N. N. MATHUR, J. ( 1 ) THE challenge in this group of Special Civil Application under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is the order of termination of each petitioners, passed by the respondent-Surat Municipal Corporation and also the decision of the Standing committee rejecting their representations. ( 2 ) THE first Special Civil Application being 7110/97 has been filed by Surat municipal Corporation Employees (Staff) Union challenging the order of termination of 65 employees who are said to be its members, 16 out of the said 65 employees have also challenged the individual order of termination by filing separate Special Civil application. ( 3 ) IN September, 1994, there was outbreak of epidemic in Surat City and the situation was so grave that the State of Gujarat having formed the opinion that stoppage or the cessation of the performance of any of the essential services will be prejudicial to the safety or health or the maintenance of services essential to the life of community in the city, declared that an emergency existed in that City as a consequence, thereof, no member of such essential services for a period of 90 days shall withdraw or absent himself from duties. A public announcement was also made in that regard by publishing in the newspapers. The employees were asked to resume their duties immediately. It was made clear that if they are on leave, the same stand cancelled. A clear warning was given that if they do not resume their duties, they will be removed from service. The situation was so grave that without the cooperation of the officers and the staff members, it was not possible to meet the challenge. Many Governmental and Non-Governmental organisations of Surat city and outside rushed to help the people on humanitarian grounds. The petitioners in this group of Special Civil Applications are employees of the Corporation who alleged to have absented themselves from duty, during that grave period. Their contention is that the order of termination is shocking and inhumane. ( 4 ) OUT of 13,000 employees of the Surat Municipal Corporation, services of about 70 employees were terminated as they acted in violation of the Notification dated 25. 9. 1994 by absenting themselves from duty. Thus, their services were terminated by order dated 29. 9. 1994 in terms of the Notification dated 25. 9. 1994. ( 4 ) OUT of 13,000 employees of the Surat Municipal Corporation, services of about 70 employees were terminated as they acted in violation of the Notification dated 25. 9. 1994 by absenting themselves from duty. Thus, their services were terminated by order dated 29. 9. 1994 in terms of the Notification dated 25. 9. 1994. The said order of termination was challenged before this Court by the Surat Municipal Corporation (Staff) Union which was registered as Special Civil Application No. 12677/94. While considering the question of interim relief, the Court noticed that no disciplinary action preceded the orders of dismissal. The Court also noticed the fact that the provision of Sec. 62, prima facie do not warrant dismissal, in view of the fact that Sec. 62 has to be read with the provisions of sec. 396 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation Act, 1949, which provides for punishment for breach of Sees. 61 and 62 of the Act. Therefore, if an employee withdraws himself from duty, except in case of illness or accident disabling him from discharge of his duties or neglects or refuses to perform duties, he would be committing an offence, which on conviction would be punishable with imprisonment, which may extend to one year or with fine or both as provided under Sec. 396 of the Act. It was submitted on behalf of the employees Union that the order of terminations were passed mechanically even without considering that many of such employees were on sanctioned leave, including maternity leave. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court, by interim order dated 11. 7. 1996, directed the respondent authorities to consider the relevant aspect and take a decision. The relevant part of the order is extracted as follows: "it is therefore, directed by way of interim relief that the concerned authority of the respondents will consider this aspect of the matter and take into consideration all the particulars that may be placed before them by the petitioners. It is stated on behalf of the petitioner that within two weeks from today such particulars and contentions will be placed before the concerned authority of the respondent corporation. On that being done, the competent authority will take a decision in the matter expeditiously and place a copy of the said decision on the record of this case. It is stated on behalf of the petitioner that within two weeks from today such particulars and contentions will be placed before the concerned authority of the respondent