HARI NATH TILHARI, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision under Section 115 of CPC arises from the judgment and order dated 12. 1. 1994 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge, Bangalore, in M A. 108/92-arising out of an order dated 29 7 1992 passed by the Munsiff, Nela mangala, rejecting the interim relief application 1 A 1 under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of cpc,-allowing the appeal, setting aside the order of the trial Court dt. 29. 7. 1992, and granting temporary injunction order in favour of the present opposite party in the revision petition i. e, in favour of the plaintiff. ( 2 ) THE facts of the case in brief are that, the respondent in his capacity as the Secretary of Shivaganga Mandal, filed the suit against the revision petitioners for a decree for permanent injunction with the allegation to the effect that the land belongs to the Government and the Panchayat is entitled to manage the affairs of that land and the Panchayat has authorised him to file the suit for injunction He asserted that the Government land being in his possession and the defendant is intending to tresspass so the defendant be restrained by decree for permanent injunction from committing tresspass thereof as well as from interfering with the possession of the Government land Along with the plaint, the plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rule 1 of cpc with an allegation almost to the same effect Learned trial Court by its order dated july 29, 1992, rejected the application holding that the suit land belongs to the Government and the RTC and Pahani extract also shows that it to be Government land. It has further observed that the Mandal Panchayat is a local body constituted by the Government and unless the plaintiff had been properly authorised to file the suit, plaintiff has no authority to maintain the suit It held that the plaintiff has not made out any prima facie case and the balance of convenience is not in his favour. It has further observed that the documents produced by the defendant show that the suit schedule property was once leased in favour of the defendant and the subsequent haraj Histihar was stayed and rejected the application I. A. I, for temporary injunction Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and order of the trial Court, plaintiff preferred M A No 108/92. It has further observed that the documents produced by the defendant show that the suit schedule property was once leased in favour of the defendant and the subsequent haraj Histihar was stayed and rejected the application I. A. I, for temporary injunction Feeling aggrieved from the judgment and order of the trial Court, plaintiff preferred M A No 108/92. The Appellate Court considered the materials on record and observed that the order of the trial Court was perverse and capricious and if the defendant is permitted to interfere with the suit property the maintenance of The order passed by the trial Court will be prejudicial to the interest of Government and plaintiff. If injunction order is not granted, defendant will definitely occupy the property and dispossess the plaintiff and there will be irreparable loss as such plaintiff is entitled to temporary injunction order and thus allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the trial Court and granted the injunction as prayed Feeling aggrieved from the order of the Appellate court, the defendant has come up in revision under Section 115 CPC. ( 3 ) I have heard Sri A V Gangadharappa, learned counsel for the revision petitioner ( 4 ) SRI A. V. Gangadharappa contended that the order of the Appellate Court (Civil judge) passed in appeal is without jurisdiction as the Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the trial Court refusing to grant injunction order. Sri Gangadharappa thereafter moulded his arguments and contended unless and until it is shown that the order passed by the trial court rejecting the injunction was capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable, the Appellate court could not interfere with the discretion or exercise of jurisdiction or with the order refusing to exercise jurisdictional power in favour of the plaintiff That when the trial Court had found that the defendant has been in possession, it could not reverse the finding of fact in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction Sn gangadharappa made a reference to the decision of their Lordship of the Supreme Court in the case of The Printers (Mysore) Pvt. Ltd. v Pothan Joseph to the observations contained in paragraph 9 ( 5 ) I have applied my mind to the contentions of the learned counsel for the applicant and the authority cited before me by Sri A. V. Gangadharappa the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 115 is confined to the question of juris- dictional error and as proviso to Section 115 provides that revisional jurisdiction has to be exercised only in cases where jurisdictional error is shown to have been done by the court below and further it is shown that if order is allowed to stand, it is likely to cause irreparable loss or injury As regards the question of power of the first appellate Court, it will be appropriate to refer to the provisions of Section 107 CPC. Section 107 of CPC reads as under:-"section 107: Powers of Appellate court - (1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, an Appellate Court shall have power- (a) to determine a case finally, (b) to remand a case; (c) to frame issues and refer them for trial, (d) to take additional eidence or to require such evidence to be taken. (2) Subject as aforesaid, the Appellate court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the same duties as are conferred and imposed by this Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of suits instituted therein it will be very appropriate at this stage to refer and quote the following observations made in the case of Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh and Ors in paragraph 7, their Lordships observed, "the question for our consideration is undoubtedly one of fact, the decision of which depends upon the appreciation of the oral evidence adduced in the case in such cases, the appellate Court has got to bear in mind that it has not the advantage which the trial Judge had in having the witnesses before him and of observing the manner in which they deposed in Court. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate Court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge The rule is-and it is nothing more than a rule of practice- that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of the witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge's notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lies, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact vide Lord Atkin's observations in W. C macdonald v. Fred Latimer, AIR (16) 1929 PC 15 at p 18 (112 1c 375) in paragraph No. 15, their Lordships further observed, the duty of the appellate Court in such cases is to see whether the evidence taken as a whole can reasonably justify the conclusion which the trial Court arrived at or whether there is an element of improbability arising from proved circumstances which in the opinion of the Court outweighs such finding". ( 6 ) IN the case The Printers (Mysore) Private Limited v. Pothan Joseph (supra) referred to by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the principle has been laid down with reference to Section 27 o the Arbitration Act and the power of the Appellate Court. ( 6 ) IN the case The Printers (Mysore) Private Limited v. Pothan Joseph (supra) referred to by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the principle has been laid down with reference to Section 27 o the Arbitration Act and the power of the Appellate Court. In paragraph 9, their Lordships observe,"where the discretion vested in the court under Section 34 has been exercised by the trial Court the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of the said discretion" the expression used by their Lordships that, "the Appellate Court should be slow to interfere with the exercise of the said discretion" clearly runs counter to the contention of the applicant's counsel that the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the discretionary order Really it comes out that their lordships of the Supreme Court observed that when exercising the appellate power, the court should be slow to interfere with the order of the trial Court It did not mean that the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the order of the trial Court passed in exercise of its discretionary jurisdiction. Their Lordships further observed, in dealing with the matter raised before it at the appellate stage the appellate court would normally not be justified in interfering with the exercise of discretion, under appeal solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it would have come to a contrary conclusion If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner the fact that the appellate court would hve taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion"again these observations did not support the contention of the applicant's counsel that the appellate Court has no jurisdiction Really the principle laid down is the principle of guidelines of the Appellate Court to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it But it does not have the effect of ousting the jurisdiction of the appellate Court to reverse the order if the circumstance require the order of the trial Court be reversed It only says that it shall not be reversed merely because the Appellate Court may come to a different conclusion As is often said, it is not ordinarily open to the Appellate Court to substitute its own exercise of jurisdiction for that of the trial Judge but if it appears to the Appellate Court that in exercising its discretion the trial Court has acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored the relevant facts and has adopted an unjudicial approach, then it would certainly be open to the Appellate Court and in many cases, it would be its duty to interfere with the trial Court's exercise of discretion in cases where the trial court has exercised jurisdiction wrongly and improperly that would certainly justify and call for interference from the Appellate Court ( 7 ) THESE observations very clearly reveal that their Lordships laid down the guidelines for Appellate Court in the matter of exercise the jurisdiction vested in it as Appellate Court in appeals from orders passed by the trial Court in exercise of its discretionary power These observations do not mean that the Appellate court has no jurisdiction at all to interfere with the discretionary order passed by the Trial court. In my opinion, this case does not support the contention of the applicant's counsel that the Appellate Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the discretionary order Such matter or question as further been considered in the context of Section 107 of CPC in the case of Madhusudan Das v Smt Narayani bai and Ors. Their Lordships of the Supreme court observed,"at this stage, it would be right to refer to the general principle that, in an appeal against a trial Court decree, when the appellate Court considers an issue turning on oral evidence it must bear in mind that it does not enjoy the advantage which the trial Court had in having the witnesses before it and of observing the manner in which they gave their testimony When there is a conflict of oral evidence on any matter in issue and its resolution turns upon the credibility of the witnesses, the general rule is that the appellate Court should permit the findings of fact rendered by the trial Court to prevail unless it clearly appears that some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness has escaped the notice of the trial Court or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace its opinion as to where the credibility lies In this connection, reference may usefully be made to W. C. Macdonald v Fred Latimer, AIR 1929 pc 15, 18 where the Privy Council laid down that when there is a direct conflict between the oral evidence of the parties, and there is no documentary evidence that clearly affirms one view or contradicts the other, and there is no sufficient balance of improbability to displace the trial Court's findings as to the truth of the oral evidence, the appellate court can interfere only on very clear proof of mistake by the trial Court. In watt v Thomas, 1947 AC 484, 486, it was observed ". . . In watt v Thomas, 1947 AC 484, 486, it was observed ". . . it is a cogent circumstance that a Judge of first instance, when estimating the value of verbal testimony, has the advantage (which is denied to the Courts of appeal) of having the witnesses before him and observing the manner in which their evidence is given" This was adverted to with approval by the Privy Council in sara Veeraswami v Talluri Narayya (Deceased), AIR 1949 PC 32 and found favour with this Court in Sarju Parshad v Raja Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain singh, 1950 SCR 781 , 783 : ( AIR 1951 sc 120 at p. 121) It seems to us that this approach should be placed in the forefront in considering whether the high Court proceeded correctly in the evaluation of the evidence before it when deciding to reverse the findings of the trial Court The principle is one of practice and governs the weight to be given to a finding of fact by the trial Court there is, of course, no doubt that as a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on a misreading of the eidence or on conjectures and surmises the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact" so it cannot be said that the Appellate court had no jurisdiction to reverse the finding of fact