JUDGMENT - S.P. KURDUKAR, J.:---The petitioners is the detenu and he has filed this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the issue of a Habeas Corpus as he has been preventively detained in pursuance of an order passed under sub- section (2) of section 3 of the National Security Act (here in after referred to as "the Act "). The impugned order of detention is dated March 21, 1984 and it has been made by first respondent, Commissioner of Police, Thane. The grounds of detention were formulated simultaneously along with the order of detention. It is no more in dispute that the impugned order of detention along with the grounds of detention and the material relied upon and considered by the Detaining Authority was served upon the detenu. The second respondent is the State of Maharashtra. In the grounds of detention it has been disclosed that the detenu has been involved in as many as seven criminal activities which are enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to 2(g) of the grounds of detention. The material in connection with these criminal activities was placed before the Detaining Authority and upon its subjective satisfaction, the Detaining Authority reached a conclusion that with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the Public Order, it is necessary to detain him under the Act. 2. Shri S.R. Chitnis the learned Counsel, appearing in support of this petition urged two contentions namely, (i) that the Detaining Authority has not informed the detenu either in the order or in the grounds of detention that the detenu has a right to make representation to the Central Government. The detenu being an illiterate and having not been told about this valuable right in the order or in the grounds of detention, his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India is violated; and (ii) that the various criminal activities referred to in the grounds of detention in paragraphs 2(a) to 2(g) fall within the domain of law and Order and have no nexus with the public order. The impugned order thus suffers from the vice of non-application of mind, the subjective satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority is thus vitiated and consequently the order is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3. The impugned order thus suffers from the vice of non-application of mind, the subjective satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority is thus vitiated and consequently the order is illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. 3. Coming to the first submission, Shri Chitnis heavily relied upon several judgment of the Supreme Court and at this stage, we may only make a reference to these judgments : (a) (Smt. Raziya Umer Bakshi v. Union of India)1, 1980 Supreme Court Cases (Supp. Issue)195, (b) (Khatoon Begum v. Union of India)2, (1981)2 Supreme Court Cases 480, (c) (Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India) 3, (1981)2 Supreme Court Cases 427, (d) (Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate Aligarh)4, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2166, (e) (Tarachand v. State of Rajasthan and others)5, (1981)1, Supreme Court Cases 416 : A.I.R. 1980 Supreme Court 1361. Drawing support from these judgments and elaborating his first connection Shri Chitnis urged that the detenu has got a valuable right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to make the representations not only to the Detaining Authority and the appropriate Government but also to the Central Government and whenever such representation are made, an obligation is cast upon the Central Government who is invested with the power under section 14 of the Act to revoke the order of detention, to consider the representation as expeditiously as possible. According to Shri Chitnis, the detenu has got a constitutional right to have his representation considered by the Central Government and this presupposes a constitutional right in the detenu to make the representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. According to the learned Counsel, it was imperative and obligatory upon the Detaining Authority to apprise the detenu of such valuable right under Article 22(5) to make a representation to the Central Government for whatever worth the same may be. Since the Detaining Authority has failed and neglected to abide by these imperative and obligation cast upon them under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, not only the impugned order of detention but continued detention is rendered illegal. Shri Chitnis then urged that since the detenu was not told about this right, he has unable to make any representation to the Central Government. Shri Chitnis then urged that since the detenu was not told about this right, he has unable to make any representation to the Central Government. It is admitted position in the present case that the detenu has not sent or made either directly or through the State Government any representation to the Central Government. On this common premises we have to examine the first contention raised on behalf of the detenu in this petition. 