JUDGMENT : S.K. Keshote, J. Though this is titled as first appeal, but is an appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, i.e. an appeal provided under a special statute. Under Section 30 of the Act aforesaid, appeal against the award of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in favour of the injured workmen or dependents of deceased workmen for the injury or death caused in the accident arising out of and in the course his employment does lie only when this Court finds that substantial question of law arises therein. This is an appeal by Deputy Secretary, Roads and Buildings Department, Sachivalaya, Gandhinagar, directed against the award of the Labour Court and Ex-Officio Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation, Valsad, passed in Fatal Case No. (W.C.) 70/93, decided on 30th September 1997. Under the said award the respondent-claimant was awarded Rs. 59,084/- as compensation for the death of Kalidas Shukkarbhai Nayaka, a workman of the appellant, who died in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. 2. The office reported that the appeal is barred by 87 days. This report is not correct. The appeal in fact is barred by 117 days. For calculating the time taken in filing the appeal, for the purpose of determining whether it is within limitation or not, the office has taken 90 days as if the limitation prescribed for filing of this appeal in this Court against the award of the Commissioner under Section 30 the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, which is not correct. This mistake has occurred for the obvious reason that it was taken to be a regular appeal under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 for which the ordinary period of limitation is of 90 days though some exceptions are there, for example, in the case where appeal is filed by an indigent person, which is not the case here. 3. In this case, appeal against the award of the Commissioner for the Workmen's Compensation, Valsad is provided under Section 30 of the Act 1923 and the period of limitation for filing the same has to be taken out as provided under the said section. Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act 1923 prescribes the period of limitation for filing appeal under the said Section of 60 days. Sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Act 1923 prescribes the period of limitation for filing appeal under the said Section of 60 days. For determining the period taken for filing of appeal before this Court, the period of limitation for filing of the same in this Court should have been taken to be 60 days, and as a result thereof this appeal is barred by 117 days. 3. A Sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the Act 1923 provides that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable to the appeal filed under the said section. In case the appeal is not filed within the prescribed period of limitation by the appellant in this Court against the award of the Commissioner under the Workmen's Compensation Act, this Court is conferred with power to condone the delay in filing of the same in a proper case. The delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in filing of the appeal may be condoned where this Court is satisfied on the basis of the material produced on the record of the appeal that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from filing of the appeal in this Court within the prescribed period of limitation. The question which falls for consideration of this Court is whether the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be filed along with this appeal or it can be filed at any time subsequent to the filing of the appeal. Another question which arises for consideration of this Court is whether in the appeal itself the appellant can incorporate the ground on the basis of which delay is sought to be explained as well as the prayer for condonation of delay in filing of the appeal. So the question is whether it can be composite appeal and application for condonation of delay in filing thereof. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the Court to condone the delay caused in filing of the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. So the question is whether it can be composite appeal and application for condonation of delay in filing thereof. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 empowers the Court to condone the delay caused in filing of the appeal within the prescribed period of limitation. But this delay can only be condoned where this Court is satisfied that the appellant has furnished explanation for this delay or sufficient cause is made out by which it can be said to have been prevented from filing appeal within prescribed period of limitation and prayer has also been made for condonation of delay in filing thereof. Furnishing of explanation or giving of sufficient cause by which it is prevented from filing appeal and prayer for condonation of delay is a sine qua non for exercising power by this Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 as it is made applicable to the appeal filed under Section 30 of the Act 1923. The substance and not the form is material. This is permissible by necessary legal fiction or deemed to have been permissible to the appellant either by filing separate application for condonation of delay in filing appeal or it may incorporate necessary grounds and the prayer in the memo of appeal itself. Otherwise also, I fail to see any useful purpose that will be served in case insistence is made by the court on the filing of separate application for condonation of delay caused in filing of the appeal. Insistence on the form by this Court, more so in procedural matters, will only result in unnecessary increase of number of cases. This is permissible as per the procedure adopted in this Court by filing of separate application which is registered as civil application. It is unnecessarily increasing the work in the Registry of this Court which is already heavily burdened. To register this application separately, it will increase the ministerial work of this Court in manifold ways, that is, from the very starting point of presentation of the application to its termination finally in the form of order or judgment of this Court. Filing of separate civil application may also result in extra and heavy expenses to be incurred for the same by the litigant. Filing of separate civil application may also result in extra and heavy expenses to be incurred for the same by the litigant. Under the Court Fees Act, it is understandable, there may be a provision for levying court fees on such application and it may be one of the reasons for insisting on presentation of separate civil application for the prayer for condonation of delay in filing of the appeals. However, the main thrust and concern of the State Government may be of payment of court fees on the application. This can conveniently be done by putting additional court fees stamp prescribed for the application to be filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 by affixing the same on the memo of appeal itself in addition to the court fee of appeal. This country is facing great problem of shortage of stationery. Large quantity of stationery is imported by this country. I have been given out that a good amount of foreign exchange is spent on import of paper. Leaving apart this wider question, it is well-known that in the manufacture of paper good quantity of forest wood is consumed. If we want a pollution free environment preserving of the forest is very essential and important. To preserve forest we have to minimise the use of papers. Further to stop the wastage of stationery. If it is done certainly to some extent we will help to have pollution free environment in the country. The stationery which is used for filing of civil applications can be saved by incorporating necessary grounds for condonation of delay and prayer clause in the appeal memo itself, and that stationery can be utilised or made use of for providing stationery and books at cheap rate to the students of this country. If we make survey of the price of note books which the parents of the students of the country have to pay in the market, it will be an alarming figure. Education has become costlier and it is beyond the reach of large percentage of citizens of this country. Cost of paper may not be the only component of high cost of education, but nevertheless it is one of the important components. 