JUDGMENT A.K. Ganguly, J., This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner after his superannuation on 30.9.1973 praying for quashing of the impugned order dated 30.11.1983 whereby his 10% pension has been deducted as also against the order dated 29.5.1933 whereby his memorial petition against the said order of deduction was rejected as also against the rejection of his representation which was filed against the rejection of the memorial of the petitioner. 2. Various facts have been stated in this writ petition but the facts which are relevant for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition are noted below: It appears that the petitioner was transferred to Chapra by an order dated 15.11.1976 on which there were some dispute. The petitioner's case is that the said order of transfer was passed within two years of the petitioner's retirement. The petitioner applied for leave as at the relevant point of time he was unwell. The petitioner received a registered letter on 23.7.1977 from the then Commercial Taxes Commissioner asking the petitioner to give clarification on 12 points within 15 days and to explain why disciplinary proceeding be not taken against him. The petitioner gave his clarification on the 12 points by his reply dated 14.8.1977. In the said reply the petitioner asked for various papers and also prayed for an opportunity to adduce evidence. The petitioner further prayed for extending his leave by letter dated 3.10.1977 and the petitioner submitted a supplementary clarification by his letter dated 30.10.1977. Thereafter the petitioner did not receive any communication and retired from service on 30.9.1978. Suddenly the petitioner received a communication on 28.5.1981 from the Commissioner, Commercial Taxes-cum-Special Secretary, Finance (Commercial Taxes) Department, Bihar wherein it was stated that considering the clarification made by the petitioner, the authority found the allegation against the petitioner about carelessness in the government work, indiscipline and suspicious conduct etc. having been proved and the State Government has decided to deduct 10% of the pension of the petitioner and if the petitioner had any clarification to give, he will do so within 15 days. Thereafter the petitioner gave his reply dated 13.6.1981 within the stipulated period denying the allegation and stated therein that no departmental proceeding was ever initiated against the petitioner nor was the petitioner afforded any reasonable opportunity to know the facts and explain the same. Thereafter the petitioner gave his reply dated 13.6.1981 within the stipulated period denying the allegation and stated therein that no departmental proceeding was ever initiated against the petitioner nor was the petitioner afforded any reasonable opportunity to know the facts and explain the same. The petitioner also specifically stated that the decision about the deduction of 10% pension is a punishment and the same has been inflicted upon him without following tile provisions of rule 43 of the Bihar Pension Rule., 1950 and also without giving the petitioner an opportunity of hearing. Thereafter a detailed order was passed on 30.11.1983 i.e. more than after two years of the petitioner's reply vide Government of Bihar, finance (Commercial Taxes) Department Memo No. 1636/C dated 30.11.1983 and in the said order it was stated that after examination of tile clarification given by the petitioner in the inquiry report of one Sri Ramdas Sinha, Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Bihar, Patna, the State Government has come to the conclusion that charge Nos. 4, 5, 6 and 11 out of 12 charge have been proved. Those charges are indicative of the petitioner's carelessness, indiscipline and doubtful Conduct of the petitioner and, therefore, the State Government under the provisions of rule 139 of the Bihar pension Rules, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the said Rules) has decided to deduct 10% of the pension of the petitioner. The said order which is at Annexnre-14 is the subject matter of challenge in this proceeding. It has already been noted that against the said order the petitioner filed memorial and representations. Now the question which falls for decision in this case is whether the said order which is at Annexure-14 is legally sustainable or not. 3. In the counter affidavit which has been filed in this case by the respondents, it has been stated that while the petitioner was posted at Dhanbad, he committed several illegal acts relating to indiscipline, lacking in truthfulness and violation of the order of the superior authority and a letter dated 23-7-1977 mentioning the allegation was served upon the petitioner asking for an explanation. It is further stated that the petitioner submitted, his explanation and was allowed to inspect the documents and thereafter filed a supplementary clarification. It is further stated that the petitioner submitted, his explanation and was allowed to inspect the documents and thereafter filed a supplementary clarification. It has also been stated that after submission of the supplementary explanation by the petitioner the matter was considered thoroughly by the Department and it was found that the allegation mentioned in charge nos. 4, 5, 6 and 11 are prayed. Thereafter notice was given in respect to the order for deduction of 10% from the pension of the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner gave an explanation and the decision was taken by the State Government for deduction of 10% of the pension of the petitioner under rule 139 of the said Rules. It was stated that the State Government found that the petitioner's services were not satisfactory and as such the State Government took a decision to deduct 10% pension of the petitioner. 4. The provisions of the Bihar Pension Rules in this connection may be considered. Rule 43, especially rule 43 (b) of the said Rules provides that the State Government reserves the right of with holding or withdrawing pension or any part of it, whether permanently or for a specific period and also has a right to recover from a pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government if the pensioner is found in departmental or Judicial proceeding to have been guilty of grave misconduct. There was certain restriction in applying the said provision under rule 43 (b) of the said Rules which are mentioned in the proviso. Rule 139 of the said Rules of course is on a different footing. Under the said rule specially under rule 139 (b) of the said Rules it has been stated that if the service has not been thoroughly satisfactory, the authority sanctioning the Pension should make such reduction in the amount as it thinks proper. 