4. This contention has been taken up by the detenu in Ground No. (17) of paragraph No. (7) of the petition which reads as under : "(7). (1 to 16)......................... (17) That the Detaining Authority has not informed the detenu either in the Order nor in the Grounds that the petitioners has a right to make representation to the Central Government and, therefore, the petitioners being illiterate not having been told the valuable right in the grounds, the entire order is bad in law." In reply to this contention, a somewhat vague affidavit-in-reply has been filed by the first respondent and we wish to reproduce the same which reads thus : "22. With reference to para 7(17) of the petition, I deny that the Detaining Authority has not informed the detenu about his right to make a representation under the provisions of the said Act." If we read the return on behalf of the First Respondent, it gives an impression that the first respondent has informed the detenu about his right to make a representation under the provisions of the Act. This reply is not a reply to the above referred contention raised by the detenu. The complaint made by the detenu is that he was not informed about his right to make a representation to the Central Government and to this specific averment, there is no specific denial. Shri Kotwal could not factually improve the situation further in view of the material produced before us and proceeded on the footing that the detenu was not informed about this right to make representation to the Central Government against the order of detention. We only hope that the Detaining Authority would be careful while filing the return and would not leave such vagueness in its return. Before we consider the argument in detail, we wish to refer to the relevant provisions contained in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and also under the Act. We only hope that the Detaining Authority would be careful while filing the return and would not leave such vagueness in its return. Before we consider the argument in detail, we wish to refer to the relevant provisions contained in Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India and also under the Act. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India reads thus : "22(1) to (4)............ (5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order." Section 8 of the Act is another relevant provision for our consideration. Section 8 of the Act reads as under :--- "8. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed to persons affected by the order.---(1) When a person is detained in pursuance of a detention order, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, but ordinarily not later than five days and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than ten days from the date of detention, communicate to him the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order to the appropriate Government. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall require the authority to disclose facts which it considers to be against the public interest to disclose." Section 14 deals with the revocation of detention orders and the relevant and necessary provision contained in section 14(1)(a) and (b) reads as under : "14. Revocation of Detention orders.---(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a detention order may, at any time, be revoked or modified--- (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3) of section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or by the Central Government. (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the Central Government." As stated earlier, the impugned order of detention is made by the Commissioner of Police, Thane, the subordinate officer of the appropriate Government i.e. the State of Maharashtra. (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the Central Government." As stated earlier, the impugned order of detention is made by the Commissioner of Police, Thane, the subordinate officer of the appropriate Government i.e. the State of Maharashtra. The crucial question is as to whether Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India carves out any such fundamental right in favour of the detenu to make the representation to the Central Government and it is so, whether non-communication of such fundamental right to the detenu vitiates the impugned order of detention on the ground of infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Before we touch this controversy, we deem in necessary to refer to some authorities of the Supreme Court and this Court which were brought to our notice by the learned Public Prosecutor Shri M.R. Kotwal. Shri Kotwal urged that there is nothing in the scheme of Article 22(5) of the Constitution which spells out such a right in favour of the detenu to make representation to the Central Government. According to him, Article 22(5) of the Constitution recognizes a solitary right in favour of the detenu to make representation to the Detaining Authority only against the order of detention. It is only section 14 of the Act which gives power to the Central Government and/or the appropriate Government to revoke the detention order. According to Shri Kotwal assuming without admitted that there is an obligation upon the Central Government to consider the representations if made to it as expeditiously as possible but that does not necessarily mean that the detenu has got a right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India to make the representation and consequently such a right required to be told to the detenu. According to Shri Kotwal, therefore, the fact that the detenu was not told that he can make the representation to the Central Government against the order of detention is in no case would amount to infraction of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Shri Kotwal in support of this submission firstly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Pushpa v. Union of India)6, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1953. In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the order of detention passed under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. Shri Kotwal in support of this submission firstly relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in (Pushpa v. Union of India)6, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 1953. In that case, the Supreme Court was dealing with the order of detention passed under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. The first ground on which the order was challenged was that the detenu made representations on February 23, 1979 and on 27th March, 1979 and the same were rejected by the