4. Order 41, Rule 3A was inserted in the year 1976 in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Education has become costlier and it is beyond the reach of large percentage of citizens of this country. Cost of paper may not be the only component of high cost of education, but nevertheless it is one of the important components. 4. Order 41, Rule 3A was inserted in the year 1976 in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 3A of Order 41 of Code 1908 makes it obligatory on the part of the applicant-appellant, where appeal is presented after expiry of the period of prescribed limitation to make an application supported by affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation. The words used in this sub-rule (1) of Rule 3A of Order 41 of the Code are "accompanied by an application". So the thrust of the rule is that there must be a prayer for condonation of delay and to set forth the facts duly supported by affidavit therein on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he has sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. Insistence, as stated earlier, is on setting forth the grounds on which the condonation of delay in filing the appeal is prayed for and the facts given out showing sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within limitation, supported by an affidavit and the prayer for condonation of delay. Word "accompanied" is used in this provision and it may be taken as if provisions provides for filing of 'separate application' for condonation of delay in filing the appeal duly supported by affidavit. The purpose and object is that there must be reasons and grounds made out to the satisfaction of the court by the appellant for not preferring appeal within the specified period of limitation. The question that again arises for consideration is whether this application should be separately registered or it may be an application forming part of the memo of appeal. I checked up from the Registry and found that in the month of July 1998 total figure of pendency of civil applications in the Court is 17454. The question that again arises for consideration is whether this application should be separately registered or it may be an application forming part of the memo of appeal. I checked up from the Registry and found that in the month of July 1998 total figure of pendency of civil applications in the Court is 17454. This is an artificial figure as civil applications are nothing but interlocutory applications in the main appeal and this figure could have been avoided by filing application in the appeal itself and it may be placed in the file of the first appeal. By registering civil applications separately, proceedings taken therein are also separately prepared and drawn. It is the procedure of the Court that these civil applications are being separately kept from the main file. It is also not unknown that these civil applications many times are being listed for orders in the court without the main file being placed along with it. Orders are being passed on the civil applications and those orders, as stated earlier, are kept separately, and while dealing with the main file it is not known to the Court what type of civil applications are filed from time to time in the proceedings and what orders have been passed thereon. I don't mean to say that it cannot be made known to the court as to what civil applications are filed and what orders have been passed thereon. But to know it these civil applications are to be taken out from the farad and then only the nature of civil applications and the orders passed therein will be known by the court. It is also a fact of which notice can be taken that hundreds of civil applications are being listed in court after disposal of the main proceedings. It is also a fact that civil applications filed in this Court in the main proceedings are being listed after many years of the filing thereof. I have collected some statistics of the civil applications which are being filed in the Court from time to time and in the later part of this order I will give the details of the same to illustrate how these civil applications artificially increase the number of pending cases and increase the work of the Registry. I have collected some statistics of the civil applications which are being filed in the Court from time to time and in the later part of this order I will give the details of the same to illustrate how these civil applications artificially increase the number of pending cases and increase the work of the Registry. Order 41, Rule 3A of C.P.C. no doubt provides for filing of application, but nothing is said that it cannot be a composite application in the memo of appeal itself. Though in this case it is not necessary for me, nor I think it proper to decide the ambit and scope of this provision, but even if it is taken that it contemplates for filing of separate application for condonation of delay caused in filing of the appeal, still I fail to see how this purpose can only be achieved when such application is separately registered. Application in the appeal may only be the requirement of this provision, and this can be achieved by filing application along with the appeal itself under the title and number of the appeal. Not only this, but all the interlocutory applications filed in the main proceedings may be permitted to be filed in this way so that consolidated order sheets of the proceedings are there and at a glance the court may know what type of interlocutory applications are filed in the main proceedings and what orders have been made by the court from time to time. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that any appeal which is presented after expiry of the period of limitation is prescribed therefor it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within such period, and this application may be either setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that he has sufficient cause for not preferring appeal within such period, in the memo of appeal itself, and making prayer therein for condonation of delay or by filing separate application in the appeal itself by setting forth the necessary facts supported by affidavit to satisfy the court that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the limitation, and prayer for condonation of delay. This application may be under the title and number of the appeal itself and it may be in the file of the appeal itself. This application may not be registered as separate case, i.e. civil application. It can be taken to be part of the appeal itself and all the proceedings therein be drawn on the file of the appeal. By doing so it will reduce the work of the Registry as well as further procedural work of the advocates and will reduce the artificial increase in number of the pending cases in the court. Filing of this application separately will not serve any purpose except to increase the artificial number of pendency of cases in this Court and the work in the Registry. I may here refer to the order of 17th July 1995 of the Hon'ble Chief Justice of this Court circulated by the Registrar, which reads as under: "Every civil application must be circulated to the court along with the file of the main matter, in which civil application is made, for immediate compliance. Non-compliance of the order by the respective Branch will be viewed strictly by His Lordship the Hon'ble the Chief Justice." This order provides that every civil applications must be circulated to the court along with the file of the main matter in which civil application is made. Though this order is there, it is ordinarily not complied with. However, I am not at the point of compliance or non-compliance of this order. But I am referring this order with another purpose. From this order one thing is clear that the civil applications are interlocutory applications in the main matter and these are to be circulated along with the main matters. Substance of this order is that the court should have before it file of the main matter at the time of dealing with the civil applications. This order does not insist or contemplate that interlocutory applications filed in the main matters are to be registered separately. In case these applications are not registered separately, how it will lose any of its effect, force and purpose. This order does not insist or contemplate that interlocutory applications filed in the main matters are to be registered separately. In case these applications are not registered separately, how it will lose any of its effect, force and purpose. The applications are filed under the title and number of the main matter it is natural that it is to be dealt in the main matter and will be circulated along with the file of the main matter and compliance of the order aforesaid of Hon'ble Chief Justice will also be there. 5. I have had occasion to deal with the civil applications as mentioned below and I have noted down many details thereof, i.e. the date on which these civil applications have been filed, the date on which it was first listed, whether it is filed before or after the decision of the main matter, date of listing of these civil applications, date of decision, and the date of decision of the main matter. From these details given below it is clear that many of the civil applications are being filed after decision of the main matter; many civil applications are not listed for orders in the court before decision of the main matter; many civil applications are not listed for orders in court for years together, etc. In the light of these statistical details which I have taken out from the civil applications, I am of the considered opinion that necessary amendment in the High Court Rules needs to be made so that registration of the interlocutory applications in the main matter may be discontinued. The Registrar is directed to place this order for perusal of the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and also to circulate the same among all brother Judges. 6. The period which has been taken by the appellants in filing the appeal has been counted upto the date on which the appeal is filed in this Court, i.e. 27th March 1998. On 27th March 1998 the appellant had affixed court fees stamp of Rs. 5 on the memo of appeal. The appeal has been filed on the deficit court fees stamp of Rs. 2655/-. The deficit of the court fees has been made good on 13th May 1998. On 27th March 1998 the appeal was not properly filed appeal as the requisite court fees was not paid thereon. 5 on the memo of appeal. The appeal has been filed on the deficit court fees stamp of Rs. 2655/-. The deficit of the court fees has been made good on 13th May 1998. On 27th March 1998 the appeal was not properly filed appeal as the requisite court fees was not paid thereon. The appeal shall be deemed to be properly filed only on 13th May 1998 by legal fiction, the day on which the deficit court fees has been made good. The time required for filing of this appeal has to be taken up to 13th May 1998. This appeal is thus barred by 117 + 47 days, i.e. 164 days. Reference here may have to the provisions of Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which reads as under: "149. Power to make up deficiency of court-fees: Where the whole or any part of any fee prescribed for any document by the law for the time being in force relating to court-fees has not been paid, the Court may, in its discretion, at any stage, allow the person, by whom such fee is payable, to pay the whole or part, as the case may be, of such court-fee; and upon such payment the document, in respect of which such fee is payable, shall have the same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance." The appellant has not filed any application in this case under Section 149 of C.P.C. for extension of time to make good the deficit of court fees. It is no doubt, Section 149 empowers this Court to grant time to the appellant to make good deficiency of the court fees in its discretion. But that extension can only be granted where an application for the same has been made. Moreover, under Section 149 of C.P.C. the court has discretionary powers and that discretion means a judicial discretion. It is not a routine or formal order which the court will pass only on making of the applications by the appellant. The appellant has to give out reasons for non-payment of full court fees on the appeal on the day of presentation of the same in the Court. This appeal merely on making good deficit of the court fee has not same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. 7. The appellant has to give out reasons for non-payment of full court fees on the appeal on the day of presentation of the same in the Court. This appeal merely on making good deficit of the court fee has not same force and effect as if such fee had been paid in the first instance. 7. The third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 provides that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 30 provides that an appeal shall lie to the High Court from an order of a Commissioner awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half-monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum. Appellant is the employer of the deceased workman and challenge in this appeal has been made by it of the order of the Commissioner awarding compensation in lump sum to the claimant-respondent. I do not find any certificate of the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the impugned award, accompanied to this appeal. Learned Counsel for the appellant, on being asked by the Court, is unable to state before this Court whether the amount of compensation a lump sum awarded in favour of the respondent-claimants by the Commissioner has been deposited by it before the said authority or not. This appeal, for want of accompaniment of certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the impugned award, is not maintainable before this Court. Taking into consideration the totality of the facts of this case, the appeal deserves to be dismissed in limine on the ground, first, that it is barred by 164 days and, second, it is not accompanied by certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable to the claimant-respondents under the impugned award. 8. In the result the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.