Judgment B.P.Singh, J. 1. The appellant in this letters patent appeal was defendant No. 2 in the suit filed by respondent No. 1, her sister, for partition of the suit properties. The aforesaid suit being Partition Suit No. 116 of 1970 was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, Hazaribagh, by his judgment and decree dated 21st, April, 1975. The trial Court held the plaintiff-respondent No. 1 entitled to 1/1Oth share in the suit properties while her four sisters, including two step sisters, were held entitled to 1/10th share each. Defendant No. 5 in the suit, who belonged to the branch of Girdhari Mahto, was found entitled to 1/2 share in the suit properties. Against the judgment and decree of the trial Court only the appellant herein preferred a first appeal before this Court which was registered as Appeal From Original Decree No. 261 of 1975. The appeal was heard by a learned Judge of this Court who by his judgment dated 25th September, 1985, dismissed the appeal with costs throughout. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order this letters patent appeal has been preferred by defendant No. 2-appellant. 2. When this appeal came up for admission on 4.7.1986 counsel for the appellant did not challenge any other finding of the learned Single Judge, but urged the only point that since Mostt. Jhalia, mother of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 only inherited the property as a limited owner which became absolute under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, only her three daughters namely, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 had interest in the suit property and defendant Nos. 3 and 4 being her step daughters were not entitled to any share. The aforesaid defendant Nos. 3 and 4 were the two daughters of the father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 by his first wife, and were not the daughters of Mostt. Jhalia, the widow who was the second wife of the father of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2.However, at the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant has reiterated all the submission which were urged before the learned Single Judge. 3. The facts not in dispute may be noticed first. Lalo Mahto had two sons, namely, Girdhari Mahto and Tejan Mahto. After the death of Lalo Mahto, both the brothers jointly possessed and enjoyed the suit properties. 3. The facts not in dispute may be noticed first. Lalo Mahto had two sons, namely, Girdhari Mahto and Tejan Mahto. After the death of Lalo Mahto, both the brothers jointly possessed and enjoyed the suit properties. Girdhari Mahto died leaving behind a son, Rameshwar Mahto, who was defendant No. 5 in the suit. The plaintiff and the defendants belong to the branch of Tejan Mahto who married twice. From his first wife he had two issues, Mostt. Likhiya Devi and Mostt. Mewa Devi, who were defendant Nos. 3 and 4 in the suit. From his second wife he had three issues, all daughters, namely, Mostt. Dharmi, the plaintiff, and Mostt. Deoki Devi (defendant No. 1) and Mostt. Khirodhari Devi (defendant No. 2-appellant) Tejan Mahto died in the year 1931 and his first wife predeceased him. His second wife Mostt. Jhalia died in or about the year 1966. There is really no dispute about the half share of Rameshawar Mahto (defendant No. 5). The real dispute was about the partition of the suit properties which would fall to the share of Tejans branch consisting of his two daughters from the first marriage, and three daughters of his second wife Mostt. Jhalia 4. The plaintiff-respondent No. 1 filed the partition suit stating that Lalo Mahto died leaving behind his two sons, Girdhari Mahto and Tejan Mahto. The two sons separated from each other and divided the suit properties approximately half and half, but there was no partition by metes and bounds. Girdhari Mahto died leaving behind his son Rameshwar Mahto (defendant No. 5). Tejan Mahtos first wife died leaving behind two daughters, defendant Nos. 3 and 4. Tejan Mahto remarried and by his second wife Mostt. Jhalia, he had three daughters, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2. After the death of Tejan Mahto, Mostt. Jhalia cultivated the lands of the share of Tejan Mahto and distributed the produce of the lands amongst the five daughters of Tejan Mahto. However, she died four years ago leaving behind the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 in possession of the suit lands appertaining to the share of Tejan Mahto. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 began to look after the cultivation of the lands of Tejan Mahto, but they were not fair and just in distribution of the produce. However, she died four years ago leaving behind the plaintiff and defendants Nos. 1 to 4 in possession of the suit lands appertaining to the share of Tejan Mahto. Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 began to look after the cultivation of the lands of Tejan Mahto, but they were not fair and just in distribution of the produce. Moreover, at the time of survey, defendant No. 5 and Bihari Mahto, husband of defendant No. 2, got incorrect entries made in the new Khatiyan collusively, even though the defendants were in joint possession with the plaintiff. In these circumstances, the plaintiff claimed partition of her share in the suit lands by metes and bounds and since the defendants failed to do so, the plaintiff was left with no option but to file a suit for partition claiming her 1/10th share in the suit properties described in Schedule-A of the plaint. 