P. BASU, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal has tragic background of accidental death of a young man of 27 years, Rajesh Singh, who died on 10. 1. 1988 when passenger bus No. URN 9428 travelling between Haldwani and Almora fell into a ditch and caught fire bringing about the termination of life of Rajesh Singh being burnt while alive. He was Assistant Engineer drawing a sum of Rs. 2,384. 50 per month as salary. The bus was registered in the ownership of kanta Devi, wife of Lakhan Singh and was hypothecated with the Central Bank of India, Haldwani Branch, Nainital. The bus was insured with New India Assurance Co. Ltd. through Haldwani Branch. It was comprehensive policy issued on 19. 5. 1987 and was valid till 18. 5. 1988. To add to the tragedy, the young widow of rajesh Singh, namely, Kiran Singh was carrying a child in the womb then apart from having given birth to a daughter already. A claim petition consequently was filed on 17. 2. 1988 before the Motor accidents Claims Tribunal, Nainital, which by order dated 30. 5. 1990 has awarded a sum of Rs. 6,25,000 as compensation payable by insurance company along with 12 per cent per annum interest up-to-date. The said relief was given to the claimants under section 110-A of the Motor Vehicles act, hereinafter referred to as the Act. ( 2 ) MR. A. B. Saran, Senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Vineet Saran and Mr. M. P. Shroff have been heard at considerable length in support of this appeal. A cross-objection has also been filed by the claimants against the aforesaid judgment/order who are represented by Mr. Sankatha Rai, senior Advocate, assisted by Mr. Sharb singh, who also have been heard at equal length. The entire record has been perused. ( 3 ) MR. A. B. Saran has raised three points for consideration in this appeal, which are: (1) The finding of the Tribunal that the policy in question created indefinite liability is without any basis and the plea of the insurance company to the effect that its liability was limited to rs. 30,000 per passenger has been wrongly ignored. (2) The possession and control of the vehicle was not with Kanta Devi, but it was transferred by an agreement to pramod Chand Singh and the day-to- day running was done through Kumaun motor Operators Union (for short kmou ). 30,000 per passenger has been wrongly ignored. (2) The possession and control of the vehicle was not with Kanta Devi, but it was transferred by an agreement to pramod Chand Singh and the day-to- day running was done through Kumaun motor Operators Union (for short kmou ). The argument proceeded that since under the circumstances a driver also must have been deputed by those who were incharge of movement of the vehicle, the insurance company cannot be fastened with the liability under the policy as the insurance policy was only a contract between the appellant, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. and the registered owner. (3) That in the operative portion of the order of the Tribunal there is a direction to the insurance company alone to make payment of Rs. 6,25,000 which is illegal because the original liability must have been fixed on the owner and then it may have been passed on to the insurance company in accordance with the provisions of section 96 of the old Act. ( 4 ) RELIANCE has been placed on various documents filed before the Tribunal in as much as several decisions were cited by mr. Saran which shall be referred to in the discussions to follow. It may, however, be mentioned here that Mr. Sharb Singh has also painstakingly referred to original documents and refuted each and every argument advanced by Mr. Saran and he has placed reliance on many other decisions including the one or two cited by Mr. Saran, reference about which will exist soon hereinafter. ( 5 ) IT will be easier to dispose of the third argument first because the other two may be determined by reference to various documents relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties. It is true that in the operative portion of the order the Tribunal has said that defendant No. 2, New India assurance Co. Ltd. , Haldwani, is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 6,25,000 along with 12 per cent annual interest up-to-date in accordance with the provisions contained in section 110-A of the Act. But in two paras before that it has held that the ownership remained with the registered owner, namely, Kanta Devi, and in this connection referred to in detail the statement of Lakhan Singh, DW 2. Consequently, the argument of Mr. Saran on this point appears to be a technical one. But in two paras before that it has held that the ownership remained with the registered owner, namely, Kanta Devi, and in this connection referred to in detail the statement of Lakhan Singh, DW 2. Consequently, the argument of Mr. Saran on this point appears to be a technical one. Section 96 of the Act provides that the insurer shall subject to the provisions of this section pay to the person entitled to the benefit of the decree. Therefore, there is no error in the order when during discussion in the body of the judgment the Tribunal has held that policy was in vogue when accident took place and it was validly insured by the appellant, New India Assurance co. Ltd. and, therefore, appropriation of the decretal amount