5. Today it is well settled that a person's pension is not a bounty but it is his property. So the reduction in the amount of pension amounts to reduction or deprivation of that right to property. So judging in this context any decision taken by an authority for reduction of pension is obviously a quasi judicial decision. In other words, when such a decision is taken, the authorities decide a ‘lis' between the parties. 6. So the reduction in the amount of pension amounts to reduction or deprivation of that right to property. So judging in this context any decision taken by an authority for reduction of pension is obviously a quasi judicial decision. In other words, when such a decision is taken, the authorities decide a ‘lis' between the parties. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that since the rule empowers the authority concerned to take a decision "as it thinks proper", such a decision can be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the concerned authority. This Court is unable to appreciate the said submission. This Court finds that it is rather too late in the day to advance the said proposition. In a well known decision of the Supreme Court in the case of M. A. Rasheed Vs. State of Kerala reported in A. I. R. 1974 S. C. page 2249 Chief Justice A. N. Ray, as His Lordship then was, held that where powers are conferred on the public authority to exercise the same when “they are satisfied" or When "it appears to them" or when ""in their opinion" a certain state of affairs exists" or when powers enable public authority to take "such action as they think fit", in relation to the subject matter, the Court will not readily defer to the conclusiveness of an executive authority’s opinion as to the existence of a matter of law or fact upon which the validity of the exercise of the power is predicated. The Court has further held that where reasonable conduct is expected the criterion of reasonableness in not subjective, but objective. (Para 8). The dictum in Rasheed'a case (Supra has subsequently been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in many judgments. Therefore, it is well settled that even if the power is conferred in subjective terms, its exercise must be on objective basis. In the above premises in the instant case the authorities cannot simply say that since the power bas been concerned under rule 139 (9) of the Rules apparently in an unfettered manner, the discretion of the authority is unfettered in this respect. 7. Professor Wade has observed that a claim to exercise unfettered discretion amounts to 'Constitutional blasphemy'. Such a claim is not to be countenanced by a Court where Government is committed to run its administration on the basis or rule of law. 8. 7. Professor Wade has observed that a claim to exercise unfettered discretion amounts to 'Constitutional blasphemy'. Such a claim is not to be countenanced by a Court where Government is committed to run its administration on the basis or rule of law. 8. There is nothing known as absolute discretion in a Government under law. In this connection, the memorable words of Justice Douglas, in United State. Vs. Wunderlich reported in (1951) 342 US 98, may be quieted : “Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man from the un-limited discretion of same ruler, some Official, some bureaucrat ... Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions.” 9. That being the admitted legal position, this court cannot accept that in imposing reduction of pension of a claimant the authority can exercise unfettered discretion which is based on its subjective satisfaction. On the other hand such an exercise of power has to be reasonable just and fair and must be in consonance with principles of natural justice. 10. The next point urged by the loaned counsel for the respondents was by way of placing reliance on the case of the State of Bihar vs. Md. Idris Ansari reported in 1995 (2) P.L.J.R. page 51 (S.C.). Learned counsel placed reliance on paragraph 8 of the said judgment where the learned Judges of the Supreme Court on a conjoint reading of rule 43 (b) and rule 139 (b) of the rules semmarised the purport of those rules. The observation of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court as set out in paragraph 8 on rule 139 of the said Rule is quoted below:- “So far as that rule is concerned, it empowers the State Authorities to decide the question whether full pension should be allowed to a retired Government servant or not in the circumstances contemplated by the Rule. The first circumstance is that if the service of the Government servant is not found to be thoroughly satisfactory, appropriate reduction in the pension can be ordered by the sanctioning authority. The first circumstance is that if the service of the Government servant is not found to be thoroughly satisfactory, appropriate reduction in the pension can be ordered by the sanctioning authority. The second circumstance is that if it is found that service of the pensioner was not thoroughly satisfactory or there is proof of grave misconduct on the part of concerned Government servant while in service, the State Government in exercise of revisional power may interfere with the fixation of pension by the subordinate authority. But such power flowing from rule 139 under the aforesaid circumstances, is further hedges by two conditions. First condition is the revisional power has to be exercised in consonance with the principles of natural justice and secondly such revisional power can be exercised only within three years from the date of the sanctioning of the pension for the first time. A conjoint reading of Rule 43 (b) and Rule 139 projects the following picture: I. A retired Government servant can be proceeded against under Rule 139 and his pension can be appropriately reduced if the sanctioning authority is satisfied that the service record of the respondent was not thoroughly satisfactory. II. Even if the service record of the concerned officer is found to be thoroughly satisfactory by the sanctioning authority and if the State Government finds that it is not thoroughly satisfactory or that there is proof of grave misconduct against the concerned officer during his service tenure, the State Government can exercise revisional power to reduce the pension but the revision is also subject to the rider that it should be exercised within 3 years from the order sanctioning pension was first passed in his favour by the sanctioning authority and not beyond the period.” 