5. The main contest in the suit came from defendant No. 2 who filed a separate written statement challenging the frame of the suit, the maintainability thereof, absence of cause of action, limitation, estoppel, acquiescence etc. It was admitted by her that Tejan and Girdhari were joint till the year 1925. Since Tejan had no son, he wanted to keep one of his son-in-law as Ghar-Jamai. Three of his daughters were already married and, therefore, he got defendant No. 2 married to Dilo Mahto in the year 1927. He made it a condition that he shall be his Ghar-Jamai and reside with him. Tejan Mahto partitioned his land with his brother Girdhari by metes and bounds and got the name of defendant No. 2-appellant mutated in the Sherista of the landlords and delivered possession of the lands and other properties to defendant No. 2-appellant. Tejan Mahto died some time in the year 1931 and thereafter, when her husband Dilo Mahto wanted to go back to his native place, there were differences between Dilo Mahto and Mostt. Jhalia, mother of defendant No. 2 and ultimately after a Panchaiyati in accordance with the custom of the community Dilo Mahto divorced defendant No. 2 and executed a deed to this effect on 27.5.1932. Thereafter, in July, 1933 Mostt. Jhalia got defendant No. 2 remarried with Bihari Mahto, who also got a deed of agreement executed by Bihari Mahto to the effect that he would remain a Ghar-Jamai. Thereafter, in July, 1933 Mostt. Jhalia got defendant No. 2 remarried with Bihari Mahto, who also got a deed of agreement executed by Bihari Mahto to the effect that he would remain a Ghar-Jamai. The case of the defendant No. 2 appellant was that after the mutation of her name in respect of the properties of Tejan Mahto, she was in exclusive possession of the same to the exclusion of Mostt. Jhalia and other defendants. She paid rent to the then landlords and after vesting of the estate in the State of Bihar, to the State of Bihar. The Khatiyan was not divided despite the partition between Tejan and Girdhari, but rents were paid separately. There was a partition between Girdhari and Tejan, by metes and bounds and she was in exclusive possession of the lands which fell to the share of Tejan Mahto in her own right and asserting her independent title to the knowledge of the plaintiff and the remaining defendants. She had, therefore, acquired an indefeasible title therein. She denied that Mostt. Jhalia cultivated the land of the share of Tejan Mahto, and it was asserted by her that the other daughters of Tejan Mahto could claim no share in law till Mostt. Jhaila was alive. However, since Tejan had during his lite time given the lands of his share to defendant No. 2 who was in exclusive possession of the same, there was no question of anyone else claiming title to those lands. While her mother Mostt. Jhalia was alive, she was maintained by this defendant No. 2. After the death of Mostt. Jhalia, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 did not come in possession of the lands appertaining to the share of Tejan. In fact, the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1. 3 and 4 had no concern with the suit lands or its cultivation, and they never came in possession of the same. The clear case of defendant No. 2 was that she had come in possession of the properties of Tejan Mahto in her own right and dealt with the same even during the life time of Tejan and Mostt. Jhalia. 6. Defendant No. 5 filed a separate written statement, while defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 also filed a joint written statement. The other defendants in the suit, who were purchasers, filed a separate joint written statement. Jhalia. 6. Defendant No. 5 filed a separate written statement, while defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 also filed a joint written statement. The other defendants in the suit, who were purchasers, filed a separate joint written statement. The aforesaid defendants supported the case of defendant No. 2. 7. The trial Court after a very elaborate consideration of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that there was no partition between Tejan and Girdhari by metes and bounds. Defendant No. 2 did not acquire title to the lands appertaining to the share of Tejan Mahto by adverse possession. The evidence on record established that after the death of Tejan, Mostt. Jhalia exercised her right over the properties appertaining to the share of Tejan and that defendant No. 2 did not possess the properties in suit adverse to the interest of other defendants. 1 have carefully perused the judgment of the trial Court and I find the same to be a very well considered judgment dealing with almost every piece of evidence on record. The Court ultimately held that the appellant was entitled to 1/10th share in the suit properties on a finding that the branch of Girdhari Mahto represented by Rameshwar Mahto (defendant No. 5) was entitled to 1/2 share, while the remaining defendants being sisters of plaintiff were each entitled to an equal share, namely 1/10th, 8. On appeal, a learned Judge of this Court upheld the finding of fact recorded by the trial Court. He held that no gift deed was ever executed by Tejan in favour of his daughter (defendant No. 2). The oral gift of the suit lands was not permissible in law. D.W. 5, a witness examined on behalf of the| defendants admitted that so long as Tejan was alive he was looking after the cultivation of his lands. Ext. A/IV, the sale-deed execute in the year 1954 was executed by defendant No. 2 along with Mostt. Jhalia, her mother, and this sale-deed recited the fact that defendant No. 2 had got the property in question in the year 1933 from her mother. This recital belied the case set up by defendant No. 2 that she had acquired title over the properties in suit from her father Tejan even during his life time. It was further found that Exts. This recital belied the case set up by defendant No. 2 that she had acquired title over the properties in suit from her father Tejan even during his life time. It was further found that Exts. A/23 to A/29 the rent receipts filed were of doubtful nature because though they related to different years, they were all executed in the same year on two dates. No other receipt was produced to show that during the life time of her father defendant No. 2 had paid the rent in respect of the suit lands. The other rent receipts filed were issued long after the death of her father by the State of Bihar. The learned Judge further found that at the trial defendant No. 2 set up a new plea and examined evidence to prove that in 1933 after she remarried Bihari, her mother Mostt. Jhalia gave the lands to her, and Bihari executed an agreement (Ext. M/1) to remain a Ghar-Jamai. 