Honble CHAUHAN, J.—The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the charge-sheet dated 23.12.93, contained in Annexure 1 to this petition, by which charge of irregularities in purchase had been framed against the petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority. (2). The facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that the impug- ned charge sheet, contained in Annexure 1, had been served upon the petitioner with reference to an event which occurred in the year 1982 when the petitioner was posted as the Project Director, District Rural Development Authority, Barmer alleging that he had committed irregularities in purchasing 109 sewing machines and caused loss of Rupees ten thousand approximately. (3). The main grievance of the petitioner is that such a disciplinary proceeding cannot be initiated after a lapse of unreasonable delay, i.e., eleven years. Respondent No. 3 has replied to the ground of delay as under :- ``The provisions of the Rules of 1958 do not prescribe the time limited for initiating the proceedings against the delinquent...........The ques- tion of delay is, however, not relevant in the facts and circumstances of the case. However, when the State Government came to know of these irregularities alleged to have been committed by the petitioner during his tenure as Project Director, D.R.D.A., Barmer, the proceedings were initiated immediately. (4). Similarly, the respondents No. 1 and 2 have submitted that it is settled proposition of law that mere delay in issuing the charge-sheet is not fatal where the charges are very grave under the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958. (5). Mr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that this Court has stayed the further proceedings in the departmental enquiry and the petitioner has retired in April, 1994 and it has further been urged that even on merit, the petitioner has a very good case and he is likely to succeed. (6). Whether the charges are true or false, have to be examined in the disciplinary proceedings by the competent authority and the Court cannot go, at this stage, to decide the same. In Union of India and others vs. Upendra Singh (1), the Apex Court has held that the Court cannot take-over the function of the disciplinary authority. (6). Whether the charges are true or false, have to be examined in the disciplinary proceedings by the competent authority and the Court cannot go, at this stage, to decide the same. In Union of India and others vs. Upendra Singh (1), the Apex Court has held that the Court cannot take-over the function of the disciplinary authority. The truth or otherwise of the charges is a matter for the disciplinary authority to go into and even after conclusion of the enquiry there is a limited scope of interference only on the process of decision making and not on the correctness of the decision. Therefore, it is beyond imagination that the Court can interfere at such an early stage of the disciplinary proceedings. While deciding the said case, the Apex Court had placed reliance on its earlier judgments in H.B. Gandhi vs. Gopi Nath (2), wherein it has been held that it will be erroneous for the Court to sit in judgment against the correctness of the decision itself as the scope of judicial review is limited only to the extent of the correctness of the decision making process. (7). Similarly, in Deputy Inspector General of Police vs. K.S. Swaminathan (3), the Apex Court held that even if the charges are totally vague and do not disclose any misconduct, for which the charges have been framed, the Court would not be justified, at this stage, to go into whether the charges are true and could be gone-into, for it would be a matter, on production of evidence, for consideration at the enquiry by the Enquiry Officer. ``At the stage of framing the charges, the statement of facts and the charge-sheet supplied, are required to be looked- into by the Court or Tribunal as to the nature of charges, i.e., whether the Statement of Facts and material in support thereof, supplied to the delinquent officer, would disclose the alleged misconduct. If the aforesaid tests are applied in the instant case, it cannot be said that the memo of charges does not disclose any offence at all. (8). However, the limited scope of judicial review is only to the extent whether the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated at such a belated stage ? Reliance has been placed by Mr. Singhvi on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh & Anr. (8). However, the limited scope of judicial review is only to the extent whether the disciplinary proceedings can be initiated at such a belated stage ? Reliance has been placed by Mr. Singhvi on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bani Singh & Anr. (4), wherein the Apex Court has observed that it is unreasonable to think that the employer/administration would have taken more than twelve years to initiate the disciplinary proceedings for committing irregularities and if there is no satisfactory explanation for the inordinate delay in issuing the charge-memo, it would be unfair to permit the disciplinary enquiry to be proceeded with at such a belated stage. (9). The aforesaid case was re-considered by the Honble Supreme Court in State of Punjab & Ors. vs. Chaman Lal Goyal (5), wherein the Honble Supreme Court did not approve the earlier judgment in toto. The Honble Supreme Court placed reliance on its earlier judgment in A.R. Antuley vs. R.S. Nayak (6) and held as under :- ``It is right to say that such disciplinary proceedings must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the irregularities. They cannot be initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and it is, thus, not, also, in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafide