K. G. BALAKRISHNAN, C. J. ( 1 ) RESPONDENT No. 1 in Special Civil Application No. 2003/82 is the appellant. The. petitioners in Special Civil Application were working as Junior Clerks, stenographer and in other similar categories. They contended that they were entitiled to be considered for promotion to the posts of Senior Clerk and Stengorapher Grade-Ill. The petitioners therein raised their claim on the strength of a judgment passed by this Court. The learned Single Judge held that on the basis of Government Resolution as incorporated in the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the petitioners were entitiled to be considered for promotion and the Special Civil Application was allowed. Aggrieved by the same, present Letters Patent Appeal is preferred. ( 2 ) THE impugned judgment was passed on 21. 3. 1995. The record shows that there was no interim stay against operation of the judgment. Promotions of the respondents herein must have been considered by the authority and appropriate orders must have been passed by this time. Moreover, the learned Single Judge had directed only to consider the cases of the petitioners for promotion to the post of Senior Clerk and Stenographer grade-Ill, If they were eligible for appointment to the said posts. The appellants were asked to pass appropriate orders pursuant to the judgment of the learned Single Judge. It is also not brought to our notice that any appeal was preferred against the judgment rendered in Special Civil Application No. 4722 and other cognate matters. The impugned judgment is also Passed on the basis of Government Resolution Annexure-A. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant was not present when the appeal was taken up for hearing and when we were about to dismiss the appeal, the learned counsel for the appellant appeared and contended that this being an appeal filed under Clause 15 of the letters Patent Act, the same may not be dismissed without hearing the appellants -sel. He further contended that if the appellants counsel is absent the Court shall only it for default and shall not advert to the points raised in the appeal and dispose it of on merits. This contention was raised based on Rule 17 of Order 41 of the CPC read " with Rule 84 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993. He further contended that if the appellants counsel is absent the Court shall only it for default and shall not advert to the points raised in the appeal and dispose it of on merits. This contention was raised based on Rule 17 of Order 41 of the CPC read " with Rule 84 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, 1993. The learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on two earlier decisions of this Court in the case of J. M. Patel vs. P. G. Patel reported in 34 (1) GLR page-830 and in the case of Shantilal chandrashanker and Anr. vs. Bai Basi, Wd/o of Bhura Anop. reported in 16 (1) GLR page-1. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not a Civil Proceeding and by virtue of Rule 84 of the Gurjarat high Court Rules, 1993, provisions contained in Order 41 of the CPC shall apply and, therefore, appeal cannot be dismissed on merits when there is no appearance for the appellant. Rule 84 of the Gujarat High Courts Rules reads as follows :"84. Provision of Order XLI, CPC and rules re : regular appeals to apply to letters Patent Appeals. Except otherwise provided in this Chapter, the provisions of Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure and the rules herein contained applicable to regular appeals shall apply to Letters Patent Appeals. "rule 17 of Order 41 of the CPC is to the following effect: "17. Dismissal of appeal for appellants defualt. (1) Where on the day fixed, or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned, the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the Court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed. Explantion. Nothing in this sub-rule shall be construed as empowering the court to dismiss the appeal on the merits. (2) Where the appellant appears and the respondent does not appear, the appeal shall be heard ex parte. ( 5 ) GOING by Rule 17 of Order 41 of the CPC, if the appellant does not appear the court can dismiss the matter for default of appearance and the Explanation added to sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 makes it abundantly clear that the Court shall not dispose of the matter on merits. ( 5 ) GOING by Rule 17 of Order 41 of the CPC, if the appellant does not appear the court can dismiss the matter for default of appearance and the Explanation added to sub-rule (1) of Rule 17 makes it abundantly clear that the Court shall not dispose of the matter on merits. ( 6 ) THE view taken by this Court in the case of Madhusudan Vegetable Products Co. Ltd. vs. Rupa Chemicals, Vapi and Ors. , reported in 27, (1) GLR page-10 and in the case of shantilal Chandrashanker and Anr. vs. Bai Basi Wd/o of Bhura Anop reported in 16 (1) glr page-1, are consistent with this legal position. But the important question that is to be considered is, whether the present Letters Fetters Appeal which is filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge exercising original jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the constitution of India, could be said to be civil proceeding so as to warrant the application of Order 41 Rule 17 of the CPC and Rule 84 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, in view of the express provision contained in Sec. 141 of the CPC. Sec. 141 of the CPC says that the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure in regard to suits can be followed as far as it may be made applicable in all proceeding in Court of Civil Jurisdiction. The explanation added by way of Amendment Act of 1976, expressly states that the expression "proceedings" contained in Sec. 141 includes proceedings under Order 9, but does not include any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Section 141 of CPC is to the following effect:"141. Miscellaneous proceedings. The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. Explanation. In this Section, the expression "proceedings" includes