JUDGMENT : P.K. Tripathy, J. - Short but significant point which is raised in this revision is as to whether a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, the Code') and attachment order u/s 146 of the Code are maintainable during the pendency of a civil suit between the parties. 2. The second party member in Criminal Misc. case No. 261 of 1992 of the court of Sri M.K. Mohapatra, Executive Magistrate, Anandpur are the Petitioners, and the first party is the opposite party. While deciding the dispute u/s 145 of the Code on 29-11-1995 the Executive Magistrate passed the impugned order to keep the property under attachment and in the custody of the Revenue Inspector to avoid apprehension of breach of peace and until claims of the parties are adjudicated in Title. Suit No. 36 of 1990 on the ground that he was unable to determine as to which party was in possession of the disputed land on the date of preliminary order or two months prior to that Petitioners inter alia challenge legality of the said order. 3. It is relevant to take note of the fact involved in the case 1st. party has claimed that late Banshidhar Naik being the owner of the disputed case land vide plot Nos. 27 and 31 appertaing to Holding No. 38 in Mouza Dumuribandh in 1967 sold the land to one Saratha Naik and Ors. and in turn they sold it to Kirtan Khatua on 6-1-1975. All of them are members of Scheduled Tribe. Kirtan Khatua after obtaining permission u/s 22 of the Orissa Land Reforms Act, 1960, from the S.D.0., Anandpur, on 2-2-1978 sold, the case land to the 1st. party and since then he is in possession of the same with right, title and interest therein. The 2nd party No. 3 is the sister of late Banshidhar and 2nd party Nos. 1 and 2 are her sons. Taking advantage of the record of right having been prepared in 1975 in the name of late Banshidhar, the 2nd party members who have succeeded to other properties of late Banshidhar, created disturbances in the peaceful possession of the case land by the 1st. party. Thus, he filed Title Suit No. 36 of 1990 in the court of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior Division), Anandpur for permanent injunction. party. Thus, he filed Title Suit No. 36 of 1990 in the court of Munsif (Civil Judge, Junior Division), Anandpur for permanent injunction. Since the 2nd party created disturbance in his possession and damaged the crops grown by him, he initiated the present proceeding besides other criminal case for offences under Indian Penal Code. 4. The 2nd party members, however, denied to the title and possession claimed by the 1st. party. They have claimed that the story of sale and purchases are not true and that after the death of Banshidhar they are in possession of the case land having right, title and interest therein. They have furthar stated that 1st. party's prayer for appointment of receiver was rejected by the civil court on the ground of absence of prima facie case and that the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code is not maintainable in view of pendency of the civil suit. 5. At the time of hearing in the lower court both the parties adduced oral evidence of two witnesses each. 1st party filed xerox copy of his sale deed and the 2nd party filed certified copies of revenue records, rent receipts and other of the Civil court in M.J.C. No. 31 of 1992 under Order 40. Rule 1. CPC dated 28-1-1993. After referring to the facts and evidence the Executive Magistrate in the concluding paragraph of the impugned order recorded that: On examination all the records produced before me and the witnesses examined from both side. I am unable to satisfy myself on the possession of disputed land either of 1st. party or of the 2nd. party. Hence I ordered that the disputed land to avoid breach of peace relating to possession kept under attachment under the custody of Revenue Inspector till the disposal of civil suit T.S. No. 36/90. The stay order dated 21-11-92 is hereby with drawn. The order is pronounced today in the open court. 6. Mrs. P. Mohanty, learned Counsel for the 2nd. party Petitioners argued that in view of pendency of the civil suit the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code should not have been allowed to proceed and when the Civil Court has refused to pass order for appointment of receiver, the Executive Magistrate was not justified in passing the impugned order of attachment u/s 146 (1) of the Code and appointing the receiver. Mr. Mr. M.K. Acharya, learned Counsel for the 1st party-opposite party not agreeing with the above argument contended that initiation or continuance of the proceeding was not challenged at appropriate stage and the 2nd party participated in the hearing of the case, hence