corporation. On that being done, the competent authority will take a decision in the matter expeditiously and place a copy of the said decision on the record of this case. ( 5 ) THE petitioner Union as well as some of the employees made representation before the Commissioner, Surat Municipal Corporation. The record shows that each of the employees of the Union were heard by the Standing Committee. The Standing committee, after considering the entire material on record, including the representations submitted by them, confirmed the order of dismissal. When the matter came up for final hearing, the learned Advocate appearing for the Surat Municipal Corporation (for short, the Corporation) contended that by post-decisional hearing in terms of the orders of this court dated 11. 7. 1996, the defect in the original order of dismissal without hearing, stands cured. At that stage, the learned Advocate appearing for the Union made a request to permit them to amend the Special Civil Application with a view to challenge the order passed by the Standing Committee confirming the order of dismissal. The said prayer was not granted and the Special Civil Application was rejected by order dated 7. 4. 1997. However, liberty was granted to pursue the remedy in accordance with law. Hence these petitions. ( 6 ) IT is contended by Mr. P. B. Majmudar, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner Union as well as the individual employees that the impugned orders of dismissal is ex-fade illegal being passed without following any procedure worth-the- name or without giving any hearing on merits. He submitted that the only provision which provides for imposing of penalty is Sec. 56 of the BPMC Act. Sub-clause (3) of Sec. 56 puts an embargo on the Corporation to dismiss an officer or servant of the Municipal corporation unless he has been given reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such dismissal. It is submitted that the requirement of pre-decisional hearing cannot be effectively remedied by merely providing the post-decisional hearing. He has also dealt with the mdividual cases and pointed out that there was valid reason for each of the employees for their absence from duty. It is submitted that the requirement of pre-decisional hearing cannot be effectively remedied by merely providing the post-decisional hearing. He has also dealt with the mdividual cases and pointed out that there was valid reason for each of the employees for their absence from duty. It is also submitted that in the facts of the case, the punishment of dismissal is disproportionate. Mr. A. M. Raval, appearing for the petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 6783/97, while adopting all those contentions of Mr. P. B. Majmudar, submitted that the Standing Committee has not at all looked into the materials before them. They have just put seal on their earlier decisions. ( 7 ) MR. B. P. Tanna, Sr. Advocate appearing for the Corporation submits that in view of the Sub-clause (b) of proviso to Clause (3) of Sec. 56 of the Act, in a case where it is not reasonable practicable to give opportunity of show cause, the requirement of opportunity of hearing need not be followed. He further submitted that the situation was so grave that there was no option but to dismiss the service of the petitioner employees in terms of the notice dated 25. 9. 1994. i. e. , to dismiss the services of such employees who did not report for duty, inspite of clear warning. He further submits that even if there was any defect in the order, the same stands cured by post-decisional hearing. He submitted that it is not open for the petitioner to challenge the post-decisional hearing for the reason that the same has been undertaken in pursuance of a judicial order passed in presence of the petitioners. The said order has never been challenged by the petitioner. On the merit of the case, he submits that the Standing Committee has given full opportunity of hearing to each of such employees. The representation which was submitted by each of the petitioners to the Commissioner were placed before the Standing Committee. It is also submitted that the proceedings of the Standing Committee were adjourned from time to time on the request of such dismissed employees. He submits that no. indulgence is called for in the matter of quantum of punishment in favour of persons who ran away from duty at a moment when their services were most needed. It is also submitted that the proceedings of the Standing Committee were adjourned from time to time on the request of such dismissed employees. He submits that no. indulgence is called for in the matter of quantum of punishment in favour of persons who ran away from duty at a moment when their services were most needed. ( 8 ) SECTION 56 of the BPMC Act provides for imposition of penalty on Municipal officers and its