JUDGMENT : D.C. Srivastava, J. 1. This is tenant's revision under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rent Act (for short "the Act"). 2. Brief facts giving rise to this revision are as under : The plaintiff respondent filed Suit for eviction of two defendants on the grounds of alleged sub-letting of the suit accommodation by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 and also for non-user of the suit accommodation for a continuous period of six months before institution of the Suit and lastly that the premises was reasonably and bonafide required by the landlord respondent for his personal use. 3. The suit shop was let out to the defendant No. 1 on monthly rent at Rs. 7.50. The defendant No. 2 is real brother of the defendant No. 1. Sub- letting is alleged to the defendant No. 2, real brother of the defendant No. 1. Tenancy was determined by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. Thereafter the Suit for eviction was filed. 4. The suit was contested by the defendants through joint written statement denying these allegations. They pleaded that the shops were not genuinely and bona-fide required by the respondent landlord for his personal use. It was also denied that the defendant No. 1 had sub-let the shop to the defendant No. 2. On the other hand it was pleaded that the defendant No. 1 took suit premises on lease for joint family business as Karta of the joint family. The defendant No. 2 being member of the joint family cannot be said to be sub- tenant. On the other hand it was pleaded that the defendant No. 2 has also become tenant. Allegation of non-user was also denied. 5. The Trial Court decreed the suit finding that all the grounds taken by the landlord for eviction of the defendants were established. 6. An Appeal was preferred. The appellate Court, however, found that it was not established by the landlord that the shop premises was reasonably and bona-fide required by the landlord for his business purpose. On ground of sub- letting and non-user for the purpose for which the shops were let out the appellate Court confirmed the decree for eviction. It is how this revision has been filed in this Court. 7. On ground of sub- letting and non-user for the purpose for which the shops were let out the appellate Court confirmed the decree for eviction. It is how this revision has been filed in this Court. 7. Learned Counsel for the revisionist contended that the findings of the two Courts below on sub-letting are incorrect and illegal. He further contended that even if sub-letting is upheld the alleged sub-letting took place before commencement of the Ordinance that is before 21.5.1959, hence the said Sub-tenancy is legalised under Section 15(2) of the Act. Another contention has been that the sub-tenancy stands further legalised in view of nomination (notification ?) issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred on it under the proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act. The last contention was that the finding of the two courts below under Section 13(1)(k) of the Act is also incorrect and illegal because allegation of sub-tenancy is proved this section will not be attracted and if this section is also applied along with allegation of sub-letting it would be self-contradiction by amalgamating the two sections. 8. The finding of the lower appellate Court confirming the finding of the Trial Court that the premises is not required bona-fide and reasonably for the landlord for his personal use cannot be interfered in this revision inasmuch as no cross objection has been filed by the landlord against this finding. Simply because non-concurrent finding on this question has been returned by the lower Appellate Court it cannot be interfered in the absence of cross objection. Consequently this finding of the lower Appellate Court becomes final. 9. Coming to the question of sub-letting it is again concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts below. It was rightly contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent that such concurrent finding of fact is not required to be disturbed in this revision and the High Court in revision will be reluctant in disturbing such concurrent finding. However, in view of the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist the finding of sub-letting is not a pure finding of the fact. However, in view of the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionist the finding of sub-letting is not a pure finding of the fact. It has to be seen as to when the alleged sub-letting took place and whether alleged sub-letting if proved is protected under the Ordinance of 1959 within the meaning of Section 15(2) of the Act or it is protected under notification issued by the State Government in exercise of powers conferred under proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act. Consequently these are the questions of law and unless these questions are answered mere finding of fact does not become concluded finding on such mixed question of law and fact. 10. So far as the contention of the learned Counsel for the revisionist on legalisation of sub-tenancy under Section 15(1) of the Act is concerned it has no substance and force. Clause (2) of the said notification issued by the State Government in exercise of powers under the proviso to Section 15(1) of the Act clearly contemplates that in case where the business, its good will, entire stock, running business, account books together with interest in the tenancy are sold to the sub-tenant that such sub-tanancy is legalized. It is only when such transfer or assignment is incidental to sale that the said notification will be attracted. In the case before me there is no evidence that the defendant has sold the above things including his interest in the tenancy rights to the defendant No. 2. In the absence of sale, assignment or transfer of interest cannot be considered to be incidental to sale. As such this notification cannot legalise the alleged sub-tenancy of the defendant No. 2. 