JUDGMENT Samaresh Banerjee, J. Both the matters having arisen out of the same proceeding will be governed by the same judgment. In W.P. 16297 (W) of 1998, the writ petitioner trust and one of its trustees have challenged an Order No. 133 dated 10.8.98 passed in Case No. VIII-330/85 passed by the learned Judge, First Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta. 2. By the impugned order the Tribunal has first of all rejected the application made by the petitioner trust for recalling an order dated 8th December, 1997 passed by the Tribunal by which the Tribunal closed the cross-examination of witness No. 1 for the workman. 3. By the impugned order the Tribunal made the payment of interim relief to the workman, which was awarded to the workman long ago by the Tribunal, as a condition precedent to participation in the adjudication proceeding. 4. So far as the first part of the order of the Tribunal is concerned, i.e. its refusal to recall the aforesaid order dated 8.12.97, after considering the respective submissions of the parties and considering all materials on record, I do not find any reason to interfere with such order. 5. It appears that in justification of its prayer for recalling, the present petitioners before the Tribunal gave certain explanations which were duly considered by the Tribunal. But after due consideration thereof, in fact, the tribunal has not accepted the same. One of the explanations which was given in the application for recalling was that the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner was engaged in a case before the High Court and, therefore, was unable to appear before the Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view that for a learned Advocate in the matter of appearing before a Court there cannot be any question of priority of appearing before one Court in preference to other. 6. Although much that has been argued on that point I am of the view that when the matter was also fixed for hearing before the Tribunal, if the learned Advocate concerned was not in a position to appear in the said case because of his preoccupation in the High Court, it was incumbent upon the employer to make some other arrangements in respect thereof. There cannot be any adjournment as a matter of right. 7. There cannot be any adjournment as a matter of right. 7. It also appears to this Court from the impugned order that on the prayer of the learned Advocate for giving chance to his client to cross-examine the witness No. 1 of the workman, for ends of justice such prayer was allowed vide Order No. 132 dated 16th July, 1998 on condition of payment of costs of Rs. 500/- to the workman. Unfortunately it appears that despite such opportunity given to the said trust, the trust has failed and neglected to take such opportunity as no cost directed to be paid by the Tribunal was paid to the workman. 8. The tribunal, therefore, rightly has held that in view of such conduct of the trust there was no scope for giving any further chance of cross-examination. 9. After considering all aspect of the matter, I do not find any perversity of illegality in the order which has been passed by the tribunal rejecting the prayer of the petitioner to recall such order warranting interference by this Court. 10. As to the second part of the order, namely, making payment of interim relief as a condition precedent to participation in the proceedings although much has been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that the tribunal has no jurisdiction to do so, it appears to this Court that the tribunal has passed such order really following a judgment rendered by this Court in the case of Sri Debabrata Sen vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. being C.O. 6632 (W) of 1996 (unreported). 11. Factually it appears that as early as in 1995 by an order dated 17th May, 1995 the prayer of the workman for grant of interim relief was allowed. 12. Admittedly despite such order the petitioner trust did not comply with the order of the tribunal and did not pay such interim relief to the workman. It appears that relying on the aforesaid judgment of this Court the workman prayed before the tribunal for issuing a direction upon the trust for compliance with the order of the tribunal in the matter of payment of interim relief whereupon the tribunal by an order dated 16th July, 1998 directed the said trust to comply with the direction given in Order No. 86 dated 17th May, 1995 passed by the tribunal directing interim relief. 13. 13. As such payment was not made despite such order, by the second part of the impugned order the tribunal has passed such an order, namely, making payment of the aforesaid amount as a condition precedent in the matter of participation in the adjudication proceedings. It is not disputed by the writ petitioners before this Court that such payment has not been made. 14. The learned Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner trust and one of its trustees has made two-fold submissions. Firstly it has been contended by Mr. Chatterjee that the Tribunal not having any inherent power has no jurisdiction whatsoever to pass such order and secondly the order passed by the Tribunal is void. 15. It has also been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that in any view of the matter no wrong was committed by the trust by not paying the aforesaid amount of interim relief as directed by the Tribunal in view of the fact that the Tribunal directed payment of interim relief on condition of submission of an undertaking by the workman that in the event the award goes against the workman he has to pay back the money. It has been contended that such undertaking was not filed and therefore, there was no obligation on the part of the trust to make such payment. 