Judgment :- 1. This petition is for refund of the sum of Rs. 46,160/- deposited to the credit of R.C.O.P. No. 2222 of 1984 on the file of XI Small Causes Court, Madras. 2. The case of the petitioners is that the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller under Section 14 (1) (b) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. It was confirmed. Thereafter a Civil Revision Petition was filed in the High Court. When CMP No. 3292 of 1997 was filed for stay, this Court directed the petitioners/tenants to deposit the arrears of rent at Rs. 2000/-, the Contractual rent. Hence, a sum of Rs. 48,468/- was deposited. Ac cording to the petitioners, there was actually no arrears. The fair rent was fixed at Rs. 1154/- and it was confirmed by the Rent Control Appellate Authority. When the Civil Revision Petition was filed as against the order of eviction under Section 14 (1) (b) of the Act, it went against the petitioners/tenants and the matter was taken up to the Supreme Court and there also they failed. Hence, the petitioners claim refund of the amount paid by them in excess of the amount due to the landlords. 3. In the reply filed by the petitioners, it is made clear that the fair rent petition was filed on 21.8.1984 and after they failed in the Supreme Court, possession was handed over to the landlord on 28.10.1997. In paragraph 3, the petitioners have given the figures of the amount paid and deposited. In the said paragraph, it is alleged that from August 1984 to 28.10.1997 for 158 months, the amount due to the landlords is only Rs. 1,28,332/-. But during the said period, the total amount paid to them is Rs. 2,62,008/-. Therefore, the balance refundable is Rs. 79,676/-. 4. In the counter filed by the landlords, it is contended that the rate fixed as fair rent i.e. , Rs. 1,154/-in the Rent Control Proceedings has not become final. The Civil Revision Petition has been preferred in the High Court and the same is pending. It is also stated that the rents were not paid from 1.9.1993 onwards. Since the fixation of fair rent has not become final, the question of refund does not arise at all. 5. 1,154/-in the Rent Control Proceedings has not become final. The Civil Revision Petition has been preferred in the High Court and the same is pending. It is also stated that the rents were not paid from 1.9.1993 onwards. Since the fixation of fair rent has not become final, the question of refund does not arise at all. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners contends that once the fair rent has been fixed, the tenant is liable to pay only at the rate of fair rent fixed by the Court. He also points out that even though Civil Revision Petition has been filed in the High Court against the fixation of fair rent, no stay has been obtained. In the circumstances, refund has to be ordered. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent contends that the fair rent fixed by the Rent Controller and the Rent Control Appellate Authority has not become final and therefore only when the Civil Revision Petitions are finally disposed of, the finality would be reached with reference to the fair rent, till then, the petitioners are not entitled to the refund. 7. As per Section 7 of the Act, when the Rent Controller has fixed the fair rent of a building, the landlord is not entitled to receive any amount in excess of the fair rent. Section 7 (1) (b) of the Act states that any premium or other like sum or any rent paid in addition to, or in excess of, such fair rent, whether before or after the date of the commencement of the Act, shall be refunded by the landlord to the person by whom it was paid. The next Section that is relevant for the purpose of appreciating this case is Section 23 (4) of the Act, which reads as follows: “(4) The Decision of the Appellate Authority, and subject to such decision, an order of the Controller shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of Law, except as provided in Section 25.” A reading of the aforesaid Section indicates that once fair rent is fixed, the landlord is not entitled to any amount in excess of such rent. Further, he is bound to refund the amount received in excess, immediately after the fixation of fair rent. 8. Further, he is bound to refund the amount received in excess, immediately after the fixation of fair rent. 8. As per Section 23 (4) of the Act, a finality is reached when the appellate authority passed an order. It is true that the order of the appellate authority can be challenged under Section 25 of the Act, by way of filing a revision petition in the High Court, The Legislature has carefully enacted this provision. If they have really intended to state that the finality will be reached only when the revision petition contemplated under Section 25 of the Act is disposed of they could have very well stated so. 9. From a reading of Section 23 (4) of the Act, it is clear that the decision of the appellate authority is final. However, an opportunity or right is granted to the aggrieved person to challenge the said order in the High Court. But the object in enacting Section 23 (4) of the Act is to give finality at the appellate stage itself; otherwise, there is no necessity to enact Section 23 (4) of the Act. If we view that finality would be reached after the Civil Revision Petition is disposed of as per Section 25, then Section 23 (4) becomes redundant and unnecessary. 10. Normally, the Court has to take a provision as it stands and has to construe the object behind it. The interpretation should be to give a meaning to it and not to discard it. It is also to be presumed that when a provision is included in an enactment, the Legislature has done it with a purpose or object. Only when we give an interpretation that a finality in the Rent Control proceedings is reached after the appeal stage, there will be a meaning to the Section. 11. The learned counsel for the respondents however vehemently contended that the finality could be reached only after the disposal of the Revision Petition, and cited the following decision. 1. Ponnayva Nadar v. Patel. (1955 II MLJ SN 45). 