Chief Secretary who was not Competent Authority and that the power to consider the representation was having been vested in the appropriate Government; Clause (5) of Article 22 of the Constitution makes it obligatory for the authority making an order of preventive detention to communicate to the detenu as soon as may be, the grounds on which the order has been made and should afford the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. While examining this contention raised before the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court observed as follows : "There is nothing in the scheme of Article 22 or the provisions of the COFEPOSA which requires that the representation ought always to be considered by the appropriate Government notwithstanding the fact that the order of detention has been made by an officer specially empowered in that behalf. Undoubtedly the power to revoke the detention order under section 11 is conferred on the State Government and the Central Government whenever an order of detention is made by an officer of the State Government but that does not imply that the initial representation which a detenu has a right to make after the grounds of detention are furnished to him. Must of necessity be made and considered by the State Government. In fact the representation can and ought to be made to the Detaining Authority because it is he who has to apply his mind to the facts of the case and it is he who has furnished the grounds of detention on which he has acted and it is he who has to be convinced that the action taken by him is unjustified and requires reconsideration. After all the purpose of representation is to convince the authority to consider its decision which has resulted in the detention of the detenu. After all the purpose of representation is to convince the authority to consider its decision which has resulted in the detention of the detenu. The representation is not in the form of an appeal to the higher authority and, therefore, ipso facto it must go to the State Government. Undoubtedly, it would be open to the detenu to make a representation under section 11 requesting either the State Government or the Central Government as the case may be, to revoke the order of detention. But the initial representation that the detenu has a right to make on receipt of the grounds of detention would ordinarily be addressed to the Detaining Authority because it is that authority which has taken a decision adverse to the detenu and which has to be persuaded to reconsider the same. Therefore, if the detenu made the representation to the third respondent who had passed the detention order it was open to him to consider the same and after applying his mind to accept or reject the same. The failure to submit the representation addressed to the Detaining Authority and considered by him to the State Government would not vitiate the detention order." (Emphasis supplied). 5. Shri Kotwal then drew our attention to the latest judgement of the Supreme Court in A.I.R 1984 S.C. 1095 (State of Uttar Pradesh v. Zavad Zama Khan)7. This judgment is of the Bench consisted of three Judge and in this judgement, the Supreme Court after taking resume of its earlier decisions laid down the true interpretation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution with reference to the detenu's right to make the representation. The judgement has been rendered in a case which arose out of the judgement of the High Court of Uttar Pradesh. The High Court of Uttar Pradesh relying upon a judgement of the Supreme Court in (Phillippa Anne Duke v. State of Tamil Nadu)8, A.I.R 1982 S.C 1178 and certain other decisions held that the respondant who had made representation to the Central Government praying for revocation of detention order under section 14 of the Act failed to consider the same and therefore, the continued detention rendered illegal. The High Court of Uttar Pradesh consequently quashed and set aside the order of detention against which the State of Uttar Pradesh had gone to the Supreme Court in special leave petition. The High Court of Uttar Pradesh consequently quashed and set aside the order of detention against which the State of Uttar Pradesh had gone to the Supreme Court in special leave petition. The facts of this case are that the order of detention was made under the National Security Act on November 6, 1982 by the District Magistrate. Moradabad, but it could not be served on the detenu as he was absconding. The District Magistrate, the Detaining Authority, as required under sub-section (4) of the section 3 of the Act, forthwith made a report of the fact to the State Government of Uttar Pradesh that he had passed an order for the detention of the respondent under sub-section (3) of section 3 of the Act together with the grounds on which the order was made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, had a bearing on the matter. The State Government received the order of detention on November 8, 1982 and approved the same on November 11, 1982 under sub-section (5) of section 3 of the Act. The State Government then forwarded a report to the Central Government on the next day i.e. on November 12, 1982. The respondent surrendered to the police on May 24, 1983 and the impugned order of detention was served on him in the District Jail, Moradabad on June 1, 1983. The grounds of detention were finished to him on June 2, 1983. The detenu then made representation on June 18, 1983 through the Superintendent, District Jail, Moradabad who immediately forwarded the same to the District Magistrate, Moradabad on June 20, 1983. The District Magistrate (the Detaining Authority) forwarded the representation to the Advisory Board and the same was received by the Advisory Board on June 21, 1983. The State Government had in the meantime on June 13, 1983 made a reference to the Advisory Board under section 10 of the Act. The