servants. Sub-sec, (i) provides that a competent authority may impose penalty specified therein on a Municipal Officer or a servant, if such authority is satisfied that such Officer or servant is guilty of breach of departmental rules or discipline or of carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct or is incompetent. Sub-sec. (2) enumerates penalties which may be imposed under this sub-section Sub-clause (h) provides penalty. of dismissal. Sub-secs. (1), (3) and proviso thereto is relevant in the present context which reads as follows : "56. (1) A competent authority may subject to the provisions of this Act, impose any of the penalties specified in Sub-sec. (2) on a municipal officer or servant if such authority is satisfied that such officer or servant is guilty of a breach of departmental rules or discipline or of carelessness, neglect of duty or other misconduct or is incompetent: xxx xxx xxx (3) No Officer or servant shall be reduced to a lower post or removed or dismissed from service under this section unless he has been given a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such reduction, removal or dismissal: provided that this Sub-section shall not apply (a) Where a person is reduced, or dismissed on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) Where the competent authority is satisfied that, for reasons to be recorded in writing by such authority, it is not reasonably practicable to give that person an opportunity or showing cause. " sub-sec. (3) does not provide for a detail enquiry, but it simply provides a reasonable opportunity of hearing before the order of dismissal. Provisos (a) and (b) appended to the said sub-clause, excludes opportunity of hearing in the circumstances mentioned therein. Sub-clause (b) provides that the where the competent authority satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to give that person a hearing or showing cause, the opportunity of hearing can be dispensed with. Provisos (a) and (b) appended to the said sub-clause, excludes opportunity of hearing in the circumstances mentioned therein. Sub-clause (b) provides that the where the competent authority satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to give that person a hearing or showing cause, the opportunity of hearing can be dispensed with. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the impugned order dated 29. 9. 1994 is not preceded by opportunity of showing cause. However, submission of the Corporation is two fold. Firstly, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it was not reasonably practicable to give each of the employees opportunity of hearing or showing cause, as in the public Notice dated 25. 9. 1995, it was made abundantly clear that the situation is such grave that even the sanctioned leave stand cancelled and thus without any exception, the entire staff should immediately report to duty failing which their services shall be terminated. Thus, in case of an employee, who did not report on duty, the Corporation was left with no option but to dismiss their services. In alternate, the submission is that even if there is some defect, on that ground the same stand cured by post-decisional hearing under a judicial order. ( 9 ) I have considered the rival contentions. So far as the pre-decisional hearing is concerned, clause (b) of proviso appended to Sub-clause (3) of Sec. 56 excludes opportunity of hearing in the circumstances mentioned therein i. e. , where the authority satisfied that reasonably, it is not practicable to do so. It is now well-settled by the supreme Court in the case of Union of India, vs. Tulsiram Patel, reported in AIR 1985 SC 1416 that such a course is permissible. In the instant case, such a course was open to the corporation, as to meet the grave situation in the City of Surat, not only the presence, but the active participation of the entire staff was necessary for which, a vigilant and firm administration was also required to give message in clear terms that dereliction of duty at the most needed hours will lead to dismissal straight away. In such a situation, when the administration was engaged in saving human life, it was not practicable to hold enquiry against persons who have no sense of duty and sense of service to humanity. In such a situation, when the administration was engaged in saving human life, it was not practicable to hold enquiry against persons who have no sense of duty and sense of service to humanity. At the most genuine case, if any, can be dealt with by post-decision hearing. While it is true that the principles of natural justice is an important concept in administrative law, but in the words of Justice Krishna Iyer, it is no unruly horse, no lurking land mine, nor a judicial cure-all. Reference be made to Board of Mining examination vs. Ramjee, reported in AIR 1977 SC 965 . It has many colours and