JUDGMENT 1. - This imprisoned poet, Oscar Wilde in his poem "The ballad of reading Gaol" (Jail) wrote about prison-walls thus - "I know not whether law be right, or whether Laws be wrong, All that we know who lie in gaol, Is that the wall is strong; And that each day is like a year. A year whose day are long." "But, said Krishna Iyer, J., broken hearts cannot break prison walls. Since prisons are built with stones of law, the key to liberation too is in Law's custody. Judges themselves are prisoners of the law and are not free to free a prisoner save through the open sea same of justice according to law." 2. Explaining the material and Practical advantages of long term imprisonment, Sir Leon Radzinowicz in his book "The Growth of Crime" aptly observed as follows - "Long term imprisonment could be regarded as neat response to all three requirements; it would put the miscreants behind bars for a long time; it would demonstrate that the game was not worth the candle for other" (Page 195) The author gives examples in support of his views thus - "Two English police officers were sentenced to seven years' imprisonment for accepting bribes and conspiring to pervert the Courts of justice, two others for hounding a vagrant. In Turkey a similar sentence was passed upon a writer for translating and publishing the works of Marx and Engels. In Russia the Manager of a mechanical repair shop was sentenced to death for theft of State property. In the Philippines a Chinese businessman was condemned to public execution by firing squad for trafficking drugs. In Nigeria something like eighty people suffered the same fate within a year or two for armed robbery. All these sentences had of course their elements of deterrence and retribution. But they have in common another element, what has been called denunciation, a powerful reassertion of assertion values attached." Even from the point of view of reformative form of punishment, the author says - "Prolonged and indefinite detention is justified not only in the name of prevention but cure. The offender has been regarded in one sense as a patient to be discharged only when he responds to the treatment and can be regarded as safe." 3. Now, the key question and the back up facts, convict Leo Vaz was serving as a teacher in St. The offender has been regarded in one sense as a patient to be discharged only when he responds to the treatment and can be regarded as safe." 3. Now, the key question and the back up facts, convict Leo Vaz was serving as a teacher in St. Paul School of Beawar. The charge against him was that he used to put his male organ in the mouth and hands of the girls aged 8 to years. studying in class III , while they used to visit his house for private tuition. The girls are asked to suck his male organ and that act followed by seminal discharge. The offence came into light when Kumari Deepa Mittal made complaint to her mother and declined to go to the convict's house for tuition. Smt. Anita Mittal, the mother of Kumari Deepa, made a report on March 17, 1986 and criminal case under Section 354/377 Indian Penal Code was registered against the convict. During the course of investigation, it was found that seven girls of the same age group were subjected to outrageous assault and carnal intercourse against the order of nature. After completion of investigation, a single charge-sheet was initially submitted for offences punishable under Sections 354/377 and 376/511 Indian Penal Code. The concerned Magistrate, in whose Court the charge-sheet was filed, committed the case to the Court of Sessions, Ajmer. The Sessions Judge, after going through the charge-sheet directed to split it in separate charge-sheets as the act related to seven girls and each act constituted a separate and distinct offence. Consequently, the single charge-sheet was split in seven and three cases were sent for trial to the Courts of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer as they revealed commission of offence under Sections 354 and 377, Indian Penal Code, which are triable by a Magistrate of the first class. Four cases relating to Kumari Ritu, Kumari Neelam, Kumari Smriti and Kumari Manmeet were kept for trial by the Sessions Court as offence under Section 376 read with 511, Indian Penal Code was prima facie made out, which were exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions. These cases where registered as Sessions cases Nos. 1/91, 2/91, 3/91 and 4/91. In Sessions cases Nos. 1/91 and 3/91 the girls Kumari Ritu and Neelam did not support the prosecution case and Leo Vaz was acquitted in those cases but in Sessions cases Nos. These cases where registered as Sessions cases Nos. 1/91, 2/91, 3/91 and 4/91. In Sessions cases Nos. 1/91 and 3/91 the girls Kumari Ritu and Neelam did not support the prosecution case and Leo Vaz was acquitted in those cases but in Sessions cases Nos. 2/91 and 4/91, respectively related to Kumari Smriti and Kumari Manmeet, the convict was convicted on May 30, 1994 under Section 377 Indian Penal Code to suffer rigorous imprisonment for seven years and to pay a fine of Rs. 15,000/- in default of payment of fine to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Under Section 354 Indian Penal Code he was awarded two years' rigorous imprisonment in each case. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. Out of the fine, Rs. 10,000/- were directed to be paid to the victims. This Court, in appeals preferred by the convict, reduced the sentence of imprisonment from seven years to five years' rigorous imprisonment. However sentence of fine was maintained, sentence of imprisonment awarded in Sessions cases Nos. 2/91 and 4/91 were ordered to run concurrently. 