A. K. Srivastava, J. ( 1 ) THIS is an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 Civil Procedure Code making a prayer that defendant No. 3 namely, M/s Liberty Sales Services be restrained from handing over the peaceful and vacant possession or removing its stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items from the shop bearing No. E-27/1, Connaught Place, New Delhi. This application has been moved in Civil Suit No. 1268/98 which was instituted during vacations and was taken up by the Vacation Judge, Hon ble Justice K. Ramamoorthy on 26th June, 1998. ( 2 ) THIS I. A. was taken up for consideration and notice was issued for 9. 7. 98 Mr. Maninder Singh, Advocate appeared for defendants No. 1 and 2 and the following order was passed by Hon ble the Vacation Judge on 26th June, 1998. "mr. Maninder Singh brought to my notice the order passed by the Division Bench in the matter between his clients and his alleged licensee. According to the learned the Division Bench had directed the handing over possession on 30. 6. 98. The Plaintiff is the owner of the premises. Defendants 1 and 2 were depriving the plaintiff of his lawful claim for rent from the premises. The effect of the order passed by the Division Bench on the rights of the plaintiff has to be considered by this Court for considering the case for injunction when I. A. is taken up for final hearing. I am of the view that the plaintiff has made out a case for injunction. There shall be an injunction restraining the defendant No. 3 from handing over the vacant possession or removing its stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items from the shop bearing No. E-27/1, Connaught Place, New Delhi until further orders. WITH reference to other defendants the plaintiff shall comply with the provisions of Order 39 Rule 3 Civil Procedure Code within one week. THE learned senior Counsel for the plaintiff has handed over a type set to Mr. Maninder Singh. Defendants 1 and 2 shall file the reply on or before 7. 7. 98. POST the matter on the 9th of July 1998 for the disposal of the I. A. before the regular Court. " ( 3 ) ON 9. 7. 98, Mr. THE learned senior Counsel for the plaintiff has handed over a type set to Mr. Maninder Singh. Defendants 1 and 2 shall file the reply on or before 7. 7. 98. POST the matter on the 9th of July 1998 for the disposal of the I. A. before the regular Court. " ( 3 ) ON 9. 7. 98, Mr. Arun Jaitley appeared for defendants No. 1 and 2 and stated that he would be arguing the matter without filing any written reply to this I. A. for defendant No. 3 one Mr. P. D. Gupta, Advocate appeared. Arguments were heard on 9th, 10th, 13th and 14th July, 1998. Mr. P. N. Lekhi, Senior Advocate submitted arguments for plaintiff. Mr. Arun Jaitely, Senior Advocate submitted arguments for defendants No. 1 and 2 and Mr. R. P. Bansal, senior Advocate submitted arguments for defendant No. 3. ( 4 ) IN the suit, the following prayers have been made : "i. declare that the defendant No. 2 has played a fraud on the plaintiff by entering into the so called "agency agreement" which was nothing short of a disguise and thereby the plaintiff was defrauded of the real value which his property is able to fetch in the open market and this Hon ble Court may further be pleased to declare that no tenant is permitted without obtaining consent in writing of the landlord to earn profit by subletting; and II, declare that the Defendant No. 1 through the Defendant No. 2 has played a fraud on the Hon ble Court as well as the plaintiff and has by playing a fraud on the Hon ble Court obtained orders dated 1. 10. 96, 25. 2. 97, 21. 3. 97, 27. 5. 98 and 28. 5. 98 and III pass a decree for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,80,000. 00 (Rupees Ten Lakhs Eighty Thousand only) upto the date of filing of the suit and further at the rate of Rs. 30,000. 10. 96, 25. 2. 97, 21. 3. 97, 27. 5. 98 and 28. 5. 98 and III pass a decree for the recovery of a sum of Rs. 10,80,000. 00 (Rupees Ten Lakhs Eighty Thousand only) upto the date of filing of the suit and further at the rate of Rs. 30,000. 00 (Rupees Thirty Thousand only) and such higher amount as damages per month till the date of decision in favour of the plaintiff and against the Defendant No. 2; and IV pass a decree of perpetual injunction thereby restraining the Defendant No. 3 from handing over the peaceful and vacant possession or removing its stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items from the shop bearing No. E-27/1, Connaught Place, New Delhi; and V pass such other orders as this Hon ble Court deems fit and proper in the facts and circumstance of the case; and VI award costs of the suit in favour of the plaintiff and against the Defendants No. 1 and 2. " ( 5 ) ON perusal of the aforesaid prayers in the suit, it is apparent that the main reliefs claimed in the suit are only against defendants No. 1 and 2 i. e. that it be declared that defendant No. 2 has played certain fraud on the plaintiff by entering into certain agency agreement and that defendant No. 1 through defendant No. 2 has played a fraud on the Court as well as on the plaintiff and by playing such fraud obtained certain orders from the Court and that a decree for recovery of rupees ten lac eighty thousand upto the date of the filing of suit be passed against defendants No. 1 and 2 and