and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the Court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is to be long, always depends upon the facts of a case to case. More- over, if such delay is liable to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Whenever such a plea is raised, the Court has to way the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of the circumstances. (10). In the said case, as the enquiry has proceeded to a large extent it tilted the balance in favour of the administration and the Apex Court did not consider it proper to scuttle the process of law. (10). In the said case, as the enquiry has proceeded to a large extent it tilted the balance in favour of the administration and the Apex Court did not consider it proper to scuttle the process of law. However, commenting upon Bani Singh (supra), the Supreme Court observed that it was not clear from the said judgment as what was the nature of charges against the delinquent employee therein and in absence of any material to ascertain the gravity of the charges, it cannot be said that the said judgment can have universal application. The Court held that while quashing the charges, the Court has to weigh all the factors, both for and against the delinquent officer, and come to the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstances. (11). Shri P.C. Sharma, learned counsel placed reliance upon the Division Bench judgment of this Court passed in State of Rajasthan vs. Gulab Chand Sindal, (7), wherein the Court reversed the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge, wherein the departmental proceedings had been quashed on the ground of delay. While deciding the said case, this Court has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Faizabad vs. Sachindra Nath Pandey & Ors. (8), wherein the Supreme Court held that when the charges are serious and of grave nature, mere delay would not be sufficient to hold that the departmental enquiry be quashed. (12). Thus, if the delay remains unexplained, prejudice to the delinquent employee may be writ large on the face of it and only in exceptional circumstances where the Court is satisfied that delay in initiating the disciplinary proceedings is likely to defeat the cause of justice, the Court may be justified in intercepting the inquiry. (13). In the instant case, it has been the specific case of the respondents that the disciplinary proceedings generally initiated ``soon after discovering the irregularities and the charges against the petitioner are of a very serious and grave nature, therefore, in view of the law referred to above, the facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant any interference by this Court in its extraordinary jurisdic- tion under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner has obtained the interim relief from this Court and, thus, the proceedings could not be concluded and for the same the respondents should not be blamed in view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court in Aqeela vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. decided on 17.1.98 (9), wherein it was held that : ``There can be no quarrel on the legal proposition that no party can suffer by the action of the Court and when the High Court is exercising its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the interest of justice requires that any un-deserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised. The institution of litigation by a party should not be permitted to confer an unfair advantage on the party responsible for it. (Vide : Grindledge Bank Limited vs. Income Tax Officer & Ors. AIR 1980 SC 656 ; Ram Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1992 SC 1888 ; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. M.V. Vyasaya & Company (supra); and Smt. Ram- pati Jayaswal & Ors. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. AIR 1997 Allahaabad 171). It is, also, settled law that no litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges in the final order to be passed in the case and if the writ peti- tion is ultimately dismissed, the interim order stands nullified automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs by getting interim order and thereafter blame the Court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately devoid of any merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The maxim ``Actus Curie hemi- nem gravabit is applicable in such a case, which means that the act of the Court shall prejudice no-one. In such a situation the Court is under an obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the Court. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Vide Dr. A.K. Sircar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 1993 Suppl. Thus, any undeserved or unfair advantage gained by a party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralised as institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the Court. (Vide Dr. A.K. Sircar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. 1993 Suppl. (2) SCC 734; Shiv Shanker & Ors. vs. Board of Directors, Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Cor- poration & Anr. 1995 Suppl. (2) SCC 726; M/s. Kannoriya Chemicals and Industries Ltd. vs. U.P. Electricity Board AIR 1994 Allahabad 273; and Ugam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. 1997 (3) RLW 1517). (14). As the petitioner has obtained the interim order and respondents have suffered from the said interim relief as they could not conclude the disciplinary pro- ceedings against the petitioner, the petitioner cannot be permitted to derive any benefit from such interim order. (15). Thus, in view of the above, the petition is devoid of any merit and accordingly dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.