proceedings under Order IX, but does not include any proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution. "from the above provision it is clear that if it is a civil proceeding the provisions contained in the Code would apply to the appellate proceedings also. But if it is a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the provision contained in the code may not be strictly applicable. "from the above provision it is clear that if it is a civil proceeding the provisions contained in the Code would apply to the appellate proceedings also. But if it is a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, the provision contained in the code may not be strictly applicable. ( 7 ) WE are fortified in this view by the decision of the Superme Court in the case of puran Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors. reported in AIR 1996 SC 1092 . In that case writ petition was filed challeging the scheme prepared under Sec. 14 of the East punjab Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1948. The order passed by the Assistant Director was sought to be quashed. During the pendency of the writ petition the respondent No. 2 in the petition died and his legal heirs were not brought on record. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it was not maintainable in absence of necessary parties. The appeal filed against that decision was dismissed by holding that writ petition had been abated. The Five Judge Bench of the supreme Court had held in the case of Teja Singh vs. Union Terriory of Chandigarh, reported in AIR 1982 Pandh 169 (FB), that Order 22 of the Code of Civil procedure was applicable to proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, in view of the writ Rules framed by the said High Court. On behalf of the appellant in the said appeal, it was argued before the Supreme Court that Arts. 226 and 227 of the constitution of India have vested extraordinary power in the High Court and the procedure thereof cannot be regulated or controlled by the provisions of the CPC because the power under Arts. 226 and 227 or the Constitution has to be exercised for the ends of justice taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of a particular case. That power cannot be circumscribed by technical procedural rules regarding suit or appeal as provided under the Code. This contention was accepted and it was held that the High court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution has to adopt its own procedure which is resonable and expeditious. That power cannot be circumscribed by technical procedural rules regarding suit or appeal as provided under the Code. This contention was accepted and it was held that the High court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution has to adopt its own procedure which is resonable and expeditious. It was held in the said case as follows :"when the High Court exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the constitution, it aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy to a person, whose legal or Constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules laid down in Civil P. C. are to be applied to writ proceedings the very object and purpose is likely to be defeated. In view of the conflicting opinions expressed by the different Courts, the Parliament by the aforesaid amending Act (1976) introduced the explanation saying that in Sec. 141 of the code the expression "proceedings" does not include "any proceedings under Art. 226 of the Constitution "and statuorily recognised the view expressed by some of the Courts that writ proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution shall not be deemed to be proceedings within the. meaning of Sec. 141 of the Code. After the introduction of the explanation to Sec. 141 of the Code, it can be said that when sec. 141 provides that the procedure prescribed in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable "in all proceedings in any court of Civil Jurisdiction" it shall not include a proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution, In this background, it cannot be held that the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code are applicable per se to writ proceedings. " ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contended that a Letters Patent Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot be construed as a proceeding under An. 226/227 of the Constitution. According to him, it is a civil proceeding and the entire provisions contained in Order 41 of the CPC shall apply to it. " ( 8 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant contended that a Letters Patent Appeal filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent cannot be construed as a proceeding under An. 226/227 of the Constitution. According to him, it is a civil proceeding and the entire provisions contained in Order 41 of the CPC shall apply to it. It is submitted by him that under the Gujarat High Court Rules, no appeal is provided against the judgment of a learned Single Judge exercising power under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution and appeal is provided under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, the entire proceedings shall be construed as civil proceedings. It is true that a party who has been denied relief by the learned Single Judge in a petition under Art. 226 has got a statutory right of appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. But so far as this Court is concerned, while considering the said Letters Patent Appeal it exercises powers conferred under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution. It is a well known proposition that an appeal is continuation of a proceeding and it does not alter the nature and character of the original proceeding. It is interesting to note that in the case of Smt. Asha Devi vs. Dukhi Sao and Ors. , reported in air 1974 SC 2048 , a question arose whether in a Letters Patent Appeal jurisdiction of the appellant Court is limited to question of law under Sec. 100 of the CPC or the whole decree lies open before the Appellate Court. The Supreme Court observed that "the power of a Division