Preetam Singh v. Narendra Kumar — 1998 DIGILAW 495 (RAJ)

JUDGMENT : 1. This is defendant's revision petition under Section 115, C.P.C. from the order dated 23.3.1996 passed by Shri Gheesa Lal Choudhary, Additional District Judge No. 2, Jodhpur in Civil Appeal No. 80/95 whereby petitioner's appeal against the order dated 18.4.1995 of the learned Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) No. 3, Jodhpur has been dismissed. 2. Non-petitioner No. 2-plaintiff filed a civil regular suit for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent, subletting and personal, reasonable and bonafide necessity. During the pendency of the suit Dashrathmal sold the suit property on 2.6.1994 to Narendra Kumar. In the plaint, Dashrathmal had alleged that rent was due from petitioner since October, 1983. 3. It may be stated that Dashrathmal in fact filed two different suits - No. 134/84 against Union of India and Preetam Singh and another No. 218/88 against Preetam Singh. Both these suits were consolidated in the trial Court. The trial Court, vide its order dated 16.12.1988, determined the provisional rent under Section 13(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 'the Act'). 4. After acquisition of the suit property, non-petitioner No. 2 moved an application under Order 22, Rule 10, C.P.C. for impleading him as plaintiff along with the original plaintiff. It was further prayed that his personal necessity as the ground of eviction be substituted for the personal necessity of the original owner Dashrathmal. The petitioner objected to the addition of the party on the ground that the original landlord ceases to be landlord as soon as he sold the property and intimated regarding sale to the petitioner. His cause of action came to an end and no decree in his favour could be passed. The petitioner further objected that legally the purchaser non- petitioner No. 2 could not be allowed to substitute his personal necessity for the personal necessity of the original owner Dashrathmal. The purchaser, if he wants to seek eviction of the petitioner on ground of personal necessity, must file a new suit. Learned trial Court allowed the application of non- petitioner No. 1 vide order dated 18.4.1995. The petitioner challenged the above order in appeal but the learned appellate Court, by the impugned order, rejected the appeal. 5. I have heard Shri M.C. Bhoot appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Prakash Tatia appearing on behalf on the non-petitioners. 6. Learned trial Court allowed the application of non- petitioner No. 1 vide order dated 18.4.1995. The petitioner challenged the above order in appeal but the learned appellate Court, by the impugned order, rejected the appeal. 5. I have heard Shri M.C. Bhoot appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Shri Prakash Tatia appearing on behalf on the non-petitioners. 6. Shri Bhoot has assailed the order passed by the trial Court as well as the appellate court on the ground that in case of personal necessity, the same cannot devolve on the purchaser of the property. The Courts below, therefore, committed illegality in upholding the application of the purchaser. The purchaser cannot now continue the suit on ground of personal necessity, default in payment of rent or subletting. The above grounds could be available to the original owner but they cannot devolve on the purchaser. These rights perished as soon as there was a transfer in the ownership of the property. Shri Bhoot has cited M.M. Quasim v. Manoharlal, AIR 1981 SC 1113 , Wg. Comm. H.K. Lal v. Dr. Satish Chandra, 1996 WLC 3, Shantilal v. Chimanlal, AIR 1976 SC 2358 , Sheikh Jahangir v. Smt. Kaushalya Bai, 1987 (Supp) SCC 630 and Shyamlal v. Upbhokta Sahakari Samiti, Ward No. 3 Sardarpura, Jodhpur, 1982 WLN 467. 7. Shri Tatia, on the other hand, supported the order of the learned appellate Court as well as the trial court. He has submitted that the trial Court has not committed any mistake. The right of the non-petitioner purchaser to plead his personal and bonafide necessity was not upheld by the trial Court but his right to seek eviction of the petitioner from the suit premises on ground of default in payment of rent and subletting was held sustainable in law. He supported the impugned orders and has placed reliance on the following cases:- Babulal v. Kanhaiya Lal, AIR 1975 Raj. 136 , Shyamsunder v. Roopkanwar, 1981 RLW 319, Chandra Sen v. Murarilal, 1976 RLW 190 and Narain Das v. Rajendra Singh, 1972 RLW 100. 8. I have considered the respective contentions. In Sheikh Jahangir's case, the Supreme Court held that the ground of bonafide requirement of landlord cannot survive after the plaintiff has sold out the demised premises. The purchaser of the such premises can only file a suit. This view of the Supreme Court was followed by this Court in Wg. Comm. 8. I have considered the respective contentions. In Sheikh Jahangir's case, the Supreme Court held that the ground of bonafide requirement of landlord cannot survive after the plaintiff has sold out the demised premises. The purchaser of the such premises can only file a suit. This view of the Supreme Court was followed by this Court in Wg. Comm. H.K. Lal's case. It was held that the right of eviction on ground of bonafide requirements cannot be passed on by inheritance or succession to the subsequent purchaser. The purchaser must file a separate suit because of change of cause of action. Hence the appellate Court has not committed any mistake in not acceding to the prayer of non-petitioner No. 2 as regards his right to continue the above suit on ground of his own personal necessity after the purchase of the property. It has been held in both the above cases that the right of the landlord-owner of seeking eviction on ground of bonafide and personal necessity perishes as soon as he parts with the estate. The person purchasing the above property cannot be allowed to substitute his own ground of personal and bonafide necessity for such ground taken by the original landlord. However, the ground of continuing the suit by purchaser on ground of defaults committed by the tenant has been recognised by law because the right in respect of default committed by the tenant can be availed of by the purchaser. For this proposition I may refer to the decisions in Babulal v. Kanhaiyalal, Chandra Sen v. Murarilal and Narain Das v. Rajendra Singh. In all these cases, where there is a transfer of premises, the transferee landlord was allowed to take advantage of default in payment of rent committed by the tenant. I subscribe to the above view. In Narain Das v. Rajendra Singh's case. Hon'ble Lodha, J. also took into account the provisions contained in Section 13(1) of the Act and the definition contained in Section 3(iii) of the Act. In these three cases, it was held that the purchaser of the suit premises can avail of the right accrued in respect of default in payment of rent committed by the tenant even during the period of the original landlord seller. 9. No case law is available regarding subletting but on the above analogy, it can also be available to the purchaser of such premises. 9. No case law is available regarding subletting but on the above analogy, it can also be available to the purchaser of such premises. The view taken by the learned trial Court as well as the appellate Court is in accordance with law. 10. I, therefore, find no ground to interfere with the impugned order. 11. For the above reasons, there is no force in the revision petition and the same is hereby dismissed.Revision dismissed.