Judgment :- 1. In execution of a decree for money against the partners of a dissolved firm one of the items of immovable properties of the firm was brought to sale. The appellant purchased it in court sale, but he could not get delivery of possession as the respondent offered resistance on the strength of a deed of transfer executed in his favour by the legal heirs of a deceased partner. The execution court upheld his claim and held that the respondent got valid title through the deed of transfer, but directed him to deposit the decree amount in court and allowed the appellant to withdraw the bid amount deposited by him in court. The lower appellate court while upholding the resistance of the respondent, took the view that the respondent became a co-owner of the property on the strength of the deed of transfer. The direction to deposit the decree amount in court was deleted by the lower appellate court. The second appeal is in challenge of the said conclusion that the respondent has valid title as a co-owner. 2. The name of the dissolved firm was "The Trustful Daily Banking Company". The two partners, Bahuleyan and Madhavan were brothers. Madhavan died on 26-10-1960. It is not disputed that the firm stood dissolved with his death. As per Ext.P1 sale deed dated 28-5-1963, the legal heirs of Madhavan transferred the property in favour of the respondent for consideration. The suit was filed in 1964 by a stranger against Bahuleyan and the legal heirs of Madhavan claiming a sum of Rs. 312.20 as due from the firm. The suit was decreed on 5-6-1968 and the decree-holder was allowed to realise the amount from the property scheduled in the decree (35 cents situated at Kaloor, Cochin). The said property originally belonged to Madhavan which was brought into the assets of the firm along with or after the formation thereof. When the property was brought to sale, it was bid in auction by the appellant who is another brother of Bahuleyan. One of the allegations of the respondent is that the auction purchaser bid it at the behest of Bahuleyan who succeeded in cornering the other properties of the firm for himself. The merit of that contention was not gone into by the two courts below. One of the allegations of the respondent is that the auction purchaser bid it at the behest of Bahuleyan who succeeded in cornering the other properties of the firm for himself. The merit of that contention was not gone into by the two courts below. Though the same contention was repeated in this appeal, among other contentions, I do not think it necessary to consider it in view of the legal position involved. 3. The main contention advanced is that the property of the firm remained as such until settlement of account of the firm and the erstwhile partners have only a right to divide the residue in proportion to their respective shares and hence no transfer could be effected by the legal heirs of one of the former partners until such settlement. The question therefore to be considered is whether the respondent got any right in the property as per Ext.P1 sale deed. 4. Under S.42 (1) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (for short 'the Act.) the firm stood dissolved on 26-10-1960, the date of the death of Madhvaan. This position is not disputed. Ext. P1 sale deed was executed about three years thereafter and the suit was filed only a year after the execution of Ext. P1. There is no evidence to show whether any settlement of account was made between Bahuleyan and the legal heirs of Madhavan before the execution of Ext. P1. S.48 of the Act lays down the rules to be observed in settlement of account of a dissolved firm. Losses shall be paid first out of profits, next out of capital and lastly by the partners individually in proportion in which they were entitled to share profits. The assets of the firm shall be applied in paying the debts of the firm to the third parties, and then for paying to each partner what is due to him. Clause (IV) is the last Clause which reads thus: "The residue, if any, shall be divided among the partners in the proportion in which they were entitled to share profits". The contention is based on the said Clause that until the making of such settlement of account no partner has a right in the property of the firm. 5. S.29 (1) of the Act deals with the rights of a transferee of the interest of a partner in the firm during continuance of the firm. The contention is based on the said Clause that until the making of such settlement of account no partner has a right in the property of the firm. 5. S.29 (1) of the Act deals with the rights of a transferee of the interest of a partner in the firm during continuance of the firm. Such transfer entitles the transferee only to receive the share of the profits of the transferring partner and nothing more. Sub-S. (2) deals with the rights of such transferee on dissolution of the firm. Under the sub-section the transferee is entitled to receive the share of the assets of firm to which the transferring partner is entitled and for the purpose of ascertaining that share, to an account as from the date of dissolution. S.15 says that the property of the firm shall be held and used by the partners exclusively for the purposes of the business of the firm. 6. It is settled law that no partner can during the subsistence of a partnership claim any portion of the property as his own because the property of the firm is the trading asset of the firm. The corollary is that during such subsistence no partner can deal with any property as his own nor can he assign his interest in a specific item of property to any one. In Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishanappa (AIR 1966 S. C. 1300) the Supreme Court examined the different provisions of the Act and held that "whatever may be the character of the property which is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of the business of the partnership it becomes the property of the firm and what a partner is entitled to is his share of profits, if any, accruing to the partnership form the realisation of this property, and upon dissolution of the partnership to a share in the money representing the value of the property. During the subsidence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own". However, the Supreme Court expressed the view that "since the firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership". During the subsidence of the partnership, however, no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own". However, the Supreme Court expressed the view that "since the firm has no legal existence, the partnership property will vest in all the partners and in that sense every partner has an interest in the property of the partnership". The Supreme Court indicated explicitly that no partner can deal with any portion of the property as his own during the subsistence of the partnership. 