Narayan Madhavji Jat v. State of Maharashtra & others
1998-10-05
N.ARUMUGHAM, VISHNU SAHAI
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - SAHAI VISHNU, J.:---By this petition preferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner who is a friend of the detenu Arvind Vyas, seeks to challenge the detention order dated 15-7-1996 passed by the 2nd respondent Smt. Neela Satyanarayana, the Detaining Authority, detaining the detenu under section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 hereinafter referred to as the COFEPOSA Act, and the declaration dated 5-9-1997, issued by the Additional Secretary, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, New Delhi, under section 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act, extending the period of detention of the detenu from one year to two years. 2. The detention order dated 15-7-1996 along with the grounds of detention bearing the said date was served on the detenu on 3-8-1997. 3. Since a reference to the prejudicial activities of the detenue contained in the grounds of detention necessitating the issuance of the impugned detention order and the impugned declaration, in our view, is not necessary for the disposal of this petition, we are not adverting to them. 4. Although in this petition, Mrs. A.M.Z. Ansari, learned Counsel for the petitioner, has pleaded a large number of grounds but since, in our view, this petition deserves to succeed on the solitary ground pleaded as ground No. 4(vi), we are not adverting to the other grounds. Ground No. 4(vi), in short, is that the impugned detention order dated 15-7-1996 was executed very belatedly on 3-8-1997 and since no effective steps stipulated by law to have it promptly executed, were taken, it is vitiated in law. In the said ground, it has been specifically pleaded that the most effective method to have the detention order executed namely promptly of making an application for cancellation of bail, has not been taken and on the converse two applications for extension of bail have been moved by the sponsoring authority. It has been urged by Mrs. Ansari that the returns filed from the side of the respondents, disclose that the proposal for taking action under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was not promptly made as laid down in judicial pronouncement of this Court but was made as late as 15-4-1997, i.e. nearly ten months after the passing of the detention order. Mrs.
Ansari that the returns filed from the side of the respondents, disclose that the proposal for taking action under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was not promptly made as laid down in judicial pronouncement of this Court but was made as late as 15-4-1997, i.e. nearly ten months after the passing of the detention order. Mrs. Ansari also invited our attention to the fact that the returns filed by the respondents do not also disclose whether any action under section 7(1)(a) of the COFEPOSA Act was taken. 5. Ground No. 4(vi) of the petition has been replied to in three returns, viz. those of :- (i) Mr. M.M. Kamble, Joint Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special), Mantralaya, Mumbai, (ii) Mr. C. Rigzin, Assistant Commissioner of Customs, COFEPOSA Cell, Airport, Mumbai and (iii) Shri R.B. Dange, Inspector of Police attached to P.C.B., C.I.D., Mumbai. The short and long of the averments in the said returns is that the authorities were desperately making efforts to serve the impugned detention order on the detenu but the same could not be served as he had made himself scarce. We regret that we cannot accept this in view of the reasons mentioned in paras 6 to 9. 6. We have examined the averments in the said three returns and we are constrained to observe that they do not disclose that the most effective modes stipulated in law to have the detention order executed on the detenu were taken. From a perusal of the three returns we find that (i) no application for cancellation of the bail of the detenu was moved; (ii) on the converse, two applications for extension of his bail, viz. those dated 11-10-1996 and 13-1-1997, were moved by the sponsoring authority; (iii) no proposal for initiating any action under section 7(1)(a) of the COFEPOSA Act was made; and (iv) action under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was taken on 15-4-1997, i.e. ten months after the passing of the detention order. 7. It is well settled that if the authorities are not able to execute the detention order and are really sincere to execute it, they should apply for cancellation of bail at the earliest opportunity. There are no dearth of authorities in support of this proposition but to eschew prolixity we are only referring to one, viz.
