Bhola Nath Mahato v. State of West Bengal — 1998 DIGILAW 473 (CAL)

JUDGMENT T. Chatterjee, J. The learned Counsel for the parties appearing before me, invited me to dispose of the writ application without any direction for filing affidavits. Accordingly, by consent of parties, the writ application is taken up for hearing. 2. There is a school in the name of Tulin Jai Siaram High School (H.S.) within the jurisdiction of Jhalda Police Station in the district of Purulia (herein after referred to as "the school"). The last election of the Managing Committee of the school was held in the year 1995 and the Managing Committee took charge of the affairs of the school on 19th January, 1995. The term of the Managing Committee of the school however, expired on and from 19th January, 1998. On 9th January, 1998 the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education issued a general circular wherein the tenure of the Managing Committee of the school was extended from February, 1998 to 15th September, 1998. Subsequently, the Secretary of the West Bengal Board of Secondary Education intimated the Headmaster of the school that the tenure of the Managing Committee was extended till the completion of reconstitution of the Managing Committee of the school. According to the writ petitioner, the Headmaster of the school however, was not allowing the existing Managing Committee to run the affairs of the school on the plea that there was a vaccum of 14 days that is from 19th January, 1998 to 1st February, 1998. Some of the guardians whose wards were studying in the school, moved a writ application in this Court which was registered as W.P. 8711(W)/98 in which a prayer was made for allowing the existing Managing Committee to continue and to reconstitute in terms of the general circular No. 5/12 dated 9th January, 1998. By an order dated 11th May, 1998, a learned Judge of this Court passed an interim order in the said writ application which is to the following effect:- "In spite of notice, none appears on behalf of the respondents. The matter will appear in the last one week after the Summer Vacation. The interim order is granted in terms of annexure 'D' to this petition till the disposal of this writ application. However, the respondents will be at liberty to apply for variation and/or vacation and/or modification of this order upon notice to the writ petitioner." 3. The matter will appear in the last one week after the Summer Vacation. The interim order is granted in terms of annexure 'D' to this petition till the disposal of this writ application. However, the respondents will be at liberty to apply for variation and/or vacation and/or modification of this order upon notice to the writ petitioner." 3. It has not been disputed by the learned Counsel, appearing for the parties that the aforesaid interim order is still now continuing. However, the Headmaster of the school sent a letter to the District Inspector of Schools (S.E.) intimating him that due to cessation of guardian membership of the writ petitioner with effect from July, 1998, the question of co-option of operation of account in place of Bank account including the salary account of the staffs had arisen and as such the Headmaster of the school sought advise from the District Inspector of Schools regarding the crisis relating to the Bank account of the school. By a memorandum being Memorandum No. 1676 dated 20th August, 1998, the District Inspector of Schools (S.E), Purulia appointed Sri A.K. Mukherjee, Assistant Inspector of Schools, Purulia to act as a drawing and disbursing officer of the school so that there would be no difficulty to draw the Government grants and to disburse the salary of the approved staffs of the school at the approved rates. This Memorandum being Annexure 'H' to the writ application is now under challenge in this writ application. 4. Mr. Bhattacharyya, appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner firstly contended that the question of cessation of membership of the writ petitioner cannot arise at all as the ward of the writ petitioner has been re-admitted in class XI of the school after the ward had sat for Madhyamik Examination. Therefore, Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election cannot be applied to the facts of this case. 5. This submission of Mr. Bhattacharyya was contested by Mr. Dey, appearing on behalf of the Headmaster. In order to decide whether the membership of the writ petitioner automatically ceased on the leaving of the ward of the writ petitioner from the school, it would be relevant to refer to Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election which is as under:- "30(a)-A guardian voter owes his/her eligibility as a voter under the category of 'Guardian' in respect of a particular ward or wards. As soon as that word or wards leaves the institution, the qualification of a guardian voter shall cease. In case a ward is sent up for the Madhyamik Pariksha (Secondary Examination) in a particular academic year, the eligibility of the guardian voter in respect of that ward shall cease from 1st May of the following academic year." 6. So far as the present writ petition is concerned, it is not in dispute that the son of the writ petitioner had sat for the Madhyamik Pariksha and, therefore, the eligibility of the guardian father in respect of the son of the writ petitioner had ceased from 1st of May of the following academic year. According to Mr. Bhattacharyya in view of the admitted fact that the son of the writ petitioner has been re-admitted in Class XI, the membership of the writ petitioner from the guardian category automatically revives, and, therefore, question of cessation of membership of the writ petitioner cannot arise at all. In my view, the submission of Mr. Bhattacharyya cannot be accepted. From a plain reading of the Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election, it is clear that as soon as the ward or wards leave the institution qualification of a guardian father shall cease. (Emphasis added) Mr. Bhattacharyya however, sought to contend that Rule 30(a) of the procedures for holding election only deals with the procedure for holding election. Therefore, he sought to contend that Rule 30 (a) would be applicable only in the case of a guardian father. Since in this case that question does not arise as election was duly held and the writ petitioner contested the election from the guardian category as his son was studying in the school at that point of time, question of applicability of Rule 30(a) cannot arise at all. The argument of Mr. Bhattacharyya on the face looks attractive. But on consideration of the relevant provisions, the scheme and the object, I do not find any substance in the same. In my view, Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election must be read with Rule 11 of the Management Rules. Rule 11 of the Management Rules deals with cases of casual vacancy. Bhattacharyya on the face looks attractive. But on consideration of the relevant provisions, the scheme and the object, I do not find any substance in the same. In my view, Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election must be read with Rule 11 of the Management Rules. Rule 11 of the Management Rules deals with cases of casual vacancy. Rule 11 says that if any membership of a committee ceases at any time to fulfill the qualification in respect of which he was elected, nominated or co-opted, he shall cease to be a member and the vacancy so caused shall subject to sub-rule (2) be filled up by election, co-option or nomination, as the case may be. If we read Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election and Rule 11 of the Management Rules, it would be crystal clear that the membership of the writ petitioner automatically ceased on the leaving of his ward from the school who had sat for the Madhyamik Examination. From a plain reading of Rule 11 of the Management Rules, I am clearly of the opinion that the qualification of the writ petitioner who was elected from the guardian category ceased on the leaving of his son from the school and he will cease to be a member as soon as the qualification in respect of which he was elected, ceased. Therefore, after reading the aforesaid two provisions, there cannot be any doubt in my mind that on the leaving of the son of the writ petitioner, the membership of the writ petitioner automatically ceased. Therefore, I am of the view that the right to continue of the writ petitioner as a Secretary of the Managing Committee ceased on the ground that the ward has left the school. There is no doubt in the present case that the ward of the writ petitioner had left the school to sit for the Madhyamik Examination. In terms of Rule 30(a), the writ petitioner cannot be permitted to come within the guardian category to contest the election procedure. As Rule 11 clearly says that the qualification of a person in respect of which he was elected shall cease automatically, there cannot be any doubt that on the leaving of the son of the writ petitioner, the membership of the writ petitioner from the guardian category shall automatically cease. 7. Now the other submission of Mr. As Rule 11 clearly says that the qualification of a person in respect of which he was elected shall cease automatically, there cannot be any doubt that on the leaving of the son of the writ petitioner, the membership of the writ petitioner from the guardian category shall automatically cease. 7. Now the other submission of Mr. Bhattacharyya may be considered. He submitted that even assuming that the membership of the writ petitioner ceased on the leaving of his son from the school to sit for Madhyamik Examination, even then in view of the subsequent event that the son of the writ petitioner was re-admitted in Class XI of the school, question of cessation of membership of the writ petitioner cannot arise at all. In view of the clear mandatory provision as made in Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election read with Rule 11 of the Management Rules, I am of the firm opinion that Mr. Dey was justified in submitting that in view of the clear provision as made in Rule 30(a) read with rule 11 of the Management Rules, the membership of the writ petitioner from guardian category shall immediately cease. From a plain reading of Rule 30(a) read with Rule 11 of the Management Rules, it is clear that once cessation has taken effect, it cannot be re-opened by subsequent induction of the ward in the school. In that case, in my view such induction would be a first admission in the school which would be evident from Clause 8(2). In any view of the matter the statute does not postulate revival of membership after a lapse of few months (in this case from May 1998 to August, 1998 when the first admission of the hearing of the writ petition was made in the month of August, 1998). Therefore, relying on Rule 30(a) of the procedure for holding election read with Rule 11 of the Management Rules, I am of the view that the writ petitioner cannot automatically continue to be a member of the Managing Committee on the ground that his ward has been re-admitted in Class XI of the same school. Accordingly, I hold that the membership of the writ petitioner from the guardian category in the school has automatically ceased when his ward was sent up for Madhyamik Examination or even from 1st of May of the following academic year. Accordingly, I hold that the membership of the writ petitioner from the guardian category in the school has automatically ceased when his ward was sent up for Madhyamik Examination or even from 1st of May of the following academic year. Accordingly, I do not find any reason to hold that the Authorities were wrong in holding on the leaving of the son of the writ petitioner, the membership of the writ petitioner from the guardian category had ceased. Furthermore, in my view, if a guardian member is the Secretary of the school whose guardianship ceases as his ward had left the school, in that event, the duties of the Secretary shall be entrusted upon the Joint Secretary of the school (the Head of the Institution) as per Clause 28 of the procedure. The Head of the Institution in that case shall act as the Secretary of the school until a new Secretary is elected at a meeting conveyed by him. In any view of the matter, there is no scope to entertain the writ application against the memorandum of the District Inspector of Schools (S.E.), Purulia which is under challenge in this writ application. By this order, the District Inspector of Schools for administrative reasons has only appointed a drawing and disbursing officer for drawing Government grants and to disburse the salaries of the approved staffs of the school at the approved rates. There is no dispute that in view of an interim order passed by this Court in a pending writ application, the writ petitioner has been continuing as a Secretary of the school. Therefore, even assuming that the writ petitioner can be considered to be a member of the Managing Committee, even then in my view such membership is not disturbed by appointing a disbursing officer who has been appointed only for the purpose of drawing and disbursing Government grants and payment of salaries to the approved teachers. That being the position, I do not find any reason to interfere with the memorandum issued by the District Inspector of Schools which is under challenge in this writ application. 8. Accordingly, the writ petition fails. 9. There will be no order as to costs. Application dismissed.