7. Learned counsel cited the decision of a single judge of this Court in Vironica v. Philip (1975 K. L. T. 182). In a suit for partition of property and accounts of a firm, defendants contended that the prayer for settlement of account of the partnership is barred by Art.5 of the Limitation Act 1963. -The plea of the defendants was upheld and the suit was dismissed. The following observations of the learned judge were given thrust to by the counsel: "Neither during the existence of the partnership nor after its dissolution are partners co-owners or joint owners of the partnership assets. The firm having dissolved, their right was only to seek a settlement of accounts and claim a share in the assets after satisfying the debts and liabilities of the firm. The suit, as far as it involves such a settlement, is clearly time-barred under Art.5 of the Limitation Act 1963". Those observations were made to determine the question of limitation. It was not considered as to the legal validity of the transfer made by one of the partners of a dissolved firm of his interest in the property transferred. My attention has been drawn to the observations of Agarwala. J. In Bhola Nath v. Kaso Devi (AIR (38) 1951 Allahabad 601). "Undoubtedly, all the partners together own all the property belonging to the partnership, but the rights of an individual partner in respect of the partnership property are not identical, in the absence of any contract to the contrary, with those of co-owners of such property. Co-owners of property are owners in defined shares. Every co-owner can say with respect to his share that he is the proprietor of that share with the result that qua his share he has an absolute right to dispose it of in any way he likes. Co-owners of property are owners in defined shares. Every co-owner can say with respect to his share that he is the proprietor of that share with the result that qua his share he has an absolute right to dispose it of in any way he likes. His share in the property can be transferred or charged by him and can be sold in execution of a decree against him. The purchaser of such a share becomes a co-owner along with other co-owners with the same rights as his vendor had. The rights of the partners however, qua the partnership property are different. No single partner can say that he is the owner of a particular share in the partnership property. He is merely the owner of a share in the assets of the partnership remaining in the hands of the partners after meeting all the liabilities of the partnership with the consequence that a partner cannot transfer or charge a share in a particular item of the partnership property, nor can that particular property be attached and sold in execution of a decree against a particular partner as apart from a decree against the whole partnership". It was contended on the strength of the said decisions that no sale of property could be effected by the legal representatives of the deceased partner. It is difficult to make out a ratio from those decisions that the legal heirs of a partner are under legal disability to transfer their rights in immovable property which once belonged to the firm, after the dissolution of the firm. 8. Though a firm as such has no legal existence, the partners can sue or defend any suit in respect of immovable properties of the partnership even during the subsistence of the firm. When a firm is dissolved, there is no partnership in existence. So, it cannot be said that the partnership continues to be the owner of the immovable properties or the dissolved firm. Such properties cannot be treated as nobody's properties subsequent to the dissolution. The partners of a dissolved firm cannot have the status of partners subsequently. Then, who will protect the properties of the dissolved firm. There can be no doubt that the partners of the dissolved firm alone have the right and interest to do all things necessary for the protection of such properties. The partners of a dissolved firm cannot have the status of partners subsequently. Then, who will protect the properties of the dissolved firm. There can be no doubt that the partners of the dissolved firm alone have the right and interest to do all things necessary for the protection of such properties. As the partners have interest in the properties of the firm, which of course is subject to the claims of the creditors of the firm, they are entitled to resort to any legal proceedings for the protection of such properties. Otherwise the properties would be exposed to the peril of being destroyed by trespass or mischief or acts of waste committed by strangers. Whatever be the restrictions of the partners qua the property of the partnership during the subsistence of the firm, an erstwhile partner is not subject to such restrictions subsequent to the dissolution of the firm. If he has interest in the property of the firm, such interest is transferable to any one else. In a transfer the transferee gets all the rights which the transferor had in the property. In this view the transfer made by a former partner of the dissolved firm cannot be held to be opposed to law. In this case the legal heirs of Madhavan had interest in the immovable properties of the firm subject to the liabilities in a settlement of account. The conclusion is that by Ext.P1 sale deed the interest of the legal heirs of Madhavan was transferred to the respondent and the court sale has not affected the rights of the respondent. Hence there is no warrant to interfere with the judgment of the lower appellate court. Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.