JUDGMENT 1. Respondents 1 to 4 in the Original Petition are the appellants herein. The petitioner in the Original Petition while working as Glass I employee of Dena Bank, Cochin Naval Base Branch was served with a charge sheet dated 5th March 1987. The allegations in the charge sheet were that: "(i) Abetting/provoking Shri Madhavan (petitioner's husband) to commit criminal assault on petitioner's superior. (ii) Displaying/showing Bank records to an outsider and there by misusing official position; (iii) Unauthorisedly remaining absent from duty; and (iv) Acts unbecoming a Bank Officer." It is also stated in the charge sheet that if the above allegations are proved it would amount to contravention of Regulation.3 (i) read with Regulation.24 of the Dena Bank Officer Employees' (Conduct) Regulation.1976, punishable under Dena Bank Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulation, 1976. Since the petitioner's explanation was not found satisfactory, an enquiry was conducted. The enquiry officer found that allegations 1, 2 and 4 are proved. It was also found that the third allegation of unauthorisedly remaining absent from duty was not proved. Accordingly Ext. P-L order was passed reducing her basic pay by four stages in the present time scale, that is, from Rs. 2,085 to Rs. 1,755 so that she will draw next increment when due, as if she had never crossed Rs. 1,755. Ext. P-2 appeal was filed by the petitioner before the fourth respondent/fourth appellant against Ext. P-l order, which was dismissed. The fact that the appeal was rejected was communicated by Ext. P-3. Petitioner's review application was also rejected and the result of rejection of review petition was intimated by Ext. P-4. Petitioner challenged Ext. P-4 punishment order, Exts. P-3 and P-4 communications rejecting petitioner's appeal and review petition in the Original Petition. 2. Several grounds were urged by the petitioner for challenging the punishment order. The major grounds are: (L) Copy of the enquiry report was not furnished to the petitioner before imposing the punishment and on that ground enquiry is liable to be set aside. (2) Even if the allegations are proved these allegations will not come under Regulation.3(i) and therefore no major punishment can be imposed (3) Procedure prescribed under the Regulations before the disciplinary actions were not complied with. (2) Even if the allegations are proved these allegations will not come under Regulation.3(i) and therefore no major punishment can be imposed (3) Procedure prescribed under the Regulations before the disciplinary actions were not complied with. Regulation.6 (17) reads as follows: "The inquiring authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself examined, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him." According to the petitioner, it is a mandatory provision and since it is violated, the proceedings are liable to be set aside. (4) Sufficient opportunity was not given to peruse the documents and after the defence representative was allowed by the enquiry officer on the next day the enquiry was posted in spite of the request for adjournment. (5) Even though the enquiry authority was different from the disciplinary authority while confirming the findings and imposing punishment, there was no application of mind and Ext. P-L will not show that disciplinary authority has applied its mind and it is not a speaking order. (6) The appeal was dismissed without a speaking order and without considering the contentions raised by her in Ext. P-2 appeal memorandum. Further the appellate order was not served on her. The rejection of the appeal was only communicated through another officer. Even though there is no provision for review except for suo motu review by the management the review petition was entertained, but, its decision was only communicated through another officer. (7) The findings of the enquiry officer are perverse and there is no evidence for abetting. Consequently, finding that she is guilty is incorrect. It is also contended that what is alleged to have been shown to the outsider is the attendance register and not any official record of the Bank and no misconduct is done for punishment. 3. By the impugned Judgment learned Single Judge set aside Ext. P-L punishment order and Exts. P-3 and P-4 appellate orders on the grounds that: (1) No enquiry report was given before imposing punishment and in view of the decision in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan there is violation of rules of natural justice as enquiry report was not furnished and no second show cause notice was issued proposing the punishment. P-3 and P-4 appellate orders on the grounds that: (1) No enquiry report was given before imposing punishment and in view of the decision in Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan there is violation of rules of natural justice as enquiry report was not furnished and no second show cause notice was issued proposing the punishment. (2) Under Regulation.17 (ii) the appellate authority is bound to consider whether findings of the enquiring authority are justified or not and whether penalty is excessive or inadequate. But the appellate order is not a speaking order. The appellate authority has not considered whether the findings are justified or not and whether the punishment is excessive or inadequate. It was also found that there is no power for review and therefore, Ext. P-4 review order can be ignored. (3) There is violation of Regulation.6(17). Learned Single Judge held that: "Regulation 6(17) provides that the inquiring authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself examined, generally question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Regulation.6 (17) , is akin to S.313 Cr. P. G. and as that mandatory requirement has been overlooked by the inquiring authority the contention that the petitioner was not questioned on the circumstances appearing against her in the evidence to enable her to explain the same is well founded." 4. First ground urged by the appellants is that the decision of the Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 471 making it obligatory to supply a copy of the enquiry proceedings before punishment is prospective and not retrospective. In Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 471 it was held that in view of the different views expressed by different High Courts, obligation to supply a copy of the enquiry report to the employee before punishment is imposed, in the absence of Regulations, is applicable only from the date of that Judgment. 