maintainability of the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code cannot be raised at this stage. He further argued that when no interim arrangement relating to the case land has been made by the civil court and when dispute relating to possession has resulted in serious apprehension of breach of peace, the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate is not ousted merely because of pendency of the civil suit. He further argued that refusal to appoint receiver by the civil court does not create a ban on the learned Magistrate to undertake appropriate steps to preserve the property with a view to maintain public peace and tranquility till the factum of title and possession is decided in the civil suit. Both parties have relied upon case laws in support of their respective arguments. 7. Chapter X of the Code deals with the matter relating to maintenance of public order and tranquility and in that context, Chapter X-D of the Code deeds with the 'Dispute as to immovable property'. The provisions are essentially administrative and executive in nature. For that reason, any decision arrived at through such process does not confer a permanent right but only protects the right or maintains the status quo until due determination of right, title and/or interest as the case may be, over the disputed immovable property by a competent court of jurisdiction and such recourse is being undertaken with the dominant intention of maintenance of public order and tranquility. A proceeding under Chapter X-D of the Code is never intended to decide right and title to immovable properties. 8. The following citations are relied upon and referred to resolve the dispute. (i) A.I. Rule 1985 S.C. 472 Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. and Ors. (ii) 70 (1990) C.L.T. 760 Surendranath Das v. Tilottama and Anr. (iii) 1994 (1) O.L. Rule 114 Kali Charan v. Tara. (iv) 83 (1997) C.L.T. 310 Mayadhar Bariha v. Subdivisional Magistrate and Ors. (v) 1986(1) O.L. Rule 154 Subala Dehury v. Rupkar Dehury and Anr. (vi) 1996 Cr. L.J. 1743 Sashi Bhusan Gupta v. Mool Chandra Gupta. (vii) 1996 Gr. L.J. 2413 Sanjai Kumar and and Anr. (iii) 1994 (1) O.L. Rule 114 Kali Charan v. Tara. (iv) 83 (1997) C.L.T. 310 Mayadhar Bariha v. Subdivisional Magistrate and Ors. (v) 1986(1) O.L. Rule 154 Subala Dehury v. Rupkar Dehury and Anr. (vi) 1996 Cr. L.J. 1743 Sashi Bhusan Gupta v. Mool Chandra Gupta. (vii) 1996 Gr. L.J. 2413 Sanjai Kumar and and Anr. v. Vlth Additional District Judge Bareilly. (viii) 1997 Cr. L.J. 1326 Sukdev Singh v. Subdivisional Magistrate Sirsa. (ix) 1997 Cr. L.J. 2226 Gulam Farid v. State of Rajasthan. (x) A.I. Rule 1993 S.C. 1361 Dharampal.v. Smt. Ramshri and Ors. (xi) A.I. Rule 1994 S.C. 1436 Prakash Chandra Sachdeva v. State and Anr. In the case of Ram Sumer Puri (supra) initiation of a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code was challenged on the ground that a civil proceeding between the parties for the disputed case land was decided and civil appeal was pending. The Apex Court held that when the factum of possession is being examined by the civil court and parties can approach for interim relief of injunction or appointment of receiver a parallel proceeding u/s 145 of the Code is not maintainable. In the cases of Suendranath Das (supra), Kali Charan (supra) and Mayadhar Bariha (supra), under similar or identical situation like Ram Sumer Puri's case (supra) this Court followed the same principle and passed order against maintainability of the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code. However, in the case of Subala Dehury (supra) a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code was initiated and the Executive Magistrate also passed order u/s 146 (1) of the Code though a suit for partition had already been filed. While considering the question of maintainability of the proceeding u/s 145 of the Code this Court distinguished the ratio in the case of Ram Sumer Puri (supra) and in the case of Champabati Dibya v. State Vol. 25 (1959) C.L.T. 557 and relied upon the ratio in the cases of Kuser Pradhan v. Chaturbhuja Kuar and Ors. 36 (1970) C.L.T. 689 and Gharjugi Pradhanen and Ors. 25 (1959) C.L.T. 557 and relied upon the ratio in the cases of Kuser Pradhan v. Chaturbhuja Kuar and Ors. 36 (1970) C.L.T. 689 and Gharjugi Pradhanen and Ors. v. Radhika Majhiani (an unreported decision in Criminal Revision No. 245 of 1967 decided on 12-3-1968 by Justice G.K. Misra, (as his Lordship then was) and held that: When there is a dispute likely to cause breach of the peace but the civil court has not passed an order of restraint or injunction or made arrangement regarding the property by appointment of receiver, the Magistrate shall not