would have been permissible under the law and, therefore, the aforesaid argument of Mr. Saran is not accepted. ( 6 ) COMING to the second argument advanced by Mr. Saran about possession of the vehicle being no more with the owner and, therefore, the policy should have been treated as having become ineffective is also against the weight of the evidence on record. The statement of lakhan Singh, DW 2, has been extensively relied upon by the Tribunal and admittedly he is the husband of the registered owner of the vehicle and is also an ex member of Parliament. He has given the description of what was meant by KMOU. It is a union of transport operators and by and large is engaged in organising route, direction and place of movement, etc. , of the vehicles owned by the members of the said union. It has come in the statement of lakhan Singh that premium used to be paid by the registered owners with regard to insurance policies of their vehicles and the drivers were appointed and paid regularly by the registered owners and that all necessary formalities of the Government and the authorities were also completed by the registered owners. It was further stated that the money by way of fare or carriage charges also used to come to the registered owners. In view of the statement of the aforesaid witness, there is no error whatsoever in the finding of the Tribunal that the ownership and physical possession of the vehicle was never transferred to KMOU. ( 7 ) IN this connection, Mr. In view of the statement of the aforesaid witness, there is no error whatsoever in the finding of the Tribunal that the ownership and physical possession of the vehicle was never transferred to KMOU. ( 7 ) IN this connection, Mr. Saran drew the attention of the court to one of the statements that there was an agreement between Kanta Devi and one Pramod Chand singh about the transfer and physical possession of the vehicle to Pramod Chand singh. However, the statement of Lakhan singh completely rules out the possession of the vehicle with said Pramod Chand singh. Before the cross-examination started Lakhan Singh, DW 2, has clearly stated that neither before nor after execution of the agreement between Kanta Devi and Pramod Chand Singh the vehicle in question was ever handed over to Pramod chand Singh nor any change in regard to the ownership was ever brought about. The Tribunal has placed reliance on this part of the statement and has held that possession of the vehicle remained with the registered owner and there is no error in this finding and, therefore, it is hereby upheld. ( 8 ) NOW we come to the most important and crucial question to be determined in this appeal. It was vehemently argued by mr. Saran that in the evidence which exists on record there is an error on the face of record and no liability on the insurance company could have been fastened beyond Rs. 30,000. It is argued that: (I) The original policy when issued had an endorsement affixed to it by which i. M. T. 13 was incorporated as specific term of the policy and, therefore, the insurance premium paid by the owner could fetch only to the tune of rs. 30,000 as compensation per passenger in case of an accident. (II) The amount of the premium paid was Rs. 1,290 covering the risk of 43 passengers and, therefore, the amount explicitly comes to Rs. 30 per passenger. The argument advanced through written statement before the Tribunal and specific pleading of insurance company being that the said amount of rs. 30 as per Indian Motor Tariff Rules could get only Rs. 30,000 as policy amount per passenger. 1,290 covering the risk of 43 passengers and, therefore, the amount explicitly comes to Rs. 30 per passenger. The argument advanced through written statement before the Tribunal and specific pleading of insurance company being that the said amount of rs. 30 as per Indian Motor Tariff Rules could get only Rs. 30,000 as policy amount per passenger. (III) The insurance company has filed the true copy of the policy which was maintained in its office before the tribunal which specifically mentions i. M. T. 13 as one of the clauses which was held at the time of issuance of the policy and, therefore, the Tribunal has erred severely in placing reliance on the copy of the policy which was produced by the bank manager for and on behalf of the owners, which did not have any such endorsement as was annexed to the copy of the policy produced by the insurance company. (IV) Non-mentioning of the limit of rs. 30,000 in the policy produced by the appellant should be termed as meaningless so long as the amount of compensation at the rate of Rs. 30,000 is traceable to the insurance premium amount. The Tribunal further committed error in ignoring the endorsement which was specifically produced before it for perusal as paper No. 24c/2. ( 9 ) MR. Sharb Singh, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand wanted to advance arguments justifying the findings of the Tribunal on all the four counts advanced by Mr. Saran. It was contended that the insurance company is bound by the terms of the policy and since the bank manager has produced the original policy it does not contain any annexure as i. M. T. 13, there is no basis whatsoever for insuraqce company to argue that i. M. T. 13 was one of the ingredients of the contract between the insurance company