5. In Managing Director, ECIL. v. B. Karunakar A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074 it is very clearly held by the Constitution Bench that obligation to give copy of the enquiry officer's report to the delinquent is applicable prospectively with effect from 20th November 1990, the date on which Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case was decided. Admittedly, Ext. 5. In Managing Director, ECIL. v. B. Karunakar A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074 it is very clearly held by the Constitution Bench that obligation to give copy of the enquiry officer's report to the delinquent is applicable prospectively with effect from 20th November 1990, the date on which Mohd. Ramzan Khan's case was decided. Admittedly, Ext. P-l punishment order was passed on 1st August 1988 much before the decision in Mohd. Ramzan Knan's case A.I.R. 1991 S.C. 471 and hence on that ground it cannot be held that enquiry is defective. Therefore, we disagree with the learned Single Judge in this aspect. 6. The second argument raised by the petitioner is that even if the allegations are proved the allegations will not come under Regulation.3(i) and therefore, punishment cannot be imposed. Petitioner raised his argument based on the decision in M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut 1983 Lab I.C, 1909 wherein it was held as follows: "It is, therefore, obligatory upon the employer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which in his industrial establishment would constitute misconduct. Penalty is imposed for misconduct. The workmen must therefore, know in advance which act or omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with penalty." It was further held that: "In short it cannot be left to the vagaries of management to say ex post facto that some acts of omission or commission nowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is nonetheless a misconduct not strictly falling within the enumerated misconduct in the relevant standing order but yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a penalty." Based on the above, it is argued that even if the allegations are proved, the allegations will not come under Regulation.3(1). The allegations levelled against the petitioner even if proved will not come under Regulation.3(i). Regulation.3(i) reads as follows: "Every officer employee shall at all times take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer." According to the petitioner, there is no allegation that she is not discharging her duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence. It is not stated in the decision that the allegations proved how will come under Regulation.3(i). It is not stated in the decision that the allegations proved how will come under Regulation.3(i). This view was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Rasiklal Vaghajibhai Patel v. Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation and another 1985 Lab. I.C. 729 and in A. L. Kalra v. Project and Equipment Corporation of India Ltd. 1984 (2) LLJ. 186 . It is contended that this point was raised in the appeal memorandum but that was not considered by the appellate authority and if petitioner was given an opportunity as provided under Regulation.6(17) petitioner could have satisfied the same before the enquiry officer itself. This point was not considered by the learned Single Judge. 7. This Court will not normally interfere with the findings of the enquiry officer or with the punishment imposed by the management unless there is violation of principles of natural justice and violation of the procedure prescribed as per law. With regard to the procedural violation learned Single Judge, as already noticed found that mandatory regulation of 6(17) was violated. As per the above regulation, if the officer was examined himself in the examination, enquiry officer may question him, on the circumstances appearing against him and if he is not examined himself, the enquiry officer shall question him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling, the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him. Admittedly, petitioner was not examined. Petitioner was not given an opportunity under Regulation.6 (17). Learned Single Judge found that the provision is akin to S.313 Cr. P. C. and it is a mandatory requirement and violation of the same rendered the impugned punishment invalid. It is contented by the learned counsel for the appellants that a similar case in Bank of Baroda Officers Employees' (Conduct) Regulations was considered by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Remesh Baburao Sawai v. Bank of Baroda and others 1988 (1) C.L.R. 110. In that case the Bombay High Court found that the above provision is only a directory provision and breach of it would not lead to a conclusion that the entire enquiry is vitiated, especially when the delinquent did not point out any prejudice. In that case the Bombay High Court found that the above provision is only a directory provision and breach of it would not lead to a conclusion that the entire enquiry is vitiated, especially when the delinquent did not point out any prejudice. The Bombay High Court found that no prejudice was caused because at the end of enquiry the delinquent had filed a detailed written statement explaining all the circumstances appearing against him in the enquiry. Here there is no contention that such an opportunity was denied because after the enquiry was over petitioner was allowed to file a written statement, explaining all the circumstances appearing against him in the enquiry. Further in the absence of examination of the delinquent himself in the enquiry, for giving an opportunity to explain, the word used in the Regulation.6(17) is 'shall' and therefore, it cannot be stated that it is not mandatory as held by the Bombay High Court and it is for the disciplinary authority to establish that dispensing with the same is not causing any Prejudice to the delinquent. It was held by the learned Single Judge that the provision is similar to S.313 Cr. P. C. Supreme Court considered a similar provision under the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964. Under sub-rule (18) of R.14 of C.C.S. (C.C.A.) Rules it is incumbent on the enquiry authority to question the officer facing the charge, broadly on the evidence appearing against him in a case where the officer does not offer himself for examination as a witness. This rule was held to be a mandatory provision and omission to give such a hearing was held to be a serious error committed by the enquiry authority, by the Supreme Court in Ministry of Finance and another v. S. B. Ramesh A.I.R. 1988 S.C. 853. Therefore, Supreme Court held that similar provision is said to be mandatory. In view of the above decision, the contention of the appellants that it is not mandatory cannot be accepted. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants cited the decision in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S. K. Sharma A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1669 wherein it was held that: "In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the stand point of substantial compliance. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants cited the decision in State Bank of Patiala and others v. S. K. Sharma A.I.R. 1996 S.C. 1669 wherein it was held that: "In the case of a procedural provision which is not of a mandatory character, the complaint of violation has to be examined from the stand point of substantial compliance. Be that as it may, the order passed in violation of such a provision can be set aside only where such violation has occasioned prejudice to the delinquent employee." The appellants argued that no prejudice has been caused in this case to the petitioner and procedure is not mandatory. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court in A.I.R. 1998 S.C. 853 (supra) it cannot be contended that such a provision is not mandatory. Further, it is not proved that by not following the procedure, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. It is the case of the petitioner that the question of abetting her husband was never happened at all and that even if the allegations are proved it will not come under Regulation.3(i). All these points could have been at least satisfactorily explained by the petitioner if such an opportunity was given to her. On going through the records we are convinced that by not following the procedure prescribed under Regulation.6(17) prejudice has been caused to the petitioner. There is also no averment that there is substantial compliance. Therefore, Ext. P-l punishment order is liable to be set aside on this ground. 9. Unlike general principles of natural justice, when principles of natural justice are enshrined in a Regulation, the authorities are bound to obey the rule strictly. As held in Wiseman and another v. Borneman and others 1971 A.C. 297 it is well established that when a statute has conferred on anybody the power to make any decisions affecting individuals, court will ensure that the procedural safeguards as mentioned in the rules are followed. It is true that procedural objections are often raised by unmeritorious parties. Judges may then be tempted to refuse relief on the ground that a fair hearing could have made all difference to the result. But, in principle, it is vital that the procedure and the merits should be kept strictly apart, since otherwise the merits may be prejudiced unfairly. It is true that procedural objections are often raised by unmeritorious parties. Judges may then be tempted to refuse relief on the ground that a fair hearing could have made all difference to the result. But, in principle, it is vital that the procedure and the merits should be kept strictly apart, since otherwise the merits may be prejudiced unfairly. In General Medical Council v. Spackman 1943 A.C. 627 it was held by Lord Wright as follows: "If the principles of natural justice are violated in respect of any decision it is, indeed, immaterial whether the same decision would have been arrived at in the absence of the departure from the essential principles of justice. The decision must be declared to be no decision." As held by the Supreme Court in Hira Nath Misra and others v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Kanchi A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1260 and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 818 where the statute under which an authority functions provides for the observance of the principles of natural justice in a particular manner, natural justice will have to be observed in that manner. In the often quoted decision of the Supreme Court in the International Airport Authority's case A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1628 it was held as follows: ''.......... It is a well settled rule of administrative law that an executive authority must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its actions to be judged and it must scrupulously observe those standards on pain of invalidation of an act in violation of them. This rule was enunciated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Viterelli v. Seaton [(1959) 359 US 535: 3 L Ed. 2d 1012] where the. learned Judge said: An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. .... .Accordingly, in dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed...... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword. .... .Accordingly, in dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed...... This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with the sword. This Court accepted the rule as valid and applicable in India in A. S. Ahluwalia v. State of Punjab [ (1975) 3 S.C.R. 82 ]: (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 984) and in subsequent decision given in Sukhdev v. Bhagatram [ (1975) 3 S.C.R. 619 ]: (A.I.R. 1975 S.C. 1331)." (para 10) If an authority has not followed a procedure prescribed in a Regulation or Rule, it is for that authority to prove that by violating the above, no prejudice has actually been caused or there is substantial compliance. In this case, appellants miserably failed to do so. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was right in setting aside the punishment order for not complying with Regulation.6(17). 