Judgment :- JAGADEESAN, J. The unsuccessful plaintiffs are the appellants herein. They filed the suit OS 226/75 on the file of the sub-Court, Dindigul for declaration that the purchase made by one Haji Mohammed Rahamathulla Rowther on 27th June, 1968 from one Krishnasamy Maniagarar is not void and for injunction restraining the defendants, the IT authorities, from proceeding against the property and for declaration that the order of the third defendant dt. 1st June, 1974 holding the said sale is void and illegal. 2. The plaintiffs are the legal representatives of the said Haji Mohammed Rahamathulla Rowther. The plaintiffs case is that the purchaser purchased the property after verifying the encumbrance certificate and satisfying that there is no encumbrance over the property and the vendor having a valid transfer of title. Pursuant to the purchase, the plaintiffs got possession of the property and the patta had also been transferred in the name of the first plaintiff. The first plaintiff was never informed about the pendency of the proceedings before the IT authorities against his vendor Krishnasamy Maniagarar. One year subsequent to the purchase, the plaintiff also raised a loan from the Land Mortgage Bank and further he incurred expenses to improve the land. The vendor represented to the plaintiffs that he wants to alienate the property, since he could not visit the village in order to manage the same and further he need cash for his lorry business. If the first plaintiff had known about the pendency of the income-tax proceeding, he would not have purchased the property. Equally if the bank authorities had any notice about the pendency of the income-tax proceedings against the vendor, they would not have granted the loan. There was no publication in accordance with s. 287 of the IT Act about the proceedings against the vendor. The first plaintiff, being a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, without any notice about the pendency of the income-tax proceeding against his vendor and as such the plaintiffs title cannot be questioned. The sale in favour of the first plaintiff cannot be considered as void in view of s. 281 of the IT Act, since he has paid the sale consideration. When the Tahsildar made enquiries in respect of the sale in favour of the first plaintiff on 13th March, 1970, he came to know about the proceedings against the vendor. The sale in favour of the first plaintiff cannot be considered as void in view of s. 281 of the IT Act, since he has paid the sale consideration. When the Tahsildar made enquiries in respect of the sale in favour of the first plaintiff on 13th March, 1970, he came to know about the proceedings against the vendor. The ITO, Circle-I, Salem sent a notice on 8th January, 1971 stating that he proposed to treat the sale as void under s. 281 of the said Act and proceed against the properties and called for the objections if any. The first plaintiff accordingly submitted the reply on 15th November, 1971 and inspite of the objections of the plaintiff, the properties were attached by the Revenue Recovery Officer on 10th January, 1972 stating that the vendor of the first plaintiff failed to pay a sum of Rs. 3, 27, 742 payable under certificate dt. 14th March, 1967, as income-tax arrears. The Revenue Recovery Officer has also passed an order under r. 16(2) of the 2nd Schedule of the Act on 1st June, 1974 declaring the sale in favour of the first plaintiff as void. Since the said order is void, the suit has been filed, after issue of necessary notice under s. 80 CPC. 3. The third defendant filed the written statement which was adopted by the defendants 1 and 2 wherein it is stated that the first plaintiff has purchased the property of a defaulter and as such he is not the bona fide purchaser. The sale in favour of the first plaintiff is void and cannot be prevailed over the claims of revenue. Since vendor was in arrears of the income-tax, the TRO, Madurai was requested to collect the arrears of tax pursuant to the certificate issued by the ITO, Salem under s. 222 of the IT Act. The first certificate was issued to the Collector of Salem for recovery on 17th February, 1965 and subsequent three more certificates were issued on 20th January, 1966, 16th March, 1967 and 18th July, 1968 respectively. The plaintiff had purchased the property only on 27th June, 1968, long after the issue of certificate to the defaulter. The conduct of the vendor in disposing of the property after the receipt of the certificate for payment of the income-tax arrears would prove his mala fide intention to evade the liability. The plaintiff had purchased the property only on 27th June, 1968, long after the issue of certificate to the defaulter. The conduct of the vendor in disposing of the property after the receipt of the certificate for payment of the income-tax arrears would prove his mala fide intention to evade the liability. The plaintiffs also colluded with the defaulter. The TRO in