16. It has also been submitted by Mr. Chatterjee that the aforesaid order directing payment of interim relief has been challenged by the said trust in a writ proceeding before this Court which is pending for disposal and although admittedly no interim order has been passed in the said proceeding staying the operation of the said order, in view of pendency of such a proceeding before this Court in all propriety the Tribunal could not have passed such an order directing payment of such an amount as a condition precedent to participation in the adjudication proceeding. 17. Mr. Chatterjee also tried to challenge the merit of the said order directing payment of interim relief in this proceeding contending, inter alia, that the workman concerned is not entitled to such interim relief at all in view of the fact that despite termination of service he has not left the quarter and enjoying the same and therefore, is not entitled to such relief. 18. 18. The learned Counsel appearing for the workman has submitted, inter alia, that no wrong has been committed by the Tribunal by passing such on order directing payment of interim relief as a condition precedent to participation in view of the fact that the Tribunal has followed a judgment which has been rendered by this Court. 19. It is also to be placed on record that in course of hearing as Mr. Chatterjee contended that the workman did not file such an affidavit as directed by the Tribunal, after passing of the order by the Tribunal directing payment of interim relief, this Court on 9th September, 1998 asked the workman to satisfy the Court on such point. Thereafter on production of relevant records it appears that the workman after passing of the order directing payment of interim relief, which initially was passed ex parte, such an affidavit was filed. But it appears that subsequently such order was recalled when the application for interim relief was heard again and thereafter again an order was passed directing payment of interim relief. At that stage the workman did not file a fresh affidavit. 20. The learned Counsel appearing for the workman submitted that such an affidavit already having been filed at the initial stage, there is to necessity to file further affidavit but to obviate of the dispute relating thereto his client was ready and willing to file a fresh affidavit. It appears that thereafter a fresh affidavit has been filed. 21. Since it has been contended, inter alia, by Mr. Chatterjee that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass such order since it lacks inherent power, it is necessary to dispose of the said point first. 22. It may be recorded that the self-same question arose before this Court in the case of Debabrata Sen vs. State of West Bengal & Ors. (supra). In the said case the workman moved the High Court against an order of the Tribunal rejecting the application made by the workman before the Tribunal praying for a direction that the payment under section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act be made a condition precedent for the employer to participate in such proceeding. The Tribunal by the said order after contested hearing rejected such prayer holding that he has no jurisdiction to do so and after passing the order under Section 15(2)(b) the Tribunal becomes functus officio. The Tribunal by the said order after contested hearing rejected such prayer holding that he has no jurisdiction to do so and after passing the order under Section 15(2)(b) the Tribunal becomes functus officio. After considering all aspects of the matter this Court has held, inter alia, that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make compliance of an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 15(2)(b) as a condition precedent for participation in the proceeding. 23. In coming to such finding this Court was of the view that after passing of an order under Section 15(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act directing payment of interim relief, the Tribunal does not become functus officio since the order passed under the aforesaid provisions is in the nature of an interlocutory order and not in the nature of an award. It was further held that even though it cannot be for the Court to usurp the jurisdiction of the legislature and to legislate, in the event of a gap in the legislation, it is certainly open to the Court to fill up such gap by making a purposive interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act specially relating to the beneficial piece of legislation so that the purpose of the beneficial piece of legislation is not frustrated. It was also held that the very expression interim relief will indicate the aforesaid provisions has been introduced by the legislature by amending the Act for the purpose of giving interim relief to the workman. Such enactment, therefore, is a beneficial piece of legislation introduced for the welfare of the workmen, who are weaker section of the community. The provisions in the said section that the quantum of interim relief in case of termination of service of a workman shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West Bengal Payment and Subsistence Allowance Act, further make such position clear. 