shades, many forms and shapes. It cannot be imprisoned in straight jacket formula. In the case of union of India vs. P. K. Roy, the Apex Court observed thus "the extent and application of the doctrine of natural justice cannot be imprisoned within the straight jacket of a rigid formula. The application of the doctrine depends upon the nature of the jurisdiction conferred on the administrative authority, upon the character of the rights of the persons affected, the scheme and policy of the statute and other relevant circumstances disclosed in the particular case. " ( 10 ) THE Apex Court in the case of Maneka Gandhi vs. Union of India, reported in air 1978 SC 597 , accepted the doctrine of post decisional hearing in exceptional cases. The Apex Court in the case of Mohinder Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851 laid down that wherein an emergent situation requiring immediate action, it is not practicable to give prior notice or hearing, the preliminary action should be soon taken followed by a full remedial hearing. ( 11 ) IN Swadeshi Cotton Mills vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1981 SC 818 , the court observed that where civil consequences of the administrative action are grave and its effect is highly prejudicial to the rights and interests of the persons affected and there is nothing in the language and the scheme of the statute which unequivocally excludes a fair pre-decisional hearing and the post-decisional hearing provided therein is not a real remedial hearing equitable to a full right of appeal, the Court should be loathe to infer a legislative intent. ( 12 ) IN the case of-Institute of Chartered Accountants of India vs. L. K. Ratna, reported in AIR 1987 SC 71 , a member of the Institute was removed on the ground of misconduct. One of the questions before the Supreme Court was whether such a member was entitled to a hearing before such removal ? The Court considered that in that case, there was no statutory exclusion of post-decisional hearing and as such, a post-decisional hearing cannot be an overall substitute for the pre-decisional hearing. ( 13 ) IN the case of K. I. Shephard vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1988 SC 686 , the court said that there is no justification to throw an employee out of employment and then. give them an opportunity of representation when the requirement is that they should have the opportunity referred to above as a condition precedent to action. The Court also observed that it is the common experience that once the decision has been taken, there is a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose. ( 14 ) IN the case of Trehan vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1989 SC 568 , the supreme Court reiterated what is said in Shephards case (Supra ). ( 15 ) IN the case of Charan Lal Sahu vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1990 SC 1480 , the Court said that post-decisional hearing is possible but in rare cases. The Court thus observed : "principles of natural justice are integrally embedded in our Constitutional frame work, and their pristine glory and primacy cannot and should not be allowed to be submerged by the exigencies of particular situation or cases. This Court must always assert primacy of adherence to the principles of natural justice in all adjudications. But at the same time, these must be applied in a particular manner in particular cases having regard to the particular circumstances. " ( 16 ) IT is of course true that livelihood of an individual is greater concern for him and his family, but his livelihood is a matter of his private interest and where such livelihood comes from public exchequer the public interest being supreme, the former must yield to the latter. " ( 16 ) IT is of course true that livelihood of an individual is greater concern for him and his family, but his livelihood is a matter of his private interest and where such livelihood comes from public exchequer the public interest being supreme, the former must yield to the latter. The employees of the Corporation are paid from the public exchequer to which everyone contributes either by way of direct or indirect taxes. Those who are paid by public and in charge of public administration for public role, must therefore, in turn discharge their duties with sense of responsibility. In the instant case, there was an invasion of plague in the City of Surat. The Corporation activised itself to perform its statutory, ethical and human obligation on war-fooling. It declared the state of emergency and called all its employees who were on sanctioned leave or not to report for duty. The corporation could won the war or accomplish the task, because of the dedicated team of its employees. However, some of the employees absented themselves and fled away from surat to save their lives, completely forgetting their duty as employees and their social obligation towards the society, even as an ordinary citizen. Such persons are not entitled to heir livelihood from public exchequer. The announcement was absolutely in clear in terms that if the employees do not report, they will be removed from service. In such a situation, nothing was required to be done except to dismiss them from service. Of course, there can be certain exceptions i. e. , disabling an employee from discharging their duties for genuine reasons. Such cases can be reviewed by providing post decision hearing. In the present case, this Court, by order dated 11. 