arrived at by the trial Court The principles that have been laid down really of practice and to govern the way in which finding of fact as recorded by the trial Court is to appreciated of and if the trial Court commits an irregularity or fails to consider the material evidence to to read the documents and then record and records the finding, the Appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding and assess the evidence In the present case, prima facie the land is the Government land government has title The assertion is that the plaintiff is the Secretary of the Mandal which has got the right to manage The Court no doubt should have investigated No doubt, Section 57 of the Karnataka Taluk Panchayat samithi Mandal Panchayat 1983 provides that, "government may subject to the conditions to be specified transfer to any mandal Panchayat for management of land as well. " whether in this particular case, it has been done or not is a matter of fact to be investigated and tried and is the subject for trial so there was prima facie case for trial The lower appellate Court has also referred to Rule 3 (0) of Karnataka Mandal Panchayat (Secretaries power and duties) Rules, 1986 and observed that the rule lays down that the Secretary can institute a suit in respect of Panchayat properties with prior permission of the Mandal panchayat in cases where the management of the property is vested in the Panchayat, but question of fact again no doubt, has to be investigated So far as the question of possession is concerned, the Appellate Court has very clearly indicated that the trial Court has not appreciated the entire entries and contents of the R1c as well I may quote the observations made by the Appellate Court in paragraph 11 of the judgment of the Appellate Court". "so far as the possession of the property is concerned, the plaintiff has produced the RTC extract for the year 1988-89 to 1991-92. In this document, the name of Kathedar at Column No. 9 is shown as Gundathopu. Gunduthopu means a property belonging to the Government. So far as the person who cultivates the property is concerned in form no 12. the name has been kept blank. In columns No. 6 and 7 it is mentioned as 'government'. The nature of crop grown is not shown and the columns are left blank Therefore, as on the date of the suit as per the RTC the property is in the possession of the Government and nobody else has been granted right of cultivation or possession of the property The trial Court has not appreciated the RTC extract at all. The trial court has not even cared to look into the entries made in the RTC. It has observed in para-5 of the order that the property for the year 1988-89 to 1991-92 is shown as Gunduthopu and has left the matter there itself. "the lower Appellate Court looking to the entries contained in columns 6 and 7 of Form 12 of RTC extracts 1988-89 to 1991-92 has observed that on the date of the suit as per rtc, the property was in possession of the government and nobody else has been granted right of cultivation over the property. "the lower Appellate Court looking to the entries contained in columns 6 and 7 of Form 12 of RTC extracts 1988-89 to 1991-92 has observed that on the date of the suit as per rtc, the property was in possession of the government and nobody else has been granted right of cultivation over the property. ( 8 ) THE entries indicated that the land belonged to the government and it was in possession of the government and nobody has been granted the right of cultivation The lower Appellate Court observes that the trial Court did not consider and appreciate the extracts and it had only observed that the property in 1988-89 to 1991-92 is shown as Gunduthopu and thereafter left the other columns blank. When the trial Court has left out the material feature of the evidence coming out from the RTC extracts, it did not act according to law in recording the finding in favour of the defendant. ( 9 ) THE lower Appellate Court rightly observed that the trial Court did not consider the documents of later period i. e. , the date prior to the filing of the suit and that trial court without properly appreciating the document jumped into conclusion that plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit as to schedule property and that plaintiff in not in possession. It further observed the document of 1975-1976 did show that only for one year right of cultivation was granted to the defendant. It further observed the document of 1975-1976 did show that only for one year right of cultivation was granted to the defendant. Thereby it could not be taken that the defendant-revision petitioner was to be held to be entitled to remain in possession of the land in suit for ever in absence of any evidence and, particularly when entries of the subsequent year clearly reveal that the land has not been let out to him and nobody was cultivating as such appellate court reversed the trial Court's finding on possession by relying on later R. T C. entries as possession by relying on later RTC entries as referred to above and allowed the appeal ( 10 ) IN this view of the matter, in my opinion, it cannot be said that the Appellate Court acted without jurisdiction or illegally in exercise of jurisdiction by interfering with the order of the trial Court and by setting aside the finding of the trial Court or by issuing temporary injunction order restraining the defendant-applicant from encroaching the property in suit on the basis of the old documents relevant of 1976 and to dispossess the plaintiff or the Government. In my opinion, the order impugned in the revision namely one passed by the Appellate Court cannot be said to have been passed in exercise of jurisdiction not vested. Really, the Appellate court had full power to interfere with the finding and the order of trial Court refusing to exercise its discretionary power, because trial Court's order was perse passed illegally by ignoring the relevant entries in RTC for the year 1988-89 to 1991-92 in this view of the matter, in my opinion, the revision petition has got no merits. As such, revision petition is dismissed. Before parting with this revision, I think it proper to observe that as more than six years have passed from filing of the suit, the trial court is expected to expedite the decision of the suit and decide the suit on merits expeditiously trial Court should have disposed of the suit as there was no order staying the proceedings of the suit Any way. in view of dismissal of the revision petition by this Court, the trial court is expected to make its best efforts to dispose of the suit at the earliest possible. in view of dismissal of the revision petition by this Court, the trial court is expected to make its best efforts to dispose of the suit at the earliest possible. The learned counsel for the parties are expected to co-operate with the early disposal of the suit revision dismissed. --- *** --- .