JUDGMENT The Judgment of the Court was as follows :–– In this writ application Calcutta Improvement Trust (hereinafter referred to as CIT) has challenged an award of additional compensation under Section 23 (1A) and 23 (2) and compensation for damage under Section 48A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the said Act) passed by an order dated 23.12.88 by the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) in case No.4 of 1983 (V) under Section 18 of the said Act. 2. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 on 20.1.98 submitted before the Court that the respondent No.4 shall not file any affidavit-in-opposition in connection with the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 also submitted that the main application may be disposed of. The order dated 20.1.98 passed by this Court reads as follows :–– "The learned Advocate for the petitioner filed an affidavit of service on behalf of the petitioner showing service upon the respondents Nos. 1 and 2 pursuant to the order passed by this Court on 15.1.98. It further appears that on 15.1.98 the deponent of the affidavit of service went to serve a copy of the writ petition and a copy of the letter dated 15.1.98 issued by the learned Advocate for the petitioner communicating the order passed by the Court on 15.1.98 upon the respondent No.3 at the office of the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal. It further appears that he was told by one Sri Tapan Das, an employee of the Tribunal, that the learned President of the Tribunal has retired and the said employee of the Tribunal declined to receive the service. Under these circumstances I accept that the respondents Nos. 1, 2 and 3 have been duly served. Heard the learned Advocate for the petitioner. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 stated before this Court that the respondent No.4 shall not file any affidavit-in-opposition in connection with the writ petition filed by the petitioner. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 also submitted that the main application may be disposed of. As stated earlier the learned Advocate for the petitioner has made his submission. The learned Advocate for respondent No.4 is making his submission. The matter is heard in part. The matter shall appear tomorrow immediately after the "To be mentioned" matters. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 also submitted that the main application may be disposed of. As stated earlier the learned Advocate for the petitioner has made his submission. The learned Advocate for respondent No.4 is making his submission. The matter is heard in part. The matter shall appear tomorrow immediately after the "To be mentioned" matters. Interim order is extended until further order of this Court." 3. Accordingly the matter was finally beard, the learned Advocates for the petitioner and the respondent No.4 made submissions on behalf of their clients. 4. The respondent No.4 chose not to file any affidavit-in-opposition in connection with the writ petition. The statements made in the writ petition remained uncontroverted. The Court is bound to proceed on the basis of the uncontroverted statements made in the writ petition. 5. It appears from the writ petition that CIT was the requiring authority for the acquisition of premises No. 25, Deshapran Sashmal Road, Calcutta comprising of C. S. Plot Nos. 127, 128, 136 and 137 of mouza Kankulia. The said premises was required for the implementation of the general improvement scheme; being scheme No. 107 of CIT. The respondent No.4 claimed to be the owner of the said plot of land. For the purpose of implementation of aforesaid scheme No. 107 of CIT the said premises No. 25, Deshapran Sashmal Road, Calcutta was acquired. The Land Acquisition (L A) Collector passed the award on 16.10.1975. The respondent No.4 in the writ proceeding who was the claimant duly received the compensation awarded by the Collector. The possession of the land was taken on 12.12.1975. In the writ petition, CIT has made specific statement that thereafter CIT had no knowledge about further proceeding in the matter which remains uncontroverted. It is the case of CIT that on or about 20.11.97 for the first time, the Land Acquisition Collector by his letter dated 19.11.97 intimated CIT, the writ petitioner, that on 7.11.97 N. K. Mitra, J., in connection with a contempt application which was filed against the only alleged contemner Shri Baidyanath Sinha Roy, First Land Acquisition Collector, passed an order by directing CIT to provide with the funds to the First Land Acquisition Collector within two months so far 12% interest is concerned. The writ petitioner further stated that from the aforesaid letter dated 19.11.97. The writ petitioner further stated that from the aforesaid letter dated 19.11.97. It further appears that the Tribunal proceeded with a case being case No.4 of 1983 (V) on the reference application of the claimant. These statements have not been controverted by the respondent No.4 by filing any affidavit-in-opposition. 6. The relevant portions from the aforesaid letter dated 19.11.97 issued by the Land Acquisition Collector which is Annexure 'A' of the writ petition are quoted hereinbelow:– "In continuation of this Office Memo No. 1349-L.A., dated .11.97 on the subject I am to furnish the gist of the Order passed by the Hon'ble High Court on the contempt hearing on 7.11.97 which is as follows :–– N. K. Mitra, J. 7.11.97. Personal appearance of First Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta is dispensed with CIT is directed to provide with the funds to First Land Acquisition Collector within 2 months so far 12% interest is concerned. The 1st Land Acquisition Collector will disburse the same to the party within one month. The application is disposed of. I accordingly request you kindly to comply the Hon'ble Court's Order by placing the required fund immediately." 