Judgment :- A.S. Venkatachala Moorthy, J. The case of the petitioner is that the notification in respect of Idukki Housing cooperative Society for election of the Managing Committee members was issued on 29-4-1998. The petitioner, pursuant to the said notification, submitted his nomination paper on 14-5-1998 after complying with all the formalities. On 15-5-1998, the first respondent-Returning Officer - conducted the scrutiny of the nominations. The petitioner's nomination paper was rejected on the ground that he is the Managing Partner of Stonege Tourist Complex and the said firm has availed two loans from Idukki District Co-operative Bank and the firm has defaulted in making payments. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed this Original Petition. 2. According to the petitioner, a careful reading of R.44(1)(c)(1) of the Cooperative Societies Rules would clearly indicate that a person can be treated as a defaulter only if he is in default, either as principal debtor or as a surety, but here the petitioner is not even a member of the society which alone would enable him to borrow and further he has not stood as a surety to any borrower of the Society. The claim of the petitioner is that even though he is a managing partner of the registered firm, it cannot be said that rule 44(1)(c)(1) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules would also rope in the petitioner when the provision is otherwise and is to the effect that no member of the society, who is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him or loan in which he has stood as surety, shall be eligible for being elected. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the registered firm, namely, Stonege Tourist Complex, is a separate entity. 3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the registered firm, namely, Stonege Tourist Complex, is a separate entity. 3. The learned counsel further submitted that even assuming the said provision will apply to the petitioner, he being the Managing Director of the firm which borrowed and committed default in repayment, in view of the decision reported in Narayanappa v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (AIR 1966 SC 1300), that before proceeding against the partners of a firm, firstly the creditor or lendor has to proceed against the properties of the firm and that being so whether the petitioner is a defaulter or not can be decided only after the lendor/creditor proceed against the property of the firm and if the sale proceeds are not sufficient to discharge the liability and till it cannot be said that he is a defaulter. For all these reasons, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the first respondent erred in disqualifying the nomination of the petitioner. 4. The learned counsel for the second respondent referring to section 25 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932 would inter alia submit that the liability of the partners is one of joint and several. Placing reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court, reported in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. M/s. K, Kelukutty (AIR 1985 SC 1143), the learned counsel would submit that a partnership agreement creates and defines the relation of partnership and that the firm name is only a Collective name for the individual partners. Hence once admittedly the firm committed default, since the liability of the partners is one of joint and several, every partner is a defaulter within the meaning of the Act'. 5. The learned Government Pleader would reiterate the stand taken by the respondent in the counter-affidavit. It is submitted that one A.M. Joy, who also submitted a nomination paper, pointed out that the petitioner is a defaulter to the Idukki District Co-operative Bank, which is a Society registered under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 on the basis of the Certificate given by the General Manager of the said Co-operative Bank dated 15-5-1998. It is further submitted that the second respondent conducted a summary enquiry as contemplated under R.35(3)(e)(ii) and rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner under R.44(1)(e) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. 6. It is further submitted that the second respondent conducted a summary enquiry as contemplated under R.35(3)(e)(ii) and rejected the nomination paper of the petitioner under R.44(1)(e) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules. 6. The short point that arises for consideration is as to what is the scope of the words occurring in R.44(1)(c)(i) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules "is in default to the society or to any other society in respect of any loan or loans taken by him....". In other words, as in this case, where the petitioner is the Managing Partner of a registered firm and that firm has taken loans from the Idukki District Co-operative Bank and also committed default in payment of instalments, would it stand in the way of the Returning Officer accepting the nomination of the petitioner. To consider this point in issue, open has to refer to S.25 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932. According to the said provision, every partner is liable jointly with all the other partners and also severally, for all acts of the firm while he is a partner. In other words, the liability in the case of partnership is one of personal unlike in the case of a limited company. So, naturally it follows when a firm commits a default in repaying the loan, it would certainly amount to and mean that all partners have committed default. It cannot be said that only after the creditor proceeding against the properties of the firm and if the amounts realised out of such sale are not sufficient, that the partners could be said to have committed default. 7. That apart, it is not known as to why the petitioner has not impleaded the concerned society as a party, inasmuch as the petitioner seeks to become a member of the managing committee of that society. The said society is a proper party for the proper adjudication of the matter and it should have been impleaded as a respondent. 8. For the reasons stated above, the Original Petition is dismissed. Needless to mention that when the Original Petition is dismissed, automatically the interim orders passed by this Court, pending the disposal of the O.P. will also stand vacated.