defendant No. 2 be further directed to pay at the rate of thirty thousand per month to the Plaintiff till the date of the decision of the suit. The plaintiff has however, also prayed that a decree of perpetual injunction be passed against defendant No. 3 restraining him from handing over the vacant and peaceful possession or removing its, stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items from the shop in dispute. If this relief is granted it would mean that the defendant No. 3 shall have to remain in possession of the shop in dispute forever and shall have to keep its stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items in the shop forever. If this relief is granted it would mean that the defendant No. 3 shall have to remain in possession of the shop in dispute forever and shall have to keep its stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items in the shop forever. In the light of the facts of this case, should such perpetual injunction be granted? ( 6 ) THE facts of the case as would appear from the plaint and this interim application are that the plaintiff is owner of the property in dispute, namely, premises No. E-27/123 Connaught Place, New Delhi that the premises in dispute were let out to Bikku Mull Jain, who carried on the business under the name and style of M/s. Jakki Mull and Sons; that the agreed monthly rent of the suit premises was settled at Rs. 2,480. 00 that the purpose of letting of suit premises was commercial; that Bikku Mull Jain died and defendant No. 2 Shanti Nath Jain is son of late Bikku Mull Jain. ( 7 ) THE plaintiff contends that defendant No. 2 in order to tide over its financial difficulties undertook M/s. Liberty Sales Services as a subtenant in the premises in dispute under a fraudulent agency agreement containing a clause of minimum commission of rupees thirty thousand per month; that the aforesaid sub-letting was made without the consent of plaintiff in writing; that plaintiff filed a petition against defendants No. 1 and 2 before rent controller seeking their eviction on the grounds of sub-letting and unauthorised construction and that the said petition for eviction is pending. ( 8 ) THE plaintiff continues to state about certain litigation which defendant No. 3 prosecuted against defendants No. 1 and 2, firstly in a suit for injunction and secondly by moving an application under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act. The result of those litigations at the present is that defendant No. 3 who sought a restraint order against defendants No. 1 and 2 from dispossessing it lost up to the stage of Supreme Court in its interim applications moved in the aforesaid two kinds of litigation. The result of those litigations at the present is that defendant No. 3 who sought a restraint order against defendants No. 1 and 2 from dispossessing it lost up to the stage of Supreme Court in its interim applications moved in the aforesaid two kinds of litigation. So far as the main suit and the main petition under Section 20 of the Arbitration Act are concerned, the present position is thatSection 20 application under the Arbitration Act had been dismissed as withdrawn but the suit has not yet been dismissed as withdrawn though the learned counsel for the plaintiff made an oral request to the court that the plaintiff wished to withdraw the suit. The order passed by Hon ble Mr. Justice S. N. Kapoor on the aforesaid prayer of the learned counsel for plaintiff is as follows: "s. No. 997/96 Heard. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to take advantage of interim order. Which has virtually become a final order passed by the Hon ble Supreme Court on 21st March, 1997 in Special Leave Petition NO. . . . . . . /97 (CC 2780 ). It reads as under :- "special leave petition is dismissed. However, the impugned judgement and order of the High Court shall remain in suspension for a period of six months from this date. The suspension of the operation of the impugned order of the High Court shall not be taken that the petitioner stands absolved from meeting its liabilities in terms of the said order. "review Petition filed by the plaintiff was dismissed on 7th May, 1997 by the following order:- "we have carefully gone through the review petitions and the other connected papers. We find no merit in the review petitions and the same are accordingly dismissed. " IN such circumstances a vested right has been created in favour of the defendants and the plaintiff has virtually no right to withdraw the suit without complying the orders of the Supreme Court, for this will amount violation of the directions of the Supreme Court and abuse of the process of this court also. The aforesaid order appears to be executable also. With these observations, the matter is disposed of for the present. It may be got revived by either of the parties, if either of the parties seek and get clarification from the Hon ble Supreme Court, otherwise. The aforesaid order appears to be executable also. With these observations, the matter is disposed of for the present. It may be got revived by either of the parties, if either of the parties seek and get clarification from the Hon ble Supreme Court, otherwise. " ( 9 ) AT some stage in the aforesaid proceedings the plaintiff in this suit, namely , Sanjay Gupta applied for becoming a party to the civil proceedings