and the owner. He further contended that a copy which has been produced by the insurance company is only referable as a copy which certainly and admittedly is not a carbon copy of the policy and, therefore, it was strongly contended that insurance company knew where the shoe pinched and consequently it desisted from producing carbon copy which may have been maintained in the office. It was further contended that no officer or any other witness was examined by the insurance company to prove even what was filed as carbon copy of the policy and, therefore, it was vehemently argued that the Tribunal has nothing but to hold that the insurance company has not taken the pains to produce any witness to prove the addition to the annexure incorporating as i. M. T. 13 as ingredient of the policy issued by the company. Reliance was placed on the absence of the figure of Rs. 30,000 at any of the relevant places of the policy and, therefore, it was said that the only inference to be drawn was that the insurance company admitted the liability. Lastly, it was contended that the Tribunal has placed reliance on the document produced by the bank manager and has held the witness to be wholly independent and no blemish to his independent deposition could be pointed out by Mr. Saran and, therefore, the finding that the insurance company has failed to discharge the burden which was placed on it by law after the claimants had discharged their burden, should be upheld and the appeal must be dismissed. ( 10 ) IN National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 (SC), the honble Supreme Court went on to appreciate the Schedule to the policy itself and found out the liability as may have been indicated therein. Placing reliance on paras 6, 7 and 8 Mr. Saran argued that in this case also the policy may be examined and since 43 passengers are indicated against total premium of Rs. 1,290 the liability of Rs. 30,000 should be fixed just as rs. 20,000 were fixed in the cited decision in the observations existing in para 11 thereof. ( 11 ) IT may be mentioned here that once there is no dispute about the contents of the policy document such a course can obviously be adopted. The very base of the appellants contention depends upon the acceptance of writing and notings existing on the copy of the policy which they have produced before the Tribunal and as already noted above no witness or officer has been examined and the said document was not admitted by the claimants either. The Tribunal was perfectly justified in saying that the said document was not proved at all. The Tribunal was perfectly justified in saying that the said document was not proved at all. A document which has thus not been proved before the Tribunal cannot be made basis of the arguments at the appellate stage. ( 12 ) MR. Saran then fully banked upon a document which has been filed as an annexure in one of the affidavits in this appeal purporting to be a chart/schedule indicating the amount of premium which may be covering the amount of the payment under the policy. This is referred by mr. Saran as the Schedule fixed by the indian Motor Tariff Rules. This document was not filed before the Tribunal. At no point of time, the insurance company had pleaded and led evidence before the tribunal that the rate of premium was co-related with the rate of the money payable under the policy as per Indian Motor Tariff rules. It may be mentioned here that the tribunal has gone in depth into this issue and it recorded a finding that the policy document filed by the bank manager on behalf of the owner does not mention the liability of Rs. 30,000 per passenger. It has inferred from the contents of the policy and also by referring to the entry mentioned as i. M. T. 13 on the reverse of the policy that even there the amount of liability is not mentioned. It was rightly pointed out by Mr. Sharb Singh on behalf of the claimants-respondents that while i. M. T. 13 is written in the printed manner against which the amount of Rs. 1,290 is indicated as premium amount for 43 passengers, a blank space where liability amount should have been mentioned is left blank not only in the insurance policy filed by the bank manager but even on the copy of the policy filed by the insurance company before the tribunal. It was emphasised that it was for this reason the insurance company wanted to rely upon the endorsement said to have been affixed on the policy document. ( 13 ) AS referred to above, if the statement of bank manager has to be believed, there was no such additional endorsement affixed or attached to the policy document. The finding of the Tribunal that the amount of Rs. 30,000 is not mentioned anywhere in the policy document is fully borne out from the policy on record. ( 13 ) AS referred to above, if the statement of bank manager has to be believed, there was no such additional endorsement affixed or attached to the policy document. The finding of the Tribunal that the amount of Rs. 30,000 is not mentioned anywhere in the policy document is fully borne out from the policy on record. ( 14 ) AT this stage Mr. Saran wanted to argue this matter further particularly on the strength of the facts mentioned in two judgments, i. e. , Jugal Kishore, 1988 ACJ 270 (SC) and New India Assurance Co. Ltd, v. Shanti Bai, 1995 ACJ 470 (SC ). He wanted to