his letter dt. 28th December, 1971 intimated the vendor of the plaintiff about the illegal transfer of the properties by him. Thereafter the properties were attached by order dt. 10th January, 1972. The plaintiff has no right to question the order of attachment. The sale in favour of the first plaintiff is hit by s. 281 of the IT Act. Even in accordance with r. 16(2) of the II Schedule of the IT Act, any private transfer by the defaulter after the attachment has been made is void. Hence the suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. On the above pleadings, the parties have led in documentary evidence. The second plaintiff alone had been examined as PW 1. After elaborately considering the evidence available on record, the trial Court had dismissed the suit by judgment and decree dt. 1st April, 1980, finding that Krishnasami Maniagarar, the vendor of the first plaintiff had sold the property to the first plaintiff after the issue of certificate under the IT Act for recovery of the tax arrears from him. Hence the transaction is hit by the provisions of s. 281 as well as r. 16(1) of the IT Act. Aggrieved by the same, the plaintiffs filed an appeal in AS 358/80 on the file of the District Court, Madurai. The learned Principal District Judge, also concurred with the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 5. Though several substantial questions of law had been formulated at the time of admitting the second appeal, the following substantial questions of law arise for consideration pursuant to the arguments advanced by the counsel for the appellants. (1) Whether s. 281 of the IT Act, 1961 declaring a transfer made by the assessee during the pendency of proceedings is void, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution in the absence of any limitation of the word 'pendency of proceedings' ? (1) Whether s. 281 of the IT Act, 1961 declaring a transfer made by the assessee during the pendency of proceedings is void, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution in the absence of any limitation of the word 'pendency of proceedings' ? (2) Whether, under s. 281 of the Act, in considering the validity of a transfer made by the assessee, the knowledge of the pendency of proceedings of the transferor alone is the criterion and not the knowledge of the pendency of the proceedings on the part of a bona fide transferee for value without notice ? (3) Whether s. 281 of the Act is in pari materia with ss. 53 and 100 of the Transfer of Property Act and if it is not so whether s. 281 of the Act would infringe the equality clause of the Constitution ? (4) Whether, in considering the validity of a transfer, s. 281 of the Act and the rr. 2, 16, 48 and 51 of II Schedule should be interpreted together or whether the scope of s. 281 is different from the scope of rr. 2, 16, 48 and 51 of Sch. II to the IT Act ? 6. On the basis of the above substantial questions of law, Mr. Swaminathan, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that s. 281 of the IT Act is in pari materia with s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and hence the rights of the transferee, who is a bona fide purchaser for valuable consideration, is safeguarded. In view of the said principle, the properties of the first plaintiff cannot be proceeded with; especially when the defendants have not established any collusion between the first plaintiff and the defaulter Krishnasami Maniagarar. He further contended that r. 16(2) makes the sale void if such alienation is made subsequent to the order of attachment. In this case, the attachment order is subsequent to the sale and as such r. 16(2) cannot be applied. Rule 16(1) and s. 281 of the Act should be read conjointly and if it is established that the transferee had purchased the property without the knowledge about the tax recovery proceedings and for valuable consideration, such transfers cannot be challenged by the ITO. 7. On the contrary, Mrs. Rule 16(1) and s. 281 of the Act should be read conjointly and if it is established that the transferee had purchased the property without the knowledge about the tax recovery proceedings and for valuable consideration, such transfers cannot be challenged by the ITO. 7. On the contrary, Mrs. Kala Ramesh, the learned counsel for the respondent, contended that s. 281 of the IT Act cannot be considered in pari materia with s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The provisions of different enactments has to be considered independently and there cannot be a conjoint reading of the provisions. In order to interpret a provision in one enactment, the identical provision in another enactment cannot be of any help because the different statutes are enacted to meet the different requirements. Further r. 16(2) of the IT Act deals with the alienations made subsequent to the order of attachment. Rule 16(1) deals with the alienations of the transactions entered into by the defaulter during the pendency of the proceedings under the Act. In this case, from 1965 the recovery proceedings are pending and as such the sale in favour of the first plaintiff falls under s. 16(1) of the Act. Hence both the Courts below have rightly held that the plaintiffs cannot claim title pursuant to the sale deed in favour of the first plaintiff. 