between defendant No. 3 as the plaintiff and defendants No. 1 and 2 as the defendants but remained unsuccessful. It may also be mentioned that against one of the orders passed by the Division Bench in the aforesaid civil proceedings which went against defendant No. 3 the plaintiff in this suit, namely, Sanjay Gupta, filed Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution before the Supreme Court but later got it dismissed as withdrawn. It was also brought to my notice that in the suit instituted by defendant No. 3 against defendants No. 1 and 2. the court ordered Defendant No. 3 on application of defendants No. 1 and 2. to vacate the premises in dispute within certain time. Though defendant No. 3 filed appeal against those orders but it remained unsuccessful. Later application was moved before the court for getting the implementation of order whereby defendant No. 3 was asked to vacate the premises in dispute. Order was passed thereon with threat of punishment. Against that order an appeal had been filed before the Division Bench which is pending there. A set of copies of all these orders was handed over by the learned counsel for defendants No. 1 and 2 and the same is on record. ( 10 ) I have also been informed that an appeal against the interim order dated 26th June, 1998 passed by Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy, J (Vacation Judge) in this I. A. has been filed and the same is pending in the Division Bench. ( 11 ) AFTER narrating the entire set of facts and the history of litigation, I would now come to the merits of the application under consideration. ( 12 ) MR. Justice K. Ramamoorthy, J (Vacation Judge) in this I. A. has been filed and the same is pending in the Division Bench. ( 11 ) AFTER narrating the entire set of facts and the history of litigation, I would now come to the merits of the application under consideration. ( 12 ) MR. P. N. Lekhi, Senior advocate submitted extensive arguments to impress the Court that the alleged agency agreement entered into with defendants No. 3 is a complete fraud; that defendant No. 1 through defendant No. 2 has played a fraud on the Court as well as the plaintiff in obtaining orders of the Court dated 1. 10. 96, 25. 2. 97, 21. 3. 97, 27. 5. 98 and 28. 5. 98 in the other civil proceedings between defendant No. 3 on the one hand and defendants No. 1 and 2 on the other hand; that Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy in his interim ex-parte order dated June 26, 1998 had formed a view that the plaintiff had made out a case for injunction; that the view taken by Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy should not be disturbed unless there was cogent reason for same for which different set of facts than those set out in the plaint and the application for interim injunction were furnished to the court by defendants; that when the defendants did not file reply to this interim application or written statements to the plaint the facts as stated in the plaint or in this application should be treated as correct facts and therefore, when on those facts as averred in the plaint and this application Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy formed an opinion that the plaintiff had a case for injunction against defendant No. 3 then judicial propriety, in order to keep consistency in the co-ordinate jurisdiction should be maintained and the order should not be disturbed; that defendant No. 1 as averred in para 30 of the plaint did not have the financial means of resources to meet its liability and accordingly the plaintiff shall be relegated to a position where the plaintiff though legally entitled to occupation charges at market rate would not be in a position to recover the same from defendant No. 1 on account of its financial position and that in case defendant No. 3 vacated the premises in suit and removed its stock, furniture, ornamental and decorative items from the shop, the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injury. ( 13 ) MR. P. N. Lekhi invited my attention to Broom s Lega Maxims to show what is fraud in respect of landlord and tenant relationship. ( 14 ) HE also invited my attention to several judgments reported in 1991 (4) SCC page 139, 1988 (2) SCC page 602, 1986 (1) SCC page 581, 1993 Supp-4 SCC page 500, 1994-6 SCC 322, 1995 (Supp-1) SCC page 461, AIR 1977 SC page 725, 1994 Vol. 1 of All England Report page 385 and 1997 Vol. 3 of All England Report page 803. In support of his arguments on the aforesaid contentions, he also invited my attention to AIR 1932 Cal. page 353 and AIR 1939 Cal page 642 to impress upon me that powers of High Court exercising original side jurisdiction in matters of issuing injunction are not confined to under order 39 Rules 1 and 2 Civil Procedure Code but the High Court may pass any order where justice and expediency requires it to make. His contention was that perhaps Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy had that kind of jurisdiction in mind when His Lordship passed the interim order dated 26th June, 1998 in this application Mr. Lekhi also contended that Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy was the Hon ble Judge who had, in the civil proceedings between the defendant No. 3 on the one hand and defendants No. 1 and 2 on the other hand, by his order dated 1. 