24. It was further held that it is inconceivable that an tribunal although passes an order for grant of such relief after hearing both the parties, such an order will be allowed to be defeated and frustrated by the employer on the ground that a tribunal is powerless to enforce such an order. 24. It was further held that it is inconceivable that an tribunal although passes an order for grant of such relief after hearing both the parties, such an order will be allowed to be defeated and frustrated by the employer on the ground that a tribunal is powerless to enforce such an order. Making a purposive interpretation of section 11 of the Act which empowers the tribunal to regulate its own procedure, it was held that in exercise of such power the Tribunal can certainly evolve a procedure for enforcement of an order directing payment of interim relief to the workman, the same being in the nature of an interlocutory order but for which the very object and purpose of such a welfare legislation will be frustrated. Such purposive interpretation of the said Section was made relying on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Bharat Singh vs. Management of New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre reported in AIR 1986 Supreme Court page 842. 25. It is because of aforesaid reasons it was held that when an employer violates the order of the tribunal directing payment of interim relief by not making payment of such amount, even if such order of the tribunal has not been set aside or stayed by the higher court, it will certainly be open to the Industrial Tribunal to enforce compliance of such order of the Tribunal by making payment of interim relief as condition precedent for the employer to participate in the adjudication proceedings before the tribunal and to defend itself. It was further held that such interpretation is quite in consonance with the very purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act, one of the object of which is to ensure industrial peace for settlement of disputes between the parties. If during the pendency of adjudication of disputes between the parties, the employer is allowed to violate the order of the tribunal directing payment of interim relief with impunity and thereby to frustrate the very object and purpose of such legislation, the faith and confidence of the workman upon the machineries and functionaries under the Industrial Disputes Act are likely to be eroded affecting industrial peace. 26. 26. It was further held that our country is a Socialist Democratic Republic and as held by the Supreme Court in the case of D.S. Nakara vs. Union of India reported in AIR 1982 SC 130 the principal aim of a Socialist State as envisaged in the Preamble is to eliminate inequality of income and status and standard of life. The basic frame work of Socialism is to provide a decent standard of life to the working people and specially to provide security from cradle to grave. It is also the constitutional duty of the State, as envisaged in the Preamble of the Constitution, to secure to its citizens justice, social, economic and political. 27. Under the Constitution, therefore, judiciary like the other two wings of the state, namely, the executive and the legislature, is equally committed to secure such social and economic justice to the people. In the matter of interpretation of welfare legislation which have been enacted for the welfare of the weaker sections of the community like workman it is, therefore, necessary for the court to give such an interpretation to an enactment to ensure that social and economic justice is secured to a citizen and not frustrated. 28. It was further held that in consonance with such principle, therefore, unless, while interpreting the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and the power of the tribunal to grant interim relief under section 15(2)(b) of the Act, the power of the tribunal to enforce its order under the provisions of the Act is read in section 11 of the Act, the very purpose and object of such enactment for payment of interim relief will be frustrated and the very purpose of such enactment to give some relief to the workman during the pendency of the adjudication of the dispute before the tribunal so that he can subsist will be defeated. It will be a mockery of justice to ask the workman to invoke the provisions of section 33(C)(2)(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act for realisation of such amount and thereby encouraging a defaulting employer to prevent the workman to enjoy the benefit of such interim relief by tiring him out with lengthy litigations. 29. In such view of the matter, the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass such order is not tenable and cannot be accepted. 30. 29. In such view of the matter, the contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass such order is not tenable and cannot be accepted. 