4. In case Nos. 798/86, 799/86 and 800/86 the convict was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer on September 6, 1995 under Section 377 Indian Penal Code to suffer five years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and under Section 354 Indian Penal Code to suffer one year's rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 500/-. Thereafter an application under Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code was filed by the convict and the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer vide order dated October 10, 1995 directed under Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code that the sentences awarded in all the three cases shall run concurrently. 5. The order dated October 10, 1955 of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer has been assailed by the State of Rajasthan in S.B. Criminal Revision No. 23/96 on the ground that the CJM had no jurisdiction to alter his earlier judgment dated September 6, 1995 in view of provisions contained in Section 362, Criminal Procedure Code. 6. Whereas the convict in S.B. Cr Misc. petition No. 640/96 has sought relief that all the sentences awarded to him may be directed to run concurrently. 7. Mr. S.M. Poddar, learned Public Prosecutor in S.B. Cr. Revision No. 23/96 contended that the impugned order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is violative of Section 362, Criminal Procedure Code. 6. Whereas the convict in S.B. Cr Misc. petition No. 640/96 has sought relief that all the sentences awarded to him may be directed to run concurrently. 7. Mr. S.M. Poddar, learned Public Prosecutor in S.B. Cr. Revision No. 23/96 contended that the impugned order of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate is violative of Section 362, Criminal Procedure Code. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate has no jurisdiction to alter his earlier judgment dated September 6, 1995. On the other hand Mr. Alok Sharma, urged that a direction that subsequent sentences should run concurrently with an earlier sentence, does not amount to alteration of sentence and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate had rightly attracted the provisions contained in Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code. 8. I have reflected over the rival submission and carefully perused the impugned order. The High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Venkanna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 Andhra Pradesh 449 and the Madhya Pradesh High Court in A.S. Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1975 Cri LJ 498 took the view that a direction that a subsequent sentence should run concurrently with an earlier sentence does not amount to alteration of sentence. 9. Justice Janaki Amma in Bhaskaran v. State of Kerala, 1978 Cri LJ 738 indicated thus - "The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 contains distinct provisions as to the manner in which punishment should be undergone when a person is sentenced to imprisonment for more than one offence and they are contained in Section 31 (1) and Section 427 (1). Section 31 (1) deals with sentences in cases of conviction at one trial of two or more offences. Section 427 (1) deals with cases where a person is sentenced to different terms of imprisonment in separate trials - where the sentence in one case is imposed. Under both the above provisions the Court is competent to direct that the sentences may run concurrently. A direction that the sentences for offences tried during a single trial may run concurrently is an integral part of the judgment. If that be so, a similar direction that the sentences in a later case may run concurrently with the sentence in an earlier case is also apart of the judgment. A direction that the sentences for offences tried during a single trial may run concurrently is an integral part of the judgment. If that be so, a similar direction that the sentences in a later case may run concurrently with the sentence in an earlier case is also apart of the judgment. Therefore, a direction how the sentences in the two cases should run, issued subsequent to the disposal of the cases would amount to alteration of the judgment which is barred under Section 362, Criminal Procedure Code. If a direction under Section 31 (1) cannot be issued after the judgment is pronounced on a motion made by the accused, I fail to see how the order under Section 427 (1) can be issued after the pronouncement of the subsequent judgment. I am, therefore, unable to adopt the reasoning in A. S. Naidu v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (supra) and I hold that the direction referred to should be given at the latest when the subsequent judgment is pronounced." 10. The Division Bench of Kerala High Court in Mani and another v. State of Kerala, 1983 Cr LJ 1262 propounded thus - "It follows that the power should be exercised at the time of pronouncing the later judgment and not on a motion made thereafter. In other words, a subsequent motion is barred under Section 362 of the Code. A person who is afforded an opportunity to represent has case and get relief, and who omits to avail of it at the proper time should not be allowed to approach the Court on a later date for the same remedy by invoking the same remedy." 11. The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court however, in AIR 1955 Calcutta 632 held that the High Court has power to order that the sentences passed on different offences in respect of different convictions of the accused, by Courts other than High Court, should run concurrently. 12. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mani and another v. State of Kerala, (supra) took the similar view and I express my cordial assent to the view taken by the Calcutta High Court and Kerala High Court and in my opinion it represents the correct view of the law. 12. The Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in Mani and another v. State of Kerala, (supra) took the similar view and I express my cordial assent to the view taken by the Calcutta High Court and Kerala High Court and in my opinion it represents the correct view of the law. This Court under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code has power to issued directions that the sentences passed in different cases were to run concurrently. Therefore I hold that though the impugned judgment dated October 10, 1995 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ajmer is violative of Section 362, Criminal Procedure Code but I under Section 482 read with Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code direct that in Criminal Cases Nos. 798/ 86, 799/86 and 800/86, the sentences awarded to the convict shall run concurrently. I have issued these directions in view of Section 427 with Section 31, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 31. Criminal Procedure Code provides thus - "31. Sentence in case of conviction of several offences at one trial. - (1) When a person is convicted at one trial of two or more offences, the Court may, subject to the provisions of Section 71 of the Indian Penal Code, sentence him for such offences, to the several punishments prescribed therefor which such Court is competent to inflict; such punishments when consisting of imprisonment to commence the one after the expiration of the other in such order as the Court may direct, unless the Court directs that such punishments shall run concurrently. (2) In the case of consecutive sentence, it shall not be necessary for the Court by reason only of the aggregate punishment for the several offence being in excess of the punishment which it is competent to inflict on conviction of a single offence, to sent to offender for trial before a higher Court : Provided that - (a) in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years; (b) the aggregate punishment shall not exceed twice the amount of punishment which the Court is competent to inflict for a single offence. (3) For the purpose of appeal by a convicted person, the aggregate of the consecutive sentences passed against him under this section shall be deemed to be a single sentence." A perusal of proviso (a) of sub-section (2) of Section 31, Criminal Procedure Code demonstrates that in no case shall such person be sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than fourteen years. The convict was sentenced to undergo in the three above-noted criminal cases to suffer five years' rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and ordering these sentences to run consecutively shall mean that the convict shall have to undergo sentence of 15 years, which cannot be awarded in view of proviso (a), sub-section (2) of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Thus, I have not interfered with the impugned order dated October 10, 1995 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate to run concurrently. 13. Now I proceed to adjudicate Misc. Petition No. 640 of 1996. Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel appearing for the convict has sought direction under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code that the sentence of imprisonment awarded in Sessions Cases Nos. 2/91 and 4/91 as well as sentence awarded in Criminal Cases Nos. 798/86, 799/86 and 800/86 may be ordered to run concurrently. Mr. Alok Sharma, learned counsel placed reliance on Mohd. Akhtar Hussain alias Ibrahim Ahmed Bhatti v. Assistant Collector of Customs and others, AIR 1988 Supreme Court 2143, which propounded thus : "Section 427 relates to administration of criminal justice and provides procedure for sentencing. The sentencing court is, therefore, required to consider and make an appropriate order as to how the sentence passed in the subsequent case is to run. Whether it should be concurrent or consecutive? The basic rule of thumb over the years has been the so called single transaction rule for concurrent sentences. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different." 14. If a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally, it is wrong to have consecutive sentences. It is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences. But this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different." 14. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, RCC 1984 page 376, it was held - "The provisions of Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code are very clear, which provide that when a person already undergoing sentences of imprisonment, is sentenced subsequently in another case, such imprisonment shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which he had been previously sentenced, unless the cause directs that the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently. If feel that it would be just and proper to direct that the subsequent sentence, awarded to him, should run concurrently with the previous sentence." 15. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, Cr LR (Raj) 1987 page 241, this Court indicated thus : "The ends of justice will be met if the petitioner Mohan Lal undergoes sentences awarded to him in Criminal Cases Nos. 59 of 1984, 38 of 1984 and 144 of 1984 consecutively and undergoes rest of the sentences in the remaining seven cases concurrently with the sentences in the first three cases. The imposition of the sentence of fine will remain intact. The period during which the petitioner has already remained in jail after the awarding of the first sentence shall be deducted from the consecutive period of sentence in the first three cases referred to above." 