7. 1998, by interim order, granted post-decisional hearing. This was never objected by the petitioners. Not only this, but they accepted the post-decisional hearing by submitting representations. After having obtained the order an merit, they cannot challenge the order of post-decision hearing. In view of this, I find no illegality in the post-decisional hearing. 7. 1998, by interim order, granted post-decisional hearing. This was never objected by the petitioners. Not only this, but they accepted the post-decisional hearing by submitting representations. After having obtained the order an merit, they cannot challenge the order of post-decision hearing. In view of this, I find no illegality in the post-decisional hearing. Though it is not for this court to enter into the finding of fact recorded by the Standing Committee on the question of absence on account of illness or any other justified reasons, but in order to do complete justice to the parties, I propose to undertake the said exercise and as such I shall deal with each case. ( 17 ) BEFORE I proceed to deal with individual cases, it must he horn in mind that in a case like the present one, where state of emergency was declared and the services were declared essential, the inability of an employee to respond the call, i. e. , to report for duty, must be for a very strong unavoidable reason. The burden of establishing such fact entirely lies on absentee employee. A simple production of certificate is hardly sufficient. An opportunity to produce evidence which may inspire, confidence, can be granted only when such facts and proof are pleaded in the representation for review of the order of punishment. ( 18 ) IN pursuance of the interim direction of this Court, 33 employees individually filed, representations before the Administrator. Four employees were directed to be reinstated by the Administrator. Representation of the rest of the 29 workers did not find favour by the Administrator. The entire matter was placed before the Standing committee. Hearing was given to all of them. Liberty was given to them to make written submission. After considering all the representations and after hearing the parties, the representations were rejected. 1. Special Civil Application No. 3838/97 lataben D. Pandya, the petitioner was employed as Clerk in M. D. Hospital, Surat municipal Corporation. Her say is that before the Notification dated 25. 9. 1994, she had proceeded on leave to Baroda. She was suffering from Falciparum Malaria and she was under treatment from 24. 9. 1994 to 30. 9. 1994, and therefore, she could not attend the duties. She has produced a medical certificate of Dr. Chandrakant R. Rathod, Physician and Surgeon at Vadodara. 9. 1994, she had proceeded on leave to Baroda. She was suffering from Falciparum Malaria and she was under treatment from 24. 9. 1994 to 30. 9. 1994, and therefore, she could not attend the duties. She has produced a medical certificate of Dr. Chandrakant R. Rathod, Physician and Surgeon at Vadodara. She has also produced blood report from Pranav Pathoclinic laboratory, Baroda to show that she was suffering from falciparum malaria. The plague in Surat had plunged much before 24th September 1994. She also appears to be one of the persons who had left Surat hearing the said news. There was no reason for her to go to vadodara for treatment of Falciparum. The Standing Committee also found that the petitioner herself was serving in M. D. Hospital and she could have taken treatment in the said hospital. The Standing Committee found the version an after-thought. The view taken by the Standing Committee does not call for interference. 2. Special Civil Application No. 4496/97 the petitioner Dr. Pratibhaben Topiwala, was employed as Medical Officer in M. D. Hospital, Surat. She was appointed as Medical Officer, in the year 1976. She had left surat for Pune after getting the leave sanctioned. She was admitted in Shahade Hospital, pune. A certificate dated 27. 10. 1994 has been produced to show that she had left Surat on 19. 9. 1994 by train. A telegram has also been produced to show that she was sick and she was interested to join duties in October, 1994. There is also a certificate dated 2. 10. 