10. Lekhi also contended that Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy was the Hon ble Judge who had, in the civil proceedings between the defendant No. 3 on the one hand and defendants No. 1 and 2 on the other hand, by his order dated 1. 10. 96 accepted the application filed by defendants No. 1 and 2 and directed the defendant No. 3 to remove unsold stock and other furniture and decorative materials from the shop ( the premises in dispute in this suit) within two months and, therefore, while passing the interim order dated June 26, 1998 in this application. His lordship was surely aware of the earlier civil proceedings between defendant No. 3 and defendants No. 1 and 2 and the orders passed by His Lordship on 1. 10. 96 The stress of the arguments of Mr. P. N. Lekhi was that in spite of the fact that Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy after hearing defendant No. 3 and defendants No. 1 and 2 had directed the defendant No. 3 to vacate the premises in dispute but in this suit filed by the plaintiff, in order to do justice between the plaintiff and defendants and considering that the expediency required, His lordship passed the order in order to give relief to the plaintiff on the basis of averments made in the plaint and in this interim application. ( 15 ) AFTER submitting his arguments on the prima facie case of plaintiff, Mr. Lekhi further submitted that the balance of inconvenience was in favour of plaintiff and that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable injuries/losses if the defendant No. 3 was not restrained from vacating the premises in dispute. The thrust of his arguments on the balance of inconvenience and irreparable loss was that if the defendant No. 3 was allowed to vacate the premises in dispute the plaintiff. In the event of getting a money decree against defendants No. 1 and 2 would not be in a position to recover the decreetal amount from them. According to him if defendant No. 3 remains in possession of the premises in dispute and continues to pay rupees thirty thousand per month, the plaintiff may receive the same as occupation charges at the prevailing market rate. ( 16 ) ON the other hand, Mr. According to him if defendant No. 3 remains in possession of the premises in dispute and continues to pay rupees thirty thousand per month, the plaintiff may receive the same as occupation charges at the prevailing market rate. ( 16 ) ON the other hand, Mr. Arun Jaitely vehemently opposed this application by submitting his extensive arguments and referred to the judicial orders passed by the court in the litigation between defendant No. 3 on the one hand and defendants No. 1 and 2 on the other hand. He also contended that filing of this suit and this interim application were grossed abuse of the process of law. According to him the suit itself is not maintainable and the plaint should be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. He went to the extent of saying that the whole exercise of the plaintiff in filing this suit and this interim application is a gross contempt of court to defeat the orders given by the Court in favour of defendants No. 1 and 2. According to him thepresent suit was filed in collusion with defendant No. 3 to aid the defendant No. 3 in not complying with the orders of the court whereby he was to vacate the premises in dispute by 30th June, 1998 and failing which to receive sentence in contempt. On merits Mr. Jaitley submitted that neither the plaintiff had a prima facie case nor the plaintiff would suffer irreparable loss if the defendant No. 3 was not ejected as prayed. He also contended that the plaintiff would neither suffer any injury nor any inconvenience would be caused to him if the defendant No. 3 vacated the premises in suit. He posed a material question as to how the plaintiff would be benefited if defendant No. 3 continued to remain in possession of the premises in suit. According to him the plaintiff is entitled to a rent of Rs. 2,480. 00 only and that also from defendant No. 1 for which suit should be filed in a special court constituted for the purpose, that is to say, court of rent controller and therefore, defendant No. 3 does not owe any responsibility to the plaintiff on that count. ( 17 ) MR. 2,480. 00 only and that also from defendant No. 1 for which suit should be filed in a special court constituted for the purpose, that is to say, court of rent controller and therefore, defendant No. 3 does not owe any responsibility to the plaintiff on that count. ( 17 ) MR. R. P. Bansal appearing for defendant No. 3 narrated the entire chain of events right from the time defendant No. 3 entered into the agency agreement with defendant No. 1 till date. He referred to several judicial orders passed by courts in the two sets of judicial proceedings between defendant No. 3 on the one hand and defendant No. 1 on the other hand and also gave a copy of the order passed by Hon ble Mr. Justice S. N. Kapoor. On his prayer for withdrawal of the suit when a query was made to him whether he opposed the interim application under consideration, Mr. Bansal made a categorical statement that he neither opposed the application under consideration nor supported the interim order dated 26th June, 1998 passed by Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy He stated that defendant no. 3 would be subject to orders of this Court. ( 