant caught hold of the prosecutrix and forcibly carried her away. She also denied having stated before the police that nobody made any attempt to rescue the prosecutrix because Chandan Paswan was a criminal. 13. P.W. 4 Phul Kumari Devi also stated in Court that she did not say before the police that though she saw the appellant forcibly carrying away the prosecutrix, she did not say anything being afraid of the appellant. She also denied having said before the Police that the appellant was the son of the Mukhiya and was a criminal and therefore no one tried to stop him or to say anything. 14. However, from the evidence of the Investigating Officer P.W. 7 it is evident that P.Ws. 1, 3 and 4 were gained over and they deposed falsely before the court. From paragraph 7 of the deposition of P.W. 7 read with paragraph 10 of the case diary it is manifest that P.W. 1 had told the Investigating Officer that the prosecutrix, abandoned by her husband and her brother, used to sleep for the night in the verandah of his shop and managed her livelihood by giving tuition to children and by doing some odd jobs; that he came to learn that the Mukhiyas nephew Chandan Paswan (the appellant) had forcibly carried her away and kept her confined for several days andforcibly subjected her to sexual intercourse. 15. 15. Similarly from paragraph 8 of the deposition of P.W. 7 read with paragraph 6 of the case diary it is clear that P.W. 3 had told the Investigating Officer that she had witnessed the appellant forcibly carrying away the prosecutrix; that she had come out of her house on hearing hulla and had seen the appellant forcibly dragging away the prosecutrix; that this (incident) was witnessed by other villagers also but no one tried to rescue the prosecutrix or spoke anything about it because people were afraid of the appellant who was a Badmash. From paragraph 9 of the deposition of P.W. 7 read with paragraph 7 of the case diary it appears that P.W. 4 had also told the Investigating Officer that on the date of the occurrence she was in her house; that she knew the appellant and the prosecutrix from before; that on hearing hulla she came out and saw the appellant forcibly carrying away the prosecutrix; that she did not try to stop the appellant and did not say anything because the appellant was a Badmash and the nephew of the Mukhiya. 16. It appears that when the Investigating Officer met the witnesses after a few days of the occurrence the incident was still fresh and the witnesses were therefore, prepared to speak truthfully about it. However, when the matter came up for trial, after about six months, the witnesses had got enough time to realise that taking the side of the prosecutrix and thereby antagonizing the appellant would bring them to profits and could be hazardous too; on the other hand by giving up the cause of the prosecutrix (who in any event was abandoned by her own) they could hope for some profits without exposing themselves to any hazards. They made their decision and played their part before the trial Court accordingly. 17. The Doctor P.W. 2 was unable to give any definite opinion and told the court that sexual intercourses with the prosecutrix might or might not be ruled out. The Doctors opinion is quite understandable in view of the fact that she examined the prosecutrix on 29-1-1997 at 10.30 a.m., i.e. two days after she escaped from her confinement on 27-1-1997. 18. This leaves us with the evidence of the prosecutrix, P.W.6. The Doctors opinion is quite understandable in view of the fact that she examined the prosecutrix on 29-1-1997 at 10.30 a.m., i.e. two days after she escaped from her confinement on 27-1-1997. 18. This leaves us with the evidence of the prosecutrix, P.W.6. She remained perfectly consistent before the trial Court and gave some further details of the episode making her deposition even more convincing and acceptable. She told the Court that on 16-1-1997 at about 4 p.m. while she was returning from the washermans shop the appellant dragged her on the point of a pistol to a sugar cane field at a distance of about 100 yards. She was made to sit there for about two hours and after darkness set in the appellant took her to an orchard adjoining a petrol pump. When she begged to be released or when she cried the appellant assaulted her. He tied her hands with a muffler and committed rape on her. She further stated that two other boys who were with the appellant brought a car. She was taken by that car to a spot near the Ferozpur Mandir where her daughter was sleeping. From the Mandir they picked up her daughter also and travelled by the car for about an hour after covering her face. She was then brought to a room which was surrounded by a boundary wall. She was kept there for about ten days and each night the appellant raped her once or twice. One day the appellant was out and she was in the charge of a boy. Her daughter was seriously ill. The prosecutrix implored the boy who was watching her to let her go. He took her out and left her at a lonely place near a mound between Lal Matia and Meharma. At that point the prosecutrix took a bus coming from Pirpaiti and going to Godda. She thus came to Godda and gave a petition in writing to the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police sent her to Meharma P.S. with a constable. They reached Meharma P. S. on 18-1-1997 at about 2 p.m. where the case was instituted. She identified her written complaint which was marked as Ext. 2. She thus came to Godda and gave a petition in writing to the Superintendent of Police. The Superintendent of Police sent her to Meharma P.S. with a constable. They reached Meharma P. S. on 18-1-1997 at about 2 p.m. where the case was instituted. She identified her written complaint which was marked as Ext. 2. The prosecutrix was subjected to a lengthy cross-examination (which in parts borders on indecency) but she remained absolutely firm and consistent and the defence was unable to obtain anything to discredit her evidence. At the conclusion of her deposition the court asked her why the persons who saw the appellant dragging her away did not came to her rescue. She answered that the appellant being a criminal the persons of the locality were frightened of him. 19. Having very carefully perused the deposition of P.W. 6 I find no infirmity there and it appears that her statement in the written complaint and her statement before the Court are perfectly consistent, reliable and trustworthy. I further find myself in agreement with the trial Court that the evidence of the prosecutrix issufficiently reliable to maintain the appellants conviction though it does not find any corroboration from any other witness. 20. In Bharwada Bhoginbhai Hirjibhai V/s. State of Gujarat, AIR 1983 SC 753 : (1983 Cri LJ 1096) the Supreme Court made the following observation (paras 9 and 11) :In the Indian setting, refusal to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of the girl or the woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation be viewed with the aid of spectacles fitted with lenses tinged with doubt, disbelief or suspicion? To do so is to justify the charge of male chauvinism in a male dominated society. "Further :". . . . . . . . Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. . . . . . . . Just as a witness who has sustained an injury (which is not shown or believed to be self inflicted) is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of a sex-offence is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration notwithstanding. And while corroboration in the form of eye-witness account of an independent witness may often be forthcoming in physical assault cases, such evidence cannot be expected in sex offences, having regard to the very nature of the offence. It would therefore be adding insult to injury to insist on corroborating drawing inspiration from the rules devised by the Courts in the western world (obeisance to which has perhaps become a habit presumably on account of the colonial hung-over). We are therefore of the opinion that if the evidence of the victim does not suffer from any basic infirmity, and the probabilities-factor does not render it unworthy of credence, as a general rule, there is no reason to insist on corroboration except from the reason the medical evidence, where, having regard to the circumstances of the case, medical evidence can be expected to be forthcoming, subject to the following qualifications : Corroboration may be insisted upon when a woman having attained majority is found in a compromising position and there is likelihood of her having levelled such an accusation on account of the instinct of self-preservation. Or when the probabilities-factor is found to be out of tune." 21. I feel that the aforequoted observations of the Supreme Court apply with full force to the facts of this case. 22. At this stage, it may be noted that the witness examined by the appellant was almost farcical and I am unable to accept her statement.22A. For the reasons stated above, I find and hold that the trial Court rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant. The appellants conviction and sentence are accordingly confirmed. 23. I find no merit in this appeal. It is accordingly dismissed.Appeal dismissed.