representation of the respondent forwarded by the District Magistrate together with his comments were examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department. On June 17, 1983, the entire file was placed before the Chief Minister who after perusing the file within two days, passed an order on June 30, 1983 rejecting the said representation. The representation of the respondent forwarded by the District Magistrate together with his comments were examined by the Joint Secretary, Home Department. On June 17, 1983, the entire file was placed before the Chief Minister who after perusing the file within two days, passed an order on June 30, 1983 rejecting the said representation. On June 2, 1983, the State Government forwarded the representation made by the respondent together with its comments to the Government of India and the Central Government rejected the same on July 19, 1983. On July 5, 1983, the respondent (detenu) through his Counsel D. S. Misra addressed two representations for revocation of his detention under section 14 of the Act, one addressed to the Prime Minister of India and the other to the State Government. The Prime Minister's Secretariat on July 7, 1983 received the representation sent by the respondent. The grievance made on behalf of the respondent (detenu) was that the Central Government had not dealt with his application for revocation of the order of detention under section 14 of the Act even now. An argument was advanced on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh before the Supreme Court that the constitutional imperatives enacted in the Article 22(5) are two fold : (1) the Detaining Authority must, as soon as may be i.e. as soon as practicable, after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made. And (2) the Detaining Authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making representation against the order of detention. It was further contended on behalf of the State of Uttar Pradesh that the requirements of Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 8(1) of the Act were duly complied with and there was no question of any violation of Article 22(5) or of section 8(1) and therefore, the order of detention could not have been set aside by the High Court. 6. The Supreme Court after taking resume of several authorities which are quoted in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment has concluded in paragraph 13 as follows : "13. 6. The Supreme Court after taking resume of several authorities which are quoted in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the judgment has concluded in paragraph 13 as follows : "13. The principle that emerges from all these decisions is that the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under section 14 of the Act is a statutory power which may be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under sub-section (5) of section 3 or from the detenu in the form of a petition for representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whether or not it should revoke the order of detention in a particular case. In the present case, the detenu was not deprived of the right of making a representation to the Detaining Authority under Article 22(5) of the Constitution read with section 8(1) of the Act. Although the detenu had no right to simultaneously make a representation against the order of detention to the Central Government under Article 22(5) and there was no duty cast on the State Government to forward the same to the Central Government, nevertheless the State Government forwarded the same forthwith. The Central Government duly considered that representation which in effect was nothing but a representation for revocation of the order of detention under section 14 of the Act. That being so it was not obligatory on the part of the Central Government to consider a second representation for revocation under section 14. We may profitably refer to Phillippa Anna Duke's case A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1178 (supra), where in somewhat similar circumstances it was held that failure of the Central Government to consider a representation for revocation of an order of detention under section 11(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act handed over to the Prime Minister during her visit to England did not render the continued detention invalid. It was observed : "Representations from whatever source addressed to whomsoever officer of one or other department of the Government cannot be treated as a representation to the Government under section 11(a)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act." It may be mentioned at this stage that in the above referred judgment of the Supreme Court, the second representation made by the detenu through his Counsel remained unattended and/or no decision was communicated to the detenu. But none the less, the Supreme Court in paragraph 13 referred to hereinabove while interpreting the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India read with section 8(1) of the Act has also touched the important aspect namely, the right of the detenu to make the representation against the impugned order of detention. From these two judgments of the Supreme Court it is clear to us that the Supreme Court has accepted the right of a detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to make representation against the order of detention only to the Detaining Authority. No other constitutional right to make representation under Article 22(5) has been recognised. It is however, accepted that a detenu may make representations to the appropriate Government as well as to the Central Government as provided under the statute or the Act but the first and the initial representation which is contemplated under Article 22(5) of the Constitution is the representation to the Detaining Authority alone who has passed the order of detention. A