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1998 DIGILAW 54 (ALL)

JAWAHIR SINGH v. ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA

1998-01-20

ALOK KUMAR BASU, D.K.SETH

body1998
( 1 ) JAWAHIR Singh has filed this writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India with the prayers that :- (i) quash order dated 28-8-1997 issued by the Election Commission of India (Annexure 1) (ii) a mandamus should go commanding respondents to issue appropriate direction to all the Returning Officer of the State to ignore the direction contained in order dated 28-8-1997 (Annexure 1) while deciding objection at the time of scrutiny of nomination papers and a further direction not to reject any nomination of a candidate who has been convicted but his appeal is pending and he is enlarged on bail in the course of elections to the Lok Sabha etc. (iii) declare Section 8 (3) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 ultra vires the Constitution. ( 2 ) SRI Sandip Saxena has put in appearance on behalf of the respondents namely, Election Commission of India and the Union of India. ( 3 ) SRI P. M. N. Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, has placed the averments made in the writ petition and two decisions reported in AIR 1961 Punjab 178 Dhanji Ram Sharma v. Union of India and AIR 1971 SC 330 , Manni Lal v. Parmai Lal. It may be mentioned that Shri Singh has argued the matter with ability. ( 4 ) ARTICLE 324 of the Constitution of India has created the apex-election authority by the name of Election Commission. The entire Chapter deals with the provisions relating to the elections that may be conducted from time to time in our Country be it for the Parliament or the State Legislature. The very first sub-Article of Art. 324 begins with words that"the superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections of Parliament and to the Legislature of every State and of elections to the offices of President and Vice President held under the Constitution shall be vested in a Commission (referred to in this Constitution as the Election Commission ). " ( 5 ) THE Election Commission is to be headed by a Chief Election Commissioner and, therefore, in the very nature of the thing it is within the powers of the Election Commissioner to issue directions as he thinks necessary for carrying out the constitutional obligation placed upon him. " ( 5 ) THE Election Commission is to be headed by a Chief Election Commissioner and, therefore, in the very nature of the thing it is within the powers of the Election Commissioner to issue directions as he thinks necessary for carrying out the constitutional obligation placed upon him. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid Circular dated 28-8-1997, summarised only to highlight the arguments of Sri Singh, would read as under :-ORDER Subject : Criminalisation of Politics -- participation of criminals in the electoral process as candidates -- disqualification on conviction for offences-effect of appeal and bail-regarding. Whereas, the country is facing the serious problem of criminalisation of politics in which criminals, i. e. persons convicted by Courts of law for certain offences, are entering into election fray and contesting as candidates; andwhereas, Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 lays down the conditions under which a person would be disqualified on grounds of conviction. . . . . . . . . . . . Whereas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Whereas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (the exact wordings are omitted because in these three paragraphs the wordings of sub-section (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 of R. P. Act have been referred to ). Whereas, sub-section (4) of of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 states that none of the above mentioned disqualification will take effect in case of a person who on the date of the conviction is a Member of Parliament or the Legislature of a State, till three months have elapsed from that date or, if within that period an appeal or application for revision is brought in respect of the conviction or the sentence, until that appeal or application is disposed of by the Court; and Whereas it has been observed that even those persons who are not the sitting members of Parliament or State Legislature on the date of conviction, contest election if they have filed an appeal or application for revision and have been granted bail during pendency of such appeals/revision; and Whereas, the Commission has carefully examined and considered the question whether such persons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . can contest elections during the period when they are released on bail. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Whereas , the Commission has observed that this very question has come to be considered by several Honble High Courts and they have taken the view that the release on bail does not wipe off the disqualification under the said Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951; and Whereas, it has been observed that the Honble Madhya Pradesh High Court, while dealing with the case of Purshottam Lal Kaushik v. Vidya Charan Shukla, AIR 1980 MP 188 . Whereas, the Honble High Court of Judicature at Allahabad also took a similar view in the case of Shri Sachindra Nath Tripathi v. Doodnath, 1987 All LJ 667. Whereas, the same question again came to be considered in a more recent case before the Honble Himachal Pradesh Court in Vikram Anand v. Rakesh Singh (in the aforesaid three paras the extracts from the three rulings referred to above have been quoted by the Election Commissioner and, therefore, it is not reproduced hereinbefore ). Whereas, it has also been observed that when the Honble Supreme Court dismissed the criminal appeal filed by Shri Rakesh Singh, it also dismissed his election appeal holding that Shri Singh was disqualified ab initio for contesting election under Section 8 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Now, therefore, the Election Commission has, after taking due note and paying due regard to the above judicial pronouncements of the Honble Supreme Court and the Honble High Courts, come to the considered view THAT THE DISQUALIFICATION UNDER SECTION 8 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951 FOR CONTESTING ELECTIONS TO PARLIAMENT AND STATE LEGISLATURE, ON CONVICTION FOR OFFENCES MENTIONED THEREIN, TAKES EFFECT FROM THE DATE OF CONVICTION BY THE TRIAL COURT, IRRESPECTIVE OF WHERE THE CONVICTED PERSON IS RELEASED ON BAIL OR NOT DURING THE PENDENCY OF APPEAL (SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO THE EXCEPTION IN THE CASE OF SITTING MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT AND STATE LEGISLATURE UNDER SUB-SECTION (4) OF THE SAID SECTION 8 OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT, 1951. (Emphasis supplied)Accordingly, the Election Commission, in exercise of its powers of superintendence, direction and control of elections to Parliament or State Legislature vested by Art. 324 of the Constitution, hereby, directs that all the Returning Officers, at the time of scrutiny of nominations, must take note of the above position and decide accordingly about the validity or otherwise of the candidature of contestants disqualified under the Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Sd/- and in the name of theelection Commission of India ( 7 ) AT this juncture it may be stated here that before proceeding further with the arguments advanced by Sri Singh it may be desirable to refer the facts of the cases cited in Dhrama Raj Singhs case (supra) the word conviction as used in Art. 311 (2) proviso (a) was being considered. Simultaneously, rules in the discipline and appeals Rules of the relevant Rules were being judged side by side with the provisions contained in Art. 311. The case, is, therefore, wholly out of point. ( 8 ) IN Manni Lals case the question which came to be considered by the Honble Supreme Court was whether a disqualification resulting from out of a conviction would be completely wiped out in case of acquittal. It has been so aptly observed by the Honble Supreme Court that appellate order of acquittal takes effect retrospectively and conviction and sentence are deemed to be set aside from date they are recorded. This case also will be out of point for the reason that according to the admitted case the appeal field by the petitioner is pending and he is on bail. ( 9 ) THIS may be relevant stage where it may be mentioned that petitioner Jawahir Singh, as stated in paragraph 3 of the writ petition stood convicted in Sessions Trial No. 33 of 1986 vide judgment and order dated Sept. ( 9 ) THIS may be relevant stage where it may be mentioned that petitioner Jawahir Singh, as stated in paragraph 3 of the writ petition stood convicted in Sessions Trial No. 33 of 1986 vide judgment and order dated Sept. 1, 1987, being convicted of offences under Section 302 read with Section 34, I. P. C. and under Section 397 read with Section 34, I. P. C. and also under Section 379, I. P. C. and awarded the sentence of life imprisonment under Section 302/34, I. P. C.) seven years R. I. (under Section 307/34, I. P. C.) and one year R. I. under Section 379 Against the order of the Sessions Court convicting the aforesaid petitioner, the petitioner has preferred Criminal Appeal No. 2301 of 1987 which is pending in this High Court and the petitioner has been enlarged on bail. ( 10 ) IN view of the aforesaid factual state of affairs, the argument of Shri Singh that the petitioner cannot be deemed to be disqualified within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R. P. Act is the surviving point to be considered. Fortunately, the Honble Supreme Court has in the one of the latest cases reported in Raghbir Singh v. Surjit Singh, JT 1994 (5) SC 311 speaking through Honble Justice J. S. Verma (as Hon. CJI then was) observed that :"there is no dispute that in accordance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, the appellant was disqualifed to be a candidate at the said election held in Feb. 1992 on this ground alone. The High Court has upheld this contention of the respondent election petitioner and allowed the election petition declaring the appellants said election to be void. There being no controversy that according to the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R. P. Act, the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election held on Feb. 1992. The submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. 