JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This revisional application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is at the instance of a defendant in a suit for declaration, injunction and recovery of money and is directed against Order No. 60 dated August 29, 1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Burdwan in Title Suit No. 21 of 1995 thereby disposing of a preliminary issue as to the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the suit in affirmative. 2. The opposite parties filed the aforesaid suit in the court of learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Burdwan thereby praying the following reliefs:- "(a) A decree for declaration that the defendant-bank is not entitled to execute the compromise decree dated 7.2.92 passed in T.S. 14/90. (b) A decree for a sum of Rs. 24,48,85,000/- as pleaded in para 53 to 58 on account of damages. (c) In the alternative for a decree of Rs. 13,82,15,000/- after adjusting Rs. 10,66,70,000/- due to the defendant bank. (d) A declaration that the compromise decree stands varied in the manner advised by the defendant bank, in its letter dated 18.3.94, providing for payment of the decreetal dues in five equal annual instalments without any default. (e) A decree for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from executing and/or taking steps or further steps for executing the compromise decree passed in T.S. 14/90. (f) Mandatory injunction directing the defendant to sanction & disburse to the plaintiffs need-based working capital limit amounting to Rs. 295.27 lacs for the season 1995 an similar need based working capital limit for each & every subsequent reason till the payment of the amount legally due and payable by the pltfis. to the defdt. (g) Such further and other reliefs which the pltfis. may be found entitled to, may also be decreed against the defdt. & (h) For all costs, the suit be decreed against the defdt. bank". 3. The present petitioners having raised the dispute as to the competence of a Civil Court to entertain such a suit, a preliminary issue as to whether the court had jurisdiction to try the said suit was framed and the same was heard as preliminary issue as per order of this court in a first misc. appeal arising out of an order of injunction in connection with the said suit. 4. appeal arising out of an order of injunction in connection with the said suit. 4. By the order impugned, the learned trial Judge has held that he has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 5. Being dissatisfied, the defendant has come up in revision. 6. Mr. Bhatacharjee, the learned advocate appearing in support of this application, at the time of hearing of the instant application, fairly conceded that except prayers (a), (d) and (e), the other reliefs claimed in the suit are quite maintainable and he was not disputing the correctness of the order impugned so far those prayers are concerned. Mr. Bhattacharjee has however restricted his submission to the aforesaid three reliefs claimed and has contended that in view of Recovery of debts due to Bank and Financial Institution Act, 1993 ("Act") such reliefs are available to the plaintiffs not in a civil court but before Debt Recovery Tribunal inasmuch as the decree passed in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990 in favour of Bank is to be executed before Debt Recovery Tribunal and not before a Civil Court and those three reliefs relate to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the decree in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990. 7. Thus, Mr. Bhattacharjee contends, a Civil Court is not entitled to go into those questions relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs/opposite parties has however refuted the aforesaid contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee by relying upon an unreported decision of a Division Bench of this court dated August 12, 1998 in G.A. No. 1161 of 1997 (Bank of India vs. Khas Kajora Coal Company) wherein the said Division Bench consisting of Chatterjee and D.K. Jain, JJ. held that if a decree is passed by a Civil Court prior to coming into force of the Act, such decree should be executed before the Civil Court and the execution case to enforce such decree cannot be initiated before Debt Recovery Tribunal. The Division Bench concluded that the words "other proceeding" as appearing in section 31 of the Act does not include an execution proceeding. 9. According to Mr. The Division Bench concluded that the words "other proceeding" as appearing in section 31 of the Act does not include an execution proceeding. 9. According to Mr. Mukherjee in view of the fact that in this case the aforesaid Title Suit No. 14 of 1990 having been decreed on February 7, 1992 i.e. prior to the coming into force of the Act, the said decree is to be executed before a Civil Court and as such it is the court which passed the decree and not the Debt Recovery Tribunal which can adjudicate such questions. 10. After hearing the learned advocates for the parties and after going through the Division Bench decision placed before this court by Mr. Mukherjee, I find that the Title Suit No. 14 of 1990 filed earlier by the Bank having been decreed prior to the coming into force of the Act should be executed by initiating an execution case before a Civil Court and not before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Thus, I find no substance in the contention of Mr. Bhattacharjee that Debt Recovery Tribunal alone can entertain such dispute. 11. But although such a dispute is entertain-able by a Civil Court, the prayers (a), (d) and (e) on the face of the prayers, relate to execution, discharge and satisfaction of the compromise decree passed in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990 and as such, in view of section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure such questions should be adjudicated in the execution proceeding itself and not by a separate suit. 12. Thus, in my opinion, reliefs (a), (d) and (e) as mentioned in the plaint cannot be granted in a separate suit filed by judgment-debtors and such question should be agitated by judgment-debtors when the said decree will be executed through execution. 13. Therefore, the learned trial Judge acted illegally and with material irregularity in holding that he had jurisdiction to entertain all the reliefs claimed in the suit. 14. In view of my observation above, in my opinion, the suit was not maintainable before the learned trial Judge so far prayers (a), (d) and (e) of the plaint are concerned as those prayers relate to execution, discharge and satisfaction of decree passed in Title Suit No. 14 of 1990 and as such those questions can be agitated when such decree is sought to be enforced against the plaintiffs by way of execution. 15. The order impugned is thus modified to this extent that except prayers (a), (d) and (e) of the plaint, the other reliefs claimed in the suit are maintainable before the learned trial Judge. 16. The revisional application is thus allowed in part, the order impugned is set aside to the extent indicated above. 17. No costs. Application allowed.