contend that the type of policy, which has been interpreted in these two judgments, is more or less the same and in fact he argued that the type of policy, which has been issued in the instant case is identical and, therefore, he argued that there was no escape from the conclusion and deductions which have been made in jugal Kishores case (supra ). The request of Mr. Saran was accepted and he was permitted to argue the matter further to his satisfaction, which he has done. Consequently, the matter was listed again and arguments having been concluded, the remaining part of the judgment is being completed today. ( 15 ) LET it be stated at the very outset that the policy document is only the evidence of the contract between the insurer and the policyholder and nothing beyond that. The Schedule included in the policy has narrated the amount of the premium charged by the insurer from the policyholder and specified the liability which the insurance company, i. e. , insurer takes upon itself in accordance with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. In this connection section 95 of the old Act became relevant, but since that is a long section, only important provisions therefrom are indicated here in order to examine the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. The heading of section 95 of the Act itself says"requirements of policies and limits of liability". Sub-section (1) of section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act has two clauses, i. e. , (a) and (b ). Both these two clauses specifically speak about the liability which the policy would secure. The heading of section 95 of the Act itself says"requirements of policies and limits of liability". Sub-section (1) of section 95 of the Motor Vehicles Act has two clauses, i. e. , (a) and (b ). Both these two clauses specifically speak about the liability which the policy would secure. Clause (b) is made dependent upon the fixation of the person specified in the policy as indicated by sub-section (2 ). These two clauses (a)and (b) are followed by the proviso, which are three in number, i. e. , (i), (ii) and (iii ). A plain reading of the proviso indicates clearly that what is mandatory in the policy shall be governed by the clauses (a) and (b), but it will not cover any contractual liability. The third proviso itself says, when read together, "provided that a policy shall not be required. . . (i ). . . (ii ). . . (iii) to cover any contractual liability". ( 16 ) IT is after this proviso, that the explanation stands added (which was brought about by the Amending Act 56 of 1969) which is ultimately followed by sub-section (2) of section 95 of the Act. A perusal of sub-section (2) indicates thus the amount fixed under the policy where no contractual liability is established between the insurer and the policyholder by paying additional premium by entering into such contract, which is over and above the third party policy. ( 17 ) THIS being the legal position, the argument of Mr. Saran that the comprehensive policy has already been explained by the Honble Supreme Court in the case of shanti Bai, 1995 ACJ 470 (SC), which has followed the case of Jugal Kishore, 1988 acj 270 (SC), has to be dealt with. In the case of Jugal Kishore, no passenger was injured or killed by the accident. Jugal kishore himself was a third person inasmuch as he was in the autorickshaw which collided with the vehicle, which was insured. Likewise in Shanti Bais case unfortunate victim was sitting at the top of the roof of the vehicle and per chance was hit by a branch of tree, as a result of which the deceased fell down and died. Likewise in Shanti Bais case unfortunate victim was sitting at the top of the roof of the vehicle and per chance was hit by a branch of tree, as a result of which the deceased fell down and died. With these factual backgrounds, the premium paid in these two cases, the Schedule and the payment of premium made by the policyholder to the respective insurer were examined by their Lordships in both these cases and then it was observed that even if the word comprehensive was interpretable in particular way, it was found on facts that it was only Act liability/third party liability, which was fixed in the Schedule and no extra premium was received by the insurance company. In other words both these cases, i. e. , Jugal Kishore and Shanti Bai have been decided on the actual contract which existed through the policy document. Consequently, in one case the policy document was permitted to be examined even by the Honble Supreme Court and in the other tariff rates were also permitted to be filed in the Honble Supreme Court where it was examined. ( 18 ) IN the instant case, therefore, every thing turns by the policy document, which has been filed in this case. It has already been noted above that the insurance company did file the W. S. , but it did not examine any witness whatsoever inasmuch as secondary evidence was also not led to prove the alleged copy produced by the insurance company before the Tribunal and the finding which has been recorded by the Tribunal is specific that the paper filed by the insurance company has not been proved, is not a valid document and is not to be relied upon at all. There is no error in the finding of the Tribunal and, therefore, the copy filed by the insurance