JUDGMENT Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as well as the learned counsel representing the contesting respondents. Perused the record. The petitioner feels aggrieved by the omission of the respondents to give extension to his services and has prayed for a direction to re-instate him in service with all benefits. The petitioner had been granted an appointment on the post of peon vide the order dated 30.4.1994, which appointment was on a temporary basis and time-bound for a period of one year, liable to termination even during this period subject to one month's notice by either side. The appointment letter, a true copy of which has been filed as Annexure P.1 alongwith the petition, further indicates that the said appointment had to be treated to be on contract basis. Although the Mukhya Karyapalan Adhikari, respondent No.1, had requested for extension of the service of the petitioner before the expiry of the period of one year that is before the aforesaid appointment ceased to be effective, yet that request does not appear to have been acceded to. The petitioner has asserted that another employee who had been granted appointment alongwith the petitioner on the same terms and conditions was allowed to continue by the respondents and since the petitioner stood at par with the aforesaid employee, he should have also been granted extension in service, which was withheld without any justifiable ground acting in an arbitrary and discriminary manner. The respondent No.1 has filed the counter-affidavit/return in opposition to the writ petition. This respondent has also filed an additional return on 15.4.1998. On 2.7.1998 the learned counsel for the petitioner had stated that the petitioner did not propose to file any rejoinder-affidavit in reply to the assertions made in the aforesaid additional counter-affidavit. The contesting respondent has urged that the respondent No.1 is an autonomous agency registered under the M.P. Firms and Societies Registration Act, 1973, and was in fact a project of Central Government. It is further stated that this is being run with the financial aid provided by the Central Government. The contesting respondent has urged that the respondent No.1 is an autonomous agency registered under the M.P. Firms and Societies Registration Act, 1973, and was in fact a project of Central Government. It is further stated that this is being run with the financial aid provided by the Central Government. It has been clearly asserted in the counter-affidavit that right from 1.4.1996 none of the appointees mentioned in the order, Annexure P.3, was in the employment of the respondent No.1, and subsequent to 1.4.1996 no further order of appointment either on contract basis or otherwise had been issued either in favour of any appointees named in the order, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure P.3 alongwith the petition; or in favour of any other person. Assertion to this effect has been clearly made in paragraph 4 of the additional counter-affidavit, which assertion remained unrebutted. It may be noticed that the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Chandigarh Administration and another v. Jagjit Singh and another, reported in (1995) I Supreme Court Cases 745 had clarified that the mere fact that the respondent-authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. Taking into consideration the nature of the appointment granted to the petitioner and the terms and conditions subject to which the said appointment had been granted, and the facts and circumstances, indicated hereinabove, no justifiable ground can be said to have been made out for interference by this Court while exercising the extra ordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.