7. CIT, the writ petitioner, in Paragraph 5 of the writ petition stated as follows :–– "The petitioner states that, at no point of time the applicant was served with a notice about filing of the said reference case, and of the proceedings thereunder. At no point of time the petitioner was provided with any communication or notice or provided with an opportunity for making submission, adduce any evidence for the said proceeding before the Tribunal, although under Section 50(2) of the Land Acquisition Act the petitioner is entitled to adduce evidence or make submission in the matter of determination of compensation by the Court. The petitioner was never communicated about the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed in the case No.4 of 1983 (V) determining the compensation in the matter of said acquisition on five counts." These statements remain uncontroverted. The respondent No. 4 did not deny/dispute the above quoted statements. 8. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 argued that since the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed by the Tribunal in case No.4 of 1983 (V) was not complied with, the respondent No.4 initiated a writ proceeding being Matter No. ............... The respondent No. 4 did not deny/dispute the above quoted statements. 8. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 argued that since the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed by the Tribunal in case No.4 of 1983 (V) was not complied with, the respondent No.4 initiated a writ proceeding being Matter No. ............... of 1994 (Salil Kumar Miller v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) in the Original Side of this High Court. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 produced the signed copy of the minute of the order dated 28.9.94 passed by N. K. Mitra, J. in Matter No. .................. of 1994 (Salil Kumar Miller v. State of West Bengal and Ors.). The order dated 28.9.94 passed by N. K. Mitra, J., reads as follows :–– "The Court: None appears for the respondents. After hearing the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the writ application is disposed of by directing the respondent No.2 to remit the requisite amount as per Award being Annexure 'A' positively within 31st of December, 1994. Time limit so fixed is peremptory and mandatory. All parties to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking." The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 in course of his argument very fairly submitted that in the aforesaid writ proceeding being Matter No. .................. of 1994 (Salil Kumar Miller v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) on was not a party. Therefore, it goes without saying that CIT not being a party in the said writ proceeding, the order dated 28.9.94 has no binding force upon CIT, the writ petitioner in the present case. There is nothing on record to show that CIT was aware of the said writ proceeding at the time when the said writ proceeding was pending. 9. It appears that a contempt proceeding being C.C. No.5 of 1995 was initiated by the respondent No.4 against one Shri Baidyanath Sinba Roy on the ground of alleged violation of the aforesaid order dt. 28.9.94 passed by N. K. Mitra, J. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 produced the xerox copies of the signed copies of the minutes of the orders dated 5.1.96 and 7.11.97 passed by N. K. Mitra, J., in C. C. No.5 of 1995. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 4 very fairly submitted that in the said contempt proceeding on was not a part. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 4 very fairly submitted that in the said contempt proceeding on was not a part. The order dated 7.11.97 passed by N. K. Mitra, J. in the aforesaid contempt proceeding is quoted hereinbelow :–– "The Court : It has been submitted by the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the 1st Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta that the disputed property was acquired for the purpose of Calcutta Improvement Trust. Though an Award has been declared but since the Calcutta Improvement Trust has not put in the Awarded sum with the 1st Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, the same could not be paid to the Awardees. In such view of the matter, the Calcutta Improvement Trust is directed to put in the Awarded sum with the 1st Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, except the money which had already been paid by the contemner to the petitioner in this contempt application positively within 31.12.97 and the money would be disbursed in favour of the Awardees be the 1st Land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta, within a week thereafter. The time limit so fixed is peremptory and mandatory. Personal appearance of the alleged contemner is dispensed with. The application is disposed of. Liberty to mention. All parties are to act on a signed copy of the minutes of this order on the usual undertaking." 10. From the discussions made hereinabove it is apparent on the face of the record that CIT, the writ petitioner at no point of time had any notice or knowledge about the case No.4 of 1983 (V) before the said Tribunal which was initiated by respondent No.4 under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. CIT, the writ petitioner, was not provided with any opportunity for making any submission, adduce any evidence before the Tribunal in connection with the said case No.4 of 1983 (V). CIT, the writ petitioner, was never communicated with the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed by the Tribunal in case No.4 of 1983 (V), determining the compensation in the matter of above mentioned acquisition. CIT, the writ petitioner, was not even made party in the writ proceeding being Matter No...............of 1994 (Salil Kumar Mitter v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) which was disposed of by N. K. Mitra, J., on 28.9.94. CIT, the writ petitioner, was not even made party in the writ proceeding being Matter No...............of 1994 (Salil Kumar Mitter v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) which was disposed of by N. K. Mitra, J., on 28.9.94. Admittedly CIT, the writ petitioner, was not a party in the aforesaid contempt proceeding being C. C. No.5 of 1995 which was finally disposed of by N. K. Mitra, J., on 7.11.97. 11. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 argued that it is difficult to believe that CIT had no knowledge about the proceeding being case No.4 of 1983 (V) before the learned Tribunal. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 submitted that CIT could have appeared before the Tribunal and made its submission and adduce evidence. But the learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 could not produce any evidence to show that CIT, the writ petitioner, was aware of the proceeding being case No. 4 of 1983 (V) before the Tribunal. It is important to note here that even in the writ proceeding being Matter No. ........... of 1994 (Salil Kumar Mitter v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) which was disposed of by N. K. Mitra, J., on 28.9.94, CIT was not made a party. Therefore, CIT had no notice of the aforesaid writ proceeding also. Admittedly in the contempt proceeding being C.C. No.5 of 1995 CIT, the writ petitioner, was not a party. Therefore, it is apparent on the face of the record that Awards and directions were passed against CIT without affording CIT any opportunity to state its case. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 submitted that CIT could have preferred an appeal against the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed in case No.4 of 1983 (V) by the Tribunal. And since CIT, the writ petitioner, did not prefer any appeal before this High Court against the said Award and order dated 23.12.88, the instant writ application is not maintainable and cannot be entertained. In support of this argument the learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 referred to (1) Bihar Stale Housing Board v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1995 Patna 58. In support of this argument the learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 referred to (1) Bihar Stale Housing Board v. State of Bihar reported in AIR 1995 Patna 58. In that case a Division Bench of Patna High Court held that State Housing Board could have preferred an appeal under Section 54 of the Act against an Award enhancing the compensation for land acquired for it and even if the said appeal is barred by limitation an application for condonation of delay upon furnishing sufficient cause thereon could have been filed. The Division Bench held that thus where, without preferring an appeal against the enhancement of Award under Section 54 and without filing application for impleading itself as a party to the reference for enhancement the writ petition filed by Board after a period of 11 years without explaining gross delay and laches on its part is not maintainable. I am of the view that the facts and circumstances involved in Bihar State Housing Board's case (supra) are absolutely different from the facts and circumstances involved in the instant case. In the instant case question of filing application for impleading itself as a party to the reference for enhancement could not arise since CIT, the writ petitioner, had no knowledge about it. In the instant writ proceeding the writ petitioner has explained the cause for delay in the matter of filing the writ application which was not denied or disputed by the respondent No.4. I am satisfied that the delay has been explained by the writ petitioner properly and sufficiently. The rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before a writ could be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law, and the Court may; in exceptional cases, issue a discretionary writ notwithstanding the fact that the statutory remedies have not been exhausted. The rule does not bar the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226. What these exceptional circumstances are, cannot be exhaustively enumerated because the matter is pre-eminent one for the discretion of the Court issuing the writ, which is to be exercised according to the facts of each case. 12. The rule does not bar the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226. What these exceptional circumstances are, cannot be exhaustively enumerated because the matter is pre-eminent one for the discretion of the Court issuing the writ, which is to be exercised according to the facts of each case. 12. CIT, the writ petitioner, in Paragraph 12 of the writ petition stated that the writ petitioner has filed a review application before the Tribunal for review of the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed in case No.4 of 1983 (V), which was fixed on 11.12.97, but the prayer for stay of the award was refused. The learned Advocate for the petitioner in course of his argument submitted that the writ petitioner shall withdraw the review application which has been filed before the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal. The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the application for withdrawal is ready but the same could not be filed because the President of the Tribunal bas retired from the service and now no President has been appointed and for that reason the Tribunal is not sitting and the application could not be filed. Question is whether pending review application stands in the way of exercising the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. In (2) Municipal Council, Khurai and Anr. v. Kamal Kumar & Anr. reported in AIR 1965 SC 1321 , Supreme Court in Paragraph 7 of the reported decision observed as follows :–– "Before us it is contended by Mr. Setalvad on behalf of the Council that an appeal had already been preferred by the respondents against the assessment list and, therefore, they were not entitled to any relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that the High Court would not ordinarily entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution where no alternative remedy is open to the aggrieved party. Though that is so the High Court has jurisdiction to grant relief to such a party if it thinks proper to do so in the circumstances of the case. In the present case the High Court has chosen to exercise discretion in favour of the respondents and it would not be right for us to interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless we are satisfied that the action of the High Court was arbitrary or unreasonable. In the present case the High Court has chosen to exercise discretion in favour of the respondents and it would not be right for us to interfere with the exercise of that discretion unless we are satisfied that the action of the High Court was arbitrary or unreasonable. Nothing has been brought to our notice from which it could be inferred that the High Court acted arbitrarily in granting the writ prayed for to the respondents." 