1992. The submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of disqualification in sub-sections (1), (2), and (3) of Section 8 should be identical and there is no rational basis for providing a different period of disqualification in the different sub-section of Section 8 We are unable to accept this agrument. The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis of their nature and in the residuary provision contained in sub-section (3), the classification is made only with reference to the period of sentence being not less than two years (see paras 2 to 5 ). " ( 11 ) IN fact in Raghubir Singhs case (supra) it is specifically stated by the Honble Supreme Court that"thus, the only question for consideration by us is the constitutional validity of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R. P. Act. "in the later paragraphs their Lordships have negatived the argument that sub-section (3) of Section 8 is ultra vires. ( 12 ) SRI P. M. N. Singh on noticing this case law has, of course, appreciated that it is not possible for this Court to go into the question of vires of Section 8 (3) of the R. P. Act any more. He however, insisted with his argument that sub-section (4) of Section 9 of the Act is ultra vires and, therefore, this Court may go into that issue. It may be pointed out that sub-section (4) was enacted by amending Act No. 1 of 1989 and it made a provision for a sitting member of Parliament or Legislature of State, if while so sitting, a conviction order came to be recorded against him. This factual contingency would be totally hypthotical so far as the petitioner is concerned. Consequently this question has not to be gone into by this Court at all and in the circumstances of the present case. To repeat, the petitioner is a convict in a murder case and is on bail, therefore, his case has to be examined only by the provisions contained in Section 8 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the provisions in sub-section (4) thereof have no applicability whatsoever. To repeat, the petitioner is a convict in a murder case and is on bail, therefore, his case has to be examined only by the provisions contained in Section 8 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and the provisions in sub-section (4) thereof have no applicability whatsoever. ( 13 ) BEFORE parting, it may be mentioned that Shri Singh wanted to advance an argument that the aforesaid Circular of the Election Commission of India parttakes the character of becoming a judicial pronouncement rather than an administrative instruction. In this view of the supposed fallacy Sri Singh argued that the Election Commission has overstepped its jurisdiction. It is for the this reason that this Court has extensively referred to the entire circular above (omitting only the rulings) discussion and provisions in three sub-sections ). There is nothing in the aforesaid Circular which may be said to be an attempt on the part of the Election Commissioner to legislate. Therefore, this argument of Sri Singh is also not acceptable. ( 14 ) THE last argument advanaced by Shri Singh was that such a guideline should not have been issued because whether a nomination paper is going to be accepted or rejected on the provisions as enunciated by Section 8 and its sub-sections may be left open to the Returning Officers while scrutinising the nomination papers under Section 36 of the Representation of People Act. It is precisely the duty of the Election Commission to issue necessary guidelines for uninterrupted lawful and secure completion of election process. Consequently, the Court does not see any infirmity in the order of the Election Commission because it only narrates the spoken words of the Section 8 and also of the Honble Supreme Court as also some of the observations of some High Courts. ( 15 ) IN view of the aforesaid discussions, the writ petition fails and is summarily dismissed. ( 16 ) BEFORE the judgment was concluded Sri Anand Mohan made an application for being impleaded as opposite party in this writ petition. Since the arguments were already heard and the Court is rejecting the writ petition, there is no need to pass any order on the intervention application. It may be filed. Petition dismissed.