company cannot be relied upon for any purpose whatsoever. ( 19 ) THE statement of the bank manager has already been referred to above. It is he who filed the carbon copy of the policy, as was handed over to the bank at the time of insurance of the vehicle and in his statement he has stated that the policy document is one which the bank had received in token of the insurance of the vehicle through the insurance company, namely, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. It has been found by the Tribunal, as already noted above, that the Schedule attached to the policy indicated the excess payment of premium of Rs. 1,290 for covering the risk of 40 passengers. Before proceeding further, one factual aspect has to be mentioned to straighten the record. Mr. Saran wanted to argue that the typed figure 40 should be read as 43. He emphasised that figure zero is not the full production of the typographical pressure on the paper, but it may be half of figure 3 only and, therefore, it looks like half zero. This figure was tested by magnifying glass and it reads figure 3. At another place the figure 3 is clear and distinct. Likewise at other places the figure zero is also clear and distinctly seen by naked eyes. Therefore, this figure is and should be read as 40 (sic) 43. Thus, the conclusion is irresistible that the insurance policy covered the risk of 40 (sic) 43 passengers on payment of additional premium of Rs. 1,290. ( 20 ) AT this stage other arguments by mr. Saran should also be mentioned. He wanted to rely upon the tariff rates to indicate to this court that the premium of rs. 1,290 should be for 43 passengers and, therefore, that will tally with the liability of Rs. 30,000 per passenger as mentioned in the Schedule against the premium of rs. 30 per passenger. As stated above, there is no force in this argument at all inasmuch as the Tribunal has recorded specific findings that it was the insurance of 40 passengers for which additional premium of Rs. 1,290 was received by the insurer and, therefore, there is absolutely no error in the finding of the Tribunal, which has been recorded on the basis that the insurer had unlimited liability for covering the risk-of those 40 passengers. ( 21 ) IT must be mentioned here that Mr. Saran placed reliance on the judgment of jugal Kisfiore, 1988 ACJ 270 (SC), in order to read the observations in that case as applicable for this case also and thereby limited liability of the insurance company is only Rs. 30,000, which now should be rs. 50,000 because of the mention of rs. 50,000 itself in the Schedule and it was vehemently argued that the Tribunals award should be rejected and the liability of Rs. 30,000, which now should be rs. 50,000 because of the mention of rs. 50,000 itself in the Schedule and it was vehemently argued that the Tribunals award should be rejected and the liability of Rs. 50,000 should be fixed on the insurance company. ( 22 ) THIS takes the court to the policy document again, which has been found proved and relied upon by the Tribunal having been filed by the bank and accepted as policy in the instant case. The policy itself mentions comprehensive at the head of the document. The limits of liability indicated therein are classified in clauses (a) and (b ). Mr. Saran placed reliance on clause (a), which reads as follows:"limits of the amount of the company liability under section II-I (1) in respect of any one accident. Such amount as necessary to meet the requirements of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. "in this connection he said that I. M. T. 13 as mentioned in the policy could create the liability envisaged therein which reads as under:"in consideration of an additional premium as mentioned in the Schedule and notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section II (1) (c)but subject otherwise to the terms, exceptions, conditions and limitations of this policy the company will indemnify the insured against the liability at law for compensation (including law costs of any claimant) for death or bodily injury of any person other than a person excluded under section II (1) (b)being carried in or upon or entering or mounting or alighting from the motor vehicle but such indemnity is limited to a sum of Rs. . . . as mentioned in the schedule in respect of any one person and subject to the aforesaid limit in respect of any one person to Rs. . . . as mentioned in the Schedule in respect of any number of claims in connection with the motor vehicle arising out of one cause. " ( 23 ) THE trend of Mr. A. B. Saran was, therefore, to the effect that since under section 95 of the old Act the liability was confined to the amount of Rs. 15,000, the payment of more than Rs. 15,000 could not have been awarded under that clause and if the policy terms are taken note of, nothing beyond Rs. 30,000 was payable as compensation. ( 24 ) THE argument has two fallacies as mentioned above. 