ORDER Khan, J. -- 1. Appellant was ordered to deposit process fee by 15.5.96. He did it a day late on 16.5.96 but his writ petition No. 676/96 was dismissed by this Court by order dated 30.5.96. He thereafter filed M.C.C. No. 354/96 for restoration of this petition which was also dismissed vide order dated 29.8.96 on the ground that writ petition could not be restored where non-compliance of a peremptory Court order was involved. . 2. The matter raises an interesting issue viz:- whether non-compliance of a peremptory procedural order passed by the Court would operate as a bar to the restoration of a dismissed writ petition. 3. Appellant filed writ petition No. 676/96 alleging that his salary was wrongly reduced at his back. It came up for consideration on 9.5.96 when the writ Court passed the following order :- "Issue notice to the respondents to show cause as to why the petition be not admitted and disposed of at motion hearing stage itself. P.F. by 15.5.1996 failing which the petition shall stand dismissed. 4. Appellant deposited the P.F. on 16.5.96 but his petition was dismissed for non-compliance of the Court's peremptory order by the Registrar. He filed M.C.C. No. 354/96 thereafter for restoration of the petition on the plea that his counsel could not make it within the prescribed dead line due to unavoidable circumstances. The writ Court, however, rejected his plea on the ground that since the matter involved non-compliance of a peremptory order, as such, the writ petition was not liable to be restored. 5. The view taken appears to be erroneous on the face of it. Because non-compliance of a peremptory order passed by the Court does not constitute a basis for rejecting an application for restoration where the applicant otherwise shows a sufficient cause for such restoration. Such orders are procedural in nature and are passed more in the nature of a caution to discipline the dilatory litigants. These are not intended to kill the cause itself. Nor do these estop the Court from appreciating the circumstances leading to any appropriate modification or revokation. After all such orders are not like the law of Medes and the Persians, as observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 882 (Mahant Ramdas v. Gangadas) and hence untouchable, but are designed to expedite and facilitate adjudication between the parties. Nor do these estop the Court from appreciating the circumstances leading to any appropriate modification or revokation. After all such orders are not like the law of Medes and the Persians, as observed by the Supreme Court in AIR 1961 SC 882 (Mahant Ramdas v. Gangadas) and hence untouchable, but are designed to expedite and facilitate adjudication between the parties. This is not to suggest that the Courts are powerless in seeking prompt obedience of their orders and to eliminate any scope for delay etc. But care requires to be taken that the cause itself was not allowed to die for non-fulfillment of a technical requirement. Because the ultimate object and target was to do justifice and any rigid adherence to the cold letter of procedure should not be allowed to result in the denial of justice to the aggrieved. 6. In the result we hold that non-compliance of a peremptory order passed by the Court does not close the door for restoration of a dismissed writ petition and it is still open to the Court to exercise its power to do justice where sufficient cause was otherwise made out to support such restoration. 7. It is true that a petition or a suit can be dismissed for non-payment of postal charges or court-fee under Order 9 Rule 2 of CPC. But such dismissal is liable to be set-aside under Rule 4 of the same order where the plaintiff/petitioner satisfied the Court and shows a sufficient cause for the default. Accordingly the application for restoration deserved consideration in terms of this and the writ Court was required to examine if there was a sufficient cause for setting-aside the order of dismissal. Admittedly, it had failed to do so and had on the contrary made the peremptory order the basis for denial of restoration of writ petition. 8. In the present case appellant was only late by one day in depositing the process fee and his default deserved to be examined in the light of the cause shown by him. He could not be shown the door merely on the ground that he had not complied with the Court's peremptory order. 9. In the result this appeal is allowed and order dated 29.8.96 passed by the writ Court is quashed. He could not be shown the door merely on the ground that he had not complied with the Court's peremptory order. 9. In the result this appeal is allowed and order dated 29.8.96 passed by the writ Court is quashed. M.C.C. No. 354/96 shall also stand allowed and appellant's W.P. No. 676/96 is restored to its original number Registry to post the matter before the appropriate bench for further consideration.