Bench hearing Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 from the judgment of the Single Judge in first appeal is not limited only to a question of law under Sec. 100 of the CPC but it has the same power which the Single Judge has as a first Appellate Court in respect of both questions of fact and of law. The limitation on the power of the Court imposed by Secs. 100 and 101 of the CPC cannot be made applicable to a Letters Patent appeal for the simple reason that Single Judge of the High Court is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. ( 9 ) IN the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and Ors. vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and Ors. 100 and 101 of the CPC cannot be made applicable to a Letters Patent appeal for the simple reason that Single Judge of the High Court is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. ( 9 ) IN the case of Baddula Lakshmaiah and Ors. vs. Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple and Ors. , reported in 1996 (3) SCC 52 , while considering the nature and scope of the power of the letters Patent Bench in appeal filed against the decision of a Single Judge, the Supreme court held that"against the orders of the Trial Court, first appeal lay before the High court, both on facts as well as law. Ibis the internal working of the High Court which splits it into different "benches" and yet the Court remains one. A Letters Patent appeal permitted under the Letters Patent, is normally an intra-Court appeal whereunder the letters Patent Bench, sititing as a Court of Correction, corrects its own orders in exercise of the same jurisdiction as was vested in the Single Judge. " ( 10 ) THE Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that for all Letters patent Appeals Provisions contained in Order 41 of the CPC shall apply, in view of the provisions of Sec. 84 of the Gujarat High Court Rules, cannot be accepted. The Letters patent Appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge while exercising the powers under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution of India can be construed only as a proceeding under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution. Therefore, the provisions contained in Order 41 of the CPC are not strictly applicable to them. The High Court exercises extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India to issue various prerogative writs or directions or orders and it is a speedy and efficacious remedy for the aggrieved party. The powers of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of india are discretionary and no limits are placed upon that discretion. But it must be exercised along the recognised lines and subject to certain self-imposed restrictions and not arbitrarily. The elaborate procedure contemplated under the CPC in respect of a regular suit as such are not applicable to the proceedings under Art. 226/227 of the constitution. The rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act are also not strictly made applicable to the proceedings under writ jurisdiction. The elaborate procedure contemplated under the CPC in respect of a regular suit as such are not applicable to the proceedings under Art. 226/227 of the constitution. The rules of evidence contained in the Indian Evidence Act are also not strictly made applicable to the proceedings under writ jurisdiction. Generally such cases are decided on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties and the disputed questions of facts are not generally matter for decision in these proceedings. By the very nature of the proceedings the provisions contained in the CPC cannot be applied mutatis mutandis to such proceedings. While considering an appeal filed against the judgment of a learned single Judge, the same parameters shall apply and such proceedings also cannot be regulated by the provisions contained in Order 41 of the CPC. Taking into consideration the number of writ petitions filed in a High Court and the number of letters Patent appeals filed against the decisions of the learned Single Judges, the court must have the power to dispose of the matters on merits, when appellant or his counsel remain absent in the Court. If a matter is dismissed for default, again the appellant may seek restoration and insist for further hearing of the appeal which may ultimately consume the time of the Court. Explanation to Sec. 141 of the CPC has been added in the 1976 Amending Act only to see that the proceedings under Art. 226/227 of the Constitution are not subjected to elaborate consideration at the hands of the Court as a regular suit or appeal. Therefore, we are of the view that Letters Patent appeal filed against the judgment of the learned Single Judge while exercising jurisdiction under art. 226/227 of the Constitution, can be disposed of on merits, even if the appellant fails to make his appearance and the provisions contained in Order 41 Rule 17 of the CPC are not applicable to such proceedings, in view of the express provisions contained in sec. 141 of the CPC. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in issuing a direction to consider the case of the respondents for promotion of the cadre of Senior Clerk. As we have stated earlier, the learned Single Judge has only directed to consider their claims for promotion. ( 11 ) IN the instant case, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge was not justified in issuing a direction to consider the case of the respondents for promotion of the cadre of Senior Clerk. As we have stated earlier, the learned Single Judge has only directed to consider their claims for promotion. No direction in the nature of mandamus has been issued by the learned Single Judge. The contention raised by the appellants counsel that the appellant-agency would not be in a position to entertain the claim for promotion, despite the fact that he admits that several other persons, who were similarly situated like the respondents, were given promotion to the post of Senior Clerk, has no merit. ( 12 ) FOR the above reasons, we are not inclined to interfere with the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge. .