8. In order to appreciate the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellants, it is necessary to note down certain relevant dates. Under Ex. B2, the certificate has been issued under s. 222 of the IT Act to the said Krishnasami Maniagarar, the vendor of the plaintiff, on 17th February, 1965. Similar certificates have also been issued under Exs. B3 and B4 dt. 20th January, 1966. The assessment years are 1960-61, 1961-62 and 1962-63. Pursuant to the said certificates, the District Collector took steps to recover the arrears of tax. The defaulter obtained stay and thereafter the stay was vacated. Once again under Ex. B5 dt. 14th March, 1967 a notice under s. 222 for recovery of a sum of Rs. 56, 838 was served. Rule 2 notice dt. 28th March, 1967 with order of attachment and proclamation was served on the assessee on 22nd April, 1967. Even though the other proceedings have been initiated to recover the arrears, since the documents having not been marked, it is not necessary to refer the same. 56, 838 was served. Rule 2 notice dt. 28th March, 1967 with order of attachment and proclamation was served on the assessee on 22nd April, 1967. Even though the other proceedings have been initiated to recover the arrears, since the documents having not been marked, it is not necessary to refer the same. But, however, the fact remains that from February, 1965, the recovery proceedings are pending against the said Krishnasami Maniagarar, the vendor of the first plaintiff and he had been served with the notice who also initiated various proceedings to delay the payment of tax after issue of notice. Since the sale took place during the pendency of the recovery proceedings, the authorities have passed the order under Ex. B8 dt. 10th January, 1972, attaching the suit property and declared the sale in favour of the plaintiff as void under Ex. 9 dt. 1st June, 1974. From the above facts, there is no dispute that the first plaintiff had purchased the property under Ex. A1 on 27th June, 1968 when the recovery proceedings are pending against the vendor since 17th February, 1965. 9. Now the question for consideration is whether s. 281 of the IT Act should be read in conjunction with s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act to construe that it protects the interest of the bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration without notice about the recovery proceedings against the defaulter. 10. I do not think it is necessary to deal with the same elaborately in view of the earlier judgments reported in TRO vs. Radhakrishna Eradi TC 52R.663 and Inayat Hussain vs. Union of India TC 52R.651. 11. Before referring to those judgments, it may be worth to refer to s. 281 of the IT Act as it stood prior to the amendment introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which is as follows : "281. Transfers to defraud Revenue void. 11. Before referring to those judgments, it may be worth to refer to s. 281 of the IT Act as it stood prior to the amendment introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975, which is as follows : "281. Transfers to defraud Revenue void. - Where during the pendency of any proceeding under this Act, any assessee creates a charge on or parts with the possession by way of sale, mortgage, exchange or any other mode of transfer, whatsoever, of any of his assets in favour of any other person with the intention to defraud the Revenue such charge or transfer shall be void as against any claim in respect of any tax or any other sum payable by the assessee as a result of the completion of the said proceedings; Provided that such charge or transfer shall not be void if made for valuable consideration and without notice of the pendency of the proceeding under this Act." In considering this provision, it is but necessary to consider the purpose of the enactment because the provisions of the enactment has to be construed only on the basis of the purpose for which the same was enacted. 