similar question also fell for consideration before the Division Bench of this Court in (Mohd. Hussain v. Secy. to Govt. of Maharashtra)9, 1982 Cri.L.J. 1848. One of us (Kurdukar, J.) was a party to the said judgment. This Court again after taking resume of several judgments of the Supreme Court in connection with the right of the detenu under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, has held as follows: "There is, therefore, no breach either of the Constitution or of the statutory provisions in the present case. We, therefore, reject the contention that merely because the petitioner was not informed at the time of the service of the grounds of detention upon him, of his right to make a representation and of being heard personally before the Board, either the order of detention or his detention thereunder has become illegal." Of course, in this judgment, the complaint was that the detenu was not informed by the Detaining Authority either in the order of detention or in the grounds of detention that he has also a right to make representations to the Advisory Board. In the present case before us, the Detaining Authority had not informed the detenu that he has a right to make representations to the Central Government. In the present case before us, the Detaining Authority had not informed the detenu that he has a right to make representations to the Central Government. The fact remains that whether Article 22(5) of the Constitution spells out such a fundamental right in favour of the detenu which cast an obligation upon the Detaining Authority to inform the detenu that he has a constitutional right to make representation to the Central Government and if that is not done whether the impugned order of detention becomes illegal by reason of infraction of Article 22(5). Shri Kotwal then drew our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court (Md. D.A. Khan v. State of W.B.)10, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 734. In our opinion it is not necessary to refer to the said judgment in detail since this judgment has also been considered by the Supreme Court in State of U. P. v. Zaved Zama Khan (supra). After considering the law laid down by the Supreme Court in these judgments and after perusing the scheme of Article 22(5) and the National Security Act, we are of the opinion that the only constitutional right in connection with representation recognized in favour of the detenu under Article 22(5) is to afford him an earliest opportunity to make representation to the Detaining Authority against the order of detention and if representation is made, then a duty is cast upon the Detaining Authority making the order of detention to consider the same expeditiously. The right and obligation to make and consider the representation at the earliest opportunity is a constitutional imperative which cannot be curtailed or abridged. 7. Now we may refer to the decisions relied upon by Shri Chitnis for his proposition that under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, it is imperative on the part of the Detaining Authority to inform the detenu that he had a constitutional right to make a representation to the Central Government. Shri Chitnis however, was unable to point out to us any direct authority either of this Court or of the Supreme Court which has considered this point. Shri Chitnis however, was unable to point out to us any direct authority either of this Court or of the Supreme Court which has considered this point. Shri Chitnis however, tried to support the first contention by drawing analogy from various judgments of the Supreme Court namely, that when the detenu has got right to have his representations considered by the Central Government as expeditiously as possible it presupposes the constitutional right in him to make representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. This he tries to spell out from the judgments of the Supreme Court. According to the learned Counsel, this constitutional right was not told to the detenu which has adversely affected his fundamental right guaranteed under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. He firstly drew our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Razia Umar Bakshi v. Union of India, 1980 (Supp.) S.C.C. 195. The facts of that case show that the detenu had made a specific request to the State Government that the representation addressed to the Central Government be forwarded to the Central Government for consideration of revocation of the detention order under section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act and inspite of such a request made by the detenu, the representation were not forwarded to the Central Government and with the result, those representations remained unattended. While dealing with this aspect, the Supreme Court has stated as follows : "6. Another ground taken by Mr. Ram Jethamalani in support of the rule is that although the detenu had made a specific prayer in his representation to the State Government that his representation should be forwarded to the Central Government for consideration under section 11 of the Act, yet the Detaining Authority did not choose to forward the representation to the Central Government at all. This position is admitted and the defence taken is that as the detenu had himself sent a copy to the Central Government, the Detaining Authority did not think it necessary to forward the representation to the Central Government. This defence is wholly unacceptable. Section 11 of the Act confers a constitutional right on the detenu to have his representation considered by the Central Government." (Emphasis supplied). This defence is wholly unacceptable. Section 11 of the Act confers a constitutional right on the detenu to have his representation considered by the Central Government." (Emphasis supplied). Relying upon these observation Shri Chitnis urged