Research › Browse › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

1998 DIGILAW 514 (BOM)

Joeffrey Sales and others v. Joao Jose Fernandes and others

1998-09-24

R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR

body1998
JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---Heard Shri R.B. De Sa advocate for the petitioners. This is a revision application against the Order dated 3rd August, 1998 dismissing the application filed by the petitioners for allowing the petitioners to examine their witnesses after the closing of the case of the plaintiffs as well as of the defendants in the suit. The only ground on which the application was filed was that the earlier lawyer who was representing the plaintiffs did not inform the plaintiffs before closing the evidence of the plaintiffs and had never informed the plaintiffs to bring any of the witnesses to be examined in the Court. 2.Shri R.B. De Sa, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the trial Court erred in dismissing the application ignoring the fact that an application to examine the witnesses can be certainly made at any stage of the suit. In fact the trial Court had not passed judgment in the matter and the application was filed before such judgment was delivered; being so, the trial Court ought not to have dismissed the application merely on the ground that the evidence of the plaintiffs was closed long time back. In support of his contention he sought to rely upon the judgment of this Court in the matter of (Wasudeo Sonone and another v. Jagannath Ramlalji Jugele)1, reported in A.I.R. 1986 Bombay 43 and another decisions in the matter of (Suresh Kumar v. Baldev Raj)2, reported in A.I.R. 1984 Delhi 439, (Chandgi v. Mehar Chand and others)3, reported in A.I.R. 1998 Punjab and Haryana 197 and (Mani Dhal v. Padma Charan Dhal and others)4, reported in A.I.R. 1984 Orissa 169. 3. Undoubtedly an application seeking permission to adduce additional evidence can be filed at any stage of the suit in terms of Order XVIII, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Delhi High Court as well as this Court while interpreting the expression 'at any stage' has held that the said expression includes any stage prior to the pronouncement of the judgment. Nonetheless it is in the realm of the discretion of the Court, which can be exercised even after evidence of the parties has concluded. Of course, it must be exercised judicially and on well accepted judicial principles and not arbitrarily or capriciously. Nonetheless it is in the realm of the discretion of the Court, which can be exercised even after evidence of the parties has concluded. Of course, it must be exercised judicially and on well accepted judicial principles and not arbitrarily or capriciously. 4.The application in question was filed solely on the ground that the earlier advocate had not informed the plaintiffs to bring their witnesses to be examined in the Court. The application does not disclose the exact date as to when the earlier advocate ceased to be the advocate for the plaintiffs and since when another advocate came on record. It is the case of the plaintiffs that the present advocate informed the plaintiffs that the evidence of the plaintiffs was closed without examining the witnesses although the plaintiffs had submitted a long list of witnesses. Moreover the application does not disclose as to whether any effort was made by the plaintiffs to inquire from the lawyer about the procuring of their witness in the Court for their examination. Undisputedly the suit was filed in the year 1980. The plaintiffs evidence was closed in the year 1992 and the defence evidence was closed in the year 1993. Thereafter the plaintiffs filed two applications to produce further evidence in the form of further examination of the plaintiffs. It is also on record that in between the defendants also filed an application for recalling the plaintiffs for cross-examination on certain points and the same was allowed. 5.The application under reference does not disclose any where as to whether the earlier advocate for the plaintiffs continued to be their advocate till the closure of the evidence of the plaintiffs or he ceased to be their advocate prior to the closing of the evidence of the plaintiffs. The application only states that subsequently the plaintiffs engaged Advocate T.G. Jaques who is on record at present'. In other words the application does not disclose the exact date since when the earlier advocate ceased to be advocate for the plaintiffs and since when the other advocate came on record. It is not known as to when the file was perused by the other Advocate and when the information regarding the closure of the evidence without examination of all the witnesses was intimated to the plaintiffs. It is not known as to when the file was perused by the other Advocate and when the information regarding the closure of the evidence without examination of all the witnesses was intimated to the plaintiffs. 6.The application also does not disclose as to on what basis the plaintiffs claim that the plaintiffs were always ready and willing to bring the witnesses to the Court. It is not the case of the plaintiffs that they are illiterate. Admittedly the plaintiffs are in litigation with the respondents since 1980. In these set of facts I do not find any illegality or impropriety on the part of the trial Court in dismissing the application of the plaintiffs under Order XVIII, Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code. 7.It is also pertinent to note that the matter was fixed before the trial Court on several occasions and it was only on 30th September, 1997 that the application in question was filed by the plaintiffs. There is absolutely no explanation given for the delay in approaching the Court with the said application. The powers under Order XVIII, Rule 2 being required to be judicially exercised it was necessary for the plaintiffs to justify the delay in applying for leave to produce further evidence. 8.In the circumstances, therefore, no case of any irregularity or arbitrariness on the part of the trial Court while dismissing the application in question by the impugned order is made out. The impugned order does not disclose any jurisdictional error. None of the judgments sought to be relied upon are of any help to the petitioner. 9.In this view of the matter, there is no case made out for interference, hence the revision application is rejected. Revision Application rejected. *****