JUDGMENT Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J. This first miscellaneous appeal is at the instance of a defendant in a suit for specific performance of contract and is directed against order No. 13 dated March 11, 1991 passed by the learned trial Judge thereby disposing of an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the plaintiffs. 2. By the order impugned, the learned trial Judge restrained the defendant from transferring and/or encumbering and/or leasing out and/or changing the nature and character of the suit property till the disposal of the suit. 3. There is no dispute that appellant herein executed three separate agreements for sale with each of the plaintiffs and their mother, since deceased, for sale of 1/3rd undivided share of the suit property in their favour separately on payment of consideration money mentioned therein after receiving a sum of Rs. 75,000/- as earnest money from each of the plaintiffs and their mother. Complaining illegal termination of those agreements on the part on the defendant, the plaintiffs filed a suit for specific performance of contract within eleven months from the date of execution of the agreements. The mother of the plaintiffs died just before the institution of the instant suit. 4. In the aforesaid suit, the plaintiffs filed an application for temporary injunction restraining the defendant from transferring/encumbering/leasing and/or changing the nature and character of the suit property on the allegation that the defendant had started negotiation with the third parties for transferring the suit property. 5. The aforesaid application for temporary injunction was contested by the defendant thereby denying and disputing the allegations made by the plaintiffs. In the said written objection the defendant alleged that the plaintiffs were not ready and willing to perform their parts of the contract and the sole object of the plaintiffs was to gain time and as such the defendant was within her right to cancel those agreements. 6. The learned trial Judge on consideration of the materials before him found that the plaintiffs had a prima facie case to go for trial and in view of the nature of the suit, concluded that there should be an order of status quo as regards nature and character of the property and the property should not be transferred or encumbered in any way till the disposal of the suit. 7. 7. Being dissatisfied, the defendant has preferred the instant first miscellaneous appeal. 8. Mr. Mukherjee, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant has contended that the learned trial Judge while disposing of the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code has not followed the well accepted principles which are required to be followed by a court dealing with such application. 9. According to Mr. Mukherjee, merely because there is a prima facie case to go for trial, the learned court below could not grant any order in injunction unless it is further satisfied that the balance of convenience and inconvenience is in favour of granting injunction. Over and above, Mr. Mukherjee contends, the plaintiffs must satisfy the court that they would suffer irreparable loss and injury unless an order of injunction is passed in their favour. 10. The doctrine of Lis Pendenr, Mr. Mukherjee continues, is the sufficient protection of the plaintiffs and as such no injunction was necessary to protect the alleged interest of the plaintiffs. 11. Mr. Mukherjee further disputes the correctness of the finding of the learned trial Judge as regards the prima facie case of the plaintiffs. According to him, in the facts of the present case the learned trial Judge ought to have held there was no prima facie case of the plaintiffs to go for trial. 12. Mr. Ghosal, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs/ respondents has on the other hand supported the order impugned and has contended that the learned trial Judge after applying the proper tests has rightly exercised discretion in favour of the plaintiffs and as such we should not interfere with such a reasonable order. Mr. Ghosal further contends that the doctrine of lis pendense cannot give protection to a plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract, Mr. Ghosal thus prays for dismissal of the instant appeal. 13. Before we proceed to appreciate the respective contentions of the learned advocates for the parties, we are quite alive to the limited scope of an appeal against an order of temporary injunction. An order of injunction is a discretionary one. Ghosal thus prays for dismissal of the instant appeal. 13. Before we proceed to appreciate the respective contentions of the learned advocates for the parties, we are quite alive to the limited scope of an appeal against an order of temporary injunction. An order of injunction is a discretionary one. In an appeal against such an order, the appellate court generally does not interfere with the discretion exercised by the trial Judge unless it appears that while exercising such discretion, the learned trial Judge has wrongly applied the principles of grant of such discretion or unless it is established that such discretion has been unreasonably or capriciously used. The appellate court will not be justified in interfering with the discretion of the trial Judge solely on the ground that if it had considered the matter at the trial stage it might have come to a contrary conclusion. If the discretion has been exercised by the trial court reasonably and in a judicial manner, the fact that the appellate court could have taken a different view may not justify interference with the trial court's exercise of discretion. However, if it appears to the appellate court that in exercise of its discretion the trial court had acted unreasonably or capriciously or has ignored the relevant fact, then it would be open to the appellate court to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the trial Court. (See Pratima Dutta vs. Nilima Seal 1997 (2) CLJ 409) 14. In fine, as observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. vs. Its Mazdur Sabha reported in AIR 1980 SC 1896 , the appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong. 15. Now turning to the facts of the present case, we find that the execution of the three agreements and acceptance of Rs. 75,000/- each as earnest money are admitted by the defendant. The suit has been filed within eleven months from the date of agreements. Whether Clause 10 of the agreement authorises the defendant to forfeit earnest money is a debatable question to be decided at the trial. If it does not, then the defendant is not entitled to cancel the agreement without refunding the total amount of Rs. 2,25,000/-. The suit has been filed within eleven months from the date of agreements. Whether Clause 10 of the agreement authorises the defendant to forfeit earnest money is a debatable question to be decided at the trial. If it does not, then the defendant is not entitled to cancel the agreement without refunding the total amount of Rs. 2,25,000/-. Moreover, whether the defendant was really prevented from applying under section 230A of the Income Tax Act for the inaction of the plaintiffs, will be adjudicated after giving both sides opportunity of leading evidence. Therefore, the finding of the learned trial Judge that there exists a prima facie case of plaintiffs to go for trial is quite a reasonable view and we find no reason to interfere with such a finding. 16. As regards the other two factors viz. the question of balance of convenience and inconvenience and whether the plaintiffs will suffer irreparable loss and injury, although the learned trial Judge in so many words has not recorded his observation, we, being the first appellate court, have taken into consideration those factors in exercise of our powers conferred under sections 107 and 108 read with order 41 and order 43 of the Code and we are of the definite view that in the facts and circumstances of the present case those two points should be answered in favour of the plaintiffs. This is, in our opinion, a fit case where during the pendency of the suit for specific performance of the contract, the defendant should not be permitted to transfer or encumber or change the nature and character of the suit property. We find no force in the contention of Mr. Mukherjee that the protection given under section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act is sufficient to protect the interest of the plaintiffs. The relief of specific performance of contract is a discretionary one. If at the time of final hearing of the suit the court finds that the defendant or a subsequent transferee has demolished the entire property or has raised a multistoried structure, the court may refuse to grant such relief and instead, grant a decree for refund of earnest money and damages. Therefore in the facts of the present case there should be injunction as ordered by the learned trial Judge. Therefore in the facts of the present case there should be injunction as ordered by the learned trial Judge. The object of grant of temporary injunction is to maintain status quo so that the relief claimed in the suit may not become inappropriate at the time of disposal of the suit. 17. Therefore, we find no force in either of the contentions raised by Mr. Mukherjee and as such this appeal is dismissed. 18. Since the suit is pending for the last eight years and is otherwise ready, we direct the learned trial Judge to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and in no case later than March, 1999. 19. No costs. Ruma Pal, J: I agree. Appeal dismissed. Directions issued.