1994 certifying that the petitioner was admitted for D. U. bleeding on 22. 9. 1994 and she was advised rest till 2. 10. 1994. It is of course true that the petitioner had left Surat on 19. 9. 1994 after having got the leave sanctioned by the competent authority. She got the leave sanctioned on 18. 9. 1994 stating that 29. 9. 1994 is a off-day, she will be on casual leave on 21. 9. 1994 to 24. 9. 1994. She had applied for Earned Leave for the period 25. 9. 1994 to 30. 9. 1994. There were holidays on 1. 10. 1994 and 2. 10. 1994. It clearly shows that she had not left Surat with a view to take treatment. 1994 is a off-day, she will be on casual leave on 21. 9. 1994 to 24. 9. 1994. She had applied for Earned Leave for the period 25. 9. 1994 to 30. 9. 1994. There were holidays on 1. 10. 1994 and 2. 10. 1994. It clearly shows that she had not left Surat with a view to take treatment. She had gone to Pune for some other purpose having come to know of the epidemic in Surat, she avoided to return till it was safe. Medical certificate does not indicate seriousness of illness. It clearly appears to be a managed certificate. It is unfortunate that the petitioner, apart from being a responsible officer of the Corporation, also being a person from Medical profession, a highly respected profession, has betrayed peoples faith and hope. Her termination is perfectly justified and it calls for no interference in the finding of the Standing committee. Certificates. Not only as a Medical Officer and senior staff of the Corporation, but also the noble profession to which she belonged, she ought to have rushed to Surat. In my view her termination is perfectly justified. It was not only the duty of an employee of the corporation but it was also her professional ethics which demands that she should have attended the emergency duty in Surat. In my view, Respondent No. 2 absolutely justified in terminating her services. 3. Special Civil Application No. 5925/97 the petitioner-Valjibhai Baria was working as Superior Field worker. The say of the petitioner is that he was sick and was under medical treatment. He has produced medical certificate from Dahod. He says that he had left after obtaining leave for 23. 9. 1994. He also appears to be one of the persons who had left Surat hearing of the epidemic in Surat. The fact that he had obtained leave for only one day i. e. , for 23. 9. 1994 is of no help. He could have taken treatment at Surat. The medical certificate obtained from the Medical officer at Dahod does not inspire confidence. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the decision of the Standing Committee. 4. Special Civil Application No. 6284/97 the petitioner-M. P. Kataria was working as Superior Field worker. His say is that he was sick. In support of this, he has produced a certificate of Dr. Harshad Desai of Olpad. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the decision of the Standing Committee. 4. Special Civil Application No. 6284/97 the petitioner-M. P. Kataria was working as Superior Field worker. His say is that he was sick. In support of this, he has produced a certificate of Dr. Harshad Desai of Olpad. It is stated that he was suffering from Falciparum malaria. The Certificate is dated 5. 10. 1994. Olpad is said to be at a distance of 7 km. from Surat. He has applied for leave on 27. 9. 1997. Considering all facts of the case, he also appears to be a person who did not respond to the emergency call and ran away from Surat. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the order of the Standing Committee. 5. Special Civil Application No. 4501/97 the petitioner-Champaben J. Patel was working as Staff Nurse in M. D. Hospital. Her say is that she was under treatment for the last one and half year. A certificate dated 6. 10. 1994 has been produced saying that she was under treatment for recurrence of "acute affale of cerical efulgun". She was advised rest and treatment for 10 days. In spite of thef said disease, she was. attending her normal duties. This indicates that the disease was not that acute, which could deprive her to respond to the call given by the respondent-Corporation. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the order of the standing Committee. 6. Special Civil Application No. 4502/97 petitioner, Jayantilal G. Salat was working as Clerk-cum-Compounder in the department of Surat Municipal Corporation. His say is that his mother was ill during the period 1. 2. 1994 to 2. 3. 1994. His mother was ill much prior to the incident of outbreak of epidemic in Surat in September, 1994. A detailed representation in this regard was filed by him. It is also stated that he had reported on 29. 9. 1994, but was not taken on duty. Even according to the petitioner, his mother was ill since February, 1994. There is nothing to show that during the subject period, the condition of his mother was such that it was not possible for him to report for duty. He reported on 29. 