Honble PRASAD, J.–This misc. appeal arises out of an order passed by the learned Addl. District Judge No.3 Jodhpur dt. 3rd February, 1998. By this order, learned trial Court dismissed the application of the appellant under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 r/w Sec. 151 CPC. The case of the appellant before the learned trial Court was that earlier to the present suit, the parties had litigated. The defendant in the present suit had filed an injunction suit in which the present appellants and Smt. Pari, deceased were defendants. In that suit, father of defendants, defendant Kuna Ram had prayed that in 1961 and 1970 two separate parcels of land were purchased by him from the Municipality and U.I.T. respectively. During proceedings of the suit, Kuna Ram died and Madanlal and others were taken on record as his legal represe- ntatives. The case of Kuna Ram in the first suit was that Smt. Pari and others were interferring with his possession of the property purchased by him from the Municipality and U.I.T. Written statement was filed on behalf of Smt. Pari and others. In that written statement, few of the objections which are now sought to be agitated in the suit were raised by the appellant and Smt. Pari. Subsequent to filing of the written statement, they permitted the suit to go ex-parte. The ex-parte decree was passed in favour of the legal representatives of Kuna Ram, the present respondents. (2). To challenge that decree, the present appellants filed a suit to get the decree set aside, inter alia on the ground of fraud and certain illegalities alleged to have been committed by the trial Court. The illegalities which have been alleged to have been committed are that no issues were framed by the trial Court. Municipality and U.I.T. were not impleaded as party and question of title of the plaintiffs could not have been gone into in a injunction suit. (3). The respondents defendants contested the suit and urged that before filing the suit, the plaintiffs had made an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to get the decree set aside. That application was refused and order has become final. Further, the plaintiffs had filed objections under Sec.47 CPC. also after filing of pre- sent suit. (3). The respondents defendants contested the suit and urged that before filing the suit, the plaintiffs had made an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to get the decree set aside. That application was refused and order has become final. Further, the plaintiffs had filed objections under Sec.47 CPC. also after filing of pre- sent suit. In those objections, the plaintiffs had almost taken all the points which are subject matter of the suit and that those objections were gone into by the Executive Court and the objections were negated. The plaintiffs have failed to take any proceedings against the rejection of those objections. In the face of these two proceedings, the present suit, out of which this appeal arises is barred under the provision of Explanation 4 of Sec.11 read with Sec.12 of C.P.C. (4). I have heard learned counsel for the parties. As regards the fraud, the learned trial court has held that there appears to be no fraud committed by the defendants with the court and unless the plaintiffs show that fraud was played with the Court, no suit can be held to be maintainable to get the decree set aside. As re- gards the alleged illegalities committed the trial Court has held that they could have been at best be a subject matter of an appeal. The defendant has relief on Supreme Court Judgment in the case of Ittyavira Mathai vs. Varkey, Varkey and another (1), wherein it has been held as under:- ``(8) The first point raised by Mr. Paikedy for the appellant is that the decree in O.S.No.59 of 1093 obtained by Anantha Iyer and his brother in the suit on the hypothecation bond executed by Ittyavira in favour of Ramalinga Iyer was a nullity because the suit was barred by time. Even assuming that the suit was barred by time, it is difficult to appreciate the contention of learned counsel that the decree can be treated as a nullity and ignored in subsequent litigation. If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. If the suit was barred by time and yet, the court decreed it, the court would be committing an illegality and therefore the aggrieved party would be entitled to have the decree set aside by preferring an appeal against it. But it is well settled that a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit and over the parties thereto, though bound to decide right may decide wrong, and that even though it decided wrong, it would not be doing something which it had no jurisdiction to do. It had the jurisdiction over the subject matter and it had the jurisdiction over they party and therefore, merely because it made an error in deciding a vital issue in the suit, it cannot be said that it has acted beyond its jurisdiction. As has often been said, courts have jurisdiction to decide right or to decide wrong and even though they decide wrong, the decrees rendered by them cannot be treated as nullities. Learned counsel however referred us to the decision of the Privy Council in Iaqbal Ahmad vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh (AIR 1935 SC 85) and contended that since the court is bound under the provisions of S.3 of the Limitation Act to ascertain for itself whether the suit before it was within time, it would act without jurisdiction if it fails to do so. All that the decision relied upon says is that S.3 of the Limitation Act is pre-emptory and that it is the duty of the court to take notice of this provision and give effect to it even though the point of limitation is not referred to in the pleading. The Privy Council has not said that where the court fails to perform its duty, it acts without jurisdiction. If it fails to do its duty, it merely makes an error of law and an error of law can be corrected only in the manner laid down in the Civil Procedure Code. If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity. (5). If the party aggrieved does not take appropriate steps to have that error corrected, the erroneous decree will hold good and will not be open to challenge on the basis of being a nullity. (5). In view of this proposition of law that if a court has jurisdiction and the aggrieved party could have appealed against that decree, then errors of law which could have been corrected by the appellate Court cannot be made the subject matter of yet another suit. There will be no end to such litigation. The illegalities can be committed in any proceedings. Such illegality can only be corrected by the appellate court. Filing of a separate suit is not permissible in such circumstances. (6). The trial Court has refused injunction by observing that there is no prima facie case on the basis of foregoing discussions of the question of maintainability of the suit. I concur with the finding of the learned trial Court. There is no question of injunction being granted in favour of the appellant. In my view the trial Court has rightly refused the grant of injunction. There is no force in the appeal and the appeal is dismissed. (7). At this stage, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that he may be permitted to withdraw the suit. I am afraid that domain of granting permission of withdrawal of the suit rests with the trial Court. I am only dealing with a Misc. Appeal. This would not be proper for me to go into this question. The appellant would be well advised to make this prayer before the trial court. With this observation, this Court refuses to grant indulgence on this question. In view of above, the Misc. Appeal is dismissed.