18 ) IN order to decide the interim application under consideration, I may at the very outset make it clear that I am not giving findings on the contentions relating to the issues whether the suit is a gross misuse of the Court proceedings, whether the plaint should be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, whether the agency agreement is prima facie a fraud played by defendant No. 2, whether the court orders obtained by defendants No. 1 and 2 in other civil proceedings were obtained by fraud, whether the suit filed by plaintiff is in contempt of the court and whether this suit is collusive and in aid of the defendant No. 3. I would confine myself to the merits/demerits of the interim application under consideration solely looking to the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. ( 19 ) I have carefully considered the respective arguments of learned counsel for parties and have perused the contents of the plaint and the application under consideration. For the reasons given below. I would confine myself to the merits/demerits of the interim application under consideration solely looking to the prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss. ( 19 ) I have carefully considered the respective arguments of learned counsel for parties and have perused the contents of the plaint and the application under consideration. For the reasons given below. I have come to the conclusion that no case is made out for grant of interim injunction as prayed by the plaintiff and this interim application is liable to be rejected. ( 20 ) THE averments in the plaint for grant of injunction are that if the defendant No. 3 vacates the premises and hands over peaceful vacant possession of the premises in suit to defendant No. 1 its liability to pay a regular amount of rupees thirty thousand shall cease; that even after handing over of possession by defendant No. 3 to defendant No. 1 the liability of defendant No. 1 to pay occupation charges at the prevalent market rate of rent would continue; that defendant No. 1 does not have the financial means of resources to meet its above liability and the plaintiff shall be relegated to a position where the plaintiff though legally entitled to occupation charges at market rate would not be in a position to recover the same from the defendant No. 1 on account of its financial position and that in order to safeguard the aforesaid interest of the plaintiff interests of justice require that the status quo in respect of the premises be maintained so that the rights of the plaintiff to recover occupation charges at the market rate are protected; that the plaintiff had requested the defendant No. 3 not to hand over possession of the premises in suit but it did not accede to the request of plaintiff and gave undertaking to the Hon ble High Court that it would hand over vacant possession of the premises in suit on or before 30th June, 1998. Though in para 31 of the plaint there is an averment that the plaintiff is entitled to receive rupees thirty thousand per month from defendant No. 1 hereafter as interim measure but in the prayer clause thereof. I do not find that any prayer has been made for recovery of rupees thirty thousand per month from defendant No. 3. Though in para 31 of the plaint there is an averment that the plaintiff is entitled to receive rupees thirty thousand per month from defendant No. 1 hereafter as interim measure but in the prayer clause thereof. I do not find that any prayer has been made for recovery of rupees thirty thousand per month from defendant No. 3. ( 21 ) SAME averments have been in the application under consideration and it says that in the interests of justice status quo in respect of the premises be maintained so that the rights of the plaintiff to recover the occupation charges at the market rate are protected. ( 22 ) ON reading the aforesaid averments in the plaint and this interim application the only purpose of the plaintiff to seek the injunction against defendant No. 3 appears to be that Defendant No. 3 should continue in the premises in suit so that the plaintiff may have benefit of recovering rupees thirty thousand per month from defendant No. 3. It may, however, be noticed that there is no such prayer in the plaint for recovery of rupees thirty thousand per month from defendant No. 3. ( 23 ) THE case of the plaintiff is that by a fraudulent agency agreement defendant No. 2 through defendant No. 1 had inducted defendant No. 3 in the premises in suit and as such defendant No. 3 is sub-tenant without permission of the plaintiff. On the grounds of such alleged sub-tenancy plaintiff filed a suit for eviction of the tenant. Thus it is to be found that in one proceeding the plaintiff is seeking ejectment of defendants No. 1 and 2 on the grounds that they have illegally sub-let the premises in dispute to defendant No. 3 but on the other hand by this suit the plaintiff seeks a perpetual injunction against defendant No. 3 not to hand over possession of the premises in suit to defendant No. 1. The plaintiff on the one had alleges that the agency agreement between defendants No. 1 and defendant No. 3 is a fraud but at the same time by making a prayer that defendant No. 3 be directed not to hand over vacant possession of the premises in suit to defendant No. 1 so that the plaintiff may recover rupees thirty thousand from defendant No. 3 in future he wants that this fraud should continue and should not come to an end. How can this be permitted? The liability of defendant No. 3 is to pay rupees thirty thousand per month as minimum commission agency. The plaintiff cannot be allowed to compel defendant No. 3 to remain in possession of the premises in dispute and to continue making payment of rupees thirty thousand per month. ( 24 ) PRESENTLY, there is no privity between the plaintiff and defendant No. 3 and, therefore, defendant No. 3 is not under any obligation towards the plaintiff. If defendant No. 3 has no obligation towards plaintiff. I do not see any reason as to how for any interest of the plaintiff defendant No. 3 may be compelled to continue in possession of the premises in dispute. In my opinion, the defendant cannot be compelled to become a hen to lay future eggs for the plaintiff. ( 25 ) THE defendant No. 3 may or may not like to continue with the agency agreement with defendant No. 1 It cannot be compelled by a third party to continue with that agency agreement. Moreover, if the period of agency agreement expires or has already expired, the defendant No. 1 can compel it to vacate the premises. This would not be possible if by any Court order the defendant No. 3 is directed not to vacate the premises in dispute. Thus on this count as well, in my opinion, no injunction as prayed should be granted against defendant No. 3. ( 26 ) SO far as recovery of occupation charges at market rate is concerned, the plaintiff has already made a claim in the plaint to recover the same from defendant No. 1 till the date of the suit. Thus on this count as well, in my opinion, no injunction as prayed should be granted against defendant No. 3. ( 26 ) SO far as recovery of occupation charges at market rate is concerned, the plaintiff has already made a claim in the plaint to recover the same from defendant No. 1 till the date of the suit. The plaintiff may if permissible under law claim occupation charges at the market rate for the future period but that will be only against defendant No. 1 and not against defendant No. 3 to say that for recovery of any such occupation charges at market rate from defendant No. 1 continuance of defendant No. 3 in the premises in suit is essential may, in my opinion, be not the requirement of law. ( 27 ) MOREOVER, defendant No. 3 may continue in occupation of the premises in suit so long as it is in a position to earn so much as to pay rupees thirty thousand per month as minimum commission charges. If it does not have that much of earning, it would rightly like to vacate the premises in suit subject to such conditions as may be therein the agency agreement. Thisdiscretion on the part of defendant No. 3 cannot be fettered by any order of a court at the instance of a person who is stranger to the agency agreement. ( 28 ) MUCH argument were advanced by the learned counsel for plaintiff that Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy was of the opinion that the injunction sought for was to be granted and, therefore, when no reply had been filed by the defendants that opinion should continue and the order passed by Hon ble Mr. Justice K. Ramamoorthy on 26. 6. 98 should not be disturbed. In this regard I may say that ex parte orders are passed on hearing the learned counsel for applicant/plaintiff only and it is not necessary that ex parte order should continue till the disposal of the suit. It may be vacated varied or modified after hearing the defendant/opposite party. It may also be said that it is not obligatory on the defendant/opposite party to file reply to the interim application for injunction if the learned counsel for defendant/opposite party may argue against the application on the basis of the averments made there in to show that the plaintiff has no cause. It may also be said that it is not obligatory on the defendant/opposite party to file reply to the interim application for injunction if the learned counsel for defendant/opposite party may argue against the application on the basis of the averments made there in to show that the plaintiff has no cause. In the present case, learned counsel for defendants No. 1 and 2 made a categorical statement that, in order not to delay the hearing of the application, he would straight away submit his arguments on the basis of the averments made in the plaint and the application under consideration and the various orders passed by courts in other proceedings between the parties to the suit and he did so. As such not filing of any reply by defendants No. 1 and 2 cannot prejudice the arguments in defence. I have formed my opinion on the basis of the arguments advanced by both the parties and the pleadings. I make it clear that it is not a case of difference of opinion in the matter but it is a case where one opinion was formed ex parte and now the other opinion is being formed after hearing learned counsel for all the parties. ( 29 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons, I do not see that the plaintiff has any cause to get the injunction as prayed. The application is therefore rejected and the interim order dated June 26, 1998 is hereby vacated. ( 30 ) IT is however, made clear that any observations made in this order will not prejudice the respective cases of the parties in the main suit.