9. 1994 when the decision was taken that his services have been terminated. Even according to the petitioner, his mother was ill since February, 1994. There is nothing to show that during the subject period, the condition of his mother was such that it was not possible for him to report for duty. He reported on 29. 9. 1994 when the decision was taken that his services have been terminated. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the order of the Standing Committee. 7. Special Civil Application No. 4503/97 the petitioner Babubhai A. Patel was working as Assistant in the Bio-chemistry department of the Corporation. He says that he had gone. to Himatnagar on 24. 9. 1994 as his niece was suffering from cancer. He has produced certificate dated 2. 10. 1994 saying that the petitioner was suffering from Typhoid fever since 22. 9. 1994, and therefore, he was advised not to perform routine duties during the period 22. 7. 1994 to 30. 9. 1994. He was declared to be fit to work from 1. 10. 1994. He has also states that he received the telegram on 30. 9. 1994 and reported on 1. 10. 1994. He has also taken the plea that while at himatnagar, he was not aware of the Notification issued by the Corporation declaring emergency and the call given. Apparently, after hearing about the plague in Surat, he left the City. The medical certificate produced by him does not inspire confidence. Even if it is accepted that the niece was suffering from cancer, no emergency is shown which could prompt him to rush to Himatnagar. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the order of the Standing Committee. 8. Special Civil Application No. 4504/97 the petitioner Vasantlal R. Thakkar was working as Supervisor Technical South zone. He has produced a certificate dated 5. 10. 1994 to show that he was suffering from falciparum Malaria from 25. 9. 1994 to 30. 9. 1994. He has also produced recommendation of the Dy. Engineer dated 10. 10. 1994. The said respondent Officer of the Corporation has stated that he was actually suffering from Falciparum and therefore, he was advised on 25. 9. 1994 to go home. It appears that the said recommendation of the Dy. Engineer has not been properly considered by the Standing Committee. In view of this, this matter requires reconsideration by the Standing Committee. 1994. The said respondent Officer of the Corporation has stated that he was actually suffering from Falciparum and therefore, he was advised on 25. 9. 1994 to go home. It appears that the said recommendation of the Dy. Engineer has not been properly considered by the Standing Committee. In view of this, this matter requires reconsideration by the Standing Committee. I direct the Standing Committee of the respondent-Corporation to reconsider the case of Mr. Vasantlal R. Thakker. 9. Special Civil Application No. 4505/97 the petitioner-Pankajbhai K. Patel was working as Superior Field worker in the public Health department of the Corporation. The say of the petitioner is that his wife was not well and was under treatment as OPD patient between 14. 9. 1994 and 29. 9. 1994 at bombay. There is also evidence to show that his wife was indoor patient during the period from 14. 9. 1994 to 29. 9. 1994. The plea appears to be genuine. There is evidence to show that he was required to attend his wife at Bombay. This matter appears to have not been appreciated by the Standing Committee in right perspective. This requires reconsideration. In view of this, I direct the respondent Corporation to reconsider the case of the petitioner. 10. Special Civil Application No. 4506/97 the petitioner Lalbhai R. Patel was working as Supervisor in South Zone. The say of the petitioner is that he was suffering from malaria. He has also produced certificate dated 30. 5. 1994 saying that he was under treatment since 23. 9. 1994 and he was advised rest for one week. He has produced recommendation of Dy. Engineer indicating that he has reported on 23. 9. 1994, hut looking to his condition he was advised to go back. In my view, this matter also requires reconsideration by the Standing Committee. However, the standing Committee will thoroughly scrutinise the correctness of the recommendation of the Dy. Engineer. It appears that the said Dy. Engineer issued identical certificates in other cases also. In view of this, I direct the respondent to reconsider the case of the petitioner. 11. Special Civil Application No. 3559/97 the petitioner-Yusuf Mahmood Kazi was working as Overseer in the Public construction Department. The say of the petitioner is that he was suffering from fever. He has produced a certificate dated 4. 10. 1994 of Dr. In view of this, I direct the respondent to reconsider the case of the petitioner. 