2. Md.Abdulla & Sons v. Doraiarasu (1956 I MLJ 184 = 69 L.W. 186 3. Patel v. Ponnayya Nadar (1959 I MLJ. 32 = 72 L.W. 13 4. Ranganathan. C v. M. Suri (100 L.W. 708); and 5. Visalakshi Ammal, J v. T.B. Sathya Narayana (1996 2 L.W. 849) to support his contention. 12. (1955 II MLJ SN 45). 2. Md.Abdulla & Sons v. Doraiarasu (1956 I MLJ 184 = 69 L.W. 186 3. Patel v. Ponnayya Nadar (1959 I MLJ. 32 = 72 L.W. 13 4. Ranganathan. C v. M. Suri (100 L.W. 708); and 5. Visalakshi Ammal, J v. T.B. Sathya Narayana (1996 2 L.W. 849) to support his contention. 12. In Ponnayya Nadar v. Patel (1955 II MLJ SN 45) it has been simply stated that where a provision has been made for the orders of Rent Controller being revised or modified by a superior Tribunal, it is the final order passed by the appellate or revising tribunal and not the order of the Rent Controller that becomes final. One thing should be carefully noted. There are two stages with reference to the finality of an order passed by the Court or Tribunals. The first one is with reference to the parties. The second one is with reference to the finality to be attached to the order. It is no doubt true that the order passed by the Rent Controller would be final and conclusive, when the revisional authority passed the order. But, we should remember that there are also consequential remedies provided against the orders of the Tribunal and the Courts. Therefore, the finality in its proper sense shall be only when the final Court of the Country or the Nation gives its verdict. But as I stated above, that kind of finality is only with reference to the order, but in the mean time the Legislature can intend to put an end to the relationship to the parties i.e. , the Legislature can intend at what stage they should begin to act pursuant to an order passed by Tribunal or a Court. From Section 23 (4) of the Act, the Legislature has intended that the parties who went to the Rent Control Court must take the verdict of the appellate authority as final, in so far as the relationship is concerned or their conduct is concerned with one another. That is why, the parties are told that the finality is at the decision of the appellate authority. 13. Apart from this, in this particular case, even though the revision has been filed, no stay has been obtained. That is why, the parties are told that the finality is at the decision of the appellate authority. 13. Apart from this, in this particular case, even though the revision has been filed, no stay has been obtained. Atleast it can be interpreted that even though the finality is attached to the appellate order, since the stay is there, the finality cannot begin to operate. Therefore if we look at the decision, in this perspective it is not helpful to the respondent. 14. Md. Abdulla & Sons v. Dorai Arasu (1956 I MLJ. 184) is also a case that has arisen under Section 6 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XXV of 1949). In the said case also there was no consideration of a provision like the one we have under Section 23 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. 15. Patel v. Ponnayya Nadar (1959 I MLJ 32) is another case cited by the learned counsel for the respondents. In the said case also what is stated is that right to refund accrues to a tenant only when the fair rent is finally fixed by the machinery constituted under the Act. In my view the machinery constituted under the act is the appellate authority. Because Section 23 (4) of the Act specifically states so. Further, in the said case, the Court was not called upon to consider the provision like the one we have in Section 23 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960. 16. The other case cited by the counsel for the respondents is reported in C. Ranganathan v. M. Suri (100 L.W. 708). There, a single Judge of this Court has taken the view that mere failure to pay the fair rent itself will not attract Section 10 (2) (i) and consequently Section 11 (4) of the Act. In the said decision also the implication of Section 23 (4) of the Act is not discussed or referred to. Therefore, the said case is also not helpful. 17. In J. Visalakshi Ammal v. T.B. Sathya Narayana (1996 2 L.W. 849) also the learned Judges have observed that the difference between the fair rent and the contractual rent becomes payable when the order fixing the fair rent becomes final. Therefore, the said case is also not helpful. 17. In J. Visalakshi Ammal v. T.B. Sathya Narayana (1996 2 L.W. 849) also the learned Judges have observed that the difference between the fair rent and the contractual rent becomes payable when the order fixing the fair rent becomes final. In the said case also, I do not find any reference to Section 23 (4) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. Further the observation of the learned Judges in paragraph 10 shows that the fixing of the fair rent became final when the revision was dismissed. As I have indicated above, this finality is with reference to the order passed by the Rent Controller, but in view of Section 23 (4) of the Act, the finality for the purpose of compliance is reached when the appellate authority passed the order i.e. , the object of Section 23 (4) of the Act. That apart, Section 23 (4) of the Act was not referred to by the learned Judges in the said case. Therefore, in my view, the said case is also not helpful to the respondents. 18. For the foregoing reasons, I am of the view that the petitioners are entitled to the refund. Even though the petitioners have stated in the reply that the balance refundable is Rs. 79,676/- in the petition the prayer is only for payment of Rs. 46,160/- by issue of a cheque. In the circumstances, the petition is ordered as prayed for. However, it is made clear that as we have indicated earlier, if the respondents, succeed in the Civil Revision Petition and the order of the appellate authority is modified and there is no further proceedings in the Supreme Court by the aggrieved party and that the order reaches finality, it is needless to point out that respondents have remedies available under law.