that the Supreme Court has accepted that section 11 of the Act confers a constitutional right to have his representation considered by the Central Government. When such a right is recognised, obviously, there must be a right in the detenu to make the representation to the Central Government. We are unable to extend the ratio of this judgment to this extent as desired by Shri Chitnis. These observations will have to be read in the context of the facts of the case and having regard to the facts of that case that the State Government had failed to forward the representation to the Central Government which had also power to revoke the order of detention under section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act resulting in failure to discharge its statutory obligation. The detenu's right to have his representation considered by the Central Government was violated. From the above mentioned observations, we are of the opinion that all that the Supreme Court has laid down is that if the detenu makes representation to the Central Government either directly or through the State machinery, section 11 of the Act confers a constitutional right on the detenu to have his representation considered by the Central Government expeditiously. This judgment in our opinion, does not advance the case of the detenu any further so far the first contention is concerned. Shri Chitnis then relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Khatoon Begum v. Union of India, (1981)2 Supreme Court Cases 480. In that case, order and the grounds of detention were served on the detenu on 30th October and 1st November, 1980 respectively. On 12th November, 1980, the detenu sent a representation through jail to the Detaining Authority but no communication was received by the detenu about his representation. The Detaining Authority who has filed its return has stated that the Detaining Authority had rejected the representation on December 9, 1980 and the decision was communicated to the detenu through the Superintendent of Central Jail. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion 'that there was unreasonable and unexplained delay which renders the continued detention illegal under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. In paragraph 6 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion 'that there was unreasonable and unexplained delay which renders the continued detention illegal under Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Admittedly, in this case also, the detenu had sent the representation which remained unattended for long period and the delay was not explained by the Detaining Authority. Therefore, this judgment again is not an authority for proposition make the detenu has got a right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to make the representation to the Central Government and such a right has get to be told to him at the time of serving of the order and/or grounds of detention. 8. Shri Chitnis then drew our attention to another judgment of Supreme Court in Lallubhai Jogibhai Patel v. Union of India others (1981)2 Supreme Court Cases 427. He drew our attention to paragraphs 15 and 19 of the said judgment. We have gone through this judgment and it is clear from the facts of that case that the detenu had made representation to the Central Government through the State Government and the State Government had forwarded the same on July 17, 1980. The Central Government had failed to file an affidavit and inform the Court as to whether representations were considered and/or disposed of. In that context, the Supreme Court has observed that there is a clear breach of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Again, this judgment is not an authority for the proposition sought to be urged by Shri Chitnis. 9. Shri Chitnis then relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Wasi Uddin Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Aligarh, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 2166. He strongly relied upon the following passage from the said judgment : "The word "and shall afford" in Article 22(5) have a positive content in matters of personal liberty. The law insists upon the literal performance of a procedural requirement. The need for observance of procedural safeguards, particularly in cases of deprivation of life and liberty is of prima importance to the body politic. It is, therefore, imperative that the Detaining Authority must "apprise" a detenu of his constitutional right under Article 22(5) to make a representation against the order of detention and of his right to be heard before the Advisory Board. It is, therefore, imperative that the Detaining Authority must "apprise" a detenu of his constitutional right under Article 22(5) to make a representation against the order of detention and of his right to be heard before the Advisory Board. The right of the detenu to make a representation under Article 22(5) would be in many cases, of little avail if the detenu is not 'informed' of this right. The failure to comply with this requirement, however, does not have the effect of vitiating the impugned order of detention or render the continued detention of the detenu illegal in this case for the reason that the detenu is an enlightened person and has been in active politics and was, therefore, fully cognisant of his right to make a representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution under section 8 of the Act. In fact, the detenu appeared before the Advisory Board and filed a representation against the order of detention and was also personally heard by the Advisory Board." Shri Chitnis drawing support from these observations urged that although under Article 22(5) there is no reference to the right of a detenu to make a representation to the Advisory Board yet the Supreme Court has recognized the same as constitutional right and therefore, the same analogy be further extended in the present case and it be held that the detenu has got Constitutional right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to make the representation to the Central Government and the same should be informed to him. This judgment of the Supreme Court has been considered by the Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Husain v. Secy. Govt. of Maharashtra and in view of this judgment, it is not necessary to discuss in details the said argument. 