JUDGMENT 1. A question with regard to the interpretation of the Explanation inserted in Section 3(b) (ii) (a) in the West Bengal Act No. LVI of 1980 is involved in this writ application. 2. The aforementioned question arises in the following circumstances: – "The respondent No. 4 sold .27 acres of land of R.S. Dag No. 94 appertaining to Khatian No. 21 of Mouza Dhobaberia, by a registered deed of sale dated 9.9.1974 and delivered possession thereof. Allegedly, the said land had been sold for purchasing more profitable land in another district. The petitioner's case is that in fact such purchase had also been made by respondent No. 4 by a sale deed dated 4.3.1971 from one Sukumar Sahoo as contained in Annexure-A to the writ application. The respondent No.4 was the second transferor." 3. An application was made by respondent No. 4 before the respondent No. 2 herein for restoration of the said land purported to be in terms of Section 4(1) of the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land Act, 1973 as allegedly the first transferor was not inclined to file such application. The said proceedings was registered as R.A.L. case no. 337 of 1978-79. A specific objection was raised by the petitioner that the said application was not maintainable. The said application, was dismissed on the ground that the petitioner being not a first transferor, the said Act has no application in the said case. 4. The respondent No. 4 preferred an appeal against the said order and the respondent No. 3 by an order dated 7.5.1984 passed in R.A. No. 58 of 1980, inter alia, held: – "There is no express denial in the act that the amendment of explanation under Section 4(4) R.A.L. as made on (Illegible) 8 of 1981 will bear no (Illegible) effect. This land has been enacted to provide some facilities to the poor transferors. In this case, the first transferor Sukumar Sahoo is reported to hold lands much more than the limit and as such he is not entitled to seek any relief under this Act. Moreover, Sri Sahoo may not be interested in seeking relief under this Act. The second transferor may be allowed to seek relief under this Act and his petition be accepted for hearing for rendering Justice to the second transferor without rejecting his petition on maintainability ground." (Underlining is mine for emphasis) 5. Moreover, Sri Sahoo may not be interested in seeking relief under this Act. The second transferor may be allowed to seek relief under this Act and his petition be accepted for hearing for rendering Justice to the second transferor without rejecting his petition on maintainability ground." (Underlining is mine for emphasis) 5. The admitted fact is that the writ petitioner is not the first purchaser. The said Act was enacted to provide for the restoration of land alienated under certain circumstances and matters connected therewith. 6. Section 4 of the said Act lays down the procedure for effecting restoration of lands alienated under certain circumstances. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 entitles a person being the transferor holding not more than 2 hectares of land in the aggregate on the date of transfer before the commencement of this Act or between the date of such commencement and the date of commencement of the West Bengal Land Restoration of Alienated Land (Amendment) Act, 1980. The said provision was amended by Section 3(a)(i) of the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land (Amendment) Act, 1980 replacing the words or within 4 years from the date of such commencement which were themselves substituted by Section 2(i) of the West Bengal Land Restoration of Alienated (Amendment) Act, 1970. By reason of the Amendment Act No. LVI of 1980, the explanation appended to the said Act was also amended which is to the following effect:– "The word transferor referred to in this Act means the first transferor or, where the first transferor is unwilling to get the transferred land restored, any subsequent transferor between the expiry of the year 1967 and the date of commencement of the West Bengal Restoration of Alienated Land (Amendment) Act, 1980 and includes the heirs of such first or subsequent transferor." 7. The aforementioned clause was substituted by Section 3(b) (ii) (a) of the West Bengal Amendment Act in stead and place of the following provision: – "The word transferor referred to in this Act means the first transferor between the expiry of the year 1967 and the expiry of four years from the date of commencement of this Act and includes the heirs of such first transferor." 8. The said Act, therefore, originally did not contemplate an application against the second transferor. 9. A new right, therefore, has been created in favour of a transferor as against a second transferee. 10. The said Act, therefore, originally did not contemplate an application against the second transferor. 9. A new right, therefore, has been created in favour of a transferor as against a second transferee. 10. The only question is whether the said provision is retrospective in operation. 