30. I do not also find any impropriety or illegality in passing such an order. It appears that before passing such an order the tribunal gave opportunity to the trust to pay such amount. But such order was also not complied with and such opportunity was not availed of. 31. As to the contention of Mr. Chatterjee that the workman is not entitled to such an amount in view of the fact that the affidavit was not filed, I am unable to accept such contention. Admittedly such an affidavit was filed initially. True that the order which was initially passed directing payment of interim relief ex parte as the employer was not present was recalled and subsequently after hearing again such application was allowed and payment was directed to be made by the employer. Merely because subsequent to that again affidavit has not been filed cannot deprive the workman to get benefit of such order. Since such statement in the affidavit were made under oath, with the termination of a previous proceeding because of setting aside of the order such affidavit did not lose its force and the workman was very much bound by the undertaking given in such an affidavit. That apart it now appears that another affidavit has been filed. 32. The whole purpose of the affidavit was that in the event the award goes against the workman, the amount which will be awarded to him by way of interim relief is to be refunded. It appears to this court that such statement was there before the Tribunal by way of an affidavit. 33. Mr. chatterjee has no doubt submitted also that the pendency of the writ proceeding challenging the order directing the payment of interim relief stand in the way of tribunal to pass such an order. Admittedly no stay was granted by the High Court. Merely because of the pendency of the writ application, even though the order directing the payment of interim relief was not stayed, the petitioner was not absolved of its liability to pay interim relief, but the petitioner continued to remain liable to make such payment. No wrong, therefore, has been committed by the tribunal in passing such order. Merely because of the pendency of the writ application, even though the order directing the payment of interim relief was not stayed, the petitioner was not absolved of its liability to pay interim relief, but the petitioner continued to remain liable to make such payment. No wrong, therefore, has been committed by the tribunal in passing such order. Mr. Chatterjee has also addressed the court on merits of the order directing payment of interim relief by submitting that the workman is not entitled to such a relief because of staying in a quarter. If the present petitioner trust succeeds in its aforesaid writ petition on such a ground obviously the workman will be liable to refund in view of his affidavit and cannot have any escape. But the tribunal having passed such an order and which uptil now not having been set aside by the High Court or any other Court nor the same having been stayed, the trust remains absolutely liable to pay such amount forthwith and could not have refused to make such payment. 34. I have no doubt in mind that the present case which are coming to the notice of the Court where orders passed under Section 15(2)(b) directing payment of interim relief are violated by the employer with impunity even though such order is not stayed or set aside by the higher forum and tiring the workman out through litigations and thereby frustrating the very object and purpose of such a legislation, namely, for payment of interim relief during the pendency of an adjudication proceeding. 35. In such view of the matter I do not find any reason to interfere with the order passed by the tribunal. 36. The other writ proceeding, namely, W.P. No. 18875 (W) of 1998 has been moved by the selfsame writ petitioner trust against a subsequent order passed by the Tribunal in the same proceeding on 11th September, 1998. Since the petitioner has not obtained a certified copy he has annexed a certificate from his learned Advocate certifying the copy of the order to be correct. Since the petitioner has not obtained a certified copy he has annexed a certificate from his learned Advocate certifying the copy of the order to be correct. By the first Order No. 134 the tribunal after recording that no records were called for or produced by the workman has further given opportunity to the trust petitioner to make payment of the entire amount of interim relief by the next elate so that it can adduce fresh evidence before the tribunal to prove that the dismissal order was valid and proportionate. The second order No. 135 is an order rejecting the prayer of the trust petitioner for adjournment of the hearing and by the third order No. 136 the tribunal has allowed the prayer of the workman to file affidavit in connection with proceeding under Section 15(2)(b) recording inter alia that the High Court directed the workman to file such affidavit. 