12. It has been held in the case in McDowell & Co. vs. CTO as follows : "The proper way to construe a taxing statute, while considering a device to avoid tax, is not to ask whether the provisions should be construed literally or liberally nor whether the transaction is not unreal and not prohibited by the statute, but whether the transaction is a device to avoid tax and whether the transaction is such that the judicial process may accord its approval to it. It is neither fair nor desirable to expect the legislature to intervene and take care of every device and scheme to avoid taxation. It is upto the Court to take stock to determine the nature of the new and sophisticated legal devices to avoid tax and to expose the devices for what they really are and to refuse to give judicial benediction" . The same principle was followed by S. A. Kader, J. (as he then was) in the judgment in K. R. Loganathan vs. Union of India TC 52R.1394. In considering s. 281 of the said Act, the said provision is declaratory in nature. The same principle was followed by S. A. Kader, J. (as he then was) in the judgment in K. R. Loganathan vs. Union of India TC 52R.1394. In considering s. 281 of the said Act, the said provision is declaratory in nature. It declares that the transfers effected by any assessee with intent to defraud the Revenue during the pendency of any proceedings under the Act shall be void against any claim in respect of any tax or any sum payable by the assessee 'as a result of the completion of the said proceedings ". Therefore, the three requirements under the section are : (i) that there must be a transfer of the property; (ii) that it should be during the pendency of a proceeding under the Act; and (iii) that the transfer must be with intent to defraud the Revenue and if these conditions are satisfied, then the transfer shall be void in respect of any tax or sum payable by the assessee as a result of the completion of the proceedings during the pendency of which the transfer was effected. The effect of the section is that, if such transfer with intent to defraud the Revenue has been made and any claim for tax arises after completion of the proceedings during the pendency of which the transfer took place, such tax or other sum can be recovered by proceeding against the property notwithstanding the said transfer. 13. In the case of hand, there is no dispute that after the completion of proceedings, the recovery certificate has been issued as early as 17th February, 1965 and 20th January, 1966 under Exs. B1, B2 and B3. The first plaintiff had purchased the property while, in fact, the recovery proceedings are pending. 14. The learned counsel further placed reliance on the proviso to s. 281 of the said Act and contended that, if the transfer is for valuable consideration and without notice of the pendency of the proceedings, then such transaction will be valid. The first plaintiff being a purchaser of the property without notice of the pendency of the proceeding and for valuable consideration, he is a bona fide purchaser and as such the sale in his favour would fall within the proviso which is almost in pari materia with s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. I am unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant. Sec. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act specifically mentions that the rights of the bona fide purchaser is safeguarded. But in this provision, i.e., s. 281 of the IT Act, the section deals with the transfer made by the assessee. The said section deals with the transactions made by the assessee during the pendency of the proceedings. Hence the proviso should also only refer to the assessee alone and not the transferee which means if the assessee had created any charge or transfer the property for valuable consideration without notice of the pendency of the proceedings, then such transaction would fall under the proviso. But in the case in hand, it is very clear that the assessee had made the transfer only three years subsequent to the recovery proceedings initiated against him. Hence the assessee cannot claim the benefit under s. 281 and proviso to s. 281 do not refer to the transferor at any rate. So far as the contention of the counsel for the appellant that s. 281 must be r/w s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act, as already stated that each provision of different statute should be interpreted with the context and other provisions of that particular statute. There cannot be a conjoint reading of the two provisions. 15. It may be worth to refer to the judgment in TRO vs. Radhakrishna Eradi (supra) wherein the learned judges have held as follows :" The two operate in different spheres and deal with quite different and distinct matters. The section deals with the subject of fraudulent transfer provided for, for instance, by s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The rule, on the other hand, operates on a different sphere altogether and deals with private transfers made after an attachment of property has been effected in the course of recovery proceedings for realising the arrears of tax. The provision corresponds to what is enacted by s. 64 of the CPC. It is not possible to equate the one with the other, or to read the provisions of the one into the other or to draw a similarity between the two. The provision corresponds to what is enacted by s. 64 of the CPC. It is not possible to equate the one with the other, or to read the provisions of the one into the other or to draw a similarity between the two. In the circumstances, the learned judge was wrong in holding that the protection in