11. Special Civil Application No. 3559/97 the petitioner-Yusuf Mahmood Kazi was working as Overseer in the Public construction Department. The say of the petitioner is that he was suffering from fever. He has produced a certificate dated 4. 10. 1994 of Dr. Ibrahim A Badat certifying that the petitioner was suffering from Falciparam Malaria since 29. 9. 1994 and was under his treatment during the period from 30. 9. 1994 to 4. 10. 1994 and he was therefore, advised rest for the period 29. 9. 1994 to 4. 10. 1994 with one attendant. He also produced a certificate dated 4. 10. 1994 of Dr. Yusuf U. Patel that he was suffering from URTI. from 1. 10. 1994 to 4. 10 1994. Nothing is shown for his absence for the period from 22. 9. 1994. He joined on 27. 9. 1994 and left on the same day in the afternoon. The Standing committee has rightly rejected the case of the petitioner. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the order of the Standing Committee. 12. Special Civil Application No. 3560/97 the petitioner, Ali Kassim Moola was working as Clerk (Superior Field worker ). He says that he was suffering from Disk Lemin (low back pain) from 3. 8. 1994 to 3. 10. 1994 i. e. , even much prior to the outbreak of plague in Surat. He got leave sanctioned on 3. 8. 1994. I have seen the medical treatment given to him. The sickness was not of the nature which would deprive him to respond the call by reporting for duty. Even if he was on leave, he was required to report on duty. His services have been rightly terminated. No interference is called for in the decision of the Standing Committee. 13. Special Civil Application No. 6329/97 the petitioner-Mahendra A Modi was working on the post of Statistic Assistant with the Corporation. He is a physically handicapped person with more than 45% disability of right lower limb due to polio paralysis. He attended his duties on 24. 9. 1994. He says that he fell ill while he was in office, and therefore, he was advised to go home and take treatment. Thereafter, he went to Nadiad, and there was none in the family in Surat. He attended his duties on 24. 9. 1994. He says that he fell ill while he was in office, and therefore, he was advised to go home and take treatment. Thereafter, he went to Nadiad, and there was none in the family in Surat. He has produced certificate to show that he was suffering from acute malaria. The Standing committee has rejected his case on the ground that better treatment was available in Surat than in Nadiad. He has stated that he had fallen ill while in office and he was advised to go home. There was none of his family at Surat and he being handicapped, went to nadiad. The Standing Committee has not properly appreciated his case. The matter requires reconsideration. In view of this, the respondent will reconsider the case of the petitioner. 14. Special Civil Application No. 3530/97 the petitioner-Shakuntala P. Devlekar was Staff Nurse in the Family Planning bureau. She says that she was suffering from acute bronchitis. In my view, this illness was not of such a nature which could deprive her from attending the duties. She being a nurse, ought to have responded to the call given by the respondent-Corporation. In my view, no interference is called for in the decision of the Standing Committee. 15. Special Civil Application No. 6783/97 the petitioner Sanjay B. Dave, was working as Sanitary Sub-Inspector. The say of the petitioner is that he was suffering from malaria. He has produced a medical certificate dated 29,9. 1994. It shows that he was under treatment from 24. 9. 1994 to 29. 9. 1994. It is contended that the certificate produced by the petitioner was not considered by the standing Committee. He was also given personal hearing. The report shows that the petitioner was given personal hearing. I have seen the medical certificate produced by the petitioner. The certificate is of Dr. Mangal B. Patel of Ahmedabad. The petitioner is also one of those persons who, instead of responding to the call given by the Corporation, ran away from Surat. If he was really sick, he could have obtained treatment at Surat. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the decision of the Standing Committee. In view of the aforesaid, Special Civil Applications No. 4504/97, 4505/97, 4506/97 and 6329 of 1997 are partly allowed. If he was really sick, he could have obtained treatment at Surat. I do not find any justified reason to interfere with the decision of the Standing Committee. In view of the aforesaid, Special Civil Applications No. 4504/97, 4505/97, 4506/97 and 6329 of 1997 are partly allowed. The respondents are directed to reconsider their case within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of the writ. Rule made partly absolute to the aforesaid extent. So far as rest of the Special Civil Applications are concerned, I find no merit and each of them are rejected. Rule discharged in each Special civil Applications. No order as to costs. .