9. On the question of adverse possession the learned Judge found that the same was not proved against her father Tejan, since the evidence of D.W. 5 itself disclosed that as long as Tejan was alive he was himself looking after the cultivation of his lands. So far as adverse possession against Mostt. Jhalia was concerned, it was found that the evidence on record established that while she was alive Mostt. Jhalia exercised her rights over the suit lands, and even in the sale-deed executed by Mostt. Jhalia and defendant No. 2 it was stated that defendant No. 2 had got the lands from her mother Mostt. Jhalia in the year 1933. The learned Judge also held that even if it was assumed that after coming in possession of the suit lands Mostt. Jhalia divested herself of her rights, title and interest in the suit lands, in favour of defendant No. 2, that would not bind the other defendants who were the reversioners. The reversioners could not challenge the action of the widow Mostt. Jhalia till she was alive, but after her death they could claim their right and interest in the suit properties. Moreover, the limited estate in the hands of Mostt. The reversioners could not challenge the action of the widow Mostt. Jhalia till she was alive, but after her death they could claim their right and interest in the suit properties. Moreover, the limited estate in the hands of Mostt. Jhalia could not get enlarged into her absolute estate under the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act unless she was possessed of the estate as on the date on which the Act came into force, namely, on 17.6.1956. If the case of defendant No. 2 is to be believed, Mostt. Jhalia was not in possession of her estate on the date of coming into force of the Act and, therefore, the benefit of Sec. 14 of the Act did not accrue to Mostt. Jhalia so as to enlarge her limited estate into an absolute one. However, alienations made by Mostt. Jhalia could still be challenged by the reversioners after her death. However, the learned Judge held that Mostt.. Jhalia continued in possession of the suit properties appertaining to the share of Tejan, her husband, and defendant No. 2 never came in exclusive possession of the same in her own right so as to prescribe adversely against the interest of other defendants. 10. Having considered the evidence on record, I am satisfied that the trial Court as well as the learned Single Judge have carefully perused the evidence on record and recorded concurrent findings of fact which appear to be reasonable and based on evidence on record. Even though this Court in exercise of its letters patent jurisdiction is authorised to set aside concurren findings of fact, I have found no good ground to interfere with the findings of fact recorded concurrently by the trial Court and a learned Single Judge of this Court. The only question which remains to be considered is as to whether defendant Nos. 3 and 4, the step sisters of the plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2, are entitled to a share in the estate left behind by Mostt. Jhalia. Since the concurrent finding of fact is that Mostt. Jhalia continued in possession of the suit lands and died in the year 1966 while so possessed, the limited estate in her hands got enlarged into an absolute estate under the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 . Jhalia. Since the concurrent finding of fact is that Mostt. Jhalia continued in possession of the suit lands and died in the year 1966 while so possessed, the limited estate in her hands got enlarged into an absolute estate under the provisions of Sec. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 . Upon her death, the properties left behind by her are to devolve in accordance with the provisions of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act. 11. Sec. 15 of the Act provides that the property of a female Hindu dying intestate shall devolve according to the rules set out in Sec. 16 -- (a) firstly, upon the sons and daughters (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) and the husband, (b) secondly, upon the heirs of the husband; etc., etc. The question is whether under Sec. 15(1)(a) sons and daughters will include step sons and step daughters. If step sons and step daughters are not included under Sec. 15(1)(a), they come in the next category of heirs under Section 15(1)(b). If the heirs of category (a) are there, the heirs of category (b) will be excluded. The matter is no more res integra as it is squarely covered by a decision of the Supreme Court in Lachman Singh V/s. Kirpa Singh and Ors. -- . There the only question which arose for consideration was whether the expression sons in Clause (a) of Sec. 15(1) of the Hindu Succession Act includes step sons also i.e., sons of the husband of the deceased by another wife. After considering the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act