favour of a bona fide transferee for valuable consideration indicated by the proviso to s. 281 of the Act, must get incorporated, or be implied, into r. 16 of the Second Schedule as well. There is neither reason nor logic in doing so and we are unable to accept this process of reasoning of the learned judge. "16. This decision was followed by the Bombay High Court in Inayat Hussain vs. Union of India (supra) where it was also held that a transfer subsequent to the attachment as provided in r. 51 would be of no avail and would be void as against the Department and no question of bona fides of the transfer for value or any other question or an intention to defraud the Revenue would arise at all in considering r. 16. Therefore, I am of the view that since in this case the transfer in favour of the first plaintiff was subsequent to the pendency of recovery proceeding against the defaulter-assessee, the question of bona fides or otherwise does not arise. 17. In a recent judgment in Palani Gounder vs. Revenue Department this Court had an occasion to deal with an identical case. In this case also the learned judge has held that the notice about the recovery proceedings or the knowledge about the pendency of the proceedings would refer only to defaulter and not the purchaser. Further, it has been held that it would suffice if the defaulter had notice about the pendency of the proceedings and the non-service of notice on the defaulter under r. 2 will not make any difference. Further, it has been held that it would suffice if the defaulter had notice about the pendency of the proceedings and the non-service of notice on the defaulter under r. 2 will not make any difference. After referring to r. 51 and r. 48 of the Second Schedule and s. 222(1) of the IT Act, the Court has held as follows :" A reading of the above said rule shows that the TRO has to serve a notice on the defaulter, requiring the defaulter to pay the amount specified in the certificate within 15 days from the date of the service of the notice and also intimating the defaulter that the steps will be taken to realise the amount under the Schedule. In other words, the rule mentioned above makes it clear that the notice must contain the details of the arrears towards the income-tax and the time within which the amount to be paid. In order to give an opportunity to the defaulter, all necessary things have to be mentioned in the notice under r. 2. In this respect, it is the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that though the notice under r. 2 has not been served prior to exhibit A-1, other notices mentioning the tax arrears and the time within which the defaulter has to settle the amount have been sent and as a matter of fact, the defaulter himself gave an undertaking before the officer that he would pay the tax amount, if sufficient time is granted. In other words, even though no specific notice under r. 2 was given, the necessary ingredients mentioned in r. 2 have been fully satisfied by the Department by sending various notices prior to exhibit A-1. Hence, the contention of learned counsel for the appellants that the entire proceedings are vitiated because of non-compliance with r. 2 cannot be accepted." In view of the well laid principles, I do not think it is necessary to deal with the contention elaborately, since I am entirely in agreement with the above said principles. In view of this, the contention of the counsel for the appellants cannot be countenanced. 18. The other contention of the counsel for the appellants that r. 16 of the said Act also be read in harmony with s. 281 of the Act. In view of this, the contention of the counsel for the appellants cannot be countenanced. 18. The other contention of the counsel for the appellants that r. 16 of the said Act also be read in harmony with s. 281 of the Act. Sec. 281 of the Act deals with different circumstances and r. 16 deals with different situations. Rule 16 of the Sch. II declares the sale made by the defaulter as void after the receipt of the notice under r. 2. Sec. 281 only to safeguard the interest of the assessee. Hence the proviso to the said section deals with the alienations made by the assessee without notice of the proceedings against him under the IT Act. Hence no question of harmonising s. 281 with r. 16 arises in the circumstances. Nor can there be any question of any disharmony between the section and the rule. In fact the case reported in TRO vs. Radhakrishna Eradi (supra) referred deals with the same. 19. From the above discussion, it is clear that s. 281 of the IT Act cannot be read conjointly with s. 53 of the Transfer of Property Act and s. 281 cannot be read in harmony with r. 16 of Sch. II of the IT Act. 20. For the above stated reasons, I find that both the Courts below have rightly discussed the issues in detail and concurrently held that the plaintiffs are not entitled for the relief as claimed. Accordingly the second appeal is dismissed. No costs.