13. Thus it appears to me that this Court has jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to grant relief to such a party if the Court thinks proper to do so in the circumstances of the case, mere pendency of a review application or failure to make an appeal before the appellate authority does not take away the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution but such exercise of discretion by the High Court should not be arbitrary or unreasonable. 14. It appears from the Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed by the Tribunal in case No.4 of 1983 (V) which is Annexure 'B' of the writ petition that the Tribunal had (i) enhanced the Land Value over the Collector's Award, (ii) Awarded additional compensation under Section 23(1A) at the rate of 12% per annum, (iii) granted statutory allowance at the rate of 30% on the value of the land, (iv) Awarded damage under Section 48A of the Act at the rate of 9% of the Award. (v) granted Interest at the rate of 9% for one year and thereafter at the rate of 15% per annum on the aforesaid damage and compensation. 15. The learned Advocate for the writ petitioner argued the following points :–– 1. Right of requiring body to get notice from the Collector and the reference Court was not complied with, right to be made party and to adduce evidence was not given to the writ petitioner and due to violation of these rights the writ petitioner can invoke the writ jurisdiction. 2. Under Section 23 (1A) of the said Act the petitioner is not liable to pay additional compensation if Collector passed the Award prior to 30.4.1982, the cut-off date. 3. 2. Under Section 23 (1A) of the said Act the petitioner is not liable to pay additional compensation if Collector passed the Award prior to 30.4.1982, the cut-off date. 3. Section 48A introduced by West Bengal Act, XXXII of 1955 amending the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 to pay damages for delay was omitted by the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 and, therefore CIT, the writ petitioner, is not liable to pay damage for delay under Section 48A which was omitted by the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976. 16. In the matter of enquiry and valuation, Collector acts only as an agent of Government and the Award, in law is an offer or tender of compensation determined by the Collector. Land Acquisition Collector is a statutory authority and it discharges statutory functions and not executive functions of the Government. When once the Award as to the amount has become final, all questions as to fixing of compensation are then at an end. From the moment the Awarded sum has been deposited in the Court under Section 31(2), the functions of the Award have ceased and the Collector cease to act as an agent of the Government. In Paragraph 3 of the writ petition the writ petitioner stated that the Land Acquisition (L.A.) Collector passed the Award on 16.10.1975 and the claimant respondent No.4 duly received the compensation Awarded by the Collector and the possession of the land was taken on 12.12.75. 17. In the case of (3) Comilla Electric Supply Ltd. v. East Bengal Bank Ltd., Comilla reported in AIR 1939 Cal 669. A Division Bench of the High Court held that the company for whose benefit the land was acquired had undoubtedly a right to appear and adduce evidence on the quantum of compensation. Mukherjee, J. observed :–– "Section 50, Clause (2) purports to remedy this disability and it lays down that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The reason is plain. Mukherjee, J. observed :–– "Section 50, Clause (2) purports to remedy this disability and it lays down that in any proceeding held before a Collector or Court in such cases the local authority or company concerned may appear and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation. The reason is plain. It is the company or the local authority who has got to pay the money in such cases and it would be unjust to deny them the right to appear and adduce evidence which would have a bearing on the amount of the compensation money." Roxburgh, J. made the following observations :–– "Thus the first question for decision is clearly settled by the above decision and there can be no doubt that in the circumstances at present being considered the company is a person interested, as defined in the Act, and is entitled to require a reference under Section 18 unless that right is restricted by the terms of the proviso to Section 50(2)." 