11. Coming to the second contention that the sub-tenancy stands regularised under Section 15(2) of the Act. Certain factual aspects have to be taken into consideration in addition to Section 15(2) of the Act. As such this notification cannot legalise the alleged sub-tenancy of the defendant No. 2. 11. Coming to the second contention that the sub-tenancy stands regularised under Section 15(2) of the Act. Certain factual aspects have to be taken into consideration in addition to Section 15(2) of the Act. Section 15(2) of the Act provides as under : "(2) The bar against sub-letting, assigning or transferring premises contained in sub-section (1) shall be deemed not to have had any effect before before the commencement of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control (Amendment) Ordinance, 1959, in any area in which this Act was in operation before such commencement, and accordingly, notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or in the judgment, decree or order of a Court any such sub-lease, assignment or transfer in favour of such persons as have entered into possession despite the bar as sub-lessees, assignees or transferees, and have continued in possession at the commencement of the said Ordinance, shall be deemed to be valid and effectual." 12. The Ordinance of 1959 mentioned under this section was promulgated on 21.5.1959. Consequently in order to avail of the benefit of this sub-section the tenant has to establish that sub-lease, assignment or transfer took place before commencement of the Ordinance and the alleged sub-tenant, tranferee or assignee entered into possession and continued in possession on the date of commencement of the said Ordinance. Thus, the factual aspect which is to be considered is when the alleged sub-tenancy took place and whether the alleged sub-tenant was in possession of the disputed shop on the date of commencement of the Ordinance. 13. The Courts below for cogent reasons from the evidence on record gave finding that the defendant's plea that the lease was taken for joint family business is not established. This is a finding of fact which cannot be called as perverse. There is admission of the defendant No. 1 that the Rent note was executed and the lease was created in his name. There is no mention in the rent note that the tenancy was granted to the defendant No. 1 as Karta of the joint Hindu family for running joint family business. On the other hand there is statement of the revisionist on oath as well as his statement in the written statement that the tenancy was granted to him. There is no mention in the rent note that the tenancy was granted to the defendant No. 1 as Karta of the joint Hindu family for running joint family business. On the other hand there is statement of the revisionist on oath as well as his statement in the written statement that the tenancy was granted to him. If the plea that the shop was taken on rent by the defendant No. 1 as Karta of joint Hindu family fails then the defendant No. 2, being the brother of the defendant No. 1, cannot claim that he is tenant along with the defendant No. 1. The case of joint tenancy was never taken by the defendant No. 2. On the other hand his written statement shows that he has denied in Para 2 the relationship of the landlord between the plaintiff and himself and pleaded that the suit against him is not maintainable. He cannot be permitted to resile from his admission contained in para 2 of his written statement. In view of this admission the defendant No. 2 cannot be said to be joint tenant. Likewise he cannot be said to be tenant in his own right. 14. Learned Counsel for the revisionist, however, mentioned that an earlier suit No. 3 of 1958 was filed by the same landlord against the two defendants in which compromise was entered into and placing reliance upon Para 7 of the compromise he contended that the landlord cannot say that the defendant No. 2 was never a tenant. Para 7 of the compromise reads as under : "Now in this shop I Harilal Devji will remain as tenant, Bhai Damodar Devji is relieved as tenant." A compromise is capable of interpretation. Compromise is nothing, but terms of settlement or agreement between the parties to a pending Suit on which they requested that the suit be decided in terms of the agreement reduced into writing in the said compromise. Para 7 of the compromise on the face of it may be said to be binding on the parties because the parties are signatories to the compromise, but in this para there is no admission by the plaintiff landlord that the defendant No. 2 was ever his tenant or that the tenancy was granted to the defendant No. 1 as Karta of the joint family. The sentence "Bhai Damodar is relieved as tenant" may be superfluous sentence, but it cannot be said to be an admission of the landlord that the defendant No. 2 was also a tenant. 