7. It is well settled that if the authorities are not able to execute the detention order and are really sincere to execute it, they should apply for cancellation of bail at the earliest opportunity. There are no dearth of authorities in support of this proposition but to eschew prolixity we are only referring to one, viz. reported in J.T. 1995(6) S.C. 331 (P.M. Harikumar v. Union of India and others)1, wherein in para 13 the Apex Court thus observed:- "13. If the respondents were really sincere and anxious to serve the order of detention without any delay it was expected of them, in the fitness of things, to approach the High Court or, at least, the Court which initially granted the bail for its cancellation. .. .. ...". The said decision of the Apex Court was relied upon in two Division Bench decisions of our Court, viz. those reported in 1998 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 599, (Rameshkumar Balkrishna Cibal v. State of Maharashtra and others)2, 1998(5) Bom.C.R. 671 , (Ismail Shaikh Ali v. State of Maharashtra and others)3. In the former decision, in para 20, the Division Bench took the view that if the detention order could not be served "the correct course for the respondents was to apply for cancellation of bail". In the later decision, this Court in paras 13 and 14 has emphasised the importance of moving an application for cancellation of bail in a case where the detention order on the detenu could not be executed. 8. In the instant case, we find that not only no application for cancellation of bail was moved but on the converse two applications for extension of bail viz. those dated 11-10-1996 and 13-1-1997 were moved by the sponsoring authority. On the former, his bail was extended till 13-1-1997 and on the latter it was extended till 10-3-1997. In a large number of Division Bench decisions, our Court has construed the act of applying for extension of bail as they very converse of urgency to execute the detention order. To eschew prolicity we are only referring to two such decisions : (i) 1998 Bom.CR.(Cri.) 599 and (ii) 1998(5) Bom.C.R. 671 . 9.
In a large number of Division Bench decisions, our Court has construed the act of applying for extension of bail as they very converse of urgency to execute the detention order. To eschew prolicity we are only referring to two such decisions : (i) 1998 Bom.CR.(Cri.) 599 and (ii) 1998(5) Bom.C.R. 671 . 9. Not only do we find that no application for cancellation of bail was moved and on the converse two applications for extension of bail were moved, but no action under section 7(1)(a) of the COFEPOSA Act was initiated and the proposal under section 7(1)(b) of the COFEPOSA Act was initiated after more than ten months of passing of the detention order, i.e. on 17-4-1996. This Court in 1998(5) Bom.C.R. 671 in para 19, has emphasised upon the importance of taking prompt action under section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act. The said para read thus :- "19. We wish to emphasise that although the COFEPOSA Act does not prescribe of a time limit for commencing action under section 7, it is implicit that action under the said provisions must be taken without much loss of time, for if taken belatedly it results in the detention order being belatedly executed on the detenu and this not only vitiates the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the Detaining Authority to preventively detain the detenu but also serveres the live-link between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the rationale of clamping a detention order on him. Coercive measures like those contained in section 7 are meant to be resorted to without undue delay. In this connection, we would like to refer to a decision of our Court reported in 1992 Cri.L.J. 2363, (Shri Netaji Narayan Lotlikar v. State of Goa and another)4, wherein the Division Bench observed in paras 5 and 7 that if there is delayed action under section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act the same has to be reasonably explained and failure to satisfactorily explain the same would be fatal." 10.
The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions has frowned upon the delay in execution of the detention order but again lest our judgment be over burdened with authorities, we are referring to only that reported in A.I.R. 1990 S.C. 225, (A. Abdul Rehman v. State of Kerala and others)5, wherein the detention order was issued on 7-10-1987 and the detenu was arrested on 18-1-1988 and since the said delay was not properly explained the Supreme Court quashed the detention order. 11. In our view, on account of the delay of 13 months in execution of the detention order and the failure of the authorities to take recourse to the most effective methods stipulated by law to have the detention order executed, the live link between the prejudicial activities of the detenu and the rationale of clamping the detention order on him has been snapped and the detention order instead of being preventive has become punitive. Consequently the detention order has to be set aside. And once it happens then it follows as a logical imperative that the declaration under section 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act has also to be set aside. 12. In the result, this petition is allowed. The impugned detention order and the impugned declaration under section 9(1) of the COFEPOSA Act are quashed and the detenu is directed to be released forthwith unless wanted in some other case. Rule is made absolute. Petition allowed. -----