18. Case No.4 of 1983 (V) before the Tribunal which was initiated by the respondent No.4 under Section 18 of the L. A. Act. On the face of it, it shows that the said case was registered in 1983. Supreme Court in (4) Himalaya Tiles & Marble (P) Ltd. v. Francis Victor Coutinho reported in AIR 1980 SC 1118 in Paragraph 13 of the reported decision observed as follows :–– "Thus, the preponderance of judicial opinion seems to favour the view that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. In our opinion, this view accords with the principles of equity, Justice and good conscience. How can it be said that a person for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is to pay the compensation is not a person interested even though its stake may be extremely vital? For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. For instance, the land acquisition proceedings may be held to be invalid and thus a person concerned is completely deprived of the benefit which is proposed to be given to him. Similarly, if such a person is not heard by the Collector or a Court, he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before a Court, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view taken by the Orissa High Court or even by the Calcutta High Court that a company, local authority or a person for whose benefit the land is acquired is not an interested person. We are satisfied that such a person is vitally interested both in the title to the property as also in the compensation to be paid therefor because both these factors concern its future course of action and if decided against him, seriously prejudice his lights. Moreover, in view of the decision of this Court referred to above, we hold that the appellant was undoubtedly a person interested as contemplated by Section 18(1) of the Act. The High Court, therefore, committed an error in throwing out the appeal of the appellant on the ground that had no locus to file an appeal before the Bench." This judgment was rendered by Supreme Court on 28.3.80 and it became law of the land. 19. Sections 70 and 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 read as follows :–– "70. A Tribunal shall be constituted, as provided in Section 72, for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Board under the Laud Acquisition Act, 1894. 71. 19. Sections 70 and 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 read as follows :–– "70. A Tribunal shall be constituted, as provided in Section 72, for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Board under the Laud Acquisition Act, 1894. 71. For the purpose of acquiring land under the said Act for the Board,–– a) the Tribunal shall (except for the purpose of Section 54 of that Act) be deemed to be the Court, and the President of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Judge under the said Act; b) the said Act shall be subject to the further modifications indicated in the schedule; c) the President of the Tribunal shall have power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and to compel the production of documents, by the same means and (so far as may be) in the same manner, as is provided in the case of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; and d) the Award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Award of the Court under the said Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and (shall, subject to the provisions of Section 77A, be final)." In view of the laid Sections 70 and 71 the Tribunal constituted as provided in Section 72 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 shall perform the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Board under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The term 'the Board' has been defined in Section 2 (a) of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, it means the Board of Trustees for the improvement of Calcutta constituted under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. Admittedly the Premises No. 25, Deshapran Sashmal Road, Calcutta had been acquired for the Board and, therefore, Sections 70 and 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 are applicable in the instant case. In view of Section 71(b) of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall be subject to the modifications indicated in the schedule of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. In view of Paragraph 1 of the schedule referred to in Section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 the expression ‘local authority’ includes the Board of Trustees constituted under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. In view of Paragraph 1 of the schedule referred to in Section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 the expression ‘local authority’ includes the Board of Trustees constituted under the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. It appears that Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been touched by the schedule referred to in Section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 reads as follows :–– "20. Service of notice.––The Court shall thereupon cause a notice, specifying the day on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection, and directing their appearance before the Court on that day, to be served on the following persons, namely :–– a) the applicant; b) all persons interested in the objection, except such (if any) of them as have consented without protest to receive payment of the compensation Awarded; and c) If the objection is in regard to the area of the land or to the amount of the compensation, the Collector." 21. Thus it appears that in 1983 when the reference case under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was registered before the Tribunal it was the law of the land that the definition of 'person interested' must be liberally construed so as to include a body, local authority, or a company for whose benefit the land is acquired and who is bound under an agreement to pay the compensation. CIT, the writ petitioner, being the person interested was entitled to have notice under said Section 20 from the Tribunal regarding the aforesaid case under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 20 of the Lana Acquisition Act, 1894 accords with principles of equity, Justice and good conscience. If such an interested person is not heard by the Tribunal then he may have to pay a very heavy compensation which, in case he is allowed to appear before the Tribunal, he could have satisfied it that the compensation was far too heavy having regard to the nature and extent of the land. Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory and it was bounden duty of the Tribunal, to serve a notice upon CIT, the writ petitioner, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is mandatory and it was bounden duty of the Tribunal, to serve a notice upon CIT, the writ petitioner, as contemplated under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. By not serving a notice upon CIT, the writ petitioner, under Section 20 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894 the Tribunal proceeded with the matter arbitrarily and in excess of its jurisdiction ignoring the above referred Supreme Court decision and Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to proceed with any matter referred to it under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 without serving any notice to the 'person interested' as contemplated by Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. If the Tribunal proceeds with the hearing of the case referred to it under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 without serving any notice to the 'person interested' under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 then it shall amount to acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Admittedly in the instant case the Tribunal proceeded with the aforesaid case No.4 of 1983 (V) and passed the Award and the order dated 23.12.88 without serving any notice upon CIT, the writ petitioner, under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Thus the Tribunal passed the Award and the order dated 23.12.88 without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction. At the cost of repetition it may be stated here that CIT, the writ petitioner, had no knowledge about the case before the Tribunal. No evidence has been placed before this Court to show that the writ petitioner had knowledge about the case pending before the Tribunal. 21. A Bench of seven Judges of Supreme Court in (5) Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Syed Ishaque reported in AIR 1955 SC 233 at page 249 of the reported decision observed as follows :–– "Certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural Justice." 23. The learned Advocate for the respondent No 4 drew the attention of the Court to the following passage of the order of the Tribunal :–– "On the side of the opposite party/State of West Bengal Sri Debesh Ch. Chowdhury, the Valuation Officer of the Calcutta Improvement Trust, has been examined. He has produced and formally proved his valuation report on land along with a key plan drawn by him (vide Ext. A). And in his report he has suggested the rate of Rs. 8,833/- per cottah for valuation of the disputed land." Relying upon the above quoted paragraph the learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 argued that Sri Debesh Ch. Chowdhury, the Valuation Officer of Calcutta Improvement Trust had been examined and be produced and formally proved his valuation report on land along with a key plan drawn by him and in his report be had suggested the rate of Rs. 8,833/- per cottah for valuation of the disputed land. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 argued that thus it is evident that an Officer of CIT was examined so it cannot be said that CIT had no knowledge about the case pending before the Tribunal. It appears from the said Award and order of the Tribunal that the said valuer was repeatedly referred to in the later part of the Award and order as the Government Valuer. Thus it is evident that Sri Debesh Chandra Chowdhury, Valuation Officer of CIT was examined in course of the proceeding before the Tribunal not as a witness of CIT but as a Government Valuer. That apart mere knowledge of one Officer of CIT namely, Sri Debesh Ch. Chowdhury, the Valuation Officer does not amount to a service of notice upon CIT under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 24. The provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of the Lind Acquisition Act, was inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1934. Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 reads as follows :–– "30. 24. The provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of the Lind Acquisition Act, was inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1934. Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 reads as follows :–– "30. Transitional provisions.––(1) The provisions of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 of the Principal Act, as inserted by Clause (a) of Section 15 of this Act, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to and in relation to,–– (a) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act pending on the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1982, in the House of the People), in which an Award has been made by the Collector before that date; (b) every proceeding for the acquisition of any land under the Principal Act commenced after that date, whether or not an Award has been made by the Collector before the date of commencement of this Act." This Section 30(1) of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 was considered by Supreme Court in (6) Union of India & Ors. v. Filip Tiago De Gama reported in AIR 1990 SC 981 . Paragraphs 20 and 21 of the reported decision read as follows :–– 20. "Entitlement of additional amount provided under Section 23 (1A) depends upon pendency of acquisition proceedings as on 30th April, 1982 or commencement of acquisition proceedings after that date. Section 30, sub-section (1)(a) provides that additional amount provided under Section 23 (1A) shall be applicable to acquisition proceedings pending before the Collector as on 30th April, 1982 in which he has not made the Award before that date. If the Collector has made the Award before that date then, that additional amount cannot be awarded. Section 30, sub-section (1)(a) provides that Section 23 (1A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after 30th April, 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an Award or not before 24th September, 1984. The final point to note is that Section 30, sub-section (1) does not refer to Court Award and the Court Award is used only in Section 30, sub-section (2). 