15. If there is some ambiguity in the compromise and if the compromise is nothing, but admission of the parties, the other admissions of the parties contained in the pleadings, viz., the plaint and the written statement of the defendants can be seen to find out what was the intention of the parties in incorporating Para 7 in the compromise petition. The plaintiff in the plaint never admitted that the defendant No. 1 was granted tenancy as Karta of the joint family for running joint family business in the shop in Suit. The defendant No. 1 in his written statement has stated more than once that he had taken shop on rent of Rs. 5/- p.m. There is no averment in the written statement that the shop was taken by him as Karta of the joint Hindu family. The defendant No. 2 in his written statement has denied that he was ever tenant of the landlord. Consequently there arose no occasion for introducing the sentence in Para 7 of the compromise that "Bhai Damodar Devji is relieved as tenant." This superfluous sentence in this para cannot be considered to be admission of the landlord. If this is so then the statement in cross examination of the plaintiff that after dismissal of Civil Suit No. 3/59 on 9.7.1959 Devji ceased to be tenant is nothing but a confused statement adopting what is written in Para 7 of the compromise petition. Likewise the statement in cross examination that since 1959 Harilal alone become tenant does not mean that prior to that the defendant No. 2 was also his tenant. 16. It is thus clear from the evidence on record that the defendant No. 2 was not the tenant right from the inception of tenancy. He might have been sitting in the shop and assisting his brother, but there is categorical finding of the courts below that the alleged sub-tenancy took place on 1.1.1967 when exclusive possession of the shop was transferred by the defendant No. 1 to the defendant No. 2 and the latter commenced his grocery business with his capital in the said shop. Thus, transfer of exclusive possession of the shop took place on 1.1.1967. Thus, transfer of exclusive possession of the shop took place on 1.1.1967. Prior to that the defendant No. 2 did not occupy the shop in the capacity of Sub-tenant. If this was then the alleged sub-tenancy which was created on 1.1.1967 was a sub-tenancy created after promulgation of ordinance of 1959 on 21.5.1959 and since possession of defendant No. 2 in the shop as Sub-tenant on 21.5.1959 is not proved he is not entitled to claim protection of the Ordinance nor the tenant in chief can be permitted to say that the alleged Sub-tanancy stands regularised. 17. If these two legal questions are answered against the revisionist then remains the question of fact as to whether it was a case of sub-letting or not. 18. In establishing sub-letting the landlord has to establish two things. The first is that exclusive possession either of whole or part of tenanted accommodation was transferred to the Sub-tenant and the second is that such transfer of possession was for valuable consideration. 19. On transfer of exclusive possession of the landlord can adduce direct evidence, but it is very difficult for the landlord to adduce direct evidence that such transfer of possession was for valuable consideration. 20. On the point of transfer of possession there are certain circumstances coming out of the evidence on record which go to show that actually it was a case of transfer of exclusive possession of one shop to the defendant No. 2. The defendant No. 1 is carrying on business in Cold-drink (Soda Lemon). The defendant No. 2 on the other hand in the other shop is carrying on grossery business. It is also in evidence that both the defendants have separate living and separate mess. It is not the case that such business was carried on separately right from the inception of tenancy. The business of the defendant No. 2 is his sole proprietary business as has been held by the lower Appellate Court on the basis of the statement of Jayantilal Shantilal, a Cleark of shop and establishment Department. There is no case of the defendants that there was partition in the joint family as a result of which lease-hold rights in the suit shop went to the share of the defendant No. 2. The business of the defendant No. 2 commenced from 1.1.1967 and it is grossery business. There is no case of the defendants that there was partition in the joint family as a result of which lease-hold rights in the suit shop went to the share of the defendant No. 2. The business of the defendant No. 2 commenced from 1.1.1967 and it is grossery business. Consequently it can be said that from 1.1.1967 there was complete transfer of possession and the defendant No. 2 with his capital of Rs. 10,000/- stated grossery business in the shop. It is also admitted by the defendant No. 2 that he was put in possession of the suit shop by the defendant No. 1. As observed earlier from the written statement of the defendant No. 2 it is clear that he did not claim to be the tenant of the landlord. 21. On these facts the Courts below were right in concluding that the shop in suit was given in exclusive possession of the defendant No. 2 on 1.1.1967. 22. Coming to the second ingredient, viz., transfer of possession for valuable consideration since the landlord cannot give direct evidence he can rely upon the circumstantial evidence and also the court can infer from circumstances whether it was case of transfer of possession for valuable consideration or not. 23. The relationship between the two defendants is of real brothers. Consequently direct evidence from the landlord regarding payment of rent by the defendant No. 2 to the defendant No. 1 could not be adduced. The defendant No. 1 has not retained control over the suit shop. A different business is being run in the suit shop by the defendant No. 2, viz., grossery business. Such transfer of exclusive possession could not have been made without consideration or valuable consideration. Thus, the two ingredients to constitute sub-tenancy were fully established and the two courts below committed no error in holding that the defendant No. 2 had illegally Sub-let the suit accommodation to the defendant No. 2. 