37. Much grievances have been made about the last order by submitting that the High Court did not direct filing of such affidavit and, therefore, such recording could not have been done. It is true that this Court did not direct the workman to file such an affidavit but it was recorded by this Court that the workman is to file such affidavit. But it does not appear that the tribunal has recorded that the High Court has so directed. What has been recorded is that the workman in his application stated that the High Court directed to file such an affidavit. 38. Such statement in the application was obviously not proper and uncalled for in view of the fact that such a direction was not passed and it is the workman which offered before this Court to do so. 39. So far as the other two orders are there it appears that those are merely consequential orders, by one of those orders the trust was given an opportunity once again to make the payment which the trust has not made. 40. In such view of the matter question of interference with such order does not arise. After considering all aspects of the matter I am of the view that not only no interference is called for but also it will be fit and proper in the interest of justice to issue a direction upon the trust itself to make such payment without any delay. 41. After considering all aspects of the matter I am of the view that not only no interference is called for but also it will be fit and proper in the interest of justice to issue a direction upon the trust itself to make such payment without any delay. 41. It may be recorded again that this aspect of the matter whether in such a proceeding the itself can issue a mandate upon the private person was dealt in details in the aforesaid case of Debabrata Sen vs. State of West Bengal. After giving detailed reasons it was held that it is permissible to do so. Therefore, it is not required for this Court to repeat such reasoning once again here. It is only to be recorded that the writ court cannot be a silent spectator while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in such a situation where the employer violates the order of the tribunal directing payment of interim relief with impunity and does not conform to its legal obligation and duty to carry out the valid order of the tribunal to defeat the very purpose of the enactment for grant of interim relief and affectation of the right to life of the workman. 42. It is the fundamental duty of every citizen also under Article 51(a) of the Constitution to abide by the Constitution and respect its ideals. All courts and tribunals function under the Constitution and its orders are required to be complied with. It is also the constitutional goal of the State to ensure social and economic justice to a citizen specially the weaker sections of the community. 43. It will, therefore, not only be the duty of every citizen to strive towards such goal, it will also be the legal duty and obligation of every citizen to obey the order of the courts and tribunal functioning under the Constitution to dispense justice between the parties. 44. I, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that under the facts and circumstances of the case it is necessary for this Court to issue a direction upon the writ petitioner trust to comply with the order of the tribunal by making such payment without any delay. 45. 44. I, therefore, have no hesitation to hold that under the facts and circumstances of the case it is necessary for this Court to issue a direction upon the writ petitioner trust to comply with the order of the tribunal by making such payment without any delay. 45. Since however it appears to this Court that there is some scope of confusion on the part of the petitioner trust whether the workman is entitled to the amount directed to be paid under Section 15(2)(b) of the Act by the Tribunal in absence of filing of a fresh affidavit, after passing of the second order, I am inclined to give such time to the trust for making such payment towards the arrear. 46. Both the writ applications are, therefore, disposed of by directing that if the petitioner trust deposits a sum of Rs. 30,000/- towards arrears due and payable to the workman under the order passed by the Tribunal under section 15(2)(b) of the Act within 15th December, 1998, the tribunal shall not proceed any further till 20th January, 1999. If within the aforesaid period a further sum of Rs. 38,625 is paid towards arrears and the current amount to be paid month by month by the petitioner trust is paid which is to commence from 7th January, 1998, the tribunal shall resume the proceedings from the stage it reached on 10th August, 1998, when the petitioner trust will be entitled to participate in the proceedings and all orders passed subsequent thereto by the Tribunal shall stand recalled. 47. In default of any of such payment as aforesaid, the tribunal however will be at liberty to continue with the proceedings from the stage it last reached and conclude the same and pass the award in accordance with law. 48. It is to be placed on record that this amount which was directed to be paid towards arrear has been made accepting the statement of claim submitted by the workman before this Court. 49. There will be no order as to coats. 50. Mr. Chatterjee appearing for the petitioners however prays for stay of operation of the order, prayer is considered and rejected. 51. Certified copy or certified xerox copy of this order if applied for that will be made available to the applicant as expeditiously as possible.