Judgment There will be an order in terms of prayer (a) of the petition. 2. This appeal and the application for stay are being disposed of today, treating them as on day's list since the parties have agreed that the appeal and the application for stay be disposed of together. 3. The point in controversy involved in the appeal indeed is very-very short and simple. Despite that being the case, very-very unfortunately, the matter has been lingering on for almost a decade now. The question to be decided is whether the appellants can be prevented by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 by filing a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution from obtaining telephone connections in their residences from respondent Nos. 4 to 7. 4. Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 admittedly are the owners and promoters of the property situated at 52A, Shakespeare Sarani, Calcutta. They have constructed a multi-storeyed building on this place of land. This building has several residential flats. Appellants, nine in number, entered into separate agreements with respondent Nos. 1 to 3 for purchase of the flats for varying amounts which are indicated in para 2 of the stay application. The dates of agreement, the description of the flats and the amounts indicating the purchase money have all been clearly mentioned in para 2 of the application. There facts are not disputed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 do not also controvert the fact that the appellants entered into agreements with them for purchase of these flats and that the amounts mentioned in the application have been in fact paid by the appellants to respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Along with the stay application the appellants have also filed a statement (Annexure-B) which also contains all the details regarding the particulars of the flats, the dates of execution of the agreement, the amounts due as per the agreements, the amounts actually paid and the balance outstanding, if any. We have seen the statement and find that all the 9 appellants have paid considerable and substantial amounts, in almost all the cases to the tune of 80 to 90% of the agreed sale price of the flats (as per the agreement) and indeed very small percentage thereof remains unpaid. For example, just to illustrate two sample cases, appellant No. 1 Mrs. For example, just to illustrate two sample cases, appellant No. 1 Mrs. Pratima Bansal has paid an amount of Rs.2,62,000/- as against the agreed amount of Rs.2,98,00/- and the appellant No. 2 Anand Swarup Mishra has paid Rs.2,74,056/- as against the agreed amount of Rs.2,98,800/-. These facts are also undisputed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3. In fact in the affidavit-in-opposition filed to the stay application on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3, they have also annexed a consolidated Statement of Claims in which they have indicated the details of their claims against the appellants. In this statement they do not dispute the aforesaid facts regarding the payment of the amounts by the appellants to them nor do they deny the receipt of such payments. 5. It appears that sometime later on, rightly or wrongly, the appellants came to occupy these flats. It also appears that some disputes arose between the parties with regard to the claim of the outstanding a mounts and the way in which the appellants came to occupy the flats. These disputes are the subject-matter of an arbitration pending before Mr. Justice M. Mullick, a retired Judge of this Court. 6. Immediately after the appellants entered into the possession of the flats, they applied to respondent nos. 4 to 7 sometime in 1989 for grant of telephone connections. The respondent nos. 4 to 7 issued work orders in their favour. It also appears that sometime during this period this Court directed the appellants to approach the two Joint Receivers who had in the meantime been appointed by this Court, for forwarding their applications to the telephone authorities for providing them with telephone connections. We have seen those orders but feel that in the facts and circumstances of this case, there was no need actually to issue directions to the appellants to apply to the joint Receivers or to direct the Joint Receivers to forward their names to the telephone authorities. Giving of a telephone connection in a flat where one is normally residing is one’s right in normal course and there was as such no need for this Court to say that such applications should have been routed though the agency of the Joint Receivers. Anyway, we need not comment any more about those interlocutory orders since they are not under challenge before us. We are only making a passing reference. 7. Anyway, we need not comment any more about those interlocutory orders since they are not under challenge before us. We are only making a passing reference. 