10. Shri Chitnis then drew our attention to the two judgments of the Supreme Court namely, (i) Tata Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1981)1 S.C.C. 416 ; and (ii) Tata Chand v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1361. We have gone through both these judgments. 10. Shri Chitnis then drew our attention to the two judgments of the Supreme Court namely, (i) Tata Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (1981)1 S.C.C. 416 ; and (ii) Tata Chand v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 1361. We have gone through both these judgments. In these judgments all that the Supreme Court has emphasised is that section 11 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act confers discretion upon the Central Government to revoke the order of detention and it is therefore, necessary that as soon as the representation is received by the Central Government, it is duly bound to consider the same in order to exercise the discretion either rejecting or confirming the same. If there is an inordinate delay that would amount to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. As stated earlier, in both these cases, admittedly, the detenu had made a representation to the Central Government and since they were not considered as expeditiously as possible, the Supreme Court has observed that non-consideration of the detenu's representation made to the Central Government which has power to revoke and/or modify the order of detention under section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act within a reasonable time would amount to violation of provisions of Article 22(5) of the Constitution. The last judgment sought to be relied upon by Shri Chitnis in support of his first contention is (Rattan Singh and another v. State of Punjab)14, A.I.R. 1982 S.C. 1. In this case, the detention order was made under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974. In this case on April 19, 1981 when the detenu was under detention, his Advocate wrote a letter to the Superintendent of Central Jail, Amritsar, enclosing therewith two representations drafted on behalf of the detenu, one of which was addressed to the Joint Secretary, Department of Home, Government of Punjab, Chandigarh and the other to the Secretary, Union Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi. The Jail Superintendent was also requested by the aforesaid letter that both these representations be forwarded to the respective authorities after obtaining the signatures of the detenu thereon. The contention was raised before the Supreme Court that inspite of long passage of time, the representation to the Central Government has not so far been considered by it, rendering his continued detention illegal. The contention was raised before the Supreme Court that inspite of long passage of time, the representation to the Central Government has not so far been considered by it, rendering his continued detention illegal. The representation addressed to the State Government reached the addressee but however, the representation addressed to the Central Government as observed by the Supreme Court was tripped somewhere and did not reach the Central Government apparently never forwarded. On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the detenu has been unaccountable deprived of a valuable right of personal liberty. In this behalf, the Supreme Court has observed as follows : "Section 11(1) of the COFEPOSA confers upon the Central Government the power to revoke an order of detention even if it is made by the State Government or its Officer. That power in order to be real and effective, must imply the right in a detenu to make a representation to the Central Government against the order of detention. The failure in this case on the part either of the Jail Superintendent or the State Government to the Central Government has deprived the detenu of the valuable right to have his detention revoked by that Government. The continued detention of the detenu must, therefore, be held illegal and the detenu set free." This judgment again is distinguishable on facts. The State Government had failed to forward the representation to the Central Government as requested by the detenu who was in jail with the result the continued detention was rendered illegal as the valuable right under section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act was breached. As observed earlier in the present case, admittedly, the detenu had not sent the representation to the Central Government and, therefore, in our opinion, the question of breach of either Article 22(5) or section 14 of the Act would not arise. In all these judgments of the Supreme Court relied upon by Shri Chitnis, the issue in controversy was as to what is the effect of non-consideration of representation by the Central Government. This was obviously on the footing that such representations were made to the Central Government. The first contention of Shri Chitnis, therefore, has no substance and has got to be rejected. 11. This was obviously on the footing that such representations were made to the Central Government. The first contention of Shri Chitnis, therefore, has no substance and has got to be rejected. 