15,000, the payment of more than Rs. 15,000 could not have been awarded under that clause and if the policy terms are taken note of, nothing beyond Rs. 30,000 was payable as compensation. ( 24 ) THE argument has two fallacies as mentioned above. On the factual basis, the premium which has been paid, exceeds the act policy liability because additional sum of Rs. 1,290 was charged from the owner as passengers premium. Secondly, the policy document does not indicate that the liability of the passenger was limited to any amount much less Rs. 15,000 or rs. 30,000. Consequently, the Tribunal had correctly interpreted the policy document along with the statement of the bank manager and had rightly concluded that the liability of the insurance company in the instant case was unlimited and was fully justified and concluded, what amount of compensation was payable to the claimant. ( 25 ) AT this stage came up another wave of argument. Mr. Saran argued that the multiplier inasmuch as multiplicand have been wrongly applied by the Tribunal. In this connection reliance was placed on two decisions of the Honble Supreme Court. The first one is the case of General Manager, Kerala State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Susamma Thomas, 1994 ACJ 1 (SC) and the other is U. P. State Road Trans. Corpn. v. Trilok Chandra, 1996 ACJ 831 (SC ). It was strongly contended by Mr. Saran that the Tribunal had erred in applying 43 as multiplier figure and, therefore, it should be reduced to 16 or at best 18 as held in trilok Chandras case. ( 26 ) THIS argument invited strenuous reply from the respondents counsel who has placed strong reliance on some of the paras in Susamma Thomas case, 1994 acj 1 (SC), coupled with 2-3 cases of the Division Bench of this court. In the process of arguments in order to find out how it should have applied multiplicand and multiplier, the learned counsel took the argument to the point as to what was the permissible limit for an appeal to be filed and grounds on which it can be maintained in view of the provisions of section 96 of the old Act. ( 27 ) MR. Sharb Singh, learned counsel for the respondents has thus amplified his arguments by trying to demonstrate that the compensation must be immediately raised to Rs. ( 27 ) MR. Sharb Singh, learned counsel for the respondents has thus amplified his arguments by trying to demonstrate that the compensation must be immediately raised to Rs. 6,000 per month as the basic salary and it may be reducible to Rs. 4,000 per month and this should be multiplied by figure 12 and again it should be multiplied by figure 18 to find out the exact compensation payable. ( 28 ) THE accident in this case had taken place on 10. 1. 1988. The award of the tribunal has been passed on 30. 5. 1990. There was a stay order by this court as a result of which no money has been given to the claimant. It has also been noted above that the deceased was a young man of 27 years and was working as Assistant engineer. On the face of it he must have lived the normal life and several promotions must have come by his way. Likewise one does not see any chance why the normal promotions can or should have not been added in the compensation amount when tried to be fixed by the court or Tribunal. But the multiplier of 43 as has been applied by the Tribunal is undoubtedly excessive and wrong. It was, therefore, rightly pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents that in Trilok Chandras case, 1996 ACJ 831 (SC), the amount of compensation was left as it is and the law was laid down. In this case also, the court may adopt such a course and if possible enhance the compensation amount reasonably. ( 29 ) SINCE the parties have already known the compensation amount for the last about 8 years, it is only reasonable to leave the matter as it is and the amount does not require any alteration either by addition or by subtraction. The court is fully satisfied that if the multiplier is reduced and multiplicand is enhanced, not much difference is going to be caused to the amount fixed by the Claims Tribunal. Therefore, the said amount as awarded, is upheld. ( 30 ) IT was vehemently argued by the appellants counsel that some reduction in the rate of interest must be made. The respondents counsel has objected to any reduction and prayed for a direction to the insurance company to make the payment within one month from today. Therefore, the said amount as awarded, is upheld. ( 30 ) IT was vehemently argued by the appellants counsel that some reduction in the rate of interest must be made. The respondents counsel has objected to any reduction and prayed for a direction to the insurance company to make the payment within one month from today. ( 31 ) AFTER considering the entire matter it appears reasonable to amend interest at the rate of 9 per cent per annum instead of 12 per cent. Thus, the interest at the rate of 9 per cent alone shall be payable by the insurance company on the amount awarded by the Tribunal with effect from the date of judgment of the Tribunal and to that extent the order of the Tribunal shall stand amended. In all other respects the Tribunals award is upheld. The appellant, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. , as prayed by Mr. A. B. Saran on its behalf, shall pay the amount by depositing the entire amount within two months. The appeal is thus dismissed with the aforesaid amendment in the rate of interest. The cross-objection is also dismissed. The amount deposited in this case so far before the trial court shall be adjusted towards the amount payable. ( 32 ) A copy of this order may be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties on payment of usual charges within a fortnight. Orders accordingly. .