11. But it does not appear from perusal of the aforesaid elucidation of the rules by the Supreme Court that the question which is urged here was ever canvassed by the parties before the Honble Supreme Court. Factually the case before the Supreme Court was under rule 43 (b) of the said Rule and incidentally the Supreme Court referred to rule 139 at the appellant was trying to support their action from rule 139 of the said Rules. But the Supreme Court after noting the provisions of rule 139 held that in the facts of that case rule 139 of the Rules will not be applied. But the Supreme Court after noting the provisions of rule 139 held that in the facts of that case rule 139 of the Rules will not be applied. The question which is involved here is whether the exercise of power under rule 139 (b) can be made on a subjective satisfaction of the authority concerned. That was not the question argued before the Supreme Court. 12. The next question which has fallen for consideration is whether the principles of fairness must be observed before passing the order under rule 139. It is well settled that in a matter like the present one where the impugned order is quasi judicial in nature and it affects the persons property and causes financial prejudice to the person concerned, it must be passed consistent with the principles of natural justice which demand utmost fair play in action. 13. Here it appears from the impugned order that the order was passed on consideration of an enquiry report of one Ramdas Sinha, Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes. The said report was never made available to the petitioner. On the basis of the said report it was decided by the authorities that out of 12 charges some of the charges against the petitioner are proved. It is, therefore, clear that fair play in action has not been observed in this case inasmuch as in coming to a decision which prejudicially affects the petitioner's interest, the authorities have relied on the report of the said Sri Ramdas Sinha. Deputy Commissioner, Commercial Taxes. The said report is a vital link in the decision making process. So this is an infirmity in such decision making process. 14. Apart from that the petitioner in his show cause has also prayed for an opportunity of oral hearing. That has been denied to him. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, stated that Rule 139 of the Rules does not cast any obligation of giving an oral hearing. So hearing was not given, but the petitioner was given opportunity to file a show cause and that was considered and final order was passed imposing the deduction. 16. It is true that the rule in question does not specify any requirement of hearing. But in construing such rules, courts have interpreted it consistent with principles of natural Justice, unless such an interpretation is expressly negatived by the legislative mandate in the concerned rule. 17. 16. It is true that the rule in question does not specify any requirement of hearing. But in construing such rules, courts have interpreted it consistent with principles of natural Justice, unless such an interpretation is expressly negatived by the legislative mandate in the concerned rule. 17. Here the silence of the rule is not conclusive. As has been observed by Byles J. about more than a century ago in Cooper Vs. Wands worth Board of Works (1863) 14 C. B. N. S. 180” although there are no positive words in the Statute requiring that the party shall be heard, yet the justice of the common law will supply the omission of the legislature” This has been affirmed by Justice Bhagwati (as His Lordship then was) while delivering the leading judgment is Maneka Gandhi’s case. 18. Here the impugned order affects the petitioner’s property right. In a way it casts a stigma on him. The authorities are not to act under any urgency. In fact here, they issued the final order mort than two years after the petitioner reply to the show cause. There is no statutory appeal against an order under Rule 139. Nor is there any requirement to record reason under the rule. 19. Considering all the aspects this Court is of the opinion that the requirement of giving an oral hearing must be read into Rule 139 as an inbuilt contact of fairness in action. A mere opportunity of showing cause, though not specified in the rules, is not enough in the circumstance to meet the requirement of a fair procedure. 20. This Court is of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is eminently desirable that the petitioner should have been heard orally. 21. In view of the above reasons the impugned order cannot be sustained and as such it is quashed. 22. Since the impugned order at Annexure -14 is quashed, all the subsequent order passed by the authorities purporting to reject the petitioner's memorial and representation against the said order are also automatically set aside. In that view of the matter the impugned orders at Annexures 14, 16 and 17 are hereby quashed. The petitioner should be refunded the amount of 10% reduction of his pension which has been imposed upon him. In that view of the matter the impugned orders at Annexures 14, 16 and 17 are hereby quashed. The petitioner should be refunded the amount of 10% reduction of his pension which has been imposed upon him. If the respondents feel that they should, even at this juncture of time, reconsider the matter, in that case they must do so only after giving the petitioner a fresh opportunity of showing cause by disclosing all materials against him and coupled with a chance of oral hearing. Since the matter is an old one, the petitioner cannot be kept under perpetual tension of such a proceeding. This Court grants the respondents three month's time from the date of service of a copy of this judgment upon them to initiate and conclude such proceeding, If any, under rule 139 of the Rules on the guide lines stated above. If the respondents do not chose to undertake that exercise within the period as aforesaid, the respondents will not be allowed to do so after the expiry of the aforesaid period. This writ petition is, there fore, allowed to the extent indicated above. There will be no order as to cost.