11. It is now a well settled principle of law that the golden rule of construction is that all statutes should be presumed to be prospective unless it is made retrospective either expressly or by necessary implication. 12. Explanation as is well known is not a substantive provision. In S. Sundaram Pillai vs. V.R. Pattabiraman, AIR 1985 SC 582 , the Apex Court had laid down four objects as regard Explanation which are as follows:– "(a) To explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself. (b) Where there is any obsecurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to sub-serve (c) To provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful. (d) An Explanation cannot in any way interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where some gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment, and right with which any person under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same." 13. By reason of the said Explanation, therefore, no new right with retrospective effect could be created which would take away a right of property of the second purchaser. 14. In the year 1980 when the aforementioned Act was enacted, the protection of Article 31 contend in Part- III of the Constitution of India was available to a citizen. No person, thus, could have been deprived of his right from any property save and except in accordance with statute. However, even now in view of Article 300A of the Constitution, such a right exists. The Explanation appended to Section 4 of the said Act is not a charging provision. No person, thus, could have been deprived of his right from any property save and except in accordance with statute. However, even now in view of Article 300A of the Constitution, such a right exists. The Explanation appended to Section 4 of the said Act is not a charging provision. Thus, by reason of such Explanation a substantive right can neither be taken away nor can be conferred upon any other person. 15. Mr. Sahu, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent, however, has relied upon the decision in New Theatres (Carnatic Talkies) Ltd., Coimbatore vs. N. Vajrapani Naidu, AIR 1984 SC 1 and S.S. Grewal vs. State of Punjab & other, 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 234, for the proposition that the said Explanation is retrospective in nature so far as the same would apply to a pending proceeding. 16. In New Theatres (Carnatic Talkies) Ltd., Coimbatore vs. N. Vajrapani Naidu, AIR 1984 SC 1 , the Apex Court was considering the question as regard interpretation of the provision of Madras City Tenants' Protection Act. Section 9 of the said Act, deals with the matter relating to compensation. In that case although the suit for ejectment had already been filed, it had never been disputed that Section 9 would operate retrospectively and affect the rights of the parties. On that basis, the appellant therein had applied to the Court for the benefit of the provision of Section 9. Therein a clear provision was laid down that the amended provision of Section 9 would apply to a pending suit also. In that situation, requisite direction had been given in terms of the amended provision. 17. In S.S. Grewal vs. State of Punjab & other, 1993 Supp. (3) SCC 234, the Apex Court was concerned with seniority list. A statutory rule or order was made which was explanatory or clarificatory in nature. In that context, the Apex Court observed that as the circular letter in question merely was issued for clarification on certain doubts created by some departments, the same will be retrospective in nature. Reliance was made in this connection by the Apex Court to Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, page 58. 18. In that context, the Apex Court observed that as the circular letter in question merely was issued for clarification on certain doubts created by some departments, the same will be retrospective in nature. Reliance was made in this connection by the Apex Court to Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edition, page 58. 18. However, as indicated hereinbefore, if by reason of the Explanation appended to Section 4 of the said Act, a retrospective operation is given, the same would take away the right of a second transferee and create a fresh right upon a person who seeks alienation of the land which he has already transferred. An expropriatory legislation cannot be strictly construed. When the original Act was executed, benefit was sought to be granted in favour of a transferor who had to make a transfer which was distress in nature. If he was not entitled to the benefit of the said statute as he was in possession of a large area of land, it betrays one common sense as to how the transferee can without any express provision steps into the shoes of his predecessor. For the reasons aforementioned, I am of the opinion that the said Explanation cannot have any retrospective effect. This application is, therefore, allowed. The impugned order dated 7.5.84 is set aside. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.