10. An appeal is provided in the Regulations. Regulation.17 provides for appeal against the punishment orders and it also provides that: "The Appellate Authority shall consider whether the findings are justified or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate pass appropriate orders. The Appellate Authority may pass an order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case." By Ext. P-3 order it is communicated that the appeal is dismissed and the appellate authority has confirmed the penalty. Learned Single Judge found that it is not a speaking order. It is true that when an appellate authority confirms the order of the disciplinary authority or the enquiry officer it need not repeat what is stated by the disciplinary authority or appellate authority and need not be a lengthy order but nevertheless the order should show that there is application of mind. Several contentions were raised in Ext. P-2 appeal regarding penalty as well as the findings of the enquiry officer. It is specifically contended that even if the allegations 1 to 3 are proved they will not fall under Regulation.3(i). Several contentions were raised in Ext. P-2 appeal regarding penalty as well as the findings of the enquiry officer. It is specifically contended that even if the allegations 1 to 3 are proved they will not fall under Regulation.3(i). The allegation contained in 4 has only verbal connection with Regulation.3(i) and no incident is mentioned. Therefore, there is no misconduct punishable under the Regulation. It is further stated that when F.I.R. was stated for the same incident of abetting the husband petitioner was exonerated and no charge was framed against the petitioner' and there is no proof that she abetted in any way her husband. Procedural irregularity and non-compliance with the rules were also complained. In Ext. P-2 appeal it is mentioned as follows: "The appellant has been greatly prejudiced by the deliberate refusal and omission on the part of the I.A. to comply with the mandatory provisions of regulations, sub Regulation.10, 11 and 17. Non-compliance with a statutory provision will undoubtedly vitiate the entire proceedings and the impugned order as well as proceedings leading to the impugned order inclusive of the report of the I. A. are liable to be quashed as void, illegal and inoperative." But these contentions were not considered by the appellate authority. According to the petitioner, non-compliance of Regulation.6 (1,7) has 'greatly prejudiced' by the petitioner. None of the contentions seems to have been considered, by the appellate authority. Any way, there is non-application of mind by the appellate authority. Even though under the Regulations petitioner has got a right of appeal the appellate authority did not forward the appellate order to the petitioner. The rejection of the appeal was communicated by another officer. But full order was not communicated. Even though the writ petition filed in 1989 was disposed of only in 1994 copy of the appellate order was not produced before the Court. In Ext. P-3 order communicating the decision to dismiss the appeal it cannot be seen that the appellate authority has applied its mind with the contentions raised by the parties. When very serious contentions regarding disciplinary proceedings were taken, the appellate authority should have considered the same and passed an order. Even though it need not be an elaborate and detailed order the appellate order should show that the appellate authority has considered the contentions. Ext. When very serious contentions regarding disciplinary proceedings were taken, the appellate authority should have considered the same and passed an order. Even though it need not be an elaborate and detailed order the appellate order should show that the appellate authority has considered the contentions. Ext. P-3 communication did not show that appellate authority has considered the serious contentions raised by the petitioner. The order in review petition was also not communicated directly by the appellate authority but it was communicated through another officer. When petitioner has got a right of appeal petitioner has got a right to see the appellate order. Even though it can be communicated through another officer a copy of the entire order of the appellate authority should have been communicated. In any event, neither in Ext. P-3 order nor in Ext. P-4 review order it cannot be stated that appellate authority has applied its mind while passing the orders, nor the authority considered the contentions raised by the parties regarding procedural irregularity or correctness of the findings or justification of the punishment order. Petitioner has also got a case that in Ext. P-1 punishment order also the disciplinary authority has not applied its mind. In any event, the appellate authority has not considered these matters. Therefore, Exts. P-3 and P-4 are also liable to be set aside. 11. We have already held that Exts. P-1, P-3 and P-4 are liable to be set aside. We have seen that Regulation.6 (17) was violated which prejudiced the petitioner. In any way, it is not demonstrated to us that the petitioner is not prejudiced by the denial of an opportunity as provided under Regulation.6(17). We agree with the learned Single Judge that Exts. P-1, P-3 and P-4 are liable to be set aside and we affirm the Judgment in that respect. That does not mean that the entire enquiry proceedings are bad. We feel that on the principles laid down in the decision in Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074 the entire disciplinary procedures will not become illegal. P-1, P-3 and P-4 are liable to be set aside and we affirm the Judgment in that respect. That does not mean that the entire enquiry proceedings are bad. We feel that on the principles laid down in the decision in Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v. B. Karunakar A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 1074 the entire disciplinary procedures will not become illegal. If the Bank wants, it can proceed with from the stage where the proceedings of enquiry went wrong and re-start with giving an opportunity to the petitioner under Regulation.6 (17) and complete the enquiry proceedings, and after considering the explanation given under Regulation.6(17) and the contentions of the petitioner that even if the allegations are proved Regulation.3(i) will not be attracted, etc., the enquiry officer can make fresh findings. The enquiry can be proceeded from that stage where it went wrong. Therefore, the appeal is allowed in part. Even though we affirm the findings of the learned Single Judge that Exts. P-l, P-3 and P-4 are liable to be set aside, we leave it open to the Bank to its discretion to re-open the enquiry proceedings by giving an opportunity under Regulation.6 (17) and proceeding further according to law.