11. Coming to the second and the last contention raised by Shri Chitnis that the criminal activities referred to in Paragraph 2(a) to 2(g) fall within the domain of Law and Order and not referable to the public order at all and therefore, impugned order is illegal. The second limb of the argument of Shri Chitnis in this behalf is that the incident referred to in the grounds of detention at Serial Nos. 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) suffer from vice of staleness inasmuch as these incidents have taken place more than a year prior to the impugned order of detention. All these three criminal activities referred in Ground Nos. 2(a) to 2(c) are state and therefore, the subjective satisfaction reached by the Detaining Authority on the basis of these incidents is vitiated and consequently, the order of detention vis-a-vis these three incidents is rendered illegal and bad. This argument at the first blush appear to be undoubtedly attractive but if the grounds of detention are perused. It is clear that all these activities have a direct nexus with the maintenance of public order. The first criminal activity of the detenu started sometime on or about May 14, 1982 and the last activity ended on March 3, 1984. Within this span of short period, the detenu was found to be involved insomuch as seven criminal cases. In each of these cases it is stated that the detenu and his associates assaulted the victims. It is the potentiality of a person which has to be judged in the facts and circumstances of each case. In a given case, an isolated incident may not fall within the purview of public order but the same incident if viewed in the context of several other criminal activities of the same nature, it would clearly show and exhibit the criminal potentially of a person Shri Chitnis took us through the material placed before the Detaining Authority in connection with all these incidents and after going through the grounds of detention as well as the material we cannot accept the contention of Shri Chitnis. Shri Chitnis then urged that in all these cases the detenu was having a personal enmity against the victim and therefore, all these incidents may effect the individual and not the public at large. He further submitted that there is no material on the record to show that by reason of these criminal activities, the even tempo of the locality is disturbed. He, therefore, submitted that all these criminal activities relied upon by the Detaining Authority do not fall within the domain of public order but are referable to law and Order and therefore, the detention order is wholly unjustified, illegal and deserves to be quashed and set aside. Shri Vyas, the learned Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the Detaining Authority while referring to the material on record urged that if the cumulative effect of these activities is taken into account, it is clear that all these criminal activities fall within the domain of public order and there was no mistake whatsoever on the part of the Detaining Authority to reach a subjective satisfaction that these activities on the part of the detenu and his associates disturb the even tempo of the public in that locality and with a view to preventing him from continuing his activities, he needs to be detained under the provisions of the Act. Both the parties drew our attention to several judgments of this Court as well as of the Supreme Court; but however it is well settled that each case has to be judged bearing in mind the facts and circumstances referred to therein and there can be no hard and fact rule which will govern all the cases in a strait-jacket. Thus, there is no substance in the second contention of Shri Chitnis. 12. Shri Chitnis then drew our attention to Ground No. 2(d) of the grounds of detention and urged that by no stretch of imagination the breach of an order issued under section 37(1) read with section 135 of the Bombay Police Act would amount to an activity falling under the public order. He sought to distinguish between the orders passed under sections 37(1) and 37(3) of the Bombay Police Act. According to the learned Counsel, the concept of public peace and public safety are very much known under the Bombay Police Act and the Legislature has in its wisdom provided separate sections to cover such activities independently. He sought to distinguish between the orders passed under sections 37(1) and 37(3) of the Bombay Police Act. According to the learned Counsel, the concept of public peace and public safety are very much known under the Bombay Police Act and the Legislature has in its wisdom provided separate sections to cover such activities independently. Admittedly, so far the incident referred to in Ground No. 2(d) is concerned, there was no prohibitory order passed under sub-section (3) of section 37 of the Bombay Police Act and if it was so, a prohibitory order under sub-section (1) of section 37 of the Bombay Police Act cannot have the effect as if the order is passed under sub-section (3) of section 37 of the Bombay Police Act. There may be some legal substance in this submission; but so far as the Ground No. 2(d) is concerned, it is clear that inspite of the prohibitory order issued by the authority, the detenu was found to be carrying a Rampuri knife in his pocket. This only shows that the detenu has no respect for the prohibitory orders and inspite of such prohibitory orders bent upon to break the same by carrying such a weapon namely, the Rampuri knife. After going through the grounds of detention and the material furnished to the detenu, we are satisfied that the impugned order does not suffer from any vice. The impugned order of detention perfectly legal and valid and needs no interference. It is desirable that the Detaining Authority hereinafter may communicate in its grounds of detention that the detenu has also got right to make a representation to the Central Government in addition to the Detaining Authority, the State Government and the Advisory Board. 13. In the result, the petition fails and the rule is discharged. -----