21. In the case before us, on 26th October, 1967, the notification under Section 4 was issued. On 5th March, 1969 the Collector made the Award. The final point to note is that Section 30, sub-section (1) does not refer to Court Award and the Court Award is used only in Section 30, sub-section (2). 21. In the case before us, on 26th October, 1967, the notification under Section 4 was issued. On 5th March, 1969 the Collector made the Award. The result is that on 30th April, 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector. Therefore, Section 30 sub-section (1) (a) is not attracted to the case. Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30th April, 1982, Section 30, sub-section (1) (b) is also not applicable to the case. Here, the case is really gone by both ways. It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis. The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23 (1A).” (7) K. S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala reported in AIR 1995 SC 1012 . The majority view of the Bench, in Paragraph 55 of the reported decision. Inter alia, laid down as follows :–– "Merely because sub-section (1) of Section 30 only refers to Award made by the Collector while sub-section (2) of Section 30 also refers to an Award made by the Court as well as the order passed by the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeal against such Award does not mean that Section 23(1A) was intended to have application to all proceedings which were pending before the Civil Court on the date of the commencement of the amending Act. The difference in the phraseology in sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 30 only indicates the limited nature of the retrospectivity that has been given to provisions contained in Section 23 (1A) under Section 30(1) as compared to that given to the provisions of Sections 23(2) and 28 under Section 30(2). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that has been conferred in respect of Section 23 (1A) under sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity into the provisions of Section 23 (1A). The limited scope of the retrospectivity that has been conferred in respect of Section 23 (1A) under sub-section (1) of Section 30 does not lend support to the contention that the scope of such retrospectivity should be enlarged by reading such further retrospectivity into the provisions of Section 23 (1A). For the reasons aforementioned we are of the view that in relation to proceedings which were initiated prior to the date of the commencement of the amending Act Section 23 (1A) would be applicable only to those cases which fall within the ambit of Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the amending Act. In this context it is also necessary to bear in mind the rule of statutory construction that even where a statute is clearly intended to be to some extent retrospective; it is not to be construed as having a greater retrospective effect than its language renders necessary. (See: Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 44, para 924). There is, therefore, no scope for extending the ambit of retrospective operation of sub-section (1A) of Section 23 beyond the limits specified in Section 30(1) of the amending Act so as to apply it to all proceedings initiated prior to the date of coming into force or the amending Act which were pending before the Civil Court on reference under Section 18 of the principal Act irrespective of the date on which the Award was made by the Collector. For the reasons aforementioned we are unable to subscribe to the view taken in (8) Zora Singh, 1992 (1) SCC 673 , (supra) that sub-section (1A) of Section 23 would apply to all proceedings pending in the Reference Court on the date or commencement of the amending Act irrespective of the date on which Award was made by the Collector. In our opinion, the provisions of Section 23 (1A) of the Principal Act and Section 30(1) of the amending Act have been correctly construed in Filip Tiago, AIR 1990 SC 981 (supra) to mean that the obligation to pay additional amount in respect of proceedings initiated before the date of commencement of the amending Act is confined to the matters covered by Clauses (a) and (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the amending Act and we endorse the said view." 25. The Tribunal in its Award and order dated 23.12.88, inler alia, observed as follows:–– "The referring claimants shall further get an additional amount under Section 23(1A) calculated @ 12% per annum on the total value of land for the period of 10 years 6 months 25 days." This Award was made wholly without jurisdiction. By making this Award the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction. The Tribunal re-wrote the provisions of law. This is lack of inherent jurisdiction. 26. It appears from the aforesaid Award and order dated 23.12.88 that the Tribunal observed as follows:–– "The referring claimant shall further get damages under section 48A of the I. A. Act @ 9% per annum for the period of 2 years 4 months 9 days. This damages shall be calculated in the following manner; Statutory allowance being calculated on the value of land as determined by this Tribunal shall be added to the said Awarded value and the resultant sum shall be the basis of calculated of damages for the said period and at the said rate." 27 Section 48A which was inserted in the schedule referred to in Section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 by West Bengal Amendment Act XXXII of 1955 reads as follows:–– "48A. (1) If, within a period of two years from the date of the (Issue of the public notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9), in respect of any land, the Collector has not made an Award under Section 11 with respect to such land, the owner of the land shall be entitled to receive compensation for the damage suffered by him In consequence of the delay. (2) The provisions of Part-III of this Act shall apply, so far as may be, to the determination of the compensation payable under this section." 