lose jurisdiction to initiate a proceeding u/s 145 if the requirements of the provision are satisfied. Mere pendency or institution of a suit would not deny him jurisdiction. True, no doubt, there ought not to be two parallel proceedings in two Courts but two parallel proceedings should be of the like nature. If the civil court has intervened by appointment of receiver or passing order of injunction or restraint, there ought not to be a parallel proceeding u/s 145, otherwise, there would be a vacum; peace and tranquility would be disturbed. Therefore, either the Civil Court must take charge of the situation of the Magistrate (from sub-para of paragraph 4 at page 157) It was further held that: 5. Once we consider that public order, peace and tranquility are the concern of the Magistrate, the matter cannot be left to the parties. The Civil Court acts on the motion of a party. Neither of them might move the civil court for an order of injuction or appointment of a receiver or for an interim arrangement. The situation emanating from the dispute between the parties cannot be brushed aside because of the inaction of the parties to move the Court. The Magistrate has therefore, to intervene. But as I have said, there cannot be any absolute proposition, the facts and circumstances would determine the approach. The situation emanating from the dispute between the parties cannot be brushed aside because of the inaction of the parties to move the Court. The Magistrate has therefore, to intervene. But as I have said, there cannot be any absolute proposition, the facts and circumstances would determine the approach. In the case of Dharampal (supra), the Apex Court while examining validity of continuance of an order of attachment u/s 146(1) of the Code on the face of interim order injunction passed by the Civil Court, have been pleased to propound that the Magistrate has been given power to attach the subject of dispute until the competent court determines the rights of the parties regarding possession and such determination by the competent court need not mean till the final disposal of the suit or proceeding and it also includes interim order protecting the possession. It can be deduced from the said decision that the Apex Court does not propound it as a matter of absolute rule that mere pendency of civil proceeding takes away the jurisdiction of the Executive Magistrate. In the case of Prakash Chandra Sachdeva (supra) the Apex Court distinguishing the case of Ram Sumer Puri (supra) have held that in spite of pendency of a suit for partition and dropping of the proceeding between the parties u/s 107 of the Code, a proceeding u/s 145 of the Code is maintainable. In the other cases noted above (vide S1. Nos. VI to IX). Allahabad High Court, Punjab and Haryana High Court and Rajasthan High Court relying on the above decisions of the Apex Court have held in favour of maintainability of the proceedings under Sections 145 and 146(1) of the Code in the similar manner, as was held in the case of Subala Dehury (supra). 9. In the case at hand, it is the admitted situation that though a civil suit is pending, but no interim order has been passed to protect it from scramble for possession. Refusal to pass order for appointment of receiver on the ground of absence of prima facie case (that finding itself may not be correct keeping in view the meaning of the term 'prima facie case') does not amount to an order deciding the possession in favour of the opponent. Refusal to pass order for appointment of receiver on the ground of absence of prima facie case (that finding itself may not be correct keeping in view the meaning of the term 'prima facie case') does not amount to an order deciding the possession in favour of the opponent. It is evident from the reports submitted by police, the evidence of the parties and the circumstance of assertive rival claim for possession that there exists apprehension of breach of peace concerning possession of the disputed case land. Thus, no fault can be found with the impugned order u/s 146 of the Code because the Executive Magistrate, from the evidence adduced, was unable to satisfy himself as to which of the parties was in possession on the date of preliminary order or two months prior to that. However, in changed circumstance(s) as per the proviso to Sections 146(1) and (2) of the Code or in the event of disposal of civil suit, either party may approach the Executive Magistrate to pass appropriate order for vacating the order of attachment, discharge of the receiver and/or handing over of the usufructs, if any. The impugned order being neither illegal or unjust, the revision is dismissed. Revision dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed