M. Ramakrishna, C. J.— This is an appeal presented by forty appellants, who were the petitioners in Civil Rule No.842 of 1992 presented before this Court. 2. The petitioners had sought for a writ of Mandamus against the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 for the grounds taken in the writ petition. The learned Single Judge, after hearing the learned counsel on both the sides, held that the forty persons said to be the employees, are not employees of the Oil India Ltd, hereinafter referred to a§ OIL; on the otherhand, they have been serving as employees in a Club established by the OIL at its Duliajan campus in the district of Dibrugarh, and since they are not serving a statutory body, nor employed by them, the writ petition was not maintainable. Thus the writ petition came to be dismissed. Hence this appeal. 3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, who having«taken us through the grounds of appeal as well as the order of the learned Single Judge under appeal, placed strong reliance upon a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of MMR Khan & others vs. Union of India & others, reported in 1990 Suppl SCC 191. The learned counsel pointed to the last portion of the judgment in paragraph 39, which we extract here in below with a view to appreciate the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants : “The, result, therefore, is that the workers engaged in the statutory canteens as well as those engaged in non-statutory recognised canteens in the Railway establishments are Railway employees and they are entitled to be treated as such. The Railway Board has already treated the employees of all statutory and 11 Delhi based non statutory recognised canteens as Railway employes wef April, 1, 1990. They would, therefore, be entitled to all benefits as such Railway employees with effect from the said date, according to the service conditions prescribed for them under the relevant rules/orders.”(emphasis supplied) Based upon this, a writ of Mandamus had been issued by the Supreme Court in the MMR Khan’s (supra) case. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the view taken by the learned Single Judge holding that these forty appellants are not serving a statutory employer is not correct and the conclusion reached is untenable. 4. The learned counsel for the appellants argued that the view taken by the learned Single Judge holding that these forty appellants are not serving a statutory employer is not correct and the conclusion reached is untenable. 4. By a perusal of the judgment in the MMR Khan’s (supra) case, it is made clear that apart from reading paragraph 39 extracted above, the relevant discretion and the law as laid down by the Supreme Court are found in paragraphs 14, 27 and 28, wherein their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that even assuming that the Railway canteens are exempted, by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Railway Manual from the Administrative Instructions on Departmental Canteens on Offices and Industrial Establishment of the Govt. there are as yet no notifications on the lines of December 11, 1979 and December 23, 1980 issued for the benefit of the employees in the Railway canteens. Whatever the difference in the nature of work performed by the other staff in the different ministries, there is no difference in the work performed by the employees in the canteens run in the establishment of the ministries. Hence if the said two notifications are applicable to the employees in the canteens run by other departments of the Govt. of India, it would be highly discriminatory not to apply them to the employees in the Railway canteens. It would be violative of Articles 14 and 16. Thus, the relationship of employer and employee stands created between the Railway administration and the canteen employees from the very inception and for the purposes of the Factories Act the employees in the statutory canteens are the employees of the Railways. 5. Therefore, in the light of the conclusion reached by the Supreme Court on facts and referring to the notification issued by the Govt. of India, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion as found in paragraph 39 of the judgment, extracted above. That apart, the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the real question which arose in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . of India, the Supreme Court reached the conclusion as found in paragraph 39 of the judgment, extracted above. That apart, the Supreme Court had the occasion to deal with the real question which arose in the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. The International Airport Authority of India & others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . Referring to the provisions of Article 12 of the Constitution, in relation to the ‘State’, the ‘local authority’ and the ‘other authorities’ occurring therein, the Supreme Court had laid down as follows in paragraph 20 of the above case : “Now, obviously where a corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Govt., it would, in the exercise of its power of discretion, be subject to the same constitional or public law limitations as Govt.. The rule inhibiting arbitrary action by Govt. which we have discussed above must apply equally where such corporation is dealing with the public, whether by way of giving jobs or entering into contracts or otherwise, and it cannot act arbitrarily and enter into relationship with any person it likes at its sweet will, but its action must be in conformity with some principle which meets the test or reason and relevance.” 6. In the case of MC Mehta & others vs. Union of India & others, reported in AIR 1987 SC 1086 , interpreting the meaning of the word ‘authority’ occurring under Article 12 of the Constitution, their Lordships of the Supreme Court held as follows : “It is not correct to say that in India once a corporation is deemed to be ‘authority’, it would be subject to the constitutional limitation of fundamental rights in performance of all its functions and that the appellantion of ‘authority’ would stick to such corporation, irrespective of the functional context.” 7. The learned Single Judge had discussed two important aspects to drive home the point, viz, (1) Whether the petitioners had been employed by an employer who is controlled by the statutory obligations? (2) Whether the management of the Club is controlled by the statutory requirements as contended by the petitioners? To answer these questions, the learned Single Judge has also given specific reasons. (2) Whether the management of the Club is controlled by the statutory requirements as contended by the petitioners? To answer these questions, the learned Single Judge has also given specific reasons. Suffice it to say that private bodies, having no statutory power, not being supported by a State Act, will not come within the purview of ‘other authorities’ under Article 12 of the Constitution (please see the case in AIR 1967 SC 1 , Naresh vs. State of Maharashtra):. Again, a non-statutory body, exercising no statutory powers is not either ‘State’ or ‘other authorities’ including a company (please see the case in AIR 1962 Calcutta 10, SK Mukherjee vs. Chemicals). 8. Therefore, in the light of the foregoing, the conclusion reached by the learned Single Judge holding that the Club run by the OIL or established by OIL, cannot be said to be coming within the purview of ‘statutory powers’ or ‘other authorities5. Therefore, the employees serving such club, cannot maintain a writ. petition seeking relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Hence, we do not see any ground to interfere with the order of the learned Single Judge under appeal. The appeal is dismissed.