24. Coming to the next point there is absolutely no force in the plea that it was a case of change of user. Of course in evidence it has come that now the defendant No. 2 is using the shop as his godown and is not running his business in the same. However, change of user must be alleged and proved against the tenant and not against the Sub-tenant. Of course in evidence it has come that now the defendant No. 2 is using the shop as his godown and is not running his business in the same. However, change of user must be alleged and proved against the tenant and not against the Sub-tenant. If Sub-tenant after entering in exclusive possession changes his business it cannot be said that the tenant is guilty of not using the premises for the purpose for which it was let out. As such no decree for eviction can be passed on the ground that instead of running shop, godown has been established in the suit premises. 25. Likewise no decree for possession could be passed within the meaning of Section 13(1)(a) of the Act inasmuch as the tenant has not committed any act contrary to provisions of Clause (o) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. 26. Likewise it cannot be said that it is a case of non-user of the shop by the tenant in chief for a continuous period of six months before institution of the suit. The learned Counsel for the revisionist rightly contended that if sub-letting is to be upheld then no decree for eviction can be passed on the ground of non-user within the meaning of Section 13(1)(k) of the Act. He was right in his submission that if the Sub-tenant used the premises it cannot be said that the premises was not used at all for any purpose. Likewise of the tenant had Sub-let the accommodation to the defendant No. 2 and the defendant No. 2 is using the same it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 13(1)(k) can be applied against the tenant in chief. 27. The learned Counsel for the respondent, however, relied upon pronouncement of this Court in Dalichand Virchand Shroff v. Babulal Rajmal & Ors., reported in 11 GLR 377. It was laid down in this case as under : "In order that Clause (k) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 13 of the Bombay Rents Control Act be attracted, three conditions must be satisfied : (1) that the premises have not been used for the purpose for which they were let; (ii) that such non-user was for a continuous period of six months immediately preceding the date of the suit; and (iii) such non-user was without reasonable cause. If these three conditions are satisfied the case would fall within the purview of the clause and the landlord would be entitled to a decree for recovery of possession of the suit premises. This clause is wide enough to include not only mere cesser of user but also a change of user. If the premises were let for one purpose and they are used for a different purpose, it can well be said that the premises were not used for the purpose for which they were let. It is no doubt true that the purpose for which the suit premises were let out to the original tenant was residence. But it has to be remembered that the residence intended was of the tenant himself which may, in a given case, include the residence of his heirs and of some others. But when a tenant abandons the premises and has no control left over the premises and no interest left in the premises and has left the premises in the occupation of some other persons who are not referable to him, he cannot be said to be using the premises for the purpose for which it was let. To be protected, the user must be in a way referable to the tenant and cannot be independent of the tenant. To put an extended meaning to the word 'purpose' will lead to a rather startling view and defeat the very object of the enactment. When a tenant abandons the suit premises and goes back to reside in his home town in another State, it could not be said that he is "bonafide" tenant whose interest in the suit premises needs be protected." 28. This case to my mind is distinguishable on facts. It was not considered in this case whether Section 13(1)(e) and Section 13(1)(k) can be simultaneously applied for eviction of the tenant. These two grounds are separate grounds and cannot be amalgamated into one ground for evicting the tenant. What was held in this case was that when a tenant abandons the suit premises and no control left over the premises and no interest left in the premises and has left the premises in occupation of some other persons who are not referable to him he cannot be said to be using the premises for the purpose for which it was let. 29. 29. It was nowhere laid down in this case that if the tenant had sub-let the accommodation then also he can be evicted under Section 13(1)(k) though he is liable to be evicted under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. Moreover, the facts in Dalichand case (supra) were that the tenant abandoned the premises in dispute and went to reside in his home town in another State. Consequently it was held that it could not be said that he is a bonafide tenant whose interest in the suit premises need to be protected. Consequently this verdict cannot be safely applied in the instant case as was contended by the learned Counsel for the respondent. 30. However, since the allegation of sub-letting is fully established the two Courts below were justified in passing the decree for eviction. The revision, in these circumstances, is devoid of merit and is bound to fail. 31. The revision is hereby dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. Revision dismissed.