7. Undoubtedly the appellants are bona fide, genuine and legitimate purchasers of the flats in question. Undoubtedly they have entered into agreement with respondent nos. 1 to 3. Undoubtedly they have paid substantial amounts towards the purchase money of the flats and only very small percentage of this amount remains unpaid. There may be some disputes with regard to such unpaid amounts and the way the appellants came to actually occupy the flats. These disputes are the subject-matter of arbitration proceedings. All this however cannot stand in the way of the appellants in either applying to the telephone authorities for grant of telephone connections or the telephone authorities giving such connection to them. Both issues are absolutely independent of each other; one does not have any connection with the other. The grant of telephone connection to the appellants in no way can prejudicially or otherwise affect the outcome of any issue pending before the Arbitrator nor can it in any manner affect any right of respondent Nos. 1 to 3, if they have one qua the appellants, in respect of the property in question or the claim of the outstanding amount. 8. It is under Sections 4 and 7 of the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885 that the Central Government and its functionaries, including respondent Nos. 4 to 7 herein, have the privilege, duty and obligation to provide telephone connections to such persons who may apply for the same. Whereas Section 4 confers on the Central Government exclusive privilege of establishing maintaining and working telegraphs, under Section 7 power has been given to the Central Government to make Rules consistent with the provisions of the Act for conduct of any telegraph, established maintained or worked by the Central Government and the rates at which and other conditions and restrictions subject to which the telegraphs have to be maintained. Undoubtedly the expression "telephones" includes the telephones as well. It is in the exercise of this power under Section 7 of the Act that the Rules have been framed whereby detailed procedure has been prescribed for providing telephone connections. It is in the exercise of such powers and in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Roles made thereunder that respondent nos. It is in the exercise of this power under Section 7 of the Act that the Rules have been framed whereby detailed procedure has been prescribed for providing telephone connections. It is in the exercise of such powers and in accordance with the aforesaid provisions of the Telegraph Act, 1885 and the Roles made thereunder that respondent nos. 4 to 7 had issued work orders in favour of the appellants. The issuance of the work orders clearly created a right in favour of the appellants for being legitimately considered for grant of telephone connection. 9. If the respondent nos. 4 to 7, have already issued the work orders in favour of the appellants, they are under a statutory obligation to process such work orders further and to take this process to its logical conclusion. Unless the appellants are debarred under Statute for being provided with telephone connections or unless technically it is not feasible to provide such connections to the appellants, we see no reason why respondent Nos. 4 to 7 should not take immediate steps in executing the work order in according with law and to take such process to its logical end. 10. We are of the opinion that invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in a case like this was an improper exercise of such jurisdiction. The respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had no right to approach the Court for obtaining a restraint order against the appellants or respondent Nos. 4 to 7 for preventing the appellants from exercising their right of obtaining telephone connection in respect of their residential accommodation. They had no conceivable legitimate grievance nor do they have any right in law in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The entire controversy revolves around the adjudication of some disputed civil rights between the appellants and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and such disputed questions, in our view, could not be made the subject-matter of proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. We have no doubt that the learned Single Judge erred in law in allowing the writ application and by passing directions preventing respondent Nos. 4 to 7 from granting telephone connections to the appellants. We have no hesitation in holding that the judgment under appeal suffered from legal infirmities on this account as well. 11. As would appear, respondent Nos. We have no doubt that the learned Single Judge erred in law in allowing the writ application and by passing directions preventing respondent Nos. 4 to 7 from granting telephone connections to the appellants. We have no hesitation in holding that the judgment under appeal suffered from legal infirmities on this account as well. 11. As would appear, respondent Nos. 1 to 3 by gross abuse of the judicial process have managed to successfully prevent the appellants from obtaining such a basic facility as a telephone connection, even though under law the appellants had a right in respect thereof and respondent Nos. 1 to 3 had no legitimate grievance in law against the exercise of such right by the appellants. The appellants have been harassed for almost 10 years and prevented from use of this basic facility. They are entitled to be compensated is law by the award of costs which we assess @ Rs.2,000/- per appellant to be paid to them by the respondent No. 1 to 3, jointly and severally. 12. The Judgment of the learned Single Judge is accordingly set aside. The appeal is allowed with costs as indicated above. The application for stay is also disposed of accordingly. All parties are to act on a signed xerox copy of this dictated order on usual undertaking.