it was held: ...We are concerned in this case with the rules of succession to the property of a female Hindu dying intestate. Secs. 15 and 16 of the Act are material for our purpose. Ordinarily laws of succession to property follow the natural inclination of men and women. The list of heirs in Sec. 15(1) of the Act is enumerated having regard to the current notion about propinquity or nearness of relationship. The words son and step son are not defined in the Act. According to Collins English Dictionary a son means a male off spring and step-son means a son of ones husband or wife by a former union. The words son and step son are not defined in the Act. According to Collins English Dictionary a son means a male off spring and step-son means a son of ones husband or wife by a former union. Under the Act a son of a female by her first marriage will not succeeded to the estate of her second husband on his dying intestate. In the case of a women it is natural that a step-son, that is, the son of her husband by his another wife is a step away from the son who has come out of her own womb. But under the Act a step son of a female dying intestate is an heir and that is so because the family headed by a male is considered as a social unit. It a step-son does not fall within the scope of the expression sons in Clause (a) of Section 15(1) of the Act, he is sure to fall under Clause (b) thereof, being an heir of the husband. The word sons in Clause (a) of Sec. 15(1) of the Act includes (i) sons born out of the womb of a female by the same husband or by the different husband including illegimate sons too in view of Sec. 3 (i) of the Act and (ii) adopted sons who are deemed to be sons for purposes of inheritence. Children of any predeceased son or adopted son also fall within the meaning of the expression sons. If Parliament had felt that the word sons should include step-sons also it would have said so in express terms. We should remember that under the Hindu Law as it stood prior to the coming into force of the Act, a step son, i.e., a son of the husband of a female by another wife did not simultaneously succeed to the Stridhana of the female on her dying intestate. In that case the son born out of her womb had precedence over a step-son. Parliament would have made express provision in the Act if it intended that there should be such a radical departure from the past. We are of the view that the word sons in Clause (a) of Sec. 15(1) of the Act does not include step-sons and that step sons fall in the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in Clause (b) thereof. 12. We are of the view that the word sons in Clause (a) of Sec. 15(1) of the Act does not include step-sons and that step sons fall in the category of the heirs of the husband referred to in Clause (b) thereof. 12. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court approved the decisions of Karnataka High Court, Bombay High Court, High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the High Court of Calcutta, reported in AIR 1962 Mys 140 AIR 1969 Bom 205 AIR 1977 Punj & Har 103 and AIR 1980 Cal 334 . Their Lordship disapproved and disagreed with the decision of the Allahabad High Court, reported in I.L.R. (1968) 1 Allahabad 697, Ram Katori V/s. Prakash Wati. In the Allahabad case the dispute was between the daughters and step daughters. The Court observed that when once a property becomes the absolute property of a female Hindu it shall devolve first on her children (including the children of predeceased son and daughter) as provided in Sec. 15(1)(a) of the Act, and then on other heirs subject to only the limited change introduced in Sec. 15(2) of the Act. The step sons or step daughters still come as heirs only under Clause (b) of Sec. 15(1) or under Clause (b) of Sec. 15(2) of the Act. 13. In view of the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court it must be held that defendant Nos. 3 and 4 are not entitled to any share in the suit properties since they are step daughters of Mostt. Jhalia. Being the daughters of Tejan from his first wife, they are not the daughters of Mostt. Jhalia within the meaning of Sec. 15(1)(a) of the Act. At best they can come in as heirs of the husband of Mostt. Jhalia i.e., under Sec. 15(1)(b) of the Act. In the presence of heirs under Sec. 15(1)(a) of the Act, the heirs under Section 15(1)(b) are excluded. Thus in the suit properties defendant Nos. 3 and 4 have no share whatsoever. The plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 will be entitled to 1/6th share each while defendant No. 2 will be entitled to 1/2 share in the suit properties. In this view of the matter, the decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court in first appeal requires to be modified. 14. The plaintiff and defendant Nos. 1 and 2 will be entitled to 1/6th share each while defendant No. 2 will be entitled to 1/2 share in the suit properties. In this view of the matter, the decree passed by the trial Court and affirmed by this Court in first appeal requires to be modified. 14. Accordingly, this appeal is partly allowed, and the decree under appeal is modified to the extent that the plaintiff shall be entitled to 1/6th share in the suit properties and not to 1/10th share as decreed by the Court below. Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 shall not be entitled to any share in the suit properties. The share of defendant No. 5 shall remain unaffected, since in any event he is entitled to 1/2 share in the suit properties. The decree is accordingly modified. 15. Since the appeal has been partly allowed, 1 set-aside the order of the learned Single Judge awarding costs throughout against the appellant.