16. In Mohd. Akhtar v. Assistant Collector, (supra) their Lordships of the Supreme Court though laid down that if a given transaction constitutes two offences under two enactments generally it is wrong to have consecutive sentences and it is proper and legitimate to have concurrent sentences, but this rule has no application if the transaction relating to offences is not the same or the facts constituting the two offences are quite different. The facts of the cases in which the convict was convicted are quite different. The criminal acts were committed at different times and circumstances in all the cases are gruesome and cruel. 17. The facts of the cases in which the convict was convicted are quite different. The criminal acts were committed at different times and circumstances in all the cases are gruesome and cruel. 17. In Juja v. The State of M.P., 1984 (1) Crimes 406 the Madhya Pradesh High Court indicated thus - "Where accused committed two dacoities at different times and different places and the circumstances of dacoity in both the cases are gruesome and cruel then sentences in both dacoities shall run consecutively and not concurrently." 18. This Court in a decision delivered by Hon'ble Mohini Kapur, J. in Mahesh and others v. State of Rajasthan, RLR 1988 (1) 693 has observed thus - "5. The facts of this case stand on their own footing. Petty theft by a poor boy or theft even by professional cannot be equated to the act of the petitioners in this case by which they trapped old, infirm and poor villagers, who in the hope of cure of a minor ailment of the eye lost their eye sight by being operated by quacks with blades and pins without following or knowing the elementary procedure for surgery. All this was done for making money. There could be a variety of methods for swindling money but to take away the eye sight of several persons is a barbaric act and a crime against society as a whole which cannot invoke sympathy of this Court on the basis of judicial principles. 6. In my view this cannot be said to be a case wherein the sentence passed in subsequent cases may be ordered to run concurrently with the previous sentences. This petition is dismissed." 19. The Convict who was teacher at the relevant time convicted for his barbaric act on seven girls of the same age group who used to visit the house of the convict for private tuition were subjected to outrageous assault and carnal intercourse against the order of nature. This petition is dismissed." 19. The Convict who was teacher at the relevant time convicted for his barbaric act on seven girls of the same age group who used to visit the house of the convict for private tuition were subjected to outrageous assault and carnal intercourse against the order of nature. The act of convict is a crime against the society as a whole which in my considered view cannot invoke the sympathy of this Court, though in view of Section 31 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I did not interfere with the order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, but I do not think it proper to attract the provisions contained under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code read with Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code to grant the relief sought by the convict in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No. 640 of 1996. Granting relief to the convict in the said petitioner shall amount virtually acquitting the convict in Criminal Cases Nos. 798/86, 799/86 and 800/86. The learned Additional Sessions Judge convicted the convict in Sessions Cases Nos. 2/91 and 4/91 on May 30, 1994 under Section 377 Indian Penal Code to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and to pay fine of Rs. 15,000/- and in default to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and under Section 354 Indian Penal Code he was awarded two years' rigorous imprisonment in each case. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. This Court in appeal preferred by the convict reduced the sentence of imprisonment to five years' rigorous imprisonment and the sentence of imprisonment awarded in Sessions Cases Nos. 2/91 and 4/91 were ordered to run concurrently. In Criminal Cases Nos. 798/86, 799/86 and 800/86, the convict was convicted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate Ajmer on September, 6, 1995 under Section 377 Indian Penal Code to suffer five years' rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 5,000/- and under Section 354 Indian Penal Code to suffer one year's rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 500/- and by a subsequent order the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate on October 10, 1996 directed under Section 427, Criminal Procedure Code that the sentences awarded in all the three cases shall run concurrently. Therefore, it cannot be directed that the sentences awarded in Criminal Cases Nos. 798/86, 799/86 and 800/86 shall run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment awarded in Sessions Cases Nos. Therefore, it cannot be directed that the sentences awarded in Criminal Cases Nos. 798/86, 799/86 and 800/86 shall run concurrently with the sentence of imprisonment awarded in Sessions Cases Nos. 2/91 and 4/91 on May 30, 1994. 20. Resultantly, S.B. Cr. Revision Petition No. 23/1996 is being disposed of as indicated herein above and S.B. Cr. Misc. Petition No. 640/1996 stands dismissedRevision decided accordingly *******