28. It appears that by Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 the aforesaid Section 48A was omitted and a new Section 48A was inserted. Section 2 of the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 reads as follows :–– "2. Amendment of the Schedule to Ben. Act V of 1911.––In the Schedule to the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, for Paragraph 13 the following paragraph shall be substituted, namely, :–– "13. New Section 48A –– After Section 48, the following section shall be inserted namely, :–– "48A. Section 2 of the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 reads as follows :–– "2. Amendment of the Schedule to Ben. Act V of 1911.––In the Schedule to the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911, for Paragraph 13 the following paragraph shall be substituted, namely, :–– "13. New Section 48A –– After Section 48, the following section shall be inserted namely, :–– "48A. Section 48 not to apply in certain cases––No compensation shall be payable in pursuance of Section 48 when proceedings for acquisition of land have been abandoned on the execution of an agreement or the acceptance of a payment, in pursuance of subsection (4) of Section 78 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 (Ben. Act V of 1911)." Thus it appears that on the date of Award and order dated 23.12.88 the Tribunal had no power or jurisdiction to pass the above quoted order under Section 48A as amended by the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976. 29. Section 77 (2) of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 reads as follows :–– "Every Award of the Tribunal, and every order made by the Tribunal for the payment of money, shall be enforced by the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta as if it were a decree of that Court." It appears that the respondent No.4 did not try to enforce the Award and order of the Tribunal dated 23.12.88 for the payment of money by the Court of Small Causes of Calcutta as if it were a decree of that Court. Instead, a writ proceeding being Matter No. ...... of 1994 (Salil Kumar Mitter v. State of West Bengal & Ors.) was initiated for enforcement of the aforesaid Award and order dated 23.12.88 passed by the Tribunal. 30. The learned Advocate for the respondent No. 4 argued that the Tribunal correctly made Award under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. But while making such submission he did not make any submission in respect of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 also argued that Section 48A was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by West Bengal Amendment and, therefore, the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act; 1976 cannot omit or amend provisions of Section 48A. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 also argued that Section 48A was inserted in the Land Acquisition Act by West Bengal Amendment and, therefore, the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act; 1976 cannot omit or amend provisions of Section 48A. He did not appreciate that Section 48A was introduced by the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 as amended and, therefore, the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 can certainly amend the provision of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911 and can omit the earlier Section 48A and can insert or introduce a new Sec. 48A in the Schedule as referred to in Section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Act, 1911. 31. The learned Advocate for the respondent No.4 referred to (9) Union of India & Ors. v. Ajit Singh reported in AIR 1997 SC 2669 . The learned Advocate relied upon Paragraph 6 of the reported decision which reads as follows :–– "The next question that arises for consideration is; whether the respondent is entitled to the benefit of the Amendment Act 68 of 1984? In view of the fact that the Award of the reference Court is of November 2, 1973, the Amendment Act would apply and, therefore, the claimants are entitled to the solatium at 15% and interest at 6% on the enhanced compensation from the date of taking possession till date of deposit in the Court." It does not appear from the above quoted Paragraph 6 of the reported decision that Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act was subject matter of consideration in the said paragraph. In view of the discussions made hereinabove I am of the view that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case No.4 of 1983 (V) without serving a notice upon CIT, the writ petitioner, under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. I am also of the view that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make an Award under Section 23 (1A) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in view of Section 30 of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 because admittedly the Land Acquisition (L. A.) Collector passed the Award on 16.10.1975. I am also of the view that in view of Section 2 the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 the Tribunal on 23.12.88 had no jurisdiction to grant compensation for damage under Section 48A which was omitted by the aforesaid Amendment Act. I am also of the view that in view of Section 2 the Calcutta Improvement (Amendment) Act, 1976 the Tribunal on 23.12.88 had no jurisdiction to grant compensation for damage under Section 48A which was omitted by the aforesaid Amendment Act. Huge amount of public money is involved in this manner. Under these special circumstances I am of the view that Court should exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. I quash and set aside the order and Award dated 23.12.88 paned by the Calcutta Improvement Tribunal in case No.4 of 1983(V). However, the Tribunal is directed to proceed with the case No.4 of 1983(V) afresh after serving notice on CIT, the writ petitioner, under Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act, and the proceeding should be completed within six months from the date of communication of this order